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of structural failures of the market economy. However, the unraveling of New Deal liberalism throughout the
1940s and 1950s shifted ideological understandings of problems like unemployment, poverty and racial
inequality to explanations focused on individual deficiencies. This development had dramatic consequences
for federal education policy. Buttressed by a coalition of civil rights groups and educational organizations
pushing for federal involvement in education, Democratic policymakers turned towards education as a
cheaper and more effective replacement to earlier redistributive taxation and full employment policies. The
success of this coalition in passing the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act meant that the
institutions of the federal education state were designed with an eye towards solving poverty, unemployment,
and racial inequality. This left public schools vulnerable to political attack as these social problems failed to
disappear. By the end of the 1960s, Democratic politicians and civil rights groups began to call for greater
accountability and punishment for schools that failed to live up to expectations. This critical view was
eventually adopted by Republicans and conservative interest groups, who pushed for the introduction of
market forces in public education as a necessary corrective. These earlier developments explain why punitive
sanctions became the cornerstone of federal education policy, with particularly negative consequences for
racial minorities and poor communities.
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ABSTRACT 
SUPPLY-SIDE EDUCATION: RACE, INEQUALITY, AND THE RISE OF THE 
PUNITIVE EDUCATION STATE 
Daniel Stephen Moak 
Marie Gottschalk  
Adolph Reed 
The 1930s were dominated by an understanding that unemployment and inequality were 
primarily the result of structural failures of the market economy.  However, the 
unraveling of New Deal liberalism throughout the 1940s and 1950s shifted ideological 
understandings of problems like unemployment, poverty and racial inequality to 
explanations focused on individual deficiencies.  This development had dramatic 
consequences for federal education policy.  Buttressed by a coalition of civil rights 
groups and educational organizations pushing for federal involvement in education, 
Democratic policymakers turned towards education as a cheaper and more effective 
replacement to earlier redistributive taxation and full employment policies.  The success 
of this coalition in passing the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act meant that 
the institutions of the federal education state were designed with an eye towards solving 
poverty, unemployment, and racial inequality.  This left public schools vulnerable to 
political attack as these social problems failed to disappear.  By the end of the 1960s, 
Democratic politicians and civil rights groups began to call for greater accountability and 
!iv
punishment for schools that failed to live up to expectations.  This critical view was 
eventually adopted by Republicans and conservative interest groups, who pushed for the 
introduction of market forces in public education as a necessary corrective.   These earlier 
developments explain why punitive sanctions became the cornerstone of federal 
education policy, with particularly negative consequences for racial minorities and poor 
communities.  
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Chapter One 
The Politics of the Federal Education State: Faith in Education and the Turn 
Towards Punitiveness 
 The belief that education holds the key to individual success, social mobility and 
national competitiveness has driven the construction of an expansive and increasingly 
punitive federal education state committed to addressing broad social problems through 
the public education system.  This project traces the origins and contours of federal 
primary and secondary education policy and institutions since the 1930s.  My central 
claim is that federal policymakers built an education order in which faith in education as 
a solution to poverty, unemployment, and racial disparities led to the development of an 
increasingly punitive education state. Those on the left concerned with inequality, 
unemployment and the status of racial minorities—but ultimately unwilling to 
fundamentally challenge the economic system—looked to education as the most effective 
way to solve these problems.  By adopting an understanding of these problems as best 
addressed at the individual rather than the structural level, these actors turned to 
education as an alternative to more direct economic redistribution or federal intervention 
in the labor market.  Most accounts of the modern education state focus on the 1980s and 
the Reagan revolution as the origin of a punitive shift away from an egalitarian 
orientation in federal education policy.  Examination of the ideological and political 
compromises of the 1940s and 1950s and the initial construction of federal educational 
institutions in the 1960s reveals that the roots of modern punitive education polices run 
much deeper. 
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 The presence of a powerful and punitive federal education state is surprising when 
looking to the not-too-distant past.  In the 1930s, the national discussion of education was 
dominated by a powerful coalition of educational progressives and civil rights activists 
during the Great Depression that advocated for public educational institutions and a 
pedagogy centered on transforming the existing capitalist economic order with the aim of 
greater equality through economic redistribution and full employment. With several 
academic journals as outlets, this coalition included prominent educators and black 
intellectuals and received support from many of the most powerful civil rights and 
educational organizations throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s.  However, a changing 
international context and domestic political situation that shifted decidedly to the right 
and was increasingly less tolerant of challenges to the economic order in the post-WWII 
era gave rise to a different dominant coalition and understanding of education.  Unlike the 
previous coalition that pointed to macroeconomic causes and solutions to inequality and 
poverty, the new educational coalition framed education as a particularly effective means 
of addressing poverty, unemployment, and racial disparity.   This emergent education 
ideology, committed to equality of educational opportunity in order to fairly and 
effectively incorporate individuals into a free market economy, was fully institutionalized 
into the federal education state with the passage of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA) in 1965.  
!2
 The ideological developments of the 1930s through 1950s and the 
institutionalization of these ideas in the ESEA mark the beginning of a new, liberal 
incorporationist education order.    
This new order was liberal in its commitment to extend to all the liberal democratic ideal 
of equality of opportunity through education.  Furthermore, this commitment to equality 
of opportunity was to be backed by a robust commitment of the federal government.  The 
order was incorporationist in its goal of bringing all citizens, particularly racial 
minorities and other previously disadvantaged groups, into the broader existing economic 
and social structures.  For racial minorities, incorporation implied integration and 
educational opportunity in order to ensure they would be able to compete on equitable 
terms with their white counterparts.  Incorporation implied the elimination of arbitrary 
barriers —like race or economic condition— to success, adjusting individuals to succeed 
in the established societal structures. For many it also implied assimilation into the 
dominant cultural norms and expectations of the middle and upper classes.  Importantly, 
incorporation implied that the broader existing economic and social structure would 
remain intact.  Since the 1960s, this commitment to liberal incorporation has been the 
dominant educational order, what Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek refer to as “the 
constellation of rules, institutions, practices, and ideas that hang together over time.”  1
 The liberal incorporationist education order, tracing its ideological roots to the 
debates of the 1940s and 1950s, has structured federal education policy ever since the 
 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development, (New York: 1
Cambridge University Press, 2004): 14.
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passage of the ESEA in 1965.  The liberal incorporationist order justified an expansive 
federal commitment in the realm of education.  It also led to demands that schools be 
held accountable for addressing poverty, unemployment and racial inequality.  These 
lofty expectations meant that funding was attached to increasingly harsh measures to 
ensure accountability.  The measures have punitive consequences for teachers, students, 
and schools.  Teachers who fail to raise test scores face loss of pay and firing; students 
who fail to meet sufficient scores on standardized exit exams face denial of high-school 
diplomas; and schools that fail to achieve benchmarks on face transformation into a 
charter school, privatization, or closure.  The educational commitments established 
during the New Deal and Great Society have driven the rise in increasingly punitive 
education policies.     
 While many scholars have noted the neoliberal turn in governance of education 
and social policy more broadly, the change has typically been described as a conservative 
reaction to the excesses of the progressivism of the New Deal and Great Society 
programs.  However, my study of the first forays of the federal government into the realm 
of education policy at the height of the Great Society, as well as an understanding of the 
debates among educational professionals that occurred in the 1930s and 1940s, 
complicates this account.  The justification for, and crafting of, the ESEA positioned 
education as a poverty and unemployment program, and relied on an understanding that 
education policy should ultimately support and strengthen existing competitive economic 
structures by making them more fair and efficient through providing equal opportunity.  
!4
In an important shift, the liberal incorporationists positioned poverty, unemployment, and 
wage disparity as fundamentally individual failings rather than the result of 
fundamentally flawed economic system.  As the federal role was justified in new 
ideological terms, public funding of education did in fact increase, but it did so at the 
expense of undermining the ideological justification for more direct means of addressing 
poverty, unemployment and inequality.  Furthermore, this ideological understanding of 
education had profound consequences for federal education policy, as it supported the 
construction of a powerful federal education state that, abetted by the rise of the Reagan 
coalition, would increasingly shift towards punitive policies as the education system 
failed to meet the lofty goals set by the liberal incorporationist order. 
Overview of Argument 
 My account begins with the debate over the purpose of education during the Great 
Depression.  Beginning in the early 1930s, a group of progressive educators known as the 
social reconstructionists articulated a vision of education and the public school system as 
the handmaiden of economic transformation.  Led by George Counts and his best selling 
1932 pamphlet Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?,  the social 2
reconstructionists were highly critical of the excessive individualism, exploitation, and 
widespread poverty that characterized the existing economic order.  The inclusion of John 
Dewey and Harold Rugg, among others, meant that this group included many of the most 
prominent education leaders of the era.  The social reconstructionists advocated for a new 
 George S. Counts, Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order? (New York: John Day, 1932).2
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educational outlook in which teachers in the public schools would be the vanguard of 
social transformation away from an exploitative economic system.   
 As the social reconstructionists were pushing for changes to the economic 
structure in the 1930s and early 1940s, a group of black intellectuals was urging civil 
rights groups to shift their focus to an economic analysis of the problems facing blacks in 
the United States.  Some of the most influential black leaders of the era, including Ralph 
Bunche, A. Phillip Randolph, and Doxey Wilkerson, comprised this group.  These 
authors cautioned that the existing strategic course had placed too much emphasis on the 
racial aspect of problems like poverty and unemployment.  They pushed for an analysis 
that placed the origins of these problems squarely as a result of an exploitative economic 
system.  This group was committed to a vision of economic democracy, in which the 
education system would educate students on the importance of interracial class 
consciousness, the necessity of unionization, and need for government-supported full 
employment. 
 Remarkably, these economic progressive visions of education’s purpose were 
some of the most prominent views expressed throughout the 1930s and into the early 
1940s.  Both the social reconstructionists and economic democrats offered an 
understanding of education that stressed the need to ground education policy and aims in 
a strong commitment to economic equality as a critical aspect of democratic citizenship.  
Ultimately, since these groups traced the responsibility for unemployment, poverty and 
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racial inequality to the economic system, any educational program that hoped to address 
these problems would have to take aim at the economic system itself. 
 Despite their prevalence, these economic analyses always sat uneasily with many 
on the political left who were less comfortable directly challenging the economic system.  
Influential intellectual leaders including Charles S. Johnson (sociologist and editor of the 
National Urban League’s journal Opportunity), Howard Hale Long (associate 
superintendent of the public schools in Washington, D.C.), and prominent psychologist 
Kenneth Clark directly challenged the wisdom of pursuing a political agenda centered on 
economic claims.  Throughout the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, a fierce debate played out 
among those on the left over how far to push the challenge to the existing order.  Within 
the progressive education movement, the social reconstructionist position competed with 
the position offered by the social efficiency progressives.  Although both fell under the 
broad banner of the progressive education movement, they differed considerably in 
respect to their end goals and pedagogy.  Social efficiency progressives were committed 
to developing the educational tools that would most efficiently aid the adjustment of the 
individual into the existing economic and social structures.  These educators pushed for 
the implementation of educational tools like intelligence and achievement testing, student 
tracking and vocational training to aid in the creation of a meritocratic society.  
Importantly, the social efficiency progressives saw the appropriate role of education as 
facilitating the entrance of students into the existing economic and social structure by 
providing the appropriate skills necessary to succeed in the labor market. 
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 A similar divide characterized thinking about black education, as several 
prominent black intellectuals who were uncomfortable with the more radical claims of 
the economic democrats, called instead for a program of racial democracy.  This group 
sought fair incorporation into the existing order, or for blacks to be treated “like everyone 
else,” rather than broad transformation of the economy.   Instead of  capitalism, these 3
authors identified racial prejudice and cultural problems among lower-class blacks as 
foundational to disparate levels of black poverty, unemployment and other social 
inequalities.   The educational perspective of these racial democrats was centered around 4
preparing black students for fair competition with their white counterparts through 
programs aimed at combating white prejudice, facilitating cultural assimilation or 
acculturation, and ensuring the equitable provision of educational opportunity.  These 
scholars saw public education as one of the most effective means of addressing the most 
pressing problems facing the black community including poverty, unemployment and 
racial inequality. 
 A number of important political developments in the 1940s and 1950s help 
explain why the racial democracy and social efficiency visions of education became 
dominant.  The shifting international context at the end of the WWII meant that the 
federal government was particularly concerned about domestic racial politics.  Facing the 
need to appeal to a number of non-white nations, the federal government increasingly 
 L. D. Reddick, “What Should the American Negro Reasonably Expect as the Outcome of a Real Peace?” 3
The Journal of Negro Education (Summer, 1943), 569.
 Indeed, many of these authors openly embraced a capitalist economy as essential to protecting individual 4
freedom.  
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embraced integration and racial democracy as a means of demonstrating the appeal of the 
economic and political system of the United States.   At the same time, federal courts 5
became increasingly sympathetic to challenges to Jim Crow under the Equal Protection 
Clause.  In the critical 1954 Brown case, the Supreme Court based its decision on the 
psychological harm (rather than material) harm that segregation posed to black children, 
an argument that emerged from scholars committed to racial democracy.  The judiciary’s 
increasing willingness to accept equal protection arguments strengthened the hand of 
racial democrats.   6
 Another critical factor in the demise of the economic coalition was the brutal 
political repression of many of the most vocal supporters of social reconstruction and 
economic democracy during the Second Red Scare.  As several scholars have noted, the 
loyalty investigations of the 1940s and 1950s had a chilling effect on individuals and 
coalitions on the political left.   The investigation of prominent intellectuals on the left 7
like George Counts, Harold Rugg, and Doxey Wilkerson by state and national 
government officials had serious consequences for the ability of economic progressives to 
 See Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: 5
Princeton University Press, 2011); Phillip A. Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The 
Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
 See Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); 6
Leah N. Gordon, From Power to Prejudice: The Rise of Racial Individualism in Midcentury America 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Lani Guinier, “From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: 
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma,” The Journal of American History 91, 
no. 1 (June 1, 2004).
 See Landon R. Y. Storrs, The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left (Princeton: 7
Princeton University Press, 2012); Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America, 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1998): Andrew Hartman, Education and the Cold War: The Battle for 
the American School (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
!9
maintain social networks or organize politically.  Indeed, under the threat of loyalty 
investigations, many openly rejected or substantially modified their earlier positions.   
Finally, the shifting macroeconomic position of federal policymakers in the 1940s created 
an environment that was much more amenable to the vision of education put forth by the 
social efficiency progressives and racial democrats.  Moving away from a firm 
commitment to full employment, policy actors increasingly supported a commercial 
Keynesianism that privileged concerns about inflation and pursued tax cuts as the most 
effective means of economic management.  Unlike their New Deal predecessors who 
argued unemployment was in large part the result of fundamental flaws in a market 
economy, commercial Keynesians shifted explanatory focus to the individual, arguing 
that unemployment was largely the result of marginal workers failing to keep up with 
skill demands of the changing labor market.     8
 Changes in the international context, court doctrines, political repression and 
macroeconomic policy beliefs created a political situation in which the collective 
understanding of the purpose of the public education system shifted away from the 
economic progressive understandings that dominated the 1930s and 1940s.  These 
political developments created the conditions that led to the establishment of a liberal 
incorporationist order in education.  A broad coalition united by a commitment to 
providing equality of educational opportunity in a free market economic system 
 See Robert M. Collins, The Business Response to Keynes, 1929-1964 (New York: Columbia University 8
Press, 1982); Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: America’s Enduring Confrontation with Poverty 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): Gary Mucciaroni, The Political Failure of Employment Policy, 
1945-1982 (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1991); Margaret Weir, Politics and Jobs: The 
Boundaries of Employment Policy in the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
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supported this new liberal incorporationist education order.  Racial democrats, pushing 
for fair incorporation into the existing economic and social structures, argued that such a 
commitment was necessary to address the undemocratic relegation of blacks to inferior 
status simply because of skin color.  Social efficiency progressives, commercial 
Keynesians, and conservative economists backed this commitment to equitable 
educational opportunity as the most efficient way of ensuring individual success in the 
labor market, and of effectively using national human resources.  They positioned 
education as the best policy tool available to address the problems of poverty, 
unemployment, and racial disparity.  Additionally, by the 1960s, as it became clear that 
the liberal incorporationist ideology was better able able to accommodate the changing 
political environment, many prominent supporters of economic democracy shifted their 
positions to align more closely with that of liberal incorporation.  Among this group were 
George Counts, Ralph Bunche, Abram Harris, who all significantly modified or rejected 
their previous support of economic democracy.   The education policy proposals that 9
 Not everyone abandoned the economic democracy position.  Several authors and public servants 9
continued to maintain this position well into the 1960s.  For example Willard Wirtz, President Lyndon 
Johnson’s Secretary of Labor, Leon Keyserling, former head of the Council of Economic Advisors under 
President Harry Truman, and Bayard Rustin, a lead organizer of the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs 
and Freedom, offered spirited but unsuccessful advocacy of full employment and aggressive public job 
creation as the most effective poverty program during Johnson’s administration.  The shifting political 
context and shifting positions of many previous supporters meant that these holdouts were were 
increasingly marginalized and their effect on federal education policy was minimal.  As labor historian 
Judith Stein argues more generally, the economic crises of 1970s saw the last gasps of those advocating for 
broad structural reform, as the federal government turned to supply-side solutions instead.  See Judith 
Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2010); Judith Russell, Economics, Bureaucracy, and Race: How Keynesians 
Misguided the War on Poverty (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Leon Keyserling, “Economic 
Progress and the Great Society” in The Great Society Reader: The Failure of American Liberalism, eds. 
Marvin E. Gettleman and David Mermelstein (New York: Random House, 1967), 85-96; Bayard Rustin, 
“From Protest to Politics” in The Great Society Reader: The Failure of American Liberalism, eds. Marvin 
E. Gettleman and David Mermelstein (New York: Random House, 1967), 261-277. 
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emerged were committed to facilitating incorporation into the existing economic and 
social structures, rather than challenging them.   
 Importantly, this understanding of education guided the construction of the federal 
education state.  The interpretation of poverty, unemployment, and racial disparity as 
attributable to individual deficiencies in skill or culture helped build a coalition of 
policymakers committed to addressing these problems through an expansive federal 
education state.  The liberal incorporationist framing of education as a solution to 
poverty, racial disparity and unemployment provided a powerful vehicle for the 
establishment of the first major federal intervention into the realm of primary and 
secondary education policy, the 1965 ESEA.  Indeed, it was this ideological framing that 
proved especially effective at neutralizing and overcoming much of the fierce and 
longstanding legislative opposition to an expansive federal role in education. 
 In addition to the providing the justification for the ESEA, the liberal 
incorporationist understanding of education shaped the particular education policies that 
emerged. 
In his message to Congress urging passage of the ESEA, President Lyndon Johnson 
underlined its importance by arguing, “with education, instead of being condemned to 
poverty and idleness, young Americans can learn the skills to find a job and provide for a 
family.”   This interpretation of the origins of poverty, unemployment and racial 10
disparity drove the institutional structure of the ESEA, which was centered around 
 Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, “Report on Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 10
1965” (Washington, D.C.: United States Senate, April 6, 1965): 3
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providing compensatory funds for schools with high numbers of disadvantaged students.  
The decision to invest heavily in education was a clear indication of the move away from 
more directly interventionist approaches to address these problems, as policymakers 
sought to attack the hypothesized individual causes of poverty and unemployment rather 
than pursue broad macroeconomic solutions such as a full employment through public-
sector job guarantees, aggressively redistributive taxation, and a robust social safety net. 
 Passage of the ESEA represented institutionalization at the federal level of the 
liberal incorporationist ideology that had emerged from earlier debates over the purpose 
of education.   The institutionalization of this ideology marks a significant moment for 
the development of accountability policies in education.  The understanding of education 
as the central mechanism for overcoming poverty and unemployment also drove many 
policymakers and scholars to criticize public schools and teachers as responsible for these 
problems and to demand strict accountability for federal funds distributed by the ESEA.  
Senator Robert Kennedy (D-NY), Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel, 
psychologist Kenneth Clark and other liberal incorporationists led the charge in the 1960s 
for extensive evaluation and reporting requirements, and pointed to standardized tests as 
the best means of evaluating program success.   The belief that the equalization of 11
educational opportunity would help eliminate poverty, unemployment and racial 
disparities drove these policies.   
 See Kenneth Bancroft Clark, Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); 11
Harlem Youth Opportunities, Inc,  Youth in the Ghetto: A Study of the Consequences of Powerlessness and 
a Blueprint for Change (New York: HARYOU, 1964); Samuel Halperin, “ESEA Ten Years Later,” 
Educational Researcher, January 1975.
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 Notably, the ESEA and subsequent federal education policies did substantially 
increase federal funding of public schools, addressed some of the most egregious funding 
inequities in the education system, and facilitated partial desegregation.  However, it is is 
important to recognize that many of these same policies pushed the federal education 
state in a punitive direction.  Despite evidence that schools had limited, if any, capability 
to substantially raise student test scores, federal funding was attached to requirements 
that demanded that schools demonstrate that the money was being put to good use, which 
most often meant an ability to show an increase in student test scores.  As the association 
between effective use of federal money and test scores tightened in the mind of 
policymakers, students, teachers, and schools were increasingly subjected to policies that 
punished for failing to live up to expectations.  As the liberal incorporationist order 
triggered broad support for federal involvement in education, it also triggered demands 
for accountability due to suspicion of the role existing educational institutions had played 
in perpetuating social problems. 
 The liberal incorporationist terms on which the ESEA was established has framed 
and structured subsequent developments.  As federal investment in education failed to 
show the lofty results predicted by the liberal incorporationists, federal policies grew 
increasingly punitive.  Early reports indicating educational programs targeted towards the 
poor had little to no effect on educational outcomes prompted swift reaction from 
Congressional actors.  Disappointed policymakers pushed passed a number of 
amendments in the 1960s and 1970s that increased evaluation and reporting requirements 
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for ESEA programs and strengthened the reliance on standardized achievement tests as 
the best evaluation metric.  Additionally, these amendments mandated strict sanctions 
against states and schools systems that failed to meet expectations and increased funds 
for the enforcement activity of federal agencies in charge of oversight. 
 While segments of the Republican Party provided some of the fiercest opposition 
to the liberal incorporationist order, this opposition mostly centered on the 
appropriateness of a federal role, not over the understanding of education that it implied.  
By the mid-1980s with the ESEA firmly established, and on the heels of the explosive 
federal report A Nation At Risk, warning of the national peril posed by a failing public 
education system, much of the Republican opposition to federal involvement had 
dissipated.  But the Republican embrace of the liberal incorporationist order also opened 
avenues for the party to craft educational policies that aligned closer to its ideology.  As 
Robert Collins has noted, a given ideological commitment like liberal incorporation in 
education, “offe[rs] policy formulations which diffe[r] significantly in their ideological, 
political, and economic potentials.”   In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Republican 12
policymakers, national business organizations, and a number of civil rights groups voiced 
increasing concern over the fact that public schools had failed to raise standardized test 
scores and eliminate racial disparities on these tests.  This concern, coupled with the 
persistence of poverty and perception of a workforce unprepared for changing globalized 
 Collins, The Business Response to Keynes, 10.12
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economy, led these groups to push for the introduction of market incentives to increase 
accountability in the public school system.   
 Policies like high stakes standardized tests, merit-based teacher pay, mass closings 
of schools or firings of teachers deemed underperforming, and the expansion of charter 
and private options in schooling became solutions to a system in crisis.  Crucially, all of 
these policies are consistent with the liberal incorporationist understanding of the purpose 
of education.  These policies were predominantly promoted by the federal government 
through legislation like the Improving America’s Schools Act under President Bill 
Clinton, the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act under President George W. Bush era, and 
the Race to the The Top (RTT) initiative under President Barack Obama.  This list of 
legislation indicates the consolidation of bipartisan consensus around the a punitive 
education state committed to the introduction of market incentives in public education.. 
 The introduction of market incentives and punitive education policies has not 
undermined the liberal incorporationist education order.  In fact, these reforms are the 
result of a constant source of tension embedded within the liberal incorporationist order.  
The vision of education as a solution to poverty, unemployment, and racial disparity 
meant that the continued existence of these problems spurred continuous calls for 
education reform.  Debates over the benefits of charter or private schools or strict 
sanctions have all centered on how best to achieve liberal incorporationist goals.  Recent 
shifts towards punitive accountability and school choice policies are driven by the belief 
that if schools are effective in raising test scores and reducing racial disparities on these 
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achievement metrics, it will  ultimately lead to a reduction in poverty, unemployment, 
and racial inequality.   And as earlier, the willingness to fund the buildup of an 
increasingly punitive education state corresponds with a rejection of interventionist 
macro-economic policies to address these problems more directly.  Critically, the 
increasing use of privatization, high-stakes testing, and mass firings of public school 
teachers do not represent a challenge to the liberal incorporationist order established 
during the Great Society, but are rather an increasingly destructive extension of the 
institutional and ideological commitments it established. 
Rethinking the Origins of the Federal Education State 
 The effects of the punitive accountability turn in education policy have been a 
major focus of education researchers, particularly in the wake of NCLB and RTT.  While 
these reforms have been promoted as solutions to an inequitable and deficient education 
system, several scholars have found that these reforms have had distinctly negative 
consequences for students, teachers, and the public education more broadly.  Researchers 
have found evidence that the high-stakes tests and punitive turnaround strategies for 
failing schools such as transformation into charters, merit pay for teachers, privatization, 
and school closure required by NCLB and RTT have had numerous and severe 
unintended consequences.  In the classroom, studies have suggested that these reforms 
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have narrowed the curriculum,  caused teachers to focus on borderline or “bubble” 13
students most likely to increase their test scores,  led to deceitful reclassification or 14
expulsion of low performing students as a means raising test averages,  increased 15
teacher turnover and decreased teacher satisfaction,  and increase in student dropout 16
rates.   Scholars have also found that these negative consequences disproportionally 17
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affect the poor, racial minorities, and urban communities.   These negative consequences 18
and their inequitable distribution have led to serious concerns that the current educational 
policy landscape has hobbled the democratic responsiveness and purpose of public 
education.  19
 As evidence of the negative consequences of recent educational reforms has 
become widespread, scholars from several disciplines have sought to explain the origins 
of these policies.  Though otherwise very valuable, many of the most influential recent 
accounts fail to recognize the deeper roots and the key turning points in the development 
of modern educational politics just sketched.  While some scholars suggest that the 
ideological roots trace for current reforms stretch back the late 1970s,  education 20
professor Ann Winfield reflects a broad consensus in claiming, “the historical dividing 
line that marks the starting point for the present era, few would argue, is the election of 
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Ronald Reagan.”   According to these accounts, the “conservative restoration” brought 21
to power a broad coalition of groups opposed to opposed to egalitarian Great Society 
education policy.  This coalition composed of religious conservatives seeking greater 
funding for religious schools and a greater religious emphasis in the public classroom,  22
neoconservatives concerned about declining test scores and a decaying national culture,  23
and neoliberal and corporate interests seeking to introduce market forces in public 
education are pointed to as the the progenitors of the current constellation of punitive 
education policies.  24
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 Several existing accounts point to the inflammatory 1983 Nation at Risk report 
and the 1988 ESEA reauthorization as critical moments in the reorientation of the federal 
education state.   As fears of a loss of national standing and decreased social mobility 25
drove public dissatisfaction with public education, this coalition successfully pushed for 
reforms that centered on holding schools accountable.  The changes initiated by the 
political right were solidified in the 1990s as members of the Democratic Party 
recognized the need to adjust their stance as Republican efforts gained traction with 
voters. This shift accelerated as it became clear that the many of the educational policies 
advocated by Republican Party appealed to many  racial minority and urban families, 
constituencies that were traditionally Democratic.   Since the passage of the NCLB in 26
2001, Democrats and Republicans have been united in pressing for market-based reforms 
as a means of improving education.  Importantly, this bipartisan consensus on the 
appropriate role and policies of the modern federal education state is positioned as having 
its foundations in the “watershed of a new economic and political world order” ushered in 
by Reagan Revolution.  27
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 Like the scholarship emerging from other disciplines, much of the recent political 
science scholarship on the development of the federal education state maps a distinct shift 
in the 1980s from a progressive focus on educational equality to policies promoting 
excellence through standards and accountability.   Political scientists Patrick McGuinn, 28
Paul Manna, and Jesse Rhodes all characterize the early federal education state 
established in the 1960s as an equity regime focused on targeting funds to disadvantaged 
students.  These authors all point to the 1980s as a moment of a paradigm shift in 
education, when excellence replaced equity as the guiding principle of the federal 
education state, ushering in policies designed to raise the educational achievement of all 
students through standards, accountability, and standardized testing.  29
 It should be clear that from the perspective defended here, the ideological change 
and periodization stressed by the equity to excellence account is at best overstated, 
because it severely neglects crucial contributors to these developments.  It fails to offer an 
explanation for the fact that demands for accountability for failing schools, and policies 
like sanctions and annual testing designed to ensure laggards were held accountable, were 
embedded in the original construction of the federal education state in 1965.  The most 
vocal supporters of accountability policies in federal education came predominantly from 
the political left and minority groups in the 1960s and 1970s.  To fully grasp this 
development requires an understanding of the how the ideological cleavages and battles 
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of the 1940s and 1950s resulted in the construction of a federal education state centered 
around holding schools responsible for solving poverty, racial disparity and 
unemployment.  Accountability politics and policies were firmly established in the 
federal education state well before the 1980s.    Pointing to the 1980s as the origins of 
this movement masks the considerable ideological continuity between the 1960s and 
1980s in federal education policy.   The accountability turn in education policy emerged 30
from the ideological battles of the 1940s and 1950s and was firmly institutionalized in the 
Great Society expansion of the federal education state.  
 This accounts adds to a growing literature that argues that the political 
compromises and state-building activities of the New Deal and Great Society eras were 
critical to facilitating the neoliberal turn in social policy.   Analysis of the scholarship 31
that traces this dynamic in the welfare state suggests that looking to these eras is critical 
in understanding the modern education order. Marie Gottschalk demonstrates how the 
political context and strategic decisions in the 1940s and 1950s tied the labor movement 
in the United States to support of job-based health benefits and the private welfare state 
model, a political settlement that proved to be a substantial barrier to the development of 
universal insurance over the long run.   Similarly, in their examination of development 32
 This is not to say that there is no difference between the 1960s and 1980s, there are important 30
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of Medicare, Morgan and Campbell show how a coalition of southern Democrats and 
conservative Republicans turned to a “delegated welfare state” model of private, state, 
and local operation as a means of state-building in the post-WWII context that was no 
longer supportive of broad expansion of the federal welfare state.  Although this was 
politically expedient in the 1960s, this institutional structure hampered effectiveness and 
exposed the program to political attacks and market-based reforms as the political 
environment shifted.   Detailing the transition from welfare to workfare, Eva Bertram 33
demonstrates that the foundations of the punitive workfare state were laid in the 1960s by 
powerful southern Democrats in Congress.   Margaret Weir argues that the possibility for 34
robust public employment programs was undercut by the War on Poverty which 
constructed policies based on an understanding that attributed poverty to individual 
attributes rather than larger structural forces.   An examination of ideological debates of 35
the 1930s through the 1950s, and the state-building activities of the Great Society is key 
in understanding the origins of the punitive accountability education policies that 
characterize the current era. 
 In surveying the deeper origins of current policies and institutions, scholars of 
American political development have argued that the role of race looms large in 
explaining the peculiarities of the American social welfare state.  This scholarship, which 
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focuses on the ways in which race has shaped the institutional structure of the welfare 
state, suggests the need for close attention to the role of racial hierarchies in shaping the 
development of the education state.  In his examination of New Deal social welfare 
policy, Robert Lieberman argues that “race inhibited the development of a strong, unitary, 
centralized welfare state in the United States,” as the desire to maintain racial hierarchies 
drove policymakers to develop a decentralized, non-contributory social welfare programs 
designed to push blacks to the margins of the welfare state.   Similarly, Judith Russell 36
argues “institutional racism” shifted the approach of the War on Poverty to a service 
delivery model of largely ineffectual programs, despite the overwhelming preference of 
black leaders that the federal government focus on jobs and employment issues.  Russell 
suggests the refusal of federal officials to acknowledge the demands of the black 
community limited the programs that emerged from the Great Society.   In her study of 37
the federal penal state, Naomi Murakawa demonstrates how the state-building activities 
of racial liberals in the 1940s through 1960s combined with conservative hardliners to 
build a more “fair” penal system, but one that was capable of locking up significantly 
more citizens, especially poorer non-white citizens.   Finally, Lani Guinier has noted that 38
the legal strategy of the racial liberals pursuing desegregation through the courts in the 
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!25
1950s limited the direction of subsequent social policy by reframing the structural origins 
of racism as a problem of individual psychology.    39
 In addition to shaping the institutional structure of the welfare state, scholars from 
a wide array of disciplines have shown how racial ideology has shaped the political 
demands and agendas of individuals and coalitions, particularly of those of black 
Americans.  The important political and policy consequences of developments in racial 
ideology points to the need for an examination of the role of race in structuring the 
ideological contours of the educational order.  Several scholars have demonstrated how 
the embrace of particular racial ideologies had important consequences for the political 
demands of black Americans.  In his study of tracing the marginalization of class-based 
accounts of racial oppression among prominent black intellectuals in the 1920s through 
the 1940s, historian Jonathan Holloway demonstrates the way in which “people have 
used ‘race’ to constrain the possibilities of radical politics and social science thinking.”   40
Touré Reed demonstrates how the Urban League’s embrace of assimilationist theories 
emerging from the social sciences led to a racial uplift agenda that focused on changing 
individual behavior rather than structural transformation as the best means of addressing 
racial and economic inequality.   Similarly, historian Leah Gordon demonstrates how the 41
post-WWII retreat from New Deal economic liberalism and the rise in antidiscrimination 
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and antiprejudice policies were facilitated by federal and foundation support of social 
science that identified prejudice and attitudes, rather than labor exploitation and class 
struggle, as the source of racial oppression.    42
 Adolph Reed, Robert Korstad, Nelson Lichtenstein, and Risa Goluboff have 
shown how these developments in the understanding of race facilitated a shift in black 
political demands from a focus on union organizing and redistributive economic demands 
in the 1930s and 1940s to a politics centered on legal administrative demands for equal 
inclusion into existing social structures by the 1960s.   In his examination of housing 43
policy in Chicago, Preston Smith demonstrates how the post-WWII adoption of “racial 
liberalism” by black elites legitimized their claim to leadership and help consolidate a 
liberal politics that limited political demands to “equal treatment in the marketplace.”   44
Smith traces the class-inflected nature of this politics, showing how black elites targeted 
racial segregation reform while accepting the class-segmented housing arrangements 
promoted by pro-growth white business and political elites.  Tracking the consequences 
of these settlements for the current political landscape, Lester Spence examines the 
neoliberal turn in black politics over the past few decades.  Spence argues that the 
“neoliberalization of black politics” replaced political organization and mobilization with 
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a politics “in which racial inequality is managed through black elite-promoted techniques 
designed to get black people to act according to market principles.”    45
 Close attention to the ideological and institutional structuring of race in American 
political development helps illuminate why certain ideologies, coalitions and institutions 
gained prominence and how they continue to shape the educational landscape.  The 
debates and developments in the ideological understanding of race and racial inequality 
in the 1930s through the 1950s were central to building the educational coalition and 
politics that proved integral in the push to build a federal education state.  As this 
coalition succeeded in institutionalizing their demands with the 1965 ESEA, the 
expectation that public education would eliminate broader racial disparities significantly 
affected the structure of the educational programs and policies that emerged.  The 
consequences of these early debates and institutional developments shaped by race 
continue to reverberate in the educational order today. 
 One of the greatest strengths of these works has been the incorporation of ideas, 
coalitions, and institutions in a comprehensive account of political development.  Rogers 
Smith notes the importance of analytical approaches that include both ideas and 
institutions in explanations of political change.  Smith argues that ideas are crucial 
“constitutive elements” of political order, but that accounts of political development must 
also include the institutional focus as “[i]deas can produce political change only when 
 Lester K. Spence, “The Neoliberal Turn in Black Politics,” Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, 45
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particular, identifiable political institutions, groups, and actors advance them.”   This 46
project will trace the political development along what Smith refers to as the “spiral of 
politics.”   Smith suggests a model of general political development in which ideas are 47
essential constitutive elements in constructing coalitions that press for institutional 
change, which ultimately change the political context.  Smith’s argument is one that 
highlights the importance of ideas, as “coalitions, institutions, and the policies they 
eventually produce are all constituted in significant measures by the ideas that define the 
shared purposes of the coalitions and the aims of the governing officials who create 
institutions or seek to turn existing ones to their ends.”  48
 The shortcomings of existing accounts tracing the development of the education 
state suggest the value of this type of APD approach.  The close focus on the growth of 
the federal role in education has obscured the ideological continuity guiding its 
development for the last fifty years.  An examination of the ideas that shaped, and 
continue to shape, the institutional development of the federal education state is a critical 
component in understanding the educational order.   In addition to the ideological focus, 
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understanding the current landscape requires an investigation of the individuals, 
coalitions, and institutions enlisted in supporting one idea over another, which ultimately 
explains why some ideas win and others lose out.  Providing a compelling explanation for 
the current educational order dominated by a pedagogy devoted to holding schools, 
teachers, and students accountable through increasingly punitive means  requires an 
approach that takes ideas, coalitions, and institutions seriously. 
 The 1965 passage of the ESEA represents the institutionalization of a particular 
vision of education that cannot be understood without a comprehension of the 
ideological, institutional, and political battles that paved the way for its passage and 
structured its creation.  The construction and motivation for the ESEA was driven by a 
liberal incorporationist ideological understanding that positioned federal involvement in 
education as necessary for providing equality of opportunity and an essential program for 
addressing poverty, unemployment, and racial disparity.  The dominance of this 
understanding of education during the 1960s represented an ideological and political 
victory for those committed to shoring up the liberal capitalist order.  Throughout much 
of the 1930s and 1940s, a sizable group of academics and educational organizations were 
committed to a much different vision of education.  This coalition advocated for the use 
of schools and education more broadly to end excessive individualism and the 
competitive nature among students, to instill working-class solidarity, and to position 
teachers as the vanguard in the transition to a different economic and social order.  The 
fierce debate was settled as the liberal incorporationist vision ultimately proved better 
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able to accommodate the shifting political context of the nascent Cold War, a resurgent 
business community, and a federal judiciary increasingly sympathetic to claims under the 
Equal Protection Clause.   
 The liberal incorporationist understanding of the purpose of education, and the 
social problems it could and should address drove actors to articulate specific educational 
programs and policies, and create educational institutions that reflected this idea.  The 
justification for the ESEA was built solidly on liberal incorporationist ideas, and these 
ideas shaped the policies of the new federal education state and the means by which these 
polices would be evaluated.  The institutionalization of this vision of education in the 
federal education state had substantial long-term effects as the liberal incorporationist 
ideology has shaped development of education policy for the past fifty years.  
Establishing education as the solution to poverty, unemployment, and racial disparity 
ensured continued dissatisfaction with public education and drove punitive reforms.  
Attention to these ideas and the context in which they originated illuminates why the 
federal education state developed when it did, why federal education institutions took the 
form they did, and why actors advocated for particular educational policies.  In other 
words, an analysis of ideas guiding the federal education state demonstrates “why the 
different components of the political order adhere to it and why its central objectives are 
what they are.”  49
 Smith, “Which Comes First”, 108.49
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 This account of political development in education policy demonstrates that the 
liberal incorporationist ideology was distinct from previous ideological interpretations of 
the role of education and important for the construction of a political coalition that 
pressed for a federal education state and specific educational policies.  This ideology was 
the dominant justification for institutional change represented by the ESEA and continues 
to be the dominant frame for current understandings of the role of education.   The 50
liberal incorporationist order structured and limited subsequent developments in 
education policy and facilitated the rise of punitive policies.  
Chapter Outlines 
 The dissertation begins with a focus on the coalitions that engaged in heated battles 
over the future of education in the United States from the 1930s to the 1960s.  Chapters 2 
through 4 trace the rise and fall of the economic transformational coalition and its 
replacement with a coalition committed to an educational system that did not radically 
challenge existing economic structures.  I show that throughout the 1930s and into the 
1940s, a powerful alliance of educational progressives and civil rights activists advocated 
for an educational pedagogy centered on transforming the existing social structures, with 
the aim of greater equality through economic redistribution.  These educational 
progressives stressed the need to ground education policy and aims in a strong commitment 
to economic equality as a critical aspect of democratic citizenship.   
 This articulation is similar to that of Smith, Political Peoplehood and Timothy Paul Ryan Weaver, 50
Neoliberalism in the Trenches.
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  The development of this economic egalitarian coalition fostered the growth of a 
counter-movement of racial liberals and social efficiency educators seeking a fairer and 
more effective education system within the existing economic framework.  These groups 
ultimately formed a broad coalition united by a commitment to equality of educational 
opportunity in a free market economic system, or what I term a liberal incorporationist 
ideology.  Significantly, the purpose of education that emerged from the battles of this time 
period was strongly connected to human capital and culture of poverty theory.  Liberal 
incorporationists advocated for equality of opportunity for all races within the existing 
economic structure and pushed for the development of standardized testing as means of 
guiding education policy and holding educators accountable.  
 Chapter 2 traces the individuals that made up two distinct coalitions within the 
progressive education movement, mapping the political and policy cleavages between the 
social reconstructionist educational coalition grounded in a critique of the economic system 
and a counter coalition of social efficiency progressives committed to introducing scientific 
educational methods in order to aid the adjustment of individuals into the labor market.  
Chapter 3 outlines a similar divide within black educational thought between an economic 
democracy coalition committed to an educational program that challenged the economic 
order, and a racial democracy coalition that sought to institute educational policies they 
believed would facilitate integration into the existing public institutions and economy.  
Chapter 4 examines how the changing political context of the 1940s and 1950s, and the 
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response by individuals and coalitions to these changing conditions, led to the victory of 
liberal incorporationist ideology in education. 
 Having examined the ideological battles that preceded it, Chapter 5 focuses on the 
construction of the federal education state and the institutionalization of the liberal 
incorporationist order.  Covering the period between 1960 and 1975, this chapter examines 
how the ideological understanding of education that emerged from prior debates structured 
the institutions of the new federal education state, with a particular focus on the role of 
federal policymakers and the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and 
its subsequent amendments.  Chapter 5 traces how liberal incorporationist ideology drove 
policy and institutional construction of the federal education state in the ESEA.  The 
moment when Democrats succeeded in institutionalizing the federal role in education 
policy coincided with a moment of dramatic limitation in the commitment to use federal 
power to intervene in the national economy for redistributive purposes.  This political 
context, coupled with the decisive ideological victory of the liberal incorporationist 
coalition described in earlier chapters meant that much of the programmatic structure that 
emerged from the ESEA established a liberal incorporationist pedagogy and understanding 
of public education’s purpose.  This understanding served as the basis for much of the 
punitive policies of the modern education state.  Rather than stressing the need for 
economic reform, Great Society liberals shifted towards a narrower vision of equality that 
focused on the provision of equitable opportunity to succeed as sufficient for democratic 
legitimacy. 
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 The belief that education was central in overcoming a culture of poverty and 
developing human capital drove the debate over ESEA.  This belief subsequently 
determined the contours of federal programs and policies.  As Democrats backed off earlier 
commitments to full employment and strong federal intervention in the economy, they 
increasingly looked to the public schools as a solution to the problems of poverty and 
unemployment.  The retreat of the Democratic Party from redistributive policies was 
accompanied by increasingly punitive policies in the education state.  From the start, the 
nascent federal education state relied on standardized tests and sanctions as a means of 
holding recipients of federal funds accountable.  Furthermore, it was liberals that were the 
most vehement in calling for these punitive accountability policies.   My account runs 
counter to much existing scholarship, which views the ESEA as a progressive triumph that 
was later shifted towards punitiveness with the reemergence of a powerful conservative 
coalition during the Reagan era.  By ignoring the ideological underpinnings of the ESEA 
and the fundamental ideological continuity of the education state after its passage, scholars 
have failed to grasp the role of the ESEA and Great Society liberals in setting the education 
state on a path towards punitiveness.  
 The concluding chapter briefly traces the emergence of an era of bipartisan 
consensus from the 1970s to the present.  An analysis of the recent developments in the 
federal education policy, such as Improving America’s Schools Act from the Clinton era, 
the No Child Left Behind Act of the Bush era, and the Race to the Top Initiative and Every 
Student Succeeds Act under President Obama, shows that the parties have converged on a 
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common ideological understanding about the purpose and problems of education. Public 
education is seen as broken and the federal government is viewed as the most effective 
driver of badly needed reforms.  Policies like high stakes standardized tests, merit-based 
teacher pay, mass closings of schools deemed underperforming, and the expansion of 
charter and private options in schooling became bipartisan solutions to a system in crisis.  
These policies have had particularly harmful effects on the poorest students and 
communities.  The past twenty years have represented a remarkable period of agreement 
over the purpose of education and the role of the federal government.  Significantly, the 
development of this broad and durable bipartisan coalition pressing for educational reform 
occurred in era that many scholars have characterized as marked by unparalleled 
polarization.  The result is a firmly entrenched federal education state committed to 
punitive accountability policies, with particularly pernicious consequences for the most 
disadvantaged. 
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Chapter Two 
To Reconstruct or Adjust? The Battle within Progressive Education, 1920s-1940s 
Education is an economic issue -- if not ‘the’ economic issue of our time...   
It’s an economic issue when countries that out-educate us today are going to out-compete us 
tomorrow.  For years, we’ve recognized that education is a prerequisite for prosperity.  And yet, 
we’ve tolerated a status quo where America lags behind other nations...   
Meanwhile, when it comes to black students, African American students trail not only almost 
every other developed nation abroad, but they badly trail their white classmates here at home -- 
an achievement gap that is widening the income gap between black and white, between rich and 
poor. 
                -Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on 
Education Reform at the National Urban League Centennial Conference,  July 29, 2010 
 There is agreement today across the political spectrum in the United States around 
the idea that the education system is in crisis, and that educational reforms are key to 
solving myriad social problems.  The above quote from President Obama is indicative of 
the current consensus on the problems and purpose of education.  Both major political 
parties and important interest groups have voiced concerns about the quality of schooling, 
the effectiveness of teachers, the difficulty of the curriculum, the need for more 
accountability, and the comparative effectiveness of the public education system in the 
United States.  Underlying this diagnosis of school deficiency is a remarkable consensus 
about the purpose of the education system.   Elites from across the political spectrum 
promote the idea that the public education system should be centered around imparting 
skills that offer individuals the potential for future success within the existing social and 
economic order.  From the political right, this view of education is defended as the most 
efficient way of ensuring that individual earnings are tied to the skills the individual 
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brings to marketplace, that there is a steady supply of skilled workers for the labor 
market, and as the best means of preserving the nation’s international preeminence.   The 51
political left embraces this understanding out of a belief that an education system ordered 
on these principles provides the best means of economic mobility for the meritorious, and 
provides a path to success even for individuals from traditionally disadvantaged groups.    52
 This current political consensus on education understands the broader economic 
structure as set, and therefore the proper focus of the education system is to ensure that 
all children have an equal shot at success (or failure) in the existing social order.  
Although promoters of this vision of education acknowledge that such a system entails 
winners and losers, the goal is to create an educational system that ensures that winners 
and losers are determined on individual merit, not on the circumstances of birth.  Under 
this view, critiques of the education system have been twofold.  First, critics charge that 
the  system broadly does not effectively prepare students for the demands of the labor 
 The conservative Heritage Foundation recently issued a report on education reform that argued that the 51
nation’s ability to meet “challenges will depend on our economic strength, our ability to innovate, and our 
ability to produce highly skilled workers .   And all of these will depend, in turn, on how well we educate 
our children.” (Dan Lips, Jennifer Marshall, and Lindsey Burke, “A Parent’s Guide to Education 
Reform” (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, September 8, 2008): 11).  The most recent 
Republican Party Platform claimed that education was the surest means of “[m]aintaining America’s 
preeminence” in the global economy.  (Republican Party Platforms: "2012 Republican Party Platform," 
August 27, 2012. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=101961).
 For example, the 2011 annual report from the NAACP claimed, “[e]ducation is the great leveler; it allows 52
the recipient to overcome any circumstances of birth.” (“Affirming America’s Promise: 2011 Annual 
Report” (Baltimore, MD: National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 2011): 16.).  The 
2012 Democratic Party Platform argues that education as “the surest path to the the middle class” for 
individuals, and the NEA recently promised to help “fulfill the purpose” of education by “[p]repar[ing] all 
students to thrive in college, careers, and life.”(Democratic Party Platforms: "2012 Democratic Party 
Platform," September 3, 2012. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
Project http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=101962; National Education Association, “NEA’s 
Message to Members of Congress on the Reauthorization of ESEA,” March 2011, http://www.nea.org/
assets/docs/NEAESEAMessagetoHillMarch2011.pdf).
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market.  Second, the education system faces criticism for providing some groups better 
preparation for future success than others.   
 What is striking about this vision of the purpose and function of education in 
American society is its narrowness.  The role of education is reduced to developing and 
then efficiently and equally distributing the abilities of individuals to compete in the 
existing social and economic order.  If these educational conditions are met, subsequent 
inequalities that arise are viewed as essentially justified.  Absent from this vision of 
education is any notion that it is possible or desirable for the public education system to 
challenge the existing structural order which guarantees that even equitable educational 
opportunity ultimately results in inequality.   In short, the current educational consensus 53
has no broader social vision for challenging the extreme inequities that can result from a 
capitalist economic system. 
 This chapter seeks to explain the emergence and current prominence of this view 
of education.  An examination of the past indicates that this is a relatively recent 
historical development, and that this particular vision was not always the hegemonic 
force in education that it is today.  The Progressive Era in the early decades of the 
twentieth century was characterized by a growing national faith that methods and 
knowledge of the sciences could be harnessed as a means of addressing national concerns 
such as the growth of large corporations and corruption in government.  A group of 
individuals who held similar hope for the promise of science in guiding best practices in 
 Indeed, merit encouraged by unequal rewards is central aspect of the existing system.  53
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the organization and methods of teaching dominated the national conversation in 
education during this time period.  Broadly known as the progressive education 
movement, these social scientists and educators advocated for a sharp departure from the 
traditional curricula and methods of teaching, pushing for new approaches that were 
better suited to address current national problems and needs.  United by their faith in 
science and their rejection of traditional educational methods, the progressive education 
movement had a powerful and continuing effect on the ideas and methods of nation’s 
education system.  However, the broad label of Progressive Education masks substantial 
and significant differences within this group.  As educational historian David Labaree has 
noted, “[t]he progressive education movement in the United States was not a single 
entity, but a cluster of overlapping and competing tendencies.”  This chapter traces the 54
most significant division within the progressive education movement throughout the 
1920s and 1940s - the division between the social efficiency progressives and the social 
reconstructionists.    55
  David F. Labaree, E. D. Hirsch, and Barbara Beatty, “The Ed School’s Romance with Progressivism,” 54
Brookings Papers on Education Policy, no. 7 (2004): 93.
 Several scholars have noted a similar general division within the progressive education movement, but 55
disagree about the terms used to describe the different coalitions.  Stephen Tomlinson refers to the division 
conservative and liberal visions, which is similar to the liberal progressive and conservative progressive 
terminology used by Robert L. Church and Michael W. Sedlak.  Both David Tyack and David Labaree use 
the terms administrative and pedagogical progressives to draw a similar distinction.  My use of social 
efficiency and social reconstructionist labels is closest to Herbert Kliebard’s, who actually distinguishes 
three groups, social reconstructionists, social efficiency, and child-centered progressives.  For the time 
period this chapter examines, the terms social reconstructionist and social efficiency most clearly capture 
the most significant division of interest.  Robert L. Church and Michael W. Sedlak, Education in the United 
States (Free Press, 1976); Herbert M. Kliebard, The Struggle for the American Curriculum, 1893-1958, 3rd 
edition (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004); Labaree et al., “The Ed School’s Romance”, 92-100; Stephen 
Tomlinson, “Edward Lee Thorndike and John Dewey on the Science of Education,” Oxford Review of 
Education 23, no. 3 (1997): 365–83; David Tyack, The One Best System: A History of American Urban 
Education (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974).  See also Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, “The 
Plural Worlds of Educational Research,” History of Education Quarterly 29, no. 2 (1989): 183–214.
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 The social efficiency progressives believed that the primary purpose of education 
was to facilitate the successful integration of children into the existing economic and 
social landscape.  Many in this group came from the world of educational psychology 
and were firmly committed to the use of quantitative measurement including intelligence, 
aptitude, and achievement tests as a means of determining educational best practices.  
Social efficiency progressives pressed for educational opportunity to be distributed on the 
basis of intelligence and likelihood of success, and advocated for a differentiated 
curriculum based on student ability.  Alternatively, the social reconstructionists believed 
that the public schools, teachers, and the curriculum should be primarily concerned with 
educating students about social problems, as well as preparing students with the tools to 
address these social problems directly.  In the wake of the stock market crash of 1929 and 
the nascent New Deal, the social reconstructionists were highly critical of the excessive 
individualism, extreme competitiveness, and economic exploitation that characterized the 
existing economic and social institutional landscape.   Unlike the social efficiency 56
progressives, the social reconstructionists advocated that students of all abilities be 
educated together and were highly critical of standardized tests.  More broadly, the 
central cleavage between the two groups was that whereas the scientific efficiency 
progressives believed that education should help adjust the individual for success in the 
  Although social reconstructionism traces many of it roots to romanticism and child centered pedagogy of 56
John Dewey’s early writings that appeared well before the Great Depression, social reconstructionism, and 
its theorized relationship between education, existing institutions, and political change was a distinctly post 
1929 phenomena.
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existing social order, the social reconstructionists argued that the schools should help 
prepare students to fundamentally change the social order. 
 This chapter focuses on the key individuals and organizations of the two 
progressive groups.  It begins by outlining the core ideological commitments and the 
educational program of the social efficiency progressives through an examination of the 
writings of some of the most important members of this coalition.  This group dominated 
the progressive educational landscape for much of the early decades of the twentieth 
century.  However, the stock market crash of 1929 and the extended economic hardship 
of the Great Depression gave rise to a rival group of progressives, the social 
reconstructionists.  The second part of the chapter maps the educational reforms and 
ideological commitments of the social reconstructionists.  Given the radicalness of their 
critiques, this group of progressive educators held surprising influence throughout the 
1930s.   The different educational ideologies of these two groups of progressive educators 
led to distinct, and often contradictory, policy prescriptions from the two coalitions.  
These educational disagreements mapped onto broader political disagreements between 
the two groups over fairness of a capitalist economy, the requirements of equality of 
opportunity, and support of New Deal policies.  These two groups vigorously competed 
with one another for the soul of public education. Understanding the differing political 
commitments and policy differences and between these two groups is central to 
understanding why one group ultimately proved more successful in implementing its 
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educational programs.  Indeed, the consequences of the victory by the social efficiency 
progressives continue to reverberate throughout the education system today.   
The Social Efficiency Progressives 
  A powerful new coalition of academics and educators, the social efficiency 
progressives, emerged in the early decades of the twentieth century.  In the spirit of the 
era, this group of progressive educators pressed for dramatic educational reforms, arguing 
that children and society more broadly could best be served by creating a more rational 
and systemic approach to education.  Many of the most prominent members of the social 
efficiency progressive coalition, including Edward L. Thorndike, Henry H. Goddard, 
Charles H. Judd, and Robert M. Yerkes,  came from the newly emerging academic field 
of psychology.  Education was also emerging as an academic field and separate 
department in many universities, and influential early members of the field such as John 
Franklin Bobbitt, Elwood P. Cubberly, David Snedden, and Charles Prosser were also 
social efficiency progressives.  Although this coalition was certainly not uniform in their 
ideological outlook, it was united by several common commitments and beliefs about 
needed educational reforms.  Focused on the need to make the schools more efficient and 
more reflective of the needs of society, social efficiency progressives proposed a number 
of reforms to school governance, organization, and teaching methods, including tracking, 
intelligence testing, standardized achievement testing, routinized teaching methods, and 
vocational education.  This educational vision was accompanied by a belief that children 
were fundamentally not equal in intelligence or potential value to society, and efficiency 
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therefore demanded that children of different intelligence be treated differently. This 
group of progressives advocated turning away from the rote formalism of the three R’s 
that implied teaching students of all abilities the same thing and the tendency to focus on 
college preparation in high school with methods that were scientifically proven to be 
effective and were more appropriate for each student’s ability and future station in life.  
The educational vision and ideological commitments of the social efficiency progressives 
dominated the landscape of the early progressive education movement. 
Scientific Management 
 One of the core commitments that united social efficiency progressives was a 
desire to introduce the principles of industrial management into the public school system.  
Largely inspired by Frederick W. Taylor’s writings about effective industrial 
management, social efficiency sought to adapt the management principles outlined by 
Taylor to the day-to-day operation of the school.   For this group of progressives, the 
implementation of industrial management methods such as routinization, constant 
evaluation, differentiation, and efficiency provided promising avenues of reforming the 
education system.  The desire to introduce scientific management techniques spawned 
dramatic reform proposals that touched nearly every aspect of the schooling, including 
administrative organization, the curricula, and the act of teaching itself.  
 One of the staunchest and most influential advocates of intruding the logic of 
industrial management into the schools scientific management was John Franklin 
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Bobbitt.  A long-time professor of school administration at the University of Chicago, 
Bobbitt also served briefly as assistant schools superintendent of Los Angeles and 
Toledo.   Bobbitt was one of the most enthusiastic proponents of extending the methods 57
of business management into the schools, a position he outlined early in his career for the 
1913 Yearbook of the National Society for the Science of Education.  In the extensive 
piece, entitled “The Supervision of City Schools: Some General Principles of 
Management Applied to the Problems of City-School Systems,” Bobbitt argued that since  
“[e]ducation is a shaping process as much as the manufacture of steel rails,” it made since 
to apply the scientific management techniques used in business to realm of education.   58
Extending the metaphor of the school as a business, Bobbitt’s educational approach 
described school administrators as supervisors, the teachers as workers on the line, and 
the students as the educational products, and put forth a number of management 
principles designed to maximize efficiency in education.  In this new educational system 
envisioned by Bobbitt and others, “‘social efficiency’ is to become the chief watchword 
and the chief aim.”  59
 The most pressing tasks in applying scientific management techniques to the 
school was to develop standards in order to rationalize and routine the educational 
process.  Bobbitt argued that each subject should have a set of concrete standards that 
 John F. Ohles, Biographical Dictionary of American Educators (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1978): 57
143-144.
 John Franklin Bobbitt, The Supervision of City Schools: Some General Principles of Management 58
Applied to the Problems of City-School Systems (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1913): 
12.
 Ibid., 50.59
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outlined the expectations of what students should know by the time of the completion of 
each grade.  Bobbitt cited favorably the example of math standards that required students 
to complete a certain number of problems with a set level of accuracy within a given time 
limit as an ideal type of standard.  Bobbitt believed that similar standards could and 
should be set for every school subject.   Standards were the foundation of the scientific 60
management program, as they allowed for the evaluation of which teaching methods 
were most effective as well as the personal evaluation of students, teachers and 
principles.   
 Importantly, given that the usefulness of standards was largely a function of the 
ability to make different aspects of the educational process comparable, the most 
effective standards would involve reducing the educational process to easily quantifiable 
and comparable metrics.  Social efficiency progressives believed that quantifiable 
standards could even be set for subjects such as history and social studies.  The faith in 
the ability to quantify and measure all aspects of the educational process is reflected in 
Edward Thorndike’s exclamation that ‘[w]hatever exists, exists in some amount.”   The 61
development of quantified standards would allow for quick and easy comparison of 
students and teachers within schools, as well as comparisons between different schools 
using the same standards. 
 Ibid., 14, 43.60
 Edward L. Thorndike, “The Nature, Purposes, and General Methods of Measurement of Educational 61
Products,” in The Measurement of Educational Products, ed. S.A. Courtis, 17th Yearbook of the National 
Society for the Study of Education, Pt. 2 (Bloomington, IL: Public School: 1918): 16.
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 Significantly, for Bobbitt, the setting of these standards was not the role of the 
teachers or others within the education system.  Rather, the educational standards should 
be set by the needs of the broader community, and the demands of labor market in 
particular.  Bobbitt’s belief that “it is the need of the world affairs that determines the 
standard specifications for the educational product,” led him to privilege the input of 
business and corporate leaders in the creation of education standards.   Bobbitt argued 62
that “[t]he commercial world can best say what it needs,” and called for the “business 
world …. [to] state in specific terms the kinds of educational product that it desires in the 
workers that come to it.”   By informing the schools about the labor needs of industry, 63
Bobbitt hoped to use educational standards to help schools shape and prepare the students 
for their position in the labor market. 
 Given the role of the schools in helping to facilitate entry into the labor market, 
social efficiency progressives believed that one function of a rationalized school system 
was to sort students into different categories based on ability and future vocation.  
Bobbitt advocated for differentiation of standards based on the “native ability” of 
students and envisioned three separate tracks of educational standards based on the 
results of intelligence test.    Significantly, Bobbitt claimed that differentiation of 64
standards allowed for schools to begin the process of preparing the students for the 
vocational task and social role for which their intelligence best suited them.  As Bobbitt 
 Bobbitt, “Supervision of City Schools,” 34.62
 Ibid., 36.63
 Ibid., 26.64
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argued, “differentiation of standards on the basis of native ability is closely related to the 
differentiation of standards according to vocational and social destiny.”   Differentiation 65
would allow for the development of different standards and curricula for the different 
groups of students, which would ultimately smooth the transition of each group of student 
into their appropriate place in the labor market.  66
 The commitment to different educational tracks based on intelligence scores was a 
central aspect of the social efficiency progressive movement.  Edward Thorndike echoed 
Bobbitt in calling for the differentiation of educational standards and resources on the 
basis of intelligence, arguing “[i]t certainly is not reasonable that the intellectually ablest 
5 per cent of boys should be kept in school to an age only four months beyond that to 
which the least able are kept” and that “increased resources should be used to aid young 
men and women whom nature and nurture have chosen to profit from schooling.”   The 67
differentiation of standards was framed as a means of rationally distributing educational 
resources.  This differentiation of educational standards also supported subsequent social 
and class differentiation, framing the unequal distribution of educational resources and 
opportunities as a rational extension of meritocracy. 
 Ibid.65
 Bobbitt also believed that the measurement of students and the differentiation of standards was an 66
important aspect of holding teachers and principles accountable, particularly for schools serving 
disadvantaged areas.  Bobbitt argued that once differentiated standards were developed and students 
assigned to their appropriate tracks, teachers and principles could no longer “hide behind the plea that he 
has an inferior social class in his school, and therefore, high performance should not be expected of him or 
his teachers.” Ibid., 29.
 Edward L. Thorndike, “The Distribution of Education,” The School Review 40, no. 5 (May 1932): 343, 67
345.
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 The creation of standards was also meant to help define the role of the teachers in 
the classroom and to determine the most effective teaching methods.  In applying the 
methods of scientific management in business to the classroom, Bobbitt conceptualized 
the teacher as an assembly line worker whose “task is to turn out a product of definite 
sort in the shape of developed abilities within the pupils.”   According to Bobbitt, “[t]he 68
burden of finding the best methods is too large and too complicated to be laid on the 
shoulders of the teachers,” instead,  the “doctrine of scientific management” required that 
teaching method should instead be determined by school administrators.   The quantified 69
common educational standards would allow school administrators to determine the 
effectiveness of a variety of different methods in helping students meet the standards for 
each subject.  The goal was a standardized approach in all classrooms, as Bobbitt argued, 
“[a]fter experimentation and statistical comparisons have shown the methods that are 
best, then these methods must be used by the teachers.”   70
 For the teacher, the implementation of scientific management techniques would 
mean the substantial loss of professional autonomy. The social efficiency progressives 
believed that the the freedom of teachers in the classroom had to be curtailed, as it 
implied variation from methods that had been shown to be effective.  As Bobbitt claimed, 
“Teachers cannot be permitted to follow caprice in method.  When a method which is 
 Bobbitt, “Supervision of City Schools,” 23.68
 Ibid., 52.69
 Ibid., 89 (emphasis added).70
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clearly superior to all other methods has been discovered, it alone can be employed.”   71
The methods proposed by Bobbitt, Thorndike, and others removed teachers as the 
authorities in education, replacing them with the administrators who evaluated which 
methods were most effective.  The role of the teacher reduced to little more than that of a 
technician implementing methods that had been determined to help students reach the 
standards set for each grade and subject.    72
 Finally, in addition to rationally distributing educational opportunities and 
defining the appropriate role of the teacher, social efficiency progressives valued the 
ability of educational standards to aid in accountability.  Once clear standards had been 
set and effective methods been determined, there could be no excuse for failing to 
produce the desire educational product.  Although the development of standards held the 
possibility of accountability for principles and administrators, it was clear that social 
efficiency progressives were most interested in evaluating the performance of teachers.  
Bobbitt claimed that current system of promotion and salary tied to length of service was 
irrational and argued that it should be replaced by one in which teacher appointment, 
promotion, and salary were all tied to their ability to get their students to reach the 
appropriate educational standards.   Furthermore, according to Bobbitt, the 73
implementation of standards would provide supervisors with “incontestable evidence of 
inefficiency against the weak teacher who cannot or who refuses to improve.  And the 
 Ibid., 95; see also page 50.71
 Tomlinson, “Edward Lee Thorndike and John Dewey,” 367.72
 Bobbitt, “Supervision of City Schools,” 46, 73.73
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present day difficulty of removing such a teacher from the service, transferring her, or 
retiring her, will be instantly overcome.”   As on the efficiently managed shop floor, the 74
implementation of scientific management techniques in the schools would aid supervisors 
in the identification and termination of inefficient workers.  Bobbitt argued that 
accountability in education required more or less constant testing of the students and 
extensive record keeping, just as it did in the business world.    75
 Bobbitt was one of the earliest and most vocal advocates of the the introduction of 
scientific management techniques, but he certainly was not alone.  The desire to 
implement scientific reforms that would increase the efficiency of the educational system 
was shared by many other prominent social efficiency reformers, including Edward 
Thorndike, David Snedden, Charles Judd, and Henry Goddard.  Elwood Cubberly, an 76
well known and early leader in the emerging field of educational administration, offered a 
nearly identical assessment as that of Bobbitt in 1916, writing: 
Our schools are, in a sense, factories in which the raw products (children) 
are to be shaped and fashioned into products to meet the various demands 
of life.  The specifications for manufacturing come from the demands of of 
twentieth-century civilization, and it is the business of the school to build 
its pupils according to the specification laid down. This demands good 
tools, specialized machinery, continuous measurement of production to see 
 Ibid., 28; This was a clear reference to, and argument against, teacher tenure, which Bobbitt viewed as 74
inefficient and inappropriate for a well managed educational system.
 Ibid., 45-47.75
 Labaree et al., “The Ed School’s Romance”, 95; Clarence J. Karier, “Testing for Order and Control in the 76
Corporate Liberal State,” Educational Theory 22, no. 2 (April 1, 1972): 158-161; Raymond E. Callahan, 
Education and the Cult of Efficiency: A Study of the Social Forces That Have Shaped the Administration of 
the Public Schools (Chicago; London: University Of Chicago Press, 1964).
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if it is according to specifications, the elimination of waste in manufacture, 
and a large variety in the output.  77
The faith that reforms that had revolutionized the factory floor could also help 
revolutionize social institutions motivated many of the progressive efforts of the day.  
This faith also was a significant factor in the expansion of the one of the most 
consequential educational reforms to emerge from this era: widespread standardized 
testing. 
Testing 
 The desire to introduce scientific management techniques into the schools was a 
primary driver of increased demand for the development and implementation of 
standardized tests in education.  Social efficiency progressives argued that efficiency 
demanded the use of standardized tests to determine both the appropriate educational 
track for students and also to evaluate the success of schools in meeting newly developed 
standards.  As a result, educational psychologists devoted substantial time and resources 
to developing intelligence tests, meant to differentiate students by inborn intelligence, and 
also achievement tests, meant to evaluate the progress students had made towards 
meeting newly developed standards.  These tests would be the central tools in the attempt 
to reorganize the schools in most socially efficient manner, allowing for appropriate 
distribution of educational resources, determination of the best educational methods, and 
increased accountability. 
 Ellwood Patterson Cubberley, Public School Administration: A Statement of the Fundamental Principles 77
Underlying the Organization and Administration of Public Education (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
Riverside Press, 1916): 338.
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 Although the goal of widespread standardized testing of intelligence and 
achievement in education had long been the goal of the social efficiency progressives, 
this position gained substantially broader endorsement after World War I (WWI).  As the 
United States entered the conflict, the military turned towards to scientific management 
techniques as a means of efficiently dealing with the dramatic increase in the scale of 
operations and number of soldiers for which it was now responsible.  The Army hired a 
number of the nation’s most prominent psychologists, including Edward Thorndike, 
Henry Goddard, Lewis Terman and Robert Yerkes, to help implement new methods of 
dealing with massive increase in manpower.  Seizing the opportunity, Yerkes led a team 
of psychologists that developed and deployed an intelligence test in 1917 and 1918.  The 
forty-minute test given to groups of new recruits was designed to help military authorities 
quickly and efficiently identify those candidates that were intelligent enough to be 
officers, as well as identify those who were unfit for service due to low intelligence.  As a 
greater number of soldiers were tested, the psychologists developed intelligence 
guidelines for increasingly specific army vocations.  Ultimately, throughout the War, 
more than 1.75 million soldiers took intelligence tests.  The adoption of intelligence as a 
category that influenced placement was a radical development for the military, which had 
never considered intelligence or mental capacity a meaningful qualification prior to 
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WWI.  By the end of WWI, the United States military had fully embraced psychological 
methods and intelligence testings.  78
 The widespread use of intelligence tests in the war effort helped legitimize and 
popularize the concept of intelligence and its potential use for guiding social institutions.  
By 1920 Henry Goddard, a prominent psychologist and first person to translate the Binet 
intelligence test into English, asserted that “this army experience it is no longer possible 
for any one to deny the validity of mental tests.”   After the war, social efficiency 79
progressives quickly turned their attention back to the schools and attempted to 
implement a similar program in education.  In their post-War assessment of the Army 
intelligence tests, Robert Yerkes and Clarence Yoakum, two of the individuals intimately 
involved in developing tests, advocated for the introduction of intelligence tests in 
schools.  In discussing the practical applications of testing  after the end of the war, the 
two psychologists proposed “that children should be classified in accordance with mental 
ability either as they enter school or shortly thereafter and that mental ability should 
thereafter be taken into account in connection with their educational treatment.”  Much 80
like their function in military, social efficiency progressives hoped that the tests would be 
John Carson, “Army Alpha, Army Brass, and the Search for Army Intelligence,” Isis 84, no. 2 (1993): 78
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Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence, Fifth Printing (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1922).
 Goddard, Human Efficiency, 28.  Another reason that social efficiency progressives and other testing 79
advocates dominated the WWI landscape was due to the widespread repression and elimination of the 
influence of radical populists and socialists during the First Red Scare.  The general demoralized state of 
the American left meant that it provided little pushback to the efforts of the social efficiency progressives 
during and immediately after the War effort. (Karier, “Testing for Order,” 158; Lawrence A. Cremin, “John 
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used to sort children into their appropriate track, and eventually the vocation most suited 
to their intelligence level.  In 1919, the General Education Board, a philanthropic 
organization funded by John D. Rockefeller, provided $25,000 for the development tests 
designed to measure the intelligence of children in elementary schools.  The group of 
psychologists that comprised the committee in charge of developing the standards was 
comprise of many of the same individuals who had developed army intelligence tests, 
including Lewis M. Terman, Edward L. Thorndike, and Robert M. Yerkes.  Yerkes served 
as chairman, the same role he served in the military effort, of the new effort to develop 
intelligence tests for elementary school students,.  The committee developed two different 
tests, and by 1920 had secured an agreement from the World Book Company to publish 
and distribute the new tests under the title of “National Intelligence Tests.”  81
 According to social efficiency progressives it was not only tests of intelligence 
that would prove useful in education, achievement tests were also critical to ensuring an 
efficiently run educational system.  Edward Thorndike, the educational psychologist who 
had been in charge of examining the accuracy of the intelligence tests during the War, 
pressed for the extension of both intelligence and achievement testing in education, 
arguing, “[e]ducation is one form of human engineering and will profit by measurements 
of human nature and achievement, as mechanical and electrical engineering have profited 
by using the foot-pound, calories, volt, and ampere.”  Similarly, Henry Goddard 82
 Robert M. Yerkes, “News Items and Communications,” The Journal of Educational Research 1, no. 4 81
(April 1920): 321.
  Edward L. Thorndike, “Scales and Tests Supersede Old-Fashioned School Marks,” The Journal of 82
Education 94, no. 15 (October 27, 1921): 395, emphasis added.
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advocated for the introduction of an initial intelligence test to sort students into 
appropriate educational tracks, to be followed by frequent testing of achievement 
throughout the educational career of the student.  The ultimate goal, was “not only to give 
each student a mental rating but to discover by proper tests the special abilities of various 
students with an idea to guiding them in their choice of work or profession.”   The faith 83
that social efficiency progressives placed in the ability of tests to accurately determine 
intelligence and measure educational achievements meant that this group proselytized for 
the extension of testing throughout the educational process. 
 The enthusiasm for testing was largely motivated by the desire to increase the 
efficiency of the schools. The psychologists advocating for intelligence and achievement 
tests fundamentally agreed with Bobbitt’s prescription for school reform, and viewed the 
extension of testing as a necessary aspect of bringing scientific management to the 
education system.  Goddard argued that “a knowledge of the intelligence level and a 
conscious effort to fit every man to his work in accordance with his intelligence level, is 
the surest way of promoting social efficiency.”   The introduction of testing would allow 84
for the sorting and assignment of students to the most appropriate educational track for 
their intelligence level and for a tailoring of the educational program to the future place in 
the labor market as determined by the mental capacity of the student.  The social 
efficiency progressives believed that this reform would represent a substantially more 
efficient school system, as it avoided wasting educational resources on those with low 
Goddard, Human Efficiency, 116.83
 Ibid., 48.84
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intelligence who could not benefit, and allowed for greater educational investment in the 
highly intelligent students who would be most likely to benefit.  Edward Thorndike 85
captured the centrality of testing of the social efficiency progressive educational vision in 
a 1920 Harper’s essay, where he argued:  
Exact and complete knowledge about the correlations of mental traits will 
be of enormous importance for the utilization of man-power by schools, 
churches, employers, and the state.  When we have such exact knowledge, 
we shall be able to make up a bill of specifications of the sort of intellect 
and character required for a certain job, select men efficiently instead of 
haphazard, and train them according to their individual needs instead of 
indiscriminately.  86
The legitimacy granted to the psychologists after their perceived success in World War I 
meant that these recommendations carried substantial weight.  By the 1920-1921 school 
year, over one million school children had been given general intelligence tests, and over 
two million achievement tests had been administered in a number of school subjects.  87
Heredity 
 The desire of social efficiency progressives to increase testing in the education 
system, was motivated to a substantial degree by the belief that intelligence was a 
fundamentally fixed and heritable individual quality.   Social efficiency progressives such 
as Thorndike and Goddard were some of the most prominent national exponents of the 
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theory that intelligence was a trait passed down from parents to children.  This genetic 
theory positioned intelligence as a static trait of individuals, meaning that there was little 
that social institutions could do to alter this inherited individual trait.  Many of the 
educational reform proposals of social efficiency progressives, including differentiated 
curriculum and standards, the routinization of teaching, and greater focus on vocational 
education, were motivated by their understanding of the nature of intelligence as a 
genetic trait. 
 The belief in the heritability of intelligence meant that social efficiency 
progressives had a particular interest in the family background of students.  Henry 
Goddard pushed for teachers to collect information on the intelligence of student’s 
relatives, arguing “could we but know the ancestral tendency of all children in out public 
schools, we would have one very helpful guide toward the direction in which the child’s 
mind could be most easily and successfully developed.”   For Goddard, if a student’s 88
family background containing a number of low-intelligence or “feebleminded” 
individuals, it was a good indication that the student was likely also of low intelligence 
given that intelligence was a genetic trait.  Thorndike traced the differences in 
intelligence levels to the “enormous amount of variation in the nature of fertilized ova 
which are the original nature of men.”   This belief that intelligence was heritable also 89
provided the foundation for the belief that there were identifiable intelligence differences 
between sexes, social class, and in particular, racial groups.  Pointing to the fields of 
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psychology and anthropology,  Thorndike asserted that there was ample evidence that 
“there are inborn difference between human strains” when it came to intelligence.   In a 90
1946 article outlining his belief that intelligence was correlated to racial groups, 
Thorndike compared racial groups to different breeds of cows, arguing:  
Jersey cows, Guernseys, Holsteins, Herefords, etc. are distinguishable as 
Norwegians, South Italians, Bantu Negroes, and Japanese are.  Cows can 
be ranked on value scales for production of milk and butterfat, for 
production of meat, for resistance to disease, etc., as men can be ranked 
for intellect, character, skill, and other qualities serviceable for human 
welfare.  91
Given the social efficiency contention that educational resources should be distributed on 
the basis of the intelligence, the belief in racial differences in intelligence necessarily 
implied racial difference in educational resources. 
 In addition to the assertion that intelligence was inherited, the social efficiency 
progressives also argued that it was essentially an unalterable individual trait, much like 
hair color.  Thorndike also believed that the inborn trait of intelligence was correlated 
with a number of other socially desirable and hereditary traits, asserting that “in human 
nature good traits go together.  To him that hath a superior intellect is given also on the 
average a superior character; the quick boy is also in the long run more accurate; the able 
boy is also more industrious.”   For the social efficiency progressives, the measurement 92
 Edward L. Thorndike, “Racial Inequalities,” The Educational Forum 10, no. 2 (January 1, 1946): 133.90
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of intelligence in school children could then be used as a proxy for a number of desirable 
traits and ultimately, future success.   
 The identification of intelligence as a static trait possessed by the individual 
meant that it could be a particularly useful tool in efficiently organizing the education 
system.  As Thorndike wrote, “[a]n individual’s intelligence compared with that of other 
individual’s of his age is within limits, a stable, permanent characteristic of him.  It can 
be at least roughly measured and the measurement used to prophesy and direct his 
career.”   Social efficiency progressives argued that because intelligence was a 93
unchangeable trait within the individual and was highly correlated with other desirable 
qualities and the likelihood of future success, individual intelligence was a particularly 
useful tool in engineering an efficient education system. If an individual’s intelligence 
was fixed at birth, then the assignment of an individual to a particular educational track 
on the basis of intelligence test made sense from a scientific management perspective.  
The differing distributions of inborn intelligence required different educational curricula 
and experiences for different levels of individual intelligence.   94
 Importantly, the belief in the fixed nature of intelligence also implied that there 
was little that teachers, schools, or the educational system more broadly could do to 
change the social destiny of the individual student.  This understanding justified existing 
inequalities in wealth and power as largely the natural result of differences in 
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intelligence.  Goddard argued that failure to grasp the unchangeable nature of intelligence 
had resulted in dangerous public acceptance “of the sophistry ‘that education and 
environment will offset the handicap of heredity.’”   The belief that intelligence was 95
hereditary meant that the educational vision social efficiency progressives was one in 
which the transformative power of education was necessarily limited.  In his discussion 
of the racial differences of intelligence, Thorndike reflected his belief in the limited 
ability of education to change fundamental aspects of heredity, claiming, “if large random 
samplings of North Europeans and Central Africans … were given identical opportunities 
from birth and fully tested at age twenty, there would be substantial differences in ability 
to manage ideas and symbols in favor of the North Europeans.”  The educational 96
implications of this belief were clearly anti-egalitarian, as equality in education would 
mean an inefficient distribution of educational resources.  Instead of treating every 
student the same, Thorndike argued that it was important to recognize “the differences 
between the genes of races,” and that “education should be informed about the raw 
material with which it operates.”   Similarly, Goddard pressed for educational reforms 97
that acknowledged “all children are not of equal value,” and pushed for a distribution of 
educational resources based on the principle that “[e]ach child has a value to society in 
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 Thorndike,”Racial Inequalities,” 134.96
 Ibid., 137.97
!61
proportion to his degree of intelligence.”   Focusing more educational resources and 98
opportunities on the most intelligent was efficient because those with low intelligence 
could not benefit from increased educational opportunities.  Failure to tailor educational 
opportunities on the basis of intelligence also harmed the most intelligent, as they were 
forced to learn at the slower pace of their less intelligent peers.  Social efficiency 
progressives therefore advocated for a distribution of educational resources and 
differentiated educational tracks that reflected the distribution of intelligence.  99
Political Commitments 
 The ideological positions of the social efficiency progressives that motivated their 
educational reform proposals, including the heritability of desirable traits and the drive to 
implement scientific management techniques, also structured their broader political 
beliefs and positions.  The consequences of these beliefs became particularly clear in the 
wake of the market crash of 1929 and the subsequent New Deal policies.  Although the 
individuals in this group were broadly progressive, many were openly hostile to the 
reforms pursued by the New Deal coalition and by their more radical colleagues in the 
progressive education movement.  The ideological commitment of the social efficiency 
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progressives caused many to portray broad political and economic reforms as 
irresponsible, undemocratic, and inefficient. 
 The belief in the wide variation of fixed levels of intelligence shaped the social 
efficiency progressives’ understanding of democracy.  Although Henry Goddard 
acknowledged that “[t]he essential point of democracy is that every citizen shall have a 
chance to say whom he thinks is the best,” he also believed that only those with high 
levels of intelligence were suited to lead.   For Goddard, the “perfect Government” was 100
an “Aristocracy in Democracy,” where the most intelligent were elected to lead.   A  101
knowledge of varied intelligence levels was central to the democracy, as “a perfect 
democracy is only to be realized when it is based upon an absolute knowledge of mental 
levels and the organization of the social body on that basis.”   Thorndike offered a 102
similar understanding of democracy, noting that “[t]he argument for democracy is not that 
it give power to all men without distinction, but that it gives greater freedom for ability 
and character to attain power.”   For Thorndike, the fact that “the abler persons in the 103
world … are more clean, decent, just, and kind” made them ideal leaders.  Thorndike 
openly advocated for leadership on the basis of intelligence, arguing, “[i]t seems entirely 
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sage to predict that the world will get better treatment by trusting its fortunes to its 95- or 
99-percentile intelligences than it would get by itself.”     104
 Social efficiency progressives justified this elitist vision of democracy on the 
utilitarian grounds that giving the most resources and the reins of power to the most 
intelligent would ultimately result in greater social benefit than a more egalitarian 
distribution of power.  This position also provided substantial justification for the status 
quo, and the extreme inequities in income and power that characterized the 1920s.  
Thorndike viewed these inequities arising from “natural processes which gives power to 
the men of ability to gain it and keep it,” and argued that these inequities were 
fundamentally moral because “[s]uch men are, by and large, of superior intelligence, and 
consequently of somewhat superior justice and good-will.”   By justifying existing 105
power disparities as both natural and desirable, the social efficiency progressive ideology 
was essentially a ruling class ideology.  106
 The Great Depression, and the widespread economic chaos and unemployment 
that resulted, provided a fundamental challenge to the faith in ruling class.  The federal 
elections of 1932 ushered in unified control of the congress and the Presidency under the 
Democratic Party, as the Republicans lost over 100 seats in the House of Representatives, 
12 seats in the Senate, and lost the Presidency in a landslide.  The newly-elected 
Congress rushed to enact the dramatic economic reforms President Franklin D. 
 Ibid., 235.104
 Ibid.105
 Indeed, Thorndike pointed to the superior intelligences of the European monarchical families as an 106
explanation for how they had gained and maintained power. 
!64
Roosevelt.  These reforms, and much of the New Deal policy agenda, were based in part 
on significant distrust of the business and financial elites, who were believed to bear 
substantial culpability for the catastrophic consequences of the Great Depression.  The 
market crash of 1929 and the subsequent New Deal policies substantially shifted power 
from private business to the federal government, and laws such as the National Labor 
Relations Act shifted power from management to workers.  Weighing in on this new 
political climate, many social efficiency progressives were skeptical of New Deal policies 
that pushed for greater equality in industrial relations and in economic distribution of 
resources. 
 Henry Goddard had been explicit in his criticism of a left politics centered on 
economic redistribution well before the market crash.   In 1920, he claimed that those 
advocating for economic redistribution and greater incomes for laborers were 
fundamentally misguided because they failed to take into account the differences in levels 
of intelligence.  Goddard criticized the idea that laborers and workmen needed the same 
kinds of housing, luxuries, and incomes as their more highly intelligent fellow citizens.  
According to Goddard, individuals with different levels of intelligence required different 
economic resources to be content.  Furthermore,  Goddard claimed that even if society 
were to give more resources and higher wages to those with low intelligence, the end 
result would be the same since this group always has foolish spending habits and inability 
to save and plan ahead.  Goddard argued that these fact fundamentally undercut the 
arguments of those advocating for better housing, better incomes, and more opportunities 
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for the poor.  As Goddard rhetorically asked, “How can there be such a thing as social 
equality with this wide range of mental capacity?”   In the aftermath of the market crash 107
of 1929, Goddard remained hostile to redistributive politics and sought to blame those 
with low intelligence for the negative consequences of the Great Depression.  In an 1931 
address commemorating the anniversary of the Vineland laboratory, where he had helped 
Yerkes and others develop the Army intelligence tests, Goddard stated:  
The very serious problems that are confronting us right now in 
unemployment and the consequent poverty and starvation are to a very 
large degree due to the fact that the great mass of these people have not 
had the intelligence and foresight to save some of their earnings, when 
they had employment at good wages, in anticipation of just such 
difficulties as they are now facing.  108
Although the market crash and prolonged depression had caused many in the United 
States to rethink their faith in business leaders and question the fairness of a loosely 
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regulated capitalist economy, Goddard remained convinced of the fundamental efficiency 
of organizing social institutions along the lines of intelligence. 
 Goddard was not alone in his continued adherence to scientific efficiency and 
hereditarian ideological commitments in the starkly changed political environment.  In a 
1936 article, Edward Thorndike directly criticized the “desire to have many or all men 
equal” that he believed served as the foundation of many of the recent New Deal reforms, 
claiming that “equality is a false and useless God.”   Thorndike argued that the push for 109
equality was both against the tendencies human nature and inefficient.  Rather than on 
focusing on equalizing material wealth, Thorndike asserted that “[i]t is better to expend 
the time and energy in increasing goods than in equalizing them.”   Thorndike still 110
claimed that the best means of improving human welfare and increase the overall wealth 
of the country to give favorable opportunities and more resources to the most intelligent 
“rather than to distribute them equally.”   Even as much of the country was calling for 111
greater equality in economic distribution in the face of the prolonged hardship of the 
Great Depression, social efficiency progressives continued to advocate for strongly 
differentiated opportunities and outcomes distributed on the basis of intelligence. 
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The Social Reconstructionists 
 The changed political context of the Great Depression caused many to question 
the core ideological commitments of the social efficiency progressives.  The social 
efficiency progressives maintained their allegiance to their pre-1929 educational 
programs even as the Great Depression spurred the rise of new coalition of progressive 
educators.  While still progressive in their opposition to the rigidity and formalism of 
traditional schooling methods, this new group of educators had core ideological 
differences with the social efficiency progressives and rejected much of their educational 
proposals.  Known as the social reconstructionists, this new coalition was highly critical 
of the excessive competitiveness and individualism that they believed characterized 
American life and the education system.  In stark contrast with the social efficiency 
progressives, the social reconstructionists rejected educational tracking, were suspicious 
of standardized testing, and argued that teachers should have the central role in leading 
transformation of social and economic institutions that the Great Depression had exposed 
as fundamentally unfair.  Throughout the 1930s, the social efficiency progressives and 
social reconstructionist offered starkly different visions of a path forward for the 
progressive education movement. 
George Counts and the Alternative Progressive Vision 
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 With unemployment hovering around twenty percent, the national income at half 
of what it had been three years earlier, and an outbreak of violent incidents between 
police and desperate men with no means to support themselves or their families, the year 
1932 was at the heart of one of the most tumultuous periods in the nation’s history.  
Franklin Roosevelt’s decisive victory against an incumbent president provided a good 
indication of the widespread disillusionment in the existing political order, and a hunger 
for extensive political change to drag the country out of depths of the Great Depression 
and to ensure that such an event could never happen again.   The dissatisfaction in 
structural status quo was soon extended to the public education system, as educational 
professionals began to take a critical look at the role of public education system in 
society.  In the wake of the extreme conditions, some academics began to express 
frustration over “feelings of impotence against the depressed conditions that threatened 
the children’s health, school budgets and even their own jobs.”   It was in this context 112
that George Counts, a professor at the Teachers College, launched the social 
reconstructionist movement in education in a series of speeches before several national 
meetings before leading educators in February of 1932.  The speeches, later published as 
Dare the School Build a New Social Order?, offered both a critique and a path forward 
for progressive educators progressives seeking dramatic reform in the new context of the 
Great Depression.   
 C. A. Bowers, The Progressive Educator and the Depression, The Radical Years (New York: Random 112
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 In his speeches, Counts offered deep criticism of the existing social, political and 
economic structures.  Spelling out the existing contradictions of a system in which “dire 
poverty walks hand in hand with the most extravagant living the world has ever known” 
and “an abundance of goods of all kinds is coupled with privation, misery and even 
starvation,”  Counts laid the blame squarely at the feet of the “ideal of rugged 113
individualism...used to justify a system which exploits pitilessly and without thought of 
the morrow.”   Educators, specifically, were condemned for the role of the school in the 114
current crisis, as Counts claimed existing schools were organized around preparing 
students to fit into and embrace the problematic existing social orders.  This had led to an 
educational philosophy that made success “an individual rather than a social goal, 
driv[ing] every one of us into an insane competition with his neighbors.”   This critique 115
ultimately indicted the existing form of capitalism and “its deification of the principle of 
selfishness,”  leading Counts to proclaim “if democracy is to survive in the United 116
States, it must abandon its individualistic affiliations in the sphere of economics.”  117
 In the extreme volatility of the early 1930s, Counts sensed a moment of great 
possibility.  With the times “literally crying for a new vision of American destiny,” 
Counts argued that the “teaching profession, or at least its progressive elements, should 
 George S. Counts, Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order? (New York: John Day, 1932): 33.113
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eagerly grasp the opportunity which the fates have placed in their hands.”   If teachers 118
“could increase sufficiently their stock of courage, intelligence, and vision, [they] might 
become a social force of some magnitude.”   Counts called teachers to “make certain 119
that every Progressive school will use whatever power it may possess in opposing and 
checking the forces of social conservatism and reaction,”  and instead “become centers 120
for the building, and not merely for the contemplation, of our civilization....We 
should....give to our children a vision of the possibilities which lie ahead and endeavor to 
enlist their loyalties and enthusiasms in the realization of the vision.”   For Counts, this 121
involved the active cultivation of “democratic sentiments” in schoolchildren as a means 
of to bring about desirable social reconstruction.   
 This represented a major challenge to the social efficiency progressive positions.  
Counts’ proposals of greater teacher autonomy in direction of the classroom ran directly 
counter to the routinized and standardized role that scientific management techniques 
demanded in order to ensure efficiency.  Furthermore, his argument for the teacher-led 
development of educational content as a means of combatting social conservatism was 
directly counter to the fundamental belief of  social efficiency progressives that 
educational standards and curriculum content should largely come from the business 
leaders who best understood the skill demands of the labor market.  Counts’ critique of 
 Ibid., 54.118
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the social order was fundamentally also a critique of an education system designed to 
differentiate children and prepare them life in an extremely inequitable social system, 
which was the educational system for which scientific efficiency progressives had long 
advocated.  
 For Counts, this position was untenable.  In a speech given at the annual 
convention of the Progressive Education Association in Baltimore in 1932, Counts 
addressed this directly, telling the audience “If an educational movement, or any other 
movement, calls itself progressive, it must have orientation; it must possess direction.”   122
Counts charged that by maintaining silence in the classroom on major political issues, 
progressive were complicit in the creation of a system that favored the upper-middle 
class.  Clearly aware that the progressive education movement had been wary of the label 
of “indoctrination,” Counts nonetheless told the audience that “[n]eutrality with respect to 
the great issues that agitate society, while perhaps theoretically possible, is practically 
tantamount to giving support to the forces of conservatism.”   This critique was 123
especially stinging considering both the audience and the dire circumstances of the 
economic calamity facing most Americans. 
 Counts offered a clear path forward for educators and politicians concerned about 
what type of social reform to pursue in the wake of the Great Depression.  Noting that 
“[t]here can be no good individual apart from some conception of the good society; and 
 Ibid., 6.122
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the good society....must be fashioned by the hand and brain of man,”  Counts issued a 124
clear call to teacher to “deliberately reach for power and then make the most of their 
conquest”  and “the school must shape attitudes, develop tastes, and even impose 125
ideas.”    The vision put forth was one in which a clear vision of social good (and one 126
quite distinct from the ‘rugged individualism’ of a capitalist economy) was the guiding 
educational principle, with teachers taking a leading role in the development of a new 
social order through the schools.  Education was to be the midwife of social 
transformation. 
Building the Social Reconstructionist Coalition 
 The challenge issued by Counts soon drew other prominent educational figures to 
join the call for teachers to usher in a new social order.  William H. Kilpatrick, who at the 
time was perhaps the nation’s second most famous progressive educator (behind only his 
mentor, John Dewey), soon joined the cause with the publication of Education and the 
Social Crisis.  At the time of publication, Kilpatrick, also on the faculty of the Teachers 
College, was well-known for his development of the popular “project method” of 
teaching, the establishment of the National Conference on Educational Method, and for 
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founding The Journal of Educational Method.   Like Counts, Kilpatrick criticized the 127
extreme individualism that the schools were currently emphasizing, and called for the 
teaching of cooperative attitudes to schoolchildren instead.  Like Counts, Kilpatrick’s 
critique was couched in a broader critique of the existing economic order, and he called 
for a new order based on social control of economic institutions.  For Kilpatrick, teachers 
would be a vital as leaders of a coalition seeking broader social reform.   
 Another of Counts’ colleagues at the Teachers College, Harold Rugg, soon joined 
to call for a more socially conscious schooling.  Rugg was another high profile educator, 
with widespread name recognition.  In addition to his professorship, Rugg was the 
director of research at the progressive Lincoln School in New York City, and in 1929 had 
written a series of textbooks called Man and His Changing Society, in which the social 
purpose of schooling was central.  The series was quite successful, selling 1,317,960 
books and 2,687,000 workbooks between 1929 and 1939.   In December 1932, Rugg 128
clearly indicated his embrace of Counts with an article in Progressive Education entitled 
“Social Reconstruction Through Education,” in which he forcefully claimed “[n]othing 
less than thoroughgoing social reconstruction is demanded, and there is no institution 
known to the mind of man that can compass that problem except education.”    Rugg 129
 Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, An Elusive Science: The Troubling History of Education Research, 1 edition 127
(Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2002): 110-111.  Kilpatrick’s article “The Project Method” was 
turned into a pamphlet which sold over 60,000 copies.  Also, in his long tenure as a professor of education 
at Teachers College, Kilpatrick lectured to over 35,000 students, a major source for the dissemination of his 
ideas about education. 
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echoed the call by Counts for teachers to engage in the problems of the day, and construct 
an educational program centered on the problems of the current social situation.  Rugg 
argued that in the current era, this would mean a new educational program in which youth 
“will be brought to see how the concept of laissez-faire in the marriage of politics and 
economics has produced enormous inequalities in wealth and social income....the 
disastrous imperialistic exploitation of agrarian and non-militarized peoples, and thus to 
mad international rivalries and world war.”   The ultimate goal was the reconstruction 130
of a society no longer based on the “doctrine of individual success through competition,” 
but rather one in which students would have a “strong loyalty for the brotherland of all 
men on the earth.”   The open embrace by another prominent educator (and an educator 131
with one of the most widely used textbooks of the era) suggests the breadth of influence 
the social reconstructionist idea. 
 Individual professors were not the only ones that showed interest in the social 
reconstructionist position.  The National Education Association (NEA), at the time the 
largest and most powerful education group in the nation, also suggested that it was 
sympathetic to this new approach to the education in the early 1930s.  In his 1932 report 
to the Association’s annual meeting, Fred J. Kelly, the president of the NEA’s Committee 
on Social Economic Goals for America, issued a call strikingly similar to that of Counts.  
After acknowledging Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order, the report called on the 
NEA to take the lead in transforming the social order.  In a remarkable passage for an 
 Ibid., 13.130
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organization that had traditionally been quite timid in embracing controversial political 
positions, the report stated, “The NEA is saying, and I hope saying more or less 
militantly, that a social order can be built in which a social collapse such as the present 
one, will be impossible.  They are saying further that the educators of America propose to 
assume major responsibility for building such a social order.”  132
 The records of the annual meeting of the NEA throughout the 1930s provide 
evidence that the ideas of the social reconstructionists were taken seriously and that many 
in the organization supported this mission for the association. The proceedings of the 
1933 annual meeting are littered with favorable references to Counts, Kilpatrick, and 
Rugg.  In a speech before the general session entitled “Applying Ethics to Economics,” 
Robert Moore, the Secretary of the Illinois State Association, argued that the breakdown 
in the economic system offered both a challenge and an opportunity to teachers.  With 
specific reference to Harold Rugg and William Kilpatrick, Moore excoriated “rugged 
individualism” and proclaimed that, “[t]he public mind must be informed of the evils of 
the present system of economics.”   Moore claimed that, “such diffusion is in part the 133
work of teachers, since they are teachers and molders of the minds of youth.  Teachers 
must have a real understanding of the wrongs in recent economic practices,” and “a 
burning zeal to correct them.”    134
 As quoted in Bowers, The Progressive Educator, 23.132
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 In another speech before the general session on the issue of “Teacher Training for 
the New Age,” H. L. Donovan, the president of Eastern Kentucky State Teachers College, 
noted that he “thoroughly agree[d] with Dr. George Counts” on the issue of the role of the 
teacher in ushering a new age.   Donovan then called for a new teachers education that 135
stressed the knowledge of social and political programs that produced teachers who were 
“active, aggressive, competent, and effective participants in society” and who were 
willing to engage in politics and run for political office.   The annual conventions also 136
served as a means for some of the most prominent social reconstructionists to address the 
NEA directly, as Kilpatrick did in his 1935 speech that reiterated key positions from 
Education and the Social Crisis.  Kilpatrick told the assembly that “the effecting of the 
desired social-economic changes will have to be a matter of decades, so that 
education....can and must be a significant factor in the process.”   The attention given to 137
these ideas about the active role of teachers in reforming education to help reform society 
further demonstrates the penetration of social reconstructionist ideology into the most 
mainstream educational organizations. 
 The American Historical Association (AHA) was another source of support for 
the social reconstructionist position.  Noting the importance of social studies curriculum 
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for “the life, the institutions, the thought, the aspirations, and the far-reaching policies of 
the nation in its world setting,” the AHA undertook a multiyear study on how schools 
should arrange the social studies curricula.   The conclusion of the study, published in 138
1934, offered an analysis of how schools should teach social studies based on “the 
conclusion that, in the United States as in other countries, the age of individualism and 
laissez faire in economy and government is closing and that a new age of collectivism is 
emerging.”   In an echo of Counts’ thoughts on the possibility of neutrality in education, 139
the report noted, “Education always expresses some social philosophy, either large or 
small, involves some choices with respect to social and individual action and well-being, 
and rests upon some moral conception.”   The report found that current educational 140
orientation emphasized “the traditional ideas and values of economic individualism” and 
warned that failure to adjust would “intensify the conflicts, contradictions, 
maladjustments, and perils of the transition” that it saw as inevitable.   Given the failure 141
of the capitalist economy in its existing form, the report stated: 
 [t]he great purpose of American public school....is to prepare the younger 
generation for life in a highly complex industrial society....that is in rapid 
transition to from an economy based on individual enterprise and 
competition for private gain to an economy essentially co-operative and 
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integrated in character and dependent for efficient operation and careful 
planning on co-ordination of production and consumption.    142
The similarities in the report’s findings and recommendations were directly in line with 
those proposed by Counts two years prior.  Teachers were to abandon attempts at 
neutrality, and the schools were to prepare students for the new social order.  The AHA 
report provided unqualified supported the social reconstructionist vision for public 
education.  143
 The position initially advocated by George Counts thus quickly gathered support 
from a variety of sources.  Equally striking given the fairly radical nature of the claims, 
their deviation from previous progressive positions, and the stature of the individuals 
making the case was the very limited criticism that the social reconstructionist position 
faced.  Although there were a few journalists that called some of the assumptions about 
the viability and appropriateness of this position, the response to the increasing popularity 
from the vast majority of scholars and educators was either silence or support.   In the 144
early 1930s, the position outlined by Counts was supported by a broad coalition of 
educators and social scientists as a feasible and desirable path forward in reforming the 
public education system.   
 Ibid., 46.142
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The Social Frontier 
 With the individual efforts of prominent scholars already bringing significant 
attention, a group of professors and graduate students centered in the Teachers College 
decided to establish a regular journal to provide a unified voice for the social 
reconstructionist position.  After George Counts agreed to serve as the editor, the 
founding members spent much of 1934 gathering funding, working out organizational 
structure, and gathering material for the new journal, which was to be called The Social 
Frontier.  The inaugural issue of new journal was published in October of 1934, and the 
journal found immediate support, with over 2,000 subscriptions for the first edition.    145
 The journal opened with a message on the mission of the journal from William 
Kilpatrick, who was serving as the chairman of the board of directors.  Kilpatrick noted 
the auspiciousness of the past few years and boldly laid out the vision of the journal, 
noting “education has an important, even strategic, role to play in the reconstruction of 
American society,” and that the organizers’ goal was to make “The Social Frontier a 
prime medium for the development of a constructive social consciousness among 
educational workers.”   The initial edition attempted to unify the strands of 146
progressivism from a variety of academic sources, a tactic that would remain a strength 
of the journal throughout its existence.  The cover of the first journal carried a quote from 
the previously cited AHA report on social studies about the transition to the age of 
collectivism, and the journal contained articles by prominent intellectuals from various 
 Ibid., 44, 96.145
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academic fields including historian Charles Beard, economist Harold Laski, philosopher 
Sidney Hook, psychologist Goodwin Watson, and sociologist Henry Fairchild.  All took 
seriously the challenge the opening editorial’s call to actively shape a new educational 
frontier, recognizing that reform would “either make easy or difficult the transfer of the 
democratic ideal from individual to social foundations.”  147
 The first issue of the journal was also notable for clear statement of support from 
John Dewey, the most renowned and respected educational scholar of the era.  In what 
was to be the first of many articles for The Social Frontier, Dewey offered a full-throated 
defense of the social reconstructionist vision.   Hitting the familiar criticisms of “rugged 148
individualism,”  and the essential conservatism of teachers attempting to remain 149
neutral,  Dewey noted that there was a clear means through which teachers, and the 150
system of education more broadly, could lead a transformation of the existing societal 
structures.  According to Dewey, the public education system should be reformed around 
a purpose of  “[l]aying the basis, intellectual and moral, for a new social order,” which he 
hoped would “arouse a new spirit in the teaching profession and to give direction to 
 George S. Counts, Mordecai Grossman, and Norman Woelfel, eds., “Orientation,” The Social Frontier 1, 147
no. 1 (October 1934.): 4. 
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radically changed effort.”   Dewey continued to reiterate his support throughout his 151
association with the journal, with his considerable prestige and influence offering a 
prominent boost to the social reconstructionist vision.   152
 Although much of the first issue involved a restatement and consolidation of 
many previously expressed ideas, the first volume (issues 1-9) provides a good indication 
of the types of articles and topics that would be central throughout the journal’s ten year 
existence.  The editorial pages and articles touched repeatedly on topics ranging from the 
most recent meeting of the NEA (the first of what would become a regular update to 
readers on the positive and negative actions of other education associations, with the 
NEA and Progressive Education Association being primary targets),  to evaluations of 153
the promise and limitations of President Roosevelt’s New Deal programs (another 
ubiquitous topic of discussion in the journal),  the need for centralization and greater 154
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federal presence in education,  and presciently, the danger of loyalty oaths and 155
conservative opposition.    156
 The pages of The Social Frontier also provide a good indication of the popularity 
of the social reconstructionist position.  The journal often reprinted newspaper editorials 
and letters of support received from educators across the country.  Although not all of the 
editorial reaction to the first edition was positive, The Social Frontier did receive 
encouragement from several prominent newspapers, including the New York World-
Telegram, which noted, “the contents of the first number are indeed gratifying,” The 
Portland Oregonian which proclaimed that if the contents of “the first issue are a fair 
indication of what is to come, at least the new collectivism is to have a brilliant and clear 
advocacy,” and a glowing review from The New York Times, whose editorial board raved: 
That men of such high professional knowledge and strong patriotic 
purpose should undertake this venture will at any rate lead to a fresh 
appraisement of educational values in the face of the changing order and 
make against the lethargy into which fixed systems are so apt to lead....It 
is a good thing for society to have such educational leaders out on the 
frontiers, ever in search for the better.  157
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The first several issues indicate broader support from education community, including 
professors of education, professional groups like the Colorado Education Society, and 
prominently placed educational bureaucrats.   Positive reviews also streamed in from 158
other progressive organizations like the Consumer Research Bulletin, whose editor 
exclaimed, “I think your journal has by far the best combination of intelligence and social 
drive …. in what it is talking about, of any periodical published today.”   The positive 159
reception of The Social Frontier and the social reconstructionist vision for education 
would not last.  Indeed the very popularity and the seriousness with which the education 
community seemed to take the charge for social reconstruction of  the social, economic 
and political institutions prompted vociferous opposition from both conservative groups 
and the social efficiency progressives. 
Progressive Divisions 
 The division between the social reconstructionists and the social efficiency 
progressives represented a significant split within the broader progressive education 
movement.  Throughout the 1930s and into the early 1940s, these two groups articulated 
distinct visions of progressive education reform.  The varying, and in some instances, 
opposing proposals of the educational programs of the two coalitions flowed from their 
 For example, the Commissioner of Education for Puerto Rico noted the need for reform and expressed 158
confidence that, “The Social Frontier should contribute the sort of sympathetic leverage needed” (Joe 
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fundamentally distinct understandings of the purpose of education and its relation to the 
broader social and economic structures.   
 The social efficiency progressives understood the role of education to be the 
efficient integration of students into the existing social and economic landscape.  This 
belief resulted an educational program that focused on detecting the most efficient means 
of organizing the education system around this goal.  Furthermore, the belief that children 
were unequal in intelligence meant that an efficiently organized education system 
required differentiation, with educational resources and opportunities distributed on the 
basis of these inequalities.  This set of beliefs about the purpose of education and human 
nature led to the advocacy of a particular set of educational policies, including 
educational tracking, widespread use of intelligence and standardized achievement tests, 
and increased emphasis on vocational education. 
 The social reconstructionists viewed the role of the education system as primarily 
one of helping to bring about desired social transformation.  This coalition critiqued 
existing economic and social institutions as fundamentally unfair, arguing that they 
favored a small class of wealthy individuals at the expense of the masses.  For the social 
reconstructionists, the existing educational system and the proposals of the social 
efficiency progressives were part of the problematic social order because it was organized 
largely reproduce and justify existing economic and social arrangements.   The 
appropriate role of teachers and the education system more broadly was to prepare 
students 8to change these unfair social arrangements, rather than to prepare them for roles 
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in the existing landscape.  This belief about the purpose of education resulted in 
proposals for classroom instruction focused on social problems of the community,  
economic literacy, project based learning in common classroom, and the inducement of 
economic class mentality.  Social reconstructionists pushed for significant teacher 160
autonomy and academic freedom in developing their preferred methods in the classroom, 
and advocating for social reforms outside of it.  161
 Significantly, these groups understood their visions to be in conflict with one 
another.  Much of the motivation behind the organization of the social reconstructionist 
coalition was in response to what they viewed as the deficiencies in the social efficiency 
progressive vision.   The editorial board of The Social Frontier criticized social efficiency 
progressives as “apostles of merely transmissive education,” stating that they “would 
have schools contribute to nothing but repetition of what society already is or is 
doing.”   Given the dramatic events and prolonged economic suffering of the Great 162
Depression, the social reconstructionists argued that reducing schools to “a mere tool 
implement that is applied to social material as instruments for molding, stamping, and 
welding are lied to steel in a factory” was a deeply problematic educational vision that 
promised to reproduce an unfair social order.    163
 George S. Counts, Mordecai Grossman, and Norman Woelfel, eds., “‘Class’ and Social Purpose,” The 160
Social Frontier 2, no. 5 (February 1936): 134–35.
 See Volume 2, number 6 of The Social Frontier for an entire issue dedicated the academic freedom of 161
teachers, and the more limited role for administrators.
 George S. Counts, Mordecai Grossman, and Norman Woelfel, eds., “The Social Order Desired by 162
Society,” The Social Frontier 2, no. 5 (February 1936): 133–34.
 Ibid.163
!86
 The social efficiency progressives were similarly critical of the educational vision 
of the social reconstructionists.  One of the most vocal critics of the social 
reconstructionists was Charles H. Judd, a professor and educational psychologist at the 
University of Chicago who also worked as the director of education program of the 
National Youth Administration. In a number of articles throughout the 1930s, Judd 
characterized the social reconstructionists as “extremists” who were “repelled by 
logic.”   Judd criticized the unwillingness of this group to make use of the important 164
educational methods found to be effective through experimentation and “scientific 
instruments of evaluation.”   Judd was publicly critical of prominent social 165
reconstructionists such as Charles Beard, and in particular, George Counts.  Judd accused 
Counts of being “blinded by the present-day shadow of unemployment which darkens the 
world,” and of reducing teachers to role of teachers to nothing other than “correct[ing] 
the evils of capitalism and industrialism.”   According to Judd, in their zeal to move 166
past the “formalism of certain types of logical arrangements, they have discarded all 
organization.”   For Judd and other social efficiency progressives, the failure of the 167
social reconstructionists to understand that “[th]e cure for industrial chaos is intelligent 
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adaptation of individuals to the conditions which surround them” had resulted in an 
educational program that was unwise and unsound.  168
 Throughout the 1930s, one of the central and most pressing cleavages between the 
two groups of educators remained over whether schools should adjust individuals to the 
demands of the social order, or whether they should play a role in transforming these 
fundamentally unfair social institutional arrangements. The consequences of the differing 
perspectives were particularly clear when it came to the relationship between the labor 
market and the classroom. In a 1940 article entitled “Occupational Adjustment of Young 
Adults,”  Judd reiterated the social efficiency progressive commitment to organize the 
schools around the demands of the labor market.  He argued that inefficient organization 
of curriculum in many schools had contributed to the high levels of unemployment.  Judd 
suggested that part of the unemployment problem could be traced to the fact that the high 
school still tended to train students for college and professional life, despite the fact that 
the vast majority would end performing jobs that required substantially different skill 
sets.  According to Judd, “the curriculum of these schools has not been changed to keep 
up with changes in the population and in vocational opportunities; it is still largely 
organized to prepare students for the professions.”   Judd, like many social efficiency 169
progressives before him, was arguing that the education system needed to better reflect 
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the skill demands of the available jobs, and to design curriculum tracks that better 
reflected the student’s social destiny.  By focusing too much on preparing students for 
college through classical training, the schools were doing a disservice to the students and 
society by training too many students for jobs that they would never have.   This 170
perspective framed the inefficient organization of schools and curriculum as a substantial 
factor in the overproduction of students with professional training, which ultimately 
contributed to their unemployment when they could not find a job in the oversaturated 
job market.  
 At the time that Judd was making his argument for efficient organization as a 
means of addressing unemployment, William Carr, the director of research for the NEA, 
articulated a very different understanding of the relationship between school and the labor 
market.  Carr and the broader NEA at the time were staunch advocates for many of the 
educational reforms proposed by the social reconstructionists.  Carr was called to appear 
before a Congressional hearing on the “Concentration of Economic Power,” and was 
asked about the mismatch of students receiving professional training and the number that 
actually went on to work in white collar professional jobs.  In his testimony, Carr argued 
that the fact that there were so many students on the college and professional track rather 
than the vocational track was primarily due to student demand.  According to Carr, 
students preferred these courses because they understood them as the path towards jobs 
 Unlike many of the social efficiency progressives, Judd did envision support some of the political and 170
economic reforms of the New Deal.  However, his overall educational perspective and reform proposals 
placed him squarely in the social efficiency camp.
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that promised higher wages and more prestige.   Rather than adjust the curriculum and 171
force students into particular courses based on intelligence or achievement, Carr 
suggested that economic reforms could be used to change the preferences of students in 
the classroom.  Referencing the high numbers of students choosing to pursue professional 
rather than vocational education, Carr told the committee, “I can imagine, for instance, 
that if I could take a group of high school students and tell them, ‘If you will go into 
domestic service you can look forward to $25 a week,’ that situation … would not exist, 
in quite as great a degree, at least.”    Carr’s suggestion reflected the broader social 172
reconstructionist perspective of the need to adjust institutional and economic 
arrangements outside the walls of the schoolhouse to better serve students.  As prominent 
historian and Social Frontier contributor Harold Laski noted, “those who seek any 
serious adaptation of our educational system must work for the transformation of the our 
economic system as the necessary condition of their success.”   This was a clear point 173
of disagreement between the social reconstructionists and social efficiency progressives. 
 The differences in the educational vision of the two groups of progressive 
educators also reflected fundamentally different understandings of the requirements of 
democratic governance.  The social reconstructionists emphasized the need for 
 Carr testified that “[t]here is always going to be this ambition to rise, but I would like to point out that 171
this so-called ambition to rise in the professions is due partly to the halo of prestige which attaches to 
professions and partly to the fact that the professions are, on the whole, very much better off economically.” 
Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power. Part 30: Technology and Concentration of Economic 
Power: Temporary National Economic Committee, Senate, 76 Cong. 17181 (1940) (testimony of William 
G. Carr, Secretary, Educational Policies Commission).
 Ibid.172
 Harold J. Laski, “A New Education Needs a New World,” The Social Frontier 2, no. 5 (February 1936): 173
146.
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introducing a spirit of cooperation and respect for fellow students in the classroom as a 
necessary reform to the anti-democratic competitiveness and excessive individualism of 
the existing social order.  This implied the need for a common and egalitarian classroom 
where students of all backgrounds and abilities learned together.  Additionally, social 
reconstructionists stressed the need for schools to provide economic literacy on the 
consequences of various economic arrangements, because “[u]nless the average citizen is 
the final arbiter of economic issues, democracy is functioning poorly.”   174
  For  the social efficiency progressives, democracy required differentiation.  The 
social efficiency progressives argued that because children by their nature had differing 
levels of intelligence, merit, or talent a truly democratic educational system would take 
this into account when developing an educational system.  As Henry Goddard argued, 
“[i]f democracy means equal opportunity for all … then special classes are required; for 
no child has an equal opportunity in a any class where he is forced to mark time because 
the majority are slower than he.”   The hope was that educational differentiation in the 175
schools would better prepare those individuals that were best suited for leadership.  For 
the social efficiency progressives, differentiation of educational opportunity and social 
power on the basis of intelligence represented a rational and beneficial organization of a 
democratic nation. 
Conclusion 
 Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power. Part 30: Technology and Concentration of 174
Economic Power 76th Cong. 17172 (1940) (testimony of Dr. William G. Carr, Secretary, Educational 
Policies Commission).
 Henry Herbert Goddard, “The Gifted Child,” The Journal of Educational Sociology 6, no. 6 (February 175
1933): 354–61.
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 These two visions of progressive education competed for the soul of the education 
system throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s.  As discussed in chapter 4, when the 
extreme economic instability and policy experimentation of the New Deal era gave way 
to a more conservative era of involvement in WWII and the subsequent Cold War, the 
changed political context proved particularly unfavorable to the political and educational 
programs of the social reconstructionists.  Given how much the social reconstructionist 
position was dependent upon commitment to broader social transformation, once the 
political support for dramatic economic transformation subsided, the energy behind the 
social reconstructionist educational vision also faded.  Although social efficiency 
progressives also faced challenges in the post-WWII context, ultimately, their educational 
vision and policy proposals were much better positioned to accommodate the demands of 
the more conservative political era.  176
 Grasping the fundamentally distinct visions and political implications of the 
educational programs of these two coalitions is critical for understanding the origins of 
many of the educational policies of today.  As historian of education Ellen Lagemann has 
noted, “one cannot understand the history of education in the United States during the 
twentieth century unless one realizes that Edward L. Thorndike won and John Dewey 
 The most notable challenge to the ideological commitments of the social efficiency progressives in the 176
post-War II context was their hereditarianism.  The Nazi ideology and extermination efforts had made this 
position political unpalatable for much of the country.  Although many social efficiency progressives 
dropped the strict hereditarianism of Thordike and Goddard, the educational policies they advocated 
remained fundamentally similar, with more nebulous definitions of intelligence or merit replacing the 
earlier fixed and hereditarian definitions.
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lost.”   The quote from President Obama that opens this chapter, which positions the 177
education system as centrally economic program that has been inefficiently distributed 
opportunity for future success on the arbitrary basis of race (rather than the more 
meaningful basis of merit, and all determined by standardized achievement testing), has 
more than a passing similarity the social efficiency progressive vision.  The Obama 
administration’s educational reform agenda, with its focus on standardized tests, 
increasing teacher accountability, and national standards is also much more reflective of 
the policies advocated by the social efficiency progressive than those of the social 
reconstructionists.  
  Although understanding the divisions within the progressive education movement 
and the ultimate victory of the social efficiency progressive vision provides critical 
insight into the current educational moment, to fully appreciate the contours of the 
modern education policy landscape requires an understanding of the racial politics that 
has shaped their formation.   Chapter 3 turns to an exploration of the cleavages that 
divided black political organizations - which in some ways were quite similar to those 
dividing the progressive education community - and the consequences for education 
policy.  
 Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, “The Plural Worlds of Educational Research.”  History of Education 177
Quarterly, 29 (1989): 185.  Lagemann is not the only one who has noted the apparent victory of the social 
efficiency progressives.  Although David Labaree notes that the social reconstructionist vision lingers in the 
way that many people talk about education, particularly those that teach in education schools, at the level of 
school practice the social efficiency progressive vision remains dominant (Labaree, “The Ed School’s 
Romance with Progressivism”).
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Chapter Three 
Education vs. Economy: Race and Class in Black Political Visions, 1930s - 1950s 
 The 1930s through the 1950s represent some of the most tumultuous and 
significant years in black politics in America.  As Risa Goluboff has noted, the popular 
and scholarly focus on the politics of this era has often emphasized the fight against 
segregation in transportation, education and private accommodations as the dominant 
priorities of black politics.  This view is often accompanied by a triumphalist 
interpretation of the political victories of this era, culminating in the 1954 Supreme Court 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, that set the stage for the subsequent 
achievements of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s.   This interpretation of this 178
era obscures critical and substantial divisions within black politics.  A full accounting of 
these years requires understanding the deep and fundamental disagreements within black 
politics about the source of, and the policies required to overcome, racial subordination in 
the United States. 
 Much like the progressive education movement, black political movements from 
the 1930s through the 1950s were riven by divisions over interpretations of the existing 
economic landscape.  The central cleavage in black political thought during these years 
was between economic democrats and racial democrats.  The economic democrats argued 
that the racial subordination was fundamentally a problem of the exploitative economic 
system, and advocated prioritizing solutions such as interracial labor organization, 
 Risa Lauren Goluboff, “‘Let Economic Equality Take Care of Itself’: The NAACP, Labor Litigation, 178
and the Making of Civil Rights in the 1940s,” UCLA Law Review 52, no. 5 (June 2005): 1393–1486.
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economic redistribution, and public job creation as the most effective ways to address the 
poor position of black Americans.  The pedagogical approach of the economic democrats 
thus included teaching students about the problematic aspects of existing social and 
economic institutions, and encouraged educational program that promoted class 
solidarity, educated workers, and unionization. Alternatively, racial democrats interpreted 
the primary problem facing blacks as arbitrary exclusion on the basis of skin color.  They 
were committed to the goal of fair incorporation into the existing economic and social 
order. Racial democrats placed great faith in the ability of equality of educational 
opportunity to facilitate the fair incorporation of black students into economic order, and 
thus pushed for an educational program that privileged combatting segregated schools, 
combatting racial prejudice, and ensuring equitable opportunity.  Importantly, the two 
groups disagreed vehemently over the fundamental compatibility of the existing 
economic institutions with democracy, and over the ability of education to address racial 
subordination in absence of broader economic reform. 
 This chapter examines the competing political visions of economic democrats and 
racial democrats.  The chapter begins by describing the fundamental political 
commitments that distinguished these two coalitions in the 1930s and 1940s.  The most 
significant distinction between these two groups was the disagreement over whether to 
pursue racial incorporation into the existing social and economic order, or to 
fundamentally challenge and change this order. After identifying the broad political 
visions of these groups, the chapter then turns to an examination of how these visions 
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guided the differing educational programs promoted by the two coalitions.   As in the 
case of the progressive education movement, examining the divisions within black 
politics during this era is critical for understanding why education policy took the shape it 
did.  The ultimate victory of the racial democrats and their vision of education continue to 
shape the educational landscape today. 
The Problems with Democracy 
 The clearest indication of the disagreements over the appropriate direction for 
black politics, and the implications for education policy, come from articles of The 
Journal of Negro Education (JNE).  The debates that raged in the pages of the JNE in part 
reflected earlier intellectual debates over the purpose of education from the Progressive 
Era.  In the early 1930s, there were substantial disagreements over whether to pursue 
integration in education.  Indeed several authors argued against strong efforts at 
integration that they saw as unlikely to be achieved,  and instead advocated embracing 179
segregation as an opportunity to control the education of black students.   As Ralph 180
Bunche noted, in 1935 these voices came from across the political spectrum, with Marcus 
Garvey and the “back to Africa” movement on the same side as adherents to the 
“economic separatism” ideas of Booker T. Washington in expressing doubts about the 
 W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, “Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?,” The Journal of Negro Education 179
4, no. 3 (1935): 328–35.
 Du Bois was probably the most visible supporter of the position, arguing that segregated instituted 180
offered certain advantages.  Du Bois noted that, “when out schools are separate, the control of the teaching 
force, the expenditure of money, the choice of textbooks, the discipline and other administrative matters of 
this sort out, also, to come into our hands.”  Du Bois also argued that black students might require and 
benefit from a different type of education than their white counterparts, suggesting, “Negroes must know 
the history of the Negro race in America, and this they will seldom get in white institutions”(Ibid., 333, 
335).
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efficacy and desirability of pursuing integration.   Others like Congregationalist 181
minister Buell Gallagher advocated embracing segregation in order to build black schools 
aimed at reconstructing broader societal institutions, eventually including segregation.   182
Perhaps the most prominent scholar to question the pursuit of integration in the 1930s 
was W.E.B. Du Bois.  Although Du Bois clearly felt that “mixed schools” would be 
preferable in a perfect world, given the degree of white opposition, the efforts of blacks 
would be better spent in improving the schools that black children attended.  Indeed, he 
noted several benefits of segregated schools, arguing “when our schools are separate, the 
control of the teaching force, the expenditure of money, the choice of textbooks, the 
discipline and other administrative matters of this sort ought, also, to come into our 
hands, and be incessantly demanded and guarded.”   Although the push for 183
desegregation had it skeptics within the black political community, by the 1930s, it was 
clear that majority of black activists and organizations were firmly in support of pursuing 
integration.   
 Ralph J. Bunche, “A Critical Analysis of the Tactics and Programs of Minority Groups,” The Journal of 181
Negro Education 4, no. 3 (1935): 308–20.  Of course, the proposed solutions of these two groups differed 
radically.  The Garveyites and other “racial separatists” advocated physical and political separation in an 
autonomous nation.  Bunche notes that the “economic separatists” were often black business owners that in 
part depended on black business and racial loyalty to survive, and the political program of this group was 
limited to advocacy to create mirror images of white institutions in the black community.
 Buell Gordon Gallagher, “Reorganize the College to Discharge Its Social Function,” The Journal of 182
Negro Education 5, no. 3 (1936): 464–73.
 Du Bois, “Does the Negro,” 335.  Again, this was clearly a strategic choice to embrace what he saw as a 183
situation that was unlikely to change.  He knew that some would take his article a positive endorsement of 
segregated schools, to which he responded; “It is not.  It is simply calling a spade a spade.  It is saying in 
plain English: that a separate Negro school, where children are treated like human beings, trained by 
teachers of their own race, who know what it means to be black in the year of salvation 1935, is infinitely 
better than making our boys and girls doormats to be spit and trampled upon and lied to by ignorant social 
climbers, whose sole claim to superiority is the ability to kick ‘niggers’ when they are down”(Ibid.).
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 Those in favor of integration represented by far the majority position among black 
political thinkers in the mid-1930s, attracting a broad coalition from across the political 
spectrum.  The editors of The Journal of Negro Education (JNE) and Opportunity: A 
Journal of Negro Life,  and The Journal of Negro History (JNH) all endorsed 184
integration as an appropriate political goal.  Du Bois’s support of a planned segregated 
economy led the NAACP to openly repudiate his view, which resulted in his resignation 
in 1934 as editor of Crisis, the NAACP’s flagship publication.   The journals published 185
the most prominent black intellectuals, who in large part also advocated the pursuit of 
integration in education.  The NAACP, which had been founded in part as an explicit 
repudiation of the accomodationism of Booker T. Washington and whose founding 
platform included a commitment to the elimination of segregation, was already pursuing 
a legal strategy aimed at integration by the mid-1930s.    Even the normally cautious 186
National Urban League (NUL) actively joined the push for integration during the 
 This journal was the official organ of the National Urban League (NUL), an organization that operated 184
on the conservative wing of the broader civil rights movement.  
 Elliott M. Rudwick, “Du Bois’ Last Year as Crisis Editor,” The Journal of Negro Education 27, no. 4 185
(1958): 526–33.
 National Negro Committee, “Platform Adopted by the National Negro Committee, 1909,” 1909, 186
Manuscript Division, NAACP Records, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/naacp/founding-and-early-
years.html#obj10.  Both Du Bois and John Dewey were members of the National Negro Committee, the 
committee responsible for planning the permanent advocacy organization that eventually became the 
NAACP.  See also The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, “A Letter to President 
Woodrow Wilson on Federal Race Discrimination,” August 15, 1913, Manuscript Division, NAACP 
Records, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/naacp/founding-and-early-years.html#obj20.
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mid-1930s.  The opposition to segregation was supported by a variety of other political 187
organizations on the left as well, including the Workers Party, the Socialist Party, and the 
Communist Party.  188
 Importantly, the broad coalition supporting a project of desegregation consisted of 
groups with substantial ideological disagreements over pedagogy, the role of education in 
society, and the political path forward for blacks in the United States.  Although the 
dimensions of disagreement were many, the most consequential division that emerges 
from an analysis of the early discussions within this community centered on whether to 
pursue a political program centered on economic or on racial democracy.  The economic 
democracy position pointed to broad economic inequality resulting from an economic 
system that concentrated wealth in the hands of the few at the expense of the majority of 
workers.   This ideology suggested a vision of reform that centered on confronting a 189
capitalist political economy to redress inequality.   The support for integration from this 190
 This appears to due in no small part to the more confrontational approach adopted by T. Arnold Hill who 187
headed the Urban League from 1933 to 1936. Hill was eventually pushed out of the leadership of the Urban 
League dee to rising tensions with the organization’s leader, Eugene Kinckle Jones.  Jones and prominent 
white allies of the Urban League were increasingly dissatisfied with the direction that Hill had set for the 
Urban League, particularly his willingness to push the organization towards a closer association with the 
Labor and a more politically confrontational engagement.   Jones “slammed on the brakes” when he 
returned to reassume the leadership position of the organization.  Felix L. Armfield, Eugene Kinckle Jones: 
The National Urban League and Black Social Work, 1910-1940, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2014): 74.
 James W. Ford, “The Communist’s Way Out for the Negro,” The Journal of Negro Education 5, no. 1 188
(1936): 88–95; Norman Thomas, “The Socialist’s Way Out for the Negro,” The Journal of Negro Education 
5, no. 1 (1936): 100–104; Ernest Rice McKinney, “The Workers Party’s Way Out for the Negro,” The 
Journal of Negro Education 5, no. 1 (1936): 96–99.
 Preston H. Smith II, Racial Democracy and the Black Metropolis: Housing Policy in Postwar Chicago 189
(Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2012): 5.  I have chosen the term “economic democracy,” but 
substantively it is similar to the terms “industrial democracy” and “social democracy” that other authors 
have chosen to employ.
 Ibid., 10.190
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view stemmed from a broader commitment to expanding democracy to all aspects of 
economic life, including the workplace.   The racial democracy framework identified 191
the failure of the United States to fully extend civil and political rights to blacks as a 
fundamental flaw in American democracy.  Advocates of racial democracy argued that 
until all citizens were guaranteed equal access to the social and economic opportunities 
offered by the free market, the United States had failed to live up to its democratic ideals.  
Programmatically, racial democracy ideology privileged securing individual equality of 
opportunity within the existing political and economic order, and as such the elimination 
of segregation was central to this political project.  
 The fact that these two ideological programs were both united in the fight against 
integration throughout the 1930s and into the mid-1940s masked important differences in 
the end goals of groups within the black popular front coalition.  The writings of central 
figures and the educational programs of black political organizations during this period 
reveal the starkly divergent understandings of the purpose of education and appropriate 
pedagogical approaches suggested by these different ideological outlooks.  This chapter 
draws from articles published in the JNE, the JNH, and Opportunity as well as the 
political programs of the NAACP and the NUL to highlight these distinct educational 
visions.   
 Broadly, those subscribing to the racial democracy position identified segregation 
as a violation of the equality of opportunity ethos.  Inequities in education were 
 In fact, as historian Nelson Lichtenstein notes, “integration and desegregation might well be products of 191
this struggle, but they were secondary to the main objective” (Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A 
Century of American Labor (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003): 79).
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considered especially pernicious as they ultimately put minorities at a disadvantage in the 
labor market and led to a host of other arbitrary disparities between white and black 
citizens.  Ideally the schools should offer an equitable chance to black and white students 
to succeed or fail, ensuring that those of equal merit had the same footing when leaving 
the public education system.   Given the understanding that the races did not differ when 
it came to intelligence, any disparity in educational outcome could be considered a failure 
of the education system to provide equal opportunity.  The central concern with equitable 
outcomes for those of equal merit led to a natural focus on metrics of comparison of 
inputs and outputs between white and black schools and students, including school 
funding, intelligence tests, achievement tests, and teacher quality.   Pedagogically, this 192
meant a focus on determining best methods of eliminating differential educational 
outcomes between similar white and black students as well as testing to ensure that racial 
outcomes were indeed substantially similar.   
 Those committed to an economic democratic vision tended to view segregation as 
symptomatic of the types of inequities and exploitation that resulted from a relatively 
unrestrained capitalist economic system.  This meant that the fight against segregation 
was not necessarily primary in the ordering of political grievances, but was rather 
connected to a larger program of broad economic demands such as higher and equal 
wages, fair employment, political enfranchisement, and fostering interracial class 
solidarity.  Inequities in education were not necessarily more problematic than inequities 
 It was assumed that the commitment to equality of outcomes at schools would take care of the 192
disparities that existed in the labor market.
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elsewhere, a reality reflected by the fact that in general economic democrats focused 
much less on the specifics of educational policy and organization.  However, schools 
could serve as important sites in which to foster worker solidarity and much of the 
pedagogical practices that were advocated tended to stress the importance of grounding 
education in the problems of the community and connecting these problems to the 
existing economic order.  There was substantial criticism of the excessively 
individualistic and competitive ethos that of the existing school system and suspicion of 
the value of standardized educational programs and tests.  
Economic Democracy 
 An examination of the pages of the JNE and the JNH demonstrates that 
throughout the 1930s and into the mid-1940s, the center of gravity in black political 
thought was grounded in a commitment to economic democracy that was strongly critical 
of the existing economic order.  Many advocating the economic democracy position had 
deep ties with unions and left political parties.  This group also included several of the 
most prominent black academics and government employees.  Writing in the wake of the 
Great Depression and during the height of the New Deal, these authors identified 
exploitation under the existing economic order as the central problem facing blacks in the 
United States.    
 For the economic democrats, a political program centered on organizing the black 
masses as workers provided the clearest means of confronting the existing economic 
order.  While individual economic democrats differed on many particular policy 
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prescriptions and end goals, they were united by their belief in the fundamentally 
economic nature of the problems facing blacks in the United States.  This was an 
important unifying commitment and distinguished this group from the other dominant 
strand of black intellectual thought, which sought to center black politics on racial 
solidarity.   Despite several common policy positions, the boundaries of the economic 
democracy ideology were in part advanced by drawing clear differences with more 
traditional civil rights organizations advocating racial inclusion in the status quo.  In 
1936, just one year after he had helped found the National Negro Congress, John P. Davis 
wrote, “There can be little doubt that the inequalities experience by the Negro masses 
under the New Deal stem from economic and not racial causes.”   This clear 193
identification of the primacy of the economic over the racial was echoed by former 
school superintendent E.E. Lewis in the JNE’s 1939 yearbook devoted to the position of 
blacks in the social order.  Lewis argued that when comparing the importance of racial 
and economic elements in the problems facing blacks, “one is led inevitably to the 
conclusion that the economic rather than the racial factor is fundamental.”    194
 Many economic democrats were focused on the economic system as not only a 
problem for blacks, but as a challenge to the democratic ideal more generally.  The 
existence of broad economic inequality was interpreted as evidence of an unjust 
economic order that concentrated wealth and power in a the hands of the wealthy few at 
 John P. Davis, “A Survey of the Problems of the Negro Under the New Deal,” The Journal of Negro 193
Education 5, no. 1 (1936): 11.
 E. E. Lewis, “The Economic Position of the American Negro: A Brief Summary,” The Journal of Negro 194
Education 8, no. 3 (1939): 446.
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the expense of the vast majority of workers.  Those who were able to unfairly accumulate 
wealth and power had an outsized voice in the political process, which they used to rig 
the system further in their favor.  Ralph Bunche, one of the most prominent black 
intellectuals of the era, argued that democracy had never truly been extended to blacks or 
the working class as “modern democracy … was early put out to work in support of those 
ruling middle-class interests of capitalistic society which fathered it.”   Unsurprisingly, 195
blacks had faired particularly poorly under this system that consistently favored the 
interest of the largely white middle and upper classes.  
 Identifying the economic causes as the primary source of problems facing black 
Americans suggested a significantly different agenda than identifying racism as the 
central problem.   Pivotal to the political program of the economic democrats was the 
unionization of the black working class.   Ralph Bunche, a professor of political science 196
at Howard University, clearly articulated the central vision of many in this group in 1939.  
Bunche advocated for a for a program that “place[d] less emphasis on race and more on 
economics and broad political and economic forces.”    This political program would 197
“avoid dependence on professional Negro leaders” and instead turn to labor leaders, and 
“devote its full energy to toward the incorporation of Negro workers in labor unions, and 
would carry on incessant educational propaganda among both black and white workers 
 Bunche, “A Critical Analysis,” 308.195
 Many of the most vocal advocates of industrial democracy were well positioned in the labor movement.196
 Ralph J. Bunche, “The Programs of Organizations Devoted to the Improvement of the Status of the 197
American Negro,” The Journal of Negro Education 8, no. 3 (1939): 549.
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toward this end.”   George L.P. Weaver, the director of the civil rights committee of the 198
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), mirrored many of Bunche’s sentiments.  
Weaver stressed the importance of economic solidarity over racial solidarity arguing,  
“We must not only consider the raising of the black worker to a position of equality, but 
must also consider raising the standards of all workers,” and suggested that an 
“enlightened labor movement more and more considers this a workers‘ problem, instead 
of a Negro problem.”   This stance was echoed by Willard Townsend, the first black 199
man elected to the board of the CIO who pointed to the labor movement, noting “Since I 
firmly believe that economic security is a forerunner of social and political impartiality, it 
would follow that the Negro must look to organized labor for economic security.... the so-
called racial problem is a workers’ problem and must be solved by the organizations and 
education of workers.”    200
 Beyond the call to unionize, full employment was the most common policy 
proposal that united those pushing the economic democracy view.  The focus on full 
employment was driven not only by the belief that it would materially benefit blacks 
given their disproportionate share among the unemployed, but that the widespread 
availability of work would alleviate one of the main drivers of racial tension.  George L.P. 
Weaver noted that full employment would strike at the heart of “racialism” among whites 
 Ibid. 198
 George L-P Weaver, “The Role of Organized Labor in Education for Racial Understanding,” The 199
Journal of Negro Education 13, no. 3 (1944): 420.
 Willard S. Townsend, “Full Employment and the Negro Worker,” The Journal of Negro Education 14, 200
no. 1 (1945): 6.
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and blacks alike, which he understood to be founded on “the fear of job insecurity and 
competition.”   Throughout the JNE, the belief that problems between the races were 201
primarily driven by job scarcity and economic competition was a common refrain from 
the economic democracy camp.   As Professor Lloyd Bailer articulated, the focus on 202
full employment was thus driven by the belief that  “the most important single issue 
facing the non-white population is the attainment of economic equality and that in so 
doing numerous other disadvantages presently suffered will be eliminated 
automatically.”   203
 The economic democrats saw advancement on the employment and unionization 
fronts as critical democratic advancements.  A. Phillip Randolph framed the fight for 
organizing workers, higher wages, and better hours as essential to “the larger objective of 
industrial and political democracy.”   For Mary Foley Grossman, vice president of the 204
Philadelphia American Federation of Teachers, a strong public education system was 
critical for protection against “economic rulers” that “distrust democracy” and sought to 
“legalize and perpetuate their class oppression.”   Lucy Randolph Mason, one of the 205
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CIO’s most active organizers in the south, pushed for cooperation between industry, 
government and labor to protect unionization rights and achieve full employment since 
“economic democracy and political democracy are inseparable--the one cannot be 
realized without the other.”   Sociologist Oliver Cox, who advocated a more openly 206
confrontational approach to capitalism, suggested that “the greater the development of 
democracy, the greater limitations upon capitalist freedom.”   Like Mason, Cox 207
interpreted the push for full employment as “simply another attempt of workers and their 
leaders to push democracy another step forward.”   For the economic democrats, the 208
push for unionization and full employment were central to rectifying key defects of 
modern democracy. 
 Those pressing for economic democracy argued not just for centrality of the 
economic structure as the the appropriate focal point for political contestation, but 
forcefully asserted the danger of pursuing a political project aimed only at racial 
incorporation into existing institutions.  The economic democrats contended that the 
arguments emerging from racial democrats incorrectly placed the blame for the status of 
blacks on individual beliefs and racial prejudice rather than on the broader political 
economy.  This logic led racial democrats to a political program centered on “the 
 Lucy Randolph Mason, “The CIO and the Negro in the South,” The Journal of Negro Education 14, no. 206
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achievement of civil rights within the status quo”  and calls for interracial and 209
intercultural education programs aimed at eliminating the misconceptions of racial 
difference that were viewed as the foundation of racial prejudice. For the economic 
democrats like Cox, this was a fundamental misunderstanding that obscured the fact that 
“the exploitative act comes first; the prejudice follows.”   Former school administrator 210
E.E. Lewis noted that “raising the Negro to the white man’s present level would mean at 
best the elimination of narrow margins,”  a point echoed by Cox who argued that such a 211
politics sought “to eliminate only the racial aspects of the exploitative system.”    212
 Several authors pointed out that racial democracy was a class-inflected position 
that was “essentially an appeal to the consciousness of the ruling class.”   The sharpest 213
critiques on this front were frequently aimed at the NAACP.  Ralph Bunche noted “[t]he 
N.A.A.C.P. has elected to fight for civil liberties rather than for labor unity; it has never 
reached the masses of Negroes, and remains strictly Negro middle-class, Negro-
intelligentsia, in its leadership and appeal.”   Ernest Neal of the Tuskegee Institute 214
noted that the preoccupation with challenging segregation in universities, restaurants, 
 Oliver C. Cox, “The New Crisis in Leadership Among Negroes,” The Journal of Negro Education 19, 209
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hotels and public transportation was evidence of the class bias of the NAACP’s agenda, 
since only those relatively well-off in the black community would be able to afford such 
luxuries if segregation were defeated.   Emmett Dorsey, the head of the Political 215
Science Department at Howard University, argued that the NAACP was incapable of 
developing a broadly progressive “economic program because such a program must 
necessarily stress labor solidarity and fundamental social relations reform,” a position 
that was “incompatible with the Association’s middle class and thoroughly racial 
philosophy.”  216
 Beyond simply not reflecting the concerns of the vast majority of poor blacks, 
several articles in the JNE pointed out that the NAACP was actively hostile to the some 
of the central efforts of the economic democrats.  Ernest Rice McKinney, a journalist and 
labor organizer who had help found a NAACP chapter at Oberlin while in college, 
concluded that “[t]he day is rapidly passing and has almost passed in which such groups 
as the N.A.A.C.P. and the National Negro Business League can play any progressive role 
at all for the black worker.”   As labor leader A. Phillip Randolph argued, efforts to 217
unionize black workers had “suffered greatly and been incalculably hindered” by black 
leadership in the “old guard conservative group” that was “simply opposed to organized 
labor for the same reason that Mellon or Morgan is opposed to it.”     218
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 These articles reveal the central tension between the economic and racial 
democracy ideologies.  The economic democrats’ belief that economic exploitation was 
the foundation of black oppression meant that any broad political strategy aimed at 
improving the position of blacks would include structural reforms to the existing 
economic order.  Importantly, there was significant disagreement as to what these reforms 
would be.  For many, this meant replacing capitalism with an alternative economic 
system like socialism.  Others thought that reforms could be made within a capitalist 
system that would sufficiently address the problems of the working class.  Despite these 
differences, these views were united in identifying economic reforms as central to 
improving the position of blacks.  Such a commitment was not intrinsic to the racial 
democracy position.  The racial democrats belief that status of blacks was due to the 
denial of equal civil rights and liberties as well as racial prejudice resulted in a political 
commitment first and foremost to equalizing opportunities within the existing order.   219
Although several racial democrats also supported the economic reforms advocated by the 
economic democrats, many others openly opposed them.    
Racial Democracy 
 The main alternative to economic democracy, and the vision that would ultimately 
dominate black politics in the Post-War era, was the racial democracy vision.  Mainline 
civil rights organizations, such as the NAACP and the NUL, as well as many prominent 
black professionals and businessmen were the most prominent proponents of this 
 See Cox, “The New Crisis in Leadership,” for more on this distinction.219
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position.  Less radical than the economic democracy ideology, the racial democracy 
framework identified the failure to extend political and civil rights to blacks as the 
fundamental flaw of American democracy and the most pressing political grievance.  The 
racial democracy ideology proved much more capable of adapting to and accommodating 
the changing political context as the populist fever of the New Deal era gave way to a 
more conservative economic and international political outlook in the postwar era.   
 The political program of this group was primarily based on fair access and 
incorporation into the existing social and economic structures of white America.  
Although the articulation of goals occasionally differed between individuals and 
organizations, racial democrats were united by a belief that the fundamental problems 
facing blacks in the United States could ultimately be traced back to the color line.  The 
critiques offered of the social and economic institutions of the U.S were primarily based 
on the fact that they unfairly excluded blacks.  This differed from the economic 
democracy framework, which tended to point the unfair treatment of blacks as a symptom 
of institutions that were fundamentally unfair for all Americans.  Adopting the racial 
democracy framework resulted in a politics that took race as the primary analytical tool 
when determining the justness of societal arrangements.  Given that these groups broadly 
rejected the notion of biological racial difference or inferiority, any disparity that 
correlated with race was prima facie evidence of an unjust societal arrangement requiring 
redress.  Programmatically, racial democracy ideology privileged securing individual 
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equality of opportunity within the existing political and economic order, and as such the 
elimination of segregation was central to this political project. 
 The pages of the JNE provide a good example of the racial democracy 
framework.  Dillard professor of History Lawrence Reddick offers an emblematic 
summary of the political end goals of racial democrats, arguing: 
he (the negro) wants the elimination of the ‘race’ differential from the 
social order.  He wants to be treated “like everybody else.” …. for the 
Negro, as Negro, the end-purpose of his “struggle” is to wipe out every 
distinction on the basis of “color.”  This is the long-time goal.  220
The desire to “be treated like everybody else” was a common refrain and underlined that 
the primary goal was incorporation into, rather than transformation of, the existing social 
and economic institutions.  Like those in the economic democracy bloc, racial democrats 
were concerned about the economic condition of blacks, but they had a different notion of 
economic equality.  Founder and longtime editor of the JNE Charles H. Thompson 
articulated the problem facing blacks as  “Negro workers ... being denied economic 
equality--equal opportunity for employment and promotion without regard to race.”    221
 The notion of “equal opportunity” was fundamental to the racial democracy 
position and was often used as means of distinguishing it from the more radical calls for 
economic redistribution and institutional restructuring emanating from economic 
democrats.  A.D. Beittel, the president of Talladega College, made this distinction quite 
clear, arguing, “[t]he American ideal does not demand that all be reduced to a dead level 
 L. D. Reddick, “What Should the American Negro Reasonably Expect as the Outcome of a Real 220
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of mediocrity, but it does insist on a fundamental equality of opportunity.”   The former 222
vice-president and provost of the University of California Monroe Deustch echoed Beittel 
in a speech marking the opening of the NAACP at the university, claiming: 
That is the word “Equality of opportunity;” all anyone of us has right to 
ask is “a fair chance,” and that means the open door to education, the 
opportunity to do the work for which he is fitted, such promotion as his 
abilities warrant (not limited by any form of discrimination) ... In the race 
of life you have a right to toe the same mark as all others.  You ask nothing 
more - no one of us can ask more.  223
The racial democracy framework did not reject economic differentiation or disparity, but 
it strongly objected to the arbitrary barriers, like segregation or discrimination, that rigged 
the game in favor of one group over another.   In fact, in attacking discrimination based 
on race, racial democrats often actively supported discrimination on the basis of what it 
perceived to be non-arbitrary dimension, like academic merit.  For example, F.D. 
Patterson, director of the Phelps-Stokes Fund and the the president of the United Negro 
Fund, called for high academic standards for entrance to college, arguing that “[t]he 
aristocracy of such institutions must be an aristocracy not of wealth but of talent.”   The 224
notion of “equality of opportunity” was critical in delimiting the political program of 
racial democracy.  The focus on ensuring that whites and blacks were given a fair and 
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equal shot meant that disparities that did not correlate neatly along race lines faded to the 
back of the political agenda.   
 This ordering of political grievances was evident in one of the biggest differences 
between the racial and economic democracy position; their diverging view on the 
importance of material differences between individuals.  For the economic democrats the 
existence of broad economic inequality, regardless of racial distribution, was evidence of 
a fundamental problem.  The same was not true of the racial democrats, indeed many 
strenuously objected to the overarching emphasis some of their colleagues placed on 
material differences.  Howard Hale Long, who held a Ph.D in psychology from Harvard 
and served as an associate superintendent of the Washington, D.C public school system 
from 1925 through 1948, claimed: 
If we succeed in diverting some of the excess emphasis upon the material 
aspects of the Negro’s struggle for survival to the subtler problem of the 
enduring and determining psycho-physical sets towards himself and the 
world about him, our efforts will have been more than repaid.  225
This view appears in part attributable to the fact that many in the racial democracy camp 
were fundamentally less radical on the economic front than their economic counterparts, 
a distinction that would be sharpened by the 1940s.   
 Long’s early call to shift focus to the non-material was typical of racial 
democracy ideology, and many scholars and organizations turned towards investigations 
of the psychological and cultural effects of segregation and discrimination.  Psychologists 
played a particularly important role in the examination of these non-economic effects, 
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and psychology studies began to appear with regularity appear in the JNE by the early 
1940s.  Several studies focused on the racial attitudes of school children, attempting to 
trace the age when children were first able to identify race,  the beginning racial 226
preference,  and the awareness of racial hierarchy.    These studies tended to stress the 227 228
emotional and psychological awareness of inferior status.  In a speech given before the 
the Association of Colleges and and Secondary Schools for Negros, A.D. Beittel of 
Talladega College succinctly articulated the findings from psychology, stating, 
“Emotional problems are generated for the growing individual in segregated group in the 
process of adjustment and accommodation in a bifurcated society.”   Beittel also noted 229
the emerging dominance of this view among social scientists, citing a recent survey that 
found, “Ninety per cent of the total number of social scientists replying believe that 
enforced segregation has detrimental psychological effects on the segregated groups.”  230
These studies tended to fit well with the racial democracy framework because they could 
be easily disconnected from a strict focus on the material differences of the races.  This 
 R.E. Horowitz, “Racial Aspects of Self-Identification in Nursery School Children,” The Journal of 226
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appealed to a stratum of upper-class and upwardly mobile blacks for whom economic 
concerns were not necessarily paramount.  231
 These findings led racial democrats to place special emphasis on education and 
attitudes, especially that targeted towards youth.  The turn towards intercultural education 
and intergroup relations was popular in the 1940s, particularly after Gunnar Myrdal 
endorsed the strategy.   This movement was based on the understanding that inaccurate 232
beliefs and uncorrected racial stereotypes led to racial prejudice and discrimination, 
which ultimately propped up segregation.  Intercultural education, according to school 
teacher and frequent JNE contributor Rose Zeligs, was “the instruction in knowledge, 
interest, respect and mutual appreciation of different cultures” with the goal to “make 
children conscious of the process by which they get and keep their prejudices, and to 
eliminate weird and grotesque concepts and stereotypes.”   This educational strategy 233
found broad support from several teachers, religious, philanthropic, and civil rights 
organizations.     234
 As the report from the Second National Conference on Intergroup Relations 
noted, this was an agenda that called for an “approach free from dependence upon 
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cliches,” such as a class analysis.  The focus was instead on developing “knowledge of 
the dynamics of intergroup relations and conflicts...not explained by any one isolated 
factor such as the economic.”   The intercultural education program fit well with the 235
racial democracy framework, specifying the ultimate “ends to be achieved--complete and 
unqualified integration of all minorities into the total American community.”   For 236
proponents of intercultural education, and the racial democracy framework more broadly, 
achievement of integration did not require fundamental transformation of economic and 
social structures. Integration could be achieved through education to eliminate prejudice.  
As sociologist Mary Ellen Goodman argued in the JNE, “If we were to educate really 
intensively and extensively for human relations, from beginning to end of school 
experience, there might in two generations rather little awareness of race in out society 
and few problems arising from it.”   For Goodman and others, proper education could 237
reduce white prejudice, which would inevitably lead to an improvement in black societal 
standing. 
 This understanding of the origins of the problems facing blacks, and prejudice in 
particular, was the converse of that of the economic democracy framework.  As Oliver 
Cox argued, “[t]he exploitative act come first; the prejudice follows,” and prejudice 
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“belief is an empty, harmless, illusion, like beliefs in werewolves or fairies, without the 
exploitative interest with which it is impregnated.”  Sociologist William Brown was 238
particularly critical of approaches like intercultural education, arguing that race prejudice: 
is not going to be appreciably weakened by preachments or by mere 
assaults upon the stupid misconceptions current among whites about 
Negroes.  Such approaches and programs attack the symptoms and 
manifestations of race prejudice, rather than its associated factors.  Any 
realistic program will take into account the economic foundations of race 
prejudice.   239
It was this economic interpretation of racial prejudice that led economic democrats like 
CIO board member Willard Townsend to advocate for a political program aimed at full 
employment, since it would both advance the material interest of blacks and lead “to the 
removal of the white worker’s fear of him as an economic rival.”   For Cox and others 240
in the economic democracy vein, this focus on prejudice and belief was a dangerous 
political move because it fed the mysticism that beliefs were “prime movers,” which 
turned attention away from the intense political fight needed to improve the status of 
blacks, which was the only way to effectively address prejudice.   And indeed, 241
Goodman did argue that one of the virtues of intercultural education as a political 
program was that it “supports the constructive and problem-solving rather than the 
 Cox, “An American Dilemma,” 143.238
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combat orientation toward society.”   This was consistent with the general approach of 242
the racial democracy agenda, which sought inclusion in, rather than radical change to, 
existing societal institutions.   
 In addition to a focus on education, the political outlook and goals of the racial 
democrats led them to place a particular emphasis on the black family and culture.  This 
concentration was driven by the belief that in addition to white prejudice, the particular 
shortcomings of black family and culture were central mechanisms in keeping blacks in a 
subordinate position.  In An American Dilemma, Myrdal explained the connection 
between prejudice and culture through the theory of “the vicious circle.”  Myrdal claimed 
a “dynamic causation,” arguing: 
on the one hand, the Negroes’ plane of living is kept down by 
discrimination from the side of the whites while, on the other hand, the 
whites’ reason for discrimination is partly dependent upon the .... Negroes’ 
poverty, ignorance, superstition, slum dwellings, health deficiencies, dirty 
appearance, disorderly conduct, bad odor and criminality.   243
According Myrdal and other racial democrats, any effective political program would 
address both prejudice and low standards in the black community.  244
 For the racial democrats, interventions like intercultural education could begin to 
attack white prejudice, but getting a handle on the problems in the black community 
would require a focus on the black home and broader culture.  In a JNE article entitled 
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“The Social Psychology and Youth,” Herman G. Canady, chair of the Psychology 
Department at West Virginia Collegiate Institute, explained the importance of home life 
and culture for black youth: 
from the home he learns those basic habits and attitudes that largely 
determine the direction of his whole social development.  Here, many of 
his characteristics are acquired before he is 5 years old (some would say 
before he is two years old).  By the time the culture of his family is so 
firmly fixed and deeply fixed in his habit patters than he never completely 
escapes it.  245
This understanding was particularly important given that many in the racial democracy 
camp focused on the deviant nature of the black family and black culture as a partial 
explanation for poor position of black in the United States.  Sociologist E. Franklin 
Frazier argued that “[f]amily disorganization probably has been the most important social 
problem that has retarded the development of the Negro since his emancipation,”  246
claiming that because it “has failed in its function as a socializing agency, it has 
handicapped the children in their relations to the institutions in the community.”   247
Howard Professor of Education Marion T. Wright noted that the family was an important 
site in the development of the “stigma of inferiority” from segregation and 
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discrimination, as adults transmitted destructive attitudes and disorganization to their 
children, which ultimately “further handicapped ... personality development.”     248
 Any broad political agenda that hoped to fully integrate blacks into American 
society would thus have to address perceived deficiencies in the black family that harmed 
black children and spurred white prejudice.  Racial democrats advocated for programs 
geared towards educating and changing black behavior.   These programs were often 249
specifically geared to lower class blacks, whose family “sub-culture” was considered 
particularly problematic.   Indeed, several authors were careful to distinguish that many 250
of the behavioral problems that resulted in low standards of living for blacks and 
stimulated white prejudice were specific to lower-class black sub-culture.   The class-251
inflected nature of these programs was sometimes quite explicit.  For example, Canady’s 
conclusion for improving the situation of blacks ultimately suggested that “[w]hen low-
status people become more like middle- and upper-class people, they can compete on 
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 The types of education and programs varied widely, including: encouraging better mental and physical 249
hygiene (Maudelle B. Bousfield, “Redirection of the Education of Negroes in Terms of Social Needs,” The 
Journal of Negro Education 5, no. 3 (1936): 412–19; Clark and Clark “Emotional Factors”; Waldo R. 
Banks, “Changing Attitudes Towards the Negro in the United States: The Primary Causes,” The Journal of 
Negro Education 30, no. 2 (1961): 87–93), education on the  need for strong father figures given the large 
number of single mothers (Frazier, “Problems and Needs”; Howard Hale Long, “The Relative Learning 
Capacities of Negroes and Whites,” The Journal of Negro Education 26, no. 2 (1957): 121–34), improving 
parenting skills (H. M. Blalock, “Educational Achievement and Job Opportunities: A Vicious Circle,” The 
Journal of Negro Education 27, no. 4 (1958): 544–48.), raising self-esteem of young blacks (Goff, 
“Problems and Emotional Difficulties”); and teaching better habits regarding money management (Canady, 
“The Social Psychology of Youth”).
 Blalock, “Educational Achievement,” 546.250
 See Canady, “The Social Psychology of Youth”; Blalock, “Educational Achievement”; and Kenneth B. 251
Clark, “Color, Class, Personality and Juvenile Delinquency,” The Journal of Negro Education 28, no. 3 
(1959): 240–51.
!121
more nearly equal terms for the good things America has to offer.”   Howard Hale Long 252
agreed, claiming that a central uplift project for the black community was the attempt “to 
reduce all all striking derogatory, cultural differences from the dominant culture.”  And 253
since Canady contended that “a psychologically good home or a highly stimulating 
situation can be set up at any economic level,” this was a political program that stressed 
primarily attitudinal changes over structural ones.    254
 Like the call to address white prejudice through education, the tendency of the 
racial democracy advocates to focus on the standards and behavior of the black family or 
black culture was roundly criticized by those in the economic democracy camp.  The 
most central critique from this angle was directed at the failure to examine the economic 
foundations of the supposed poor standards and home life of blacks.  Cox summarized 
what many in the economic democracy camp saw as a fundamental flaw in racial 
ideology vision, noting, “both race prejudice and Negro standards are consistently 
dependent variables.  They are both produced by the calculated economic interests of the 
Southern oligarchy.  Both prejudice and the Negro’s status are dependent functions of the 
latter interest.”   For Cox,  the “deficiencies” of black life and culture and racial 255
prejudice were not the result of a mutually reinforcing web of ‘dynamic causation, rather, 
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both fundamentally the result of exploitative economic interests.  Myrdal was typical of 
many in the racial democracy camp in his reaction to the economic democracy position, 
specifically criticizing scholars and activists who attempted to reduce the problem of 
blacks to a basic economic factor, calling this approach “unrealistic and narrow.”   256
 In addition to white prejudice and black culture, racial democrats also looked 
towards the underdeveloped skills of the black workforce as an explanatory factor for the 
social and economic position of blacks.  Although prejudice may keep some employers 
from hiring black workers, some argued another reason for the marginal employment 
opportunities for blacks stemmed from fact that whites were typically better skilled.  
Thus, disparities in the labor market could exist through the rational action of the 
employer.  As prominent NUL leader T. Arnold Hill argued, “Competition for jobs 
permits the employer to make a selection of his workers, and he will select the most 
efficient ones.”   The problem of skill disparity between whites and blacks was seen as 257
particularly problematic in the wake of rapid technological change.  Charles Johnson, 
editor of the NUL’s journal Opportunity, stressed the importance of training for the skills 
required in a changing economy.  He claimed, “A problem facing this race today is one of 
mastering the techniques imposed by technological changes.  It is in this world that the 
Negro must live by competition with others who are geared to the tempo of the new 
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age.”   This perspective led to a concentration on improving the skills of black 258
employees as a means of racial advancement. 
 The fact that blacks generally brought fewer skills to the labor market was a key 
explanation offered by racial democrats for disparate outcomes.  As Columbia professor 
Robert Smuts put it: 
Those who have been actively engaged in attempting to breakdown 
employment discrimination in the North know that it is often harder to 
find a Negro who is fully qualified for a job requiring skill and training 
than it is to find employers who are willing to employ qualified 
Negroes.  259
Indeed, many racial democrats viewed poor skills of blacks as a greater barrier in the 
work place than racial prejudice.  Hill noted that there was “some evidence that indicates 
a preference for proficiency that overrides race prejudice.”   Johnson asserted that 260
“Negro youth should assure themselves of that superior competence which in many cases 
outweighs purely racial advantage.”   This belief naturally led to a focus on education 261
as the best means of improving the skills of the black workforce.  Some observed this 
problem was in part a result of the existing educational system, and the failure of Negro 
colleges and secondary schools to give sufficient emphasis and prominence to training” 
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in skills required for good paying jobs.   Since blacks had to live in competition whites 262
in the labor market, and since a highly skilled and efficient worker could potentially 
overcome the hurdle of racial discrimination, the curricular and broader educational 
strategy of the racial democrats focused on improving the skills preparation of black 
students to enter into a labor market that increasingly demanded highly skilled 
workers.    263
 The call for concentrating on preparing black children for eventual job 
competition with whites fit nicely into the racial democracy framework.  The major goal 
of racial democracy camp was incorporation into the existing institutional structure.  This 
group was essentially comfortable with the free market economy and the inequitable 
distribution of goods to some extent, so long as the inequity was not the result of some 
arbitrary factor like race.   While acknowledging that racial discrimination and 264
segregation were problems, the focus on training highly skilled workers as a way to 
potentially overcome even these barriers was essentially an affirmation of the potential 
fairness of the market in distributing jobs and wages.  
 Several authors attempted to appeal to economic self-interest of whites in arguing 
that discrimination, segregation and providing poor education failed to take full 
 Boykin, “The Vocational Education,” 43.262
 See Johnson, “On the Need of Realism”; Daniel “The Responsibility of Education”; Smuts, “The Negro 263
Community”;  J. Max Bond, “Educational Programs for the Improvement of Race Relations: The Schools,” 
The Journal of Negro Education 13, no. 3 (1944): 390–97.
 Charles S. Johnson, “The Negro and the Present Crisis,” The Journal of Negro Education 10, no. 3 264
(1941): 585–95.  See also Banks, “Changing Attitudes”; Beittel, “Some Effects”; Deutsch, “Equality in 
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advantage of the potential of the black labor force, amounting to a tremendous “waste of 
human resources... for the nation as a whole”.   This was a fundamental difference with 265
those advocating an economic democracy approach, many of whom explicitly critiqued 
the exploitative nature of the market.  For the economic democrats, the distribution of 
employment and wages were fundamentally the result of a political contestation between 
labor and management rather than the just reward for an individual’s marketable skills.  
Apart from the focus on racial prejudice, racial democrats were generally loathe place the 
blame for black unemployment and poor wages on the operation of the broader labor 
market, looking instead to strategies to increase the competitiveness of blacks as a means 
of uplift. 
 Like the economic democrats, the racial democrats argued for their political 
agenda as a move towards perfecting democracy.  Claiming that the social sciences had 
shown that intellectual capabilities were normally distributed in the human population 
and did not correlate with race, W. Hardin Hughes argued in the JNE that, “Equality, not 
of achievement as measured materially but of opportunity, is a basic principle of 
democracy.”   Myrdal quoted Donald Young, the future president of the American 266
Sociological Association, to the same effect in An American Dilemma.  Young argued, 
“Democracy is an empty word unless it means the free recognition of ability, native and 
 Johnson, “Some Significant Social,” 370.  See also Bond, “Educational Programs”; and Myrdal, An 265
American Dilemma, 78, 672. 
 Hughes, “What About Human Equality?” 60.266
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acquired, whether it be found in rich or poor, alien or native, black man or white.”   267
According to Myrdal, democracy in America required: 
free competition, which in this sphere of social stratification represents the 
combination of the two basic norms: ‘equality’ and ‘liberty.’  And it is 
prepared to accept the outcome of competition - if it is really free - though 
there be some inequality.  This demand is the essence of American 
economic and social liberalism.  Behind it is the theory that lack of free 
competition results in social inefficiency.   268
A foundational problem with segregation and discrimination for the racial democracy 
viewpoint was that it resulted in “drastic restrictions of free competition in the various 
spheres of life.”   For the racial democrats, inequality that resulted from unfair 269
competition was a violation of the democratic ideal. 
 Given this articulation of the problems facing American democracy and black 
Americans specifically, many in the racial democracy camp equated democracy with a 
capitalist economic system.  In a 1941 JNE article, Charles Johnson proclaimed: 
Political democracy has been associated with the economic system of 
capitalism and the repudiation of free capitalism, when it has occurred, has 
been accompanied by the repudiation of democracy as we know it.  Our 
present national concern for the preservation of democracy is bound up in 
considerable measure with our concern for the preservation of our 
economic system, which is the basis of our present living standards and 
our hopes for the future.  270
 As quoted in Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 672.267
 Ibid.268
 Ibid., 674-75.  Myrdal’s drastic differences with Marxism are particularly evident in this passage, where 269
he defines “[c]lasses and class differences in America are thus in this inquiry conceived of as the result of 
restriction of free competition and, consequently, of the lack of full social integration”(Ibid., 673-4).
 Johnson, “The Negro and the Present Crisis,” 585.270
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Although the virtues of capitalist economy and its essential connection to democracy 
were increasingly stressed as the Cold War intensified, the ideological outlines of the 
racial democracy position were present well before the onset of the Cold War.   While 271
the  economic democrats viewed the economic system as perpetuating an undemocratic 
concentration of wealth and power, racial democrats were most concerned with the fact 
that the concentration of wealth were exclusively reserved for white citizens.  Whereas 
economic democrats called for class solidarity to press for common political interests, 
racial democrats like Howard Hale Long asserted, “[t]he Negro group must maintain a 
diversity of interests.  Only sterility is likely to result from too much solidarity.  Let 
Negros be found in the ranks of all social and economic movements.”   Ultimately, for 272
racial democrats, until all citizens were guaranteed equal access to the social and 
economic opportunities offered by the free market, the United States had failed to live up 
to its democratic ideals. 
Educational Program of Racial Democracy 
 Education held a special place in the political program of racial democracy.  
Racial democrats argued that black children had long suffered from inferior education.  
This inequality of educational opportunity was seen as the foundation for a whole host of 
subsequent racially disparate outcomes.  Furthermore, racial democrats were committed 
 For example, Monroe Deutsch warned the newly minted NAACP chapter of University of California, “I 271
am sure that you all know that wherever Communism has become master, freedom (yes, all the freedoms) 
have vanished.” (Deustch, “Equality in Life,” 501).  Additionally, in justifying the specific programs central 
to racial democracy ideology, many authors stressed that they were alternatives to Communism.  Mary 
Goodman noted that “perhaps nothing could be more constructive in a democracy hard-pressed by 
communism” than a carefully tailored intercultural education program. (Goodman, “The Education of 
Children,” 405).
 Long, “The Position of the Negro,” 616.272
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to the belief that racial stereotypes and prejudice could be attacked with a proper 
educational program, particularly if these efforts began early.  The understanding of the 
potential for education to broadly improve the material, political and interpersonal 
situation of blacks underlined the racial democracy vision of the purpose of education.  
This particular vision of the purpose of education in turn drove the racial democrats to 
advocate for a specific set of educational programs and pedagogical approaches to 
achieve their objectives.  Ultimately this resulted in a strong commitment among racial 
democrats for intercultural education, adjustment education, federal support, and the use 
of standardized testing. 
The Strength of Education 
 The centrality of education to the racial democracy project was driven by the 
belief that education was pivotal for racial incorporation.   Education could be used to 
address the two problems that were central to the racial democracy political project: 
racial prejudice and discrimination, and the resulting inferior social, economic and 
political position this placed blacks in relation to their white counterparts.   The 
emergence of the intercultural or interracial education movement was an attempt to attack 
the attitudes that the racial democrats believed supported racial discrimination.  Although 
white attitudes were the primary target, intercultural education was also viewed as a 
means of addressing the low self esteem of black youths due their own exposure to these 
stereotypes.  Through providing information that rectified negative stereotypes about 
blacks, those advocating for intercultural education hoped to correct and eventually 
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eliminate beliefs that they thought held up the regime of racial discrimination and 
segregation. 
 Addressing the beliefs of whites and attempting to build understanding across 
racial lines was part of a longterm educational strategy that sought racial incorporation, 
but the racial democrats thought that education could also help blacks more immediately.  
Desegregation of public schools was a major goal.  George Redd, head of the Department 
of Education at Fisk University, argued that segregated education was particularly 
problematic because black schools were chronically underfunded and understaffed.  This 
placed black students “at a disadvantage in competing with members of the white race for 
social and economic gains, when these are based on matching certain skills.”   Schools 273
were the sites where individuals learned the skills necessary to gain employment in a 
changing economy, and ultimately held the key to upward mobility.   Racial democrats 274
contended that the equitable provision of these skills through a desegregated and equal 
education would help ensure the elimination of racial disparities more broadly.  
 Furthermore, the improvement in status and material condition that education 
promised blacks could also help undermine white prejudice.  As Myrdal argued, “the 
ordinary white man’s actual observation of average Negroes in his present inferior status 
make most of his beliefs natural and reasonable to him.”   Racial democrats believed 275
 George N. Redd, “The Educational and Cultural Level of the American Negro,” The Journal of Negro 273
Education 19, no. 3 (1950): 252.
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that the best strategy to immediately improve the status of blacks was through equalizing 
opportunity.   In addition to bettering the economic position of blacks, racial democrats 276
turned to education to address some of the behavioral, or ‘cultural’, differences between 
blacks and whites.  They believed that the long history of slavery and segregation had 
created an uneducated population characterized by a  cultural “backwardness” that posed 
a major barrier to social inclusion if not addressed.  277
Given the faith that racial democrats placed in education as a means of incorporation, 
education would play a central role in their political agenda.  Alain Locke captured this 
sentiment, claiming, “Education is rightly construed as providing not only the soundest 
guarantees and safeguards of a democratic state, but its main vehicle for the equalization 
of opportunity for all.”   278
 It is important to note how substantially the racial democrats goal of incorporation 
differed from the goal of the economic democrats.  Racial democrats were fundamentally 
comfortable with economic inequality, as long as it was not based on some arbitrary 
factor like race.  Inequitable distribution on the basis of what they believed to be a non-
arbitrary basis, like academic merit or skill, was compatible with (in fact, actively 
supported by) a racial democratic framework.  Equitable education in a free market 
 See for example George Redd; “it should be recognized that in Negro society education is one of the 276
most reliable of factors determining social mobility upward.”(Redd, “The Educational and Cultural Level,” 
250).
 See Allison Davis, “The Socialization of the American Negro Child and Adolescent,” The Journal of 277
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economy, then, promised not only the overall raising of black material conditions, but 
also promised that the distribution of material rewards would go to those that most 
deserved them.  Economic democrats were committed to either the radical redistribution 
of wealth (regardless of “merit”) and moving away from a market economy.  
Consequentially, education was of much less programmatic importance in the broader 
political strategy of the economic democrats. 
The Purpose of Education 
 For the racial democrats, the larger political goals coupled with faith in the myriad 
abilities of education to address the problems of blacks drove their particular 
understanding of the purpose of public education.  Racial democrats coalesced around an 
understanding of education’s purpose that emphasized its ability to ease the fair 
incorporation of blacks into the broader social and economic institutions that had largely 
been reserved for white Americans.  They developed a vision of education that focused 
on its ability to challenge what they saw as the fundamental flaw of American society, the 
arbitrary exclusion of blacks from opportunities and access on the basis of skin color.  
The purpose of education they articulated therefore asserted that education should 
challenge this exclusion by equally providing the skills necessary to succeed later in life 
while also attacking the racist beliefs that were foundational to the continuation of 
discrimination.   
 Significantly, this understanding drove the particular pedagogy that racial 
democrats advocated.  In the classroom, racial democrats advocated for an educational 
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program that centered on interracial education to undermine prejudice, adjustment 
education to ensure that the students were equipped with the skills necessary to succeed 
in the labor market, and eventually a muscular testing requirement to ensure the equitable 
provision of education.   Racial democrats argued that the federal government should 
greatly increase its involvement in the education realm, and devote ample resources to the 
achievement of this educational program.  
Interracial Education 
 In 1944, the JNE devoted its entire annual yearbook to “Education for Racial 
Understanding,” an educational strategy that was gaining traction among racial liberals.  
Around the same time, the Bureau for Intercultural Education began to publish a series of 
manuals and short books that sought to guide public school teachers in best practices.  
Founded in 1934, the New York City based Bureau was formed to provide teachers with 
intercultural education resources.    By the 1940s, with several nationally prominent 279
educators on the board of directors and with a climate that was increasingly amenable to 
intercultural education programs, the bureau began to publish a series that focused more 
specifically on race.  Entitled Problems of Race and Culture in American Education, the 
series reflected many of the discussions present in the JNE and there was substantial 
crossover between the two.  Hortense Powdermaker and Ina Corrine Brown, both 
contributors to the JNE, wrote books for the series and the several authors that were 
 Shafali Lal, “1930s Multiculturalism: Rachel Davis DuBois and the Bureau for Intercultural Education,” 279
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active in the JNE served on the board or as advisors to the bureau, including William 
Kilpatrick, Alain Locke, Allison Davis, Theodore Brameld, and Charles Johnson.   280
 Although the moniker was different, the educational ideology behind calls for 
“education for racial understanding” was essentially used interchangeably with the more 
familiar “interracial” or “intercultural” education.   Central to the interracial education 281
movement was the belief that racial tensions and prejudiced stemmed primarily from 
fundamental misunderstandings between the races.   Through particular educational 
programs, interracial education advocates hoped to attack the racial ignorance that they 
believed led to the harmful racial stereotypes that buttressed prejudice and segregation.    
 In his introduction to the JNE yearbook, Martin Jenkins, professor of education at 
Howard University, provided a comprehensive outline of the contours and purpose of 
interracial education program, and why such a program was seen as necessary.  
Identifying the primary problem facing blacks as the denial of the “right to equal 
opportunity for participation in the economic, political and social organization” of the 
United States, Jenkins noted that the purpose of the yearbook was to investigate how 
education could bridge the divide between the ideal of equality of opportunity and the 
reality of widespread prejudice and segregation.   Arguing that “education, the 282
 See William E. Vickery and Steward G. Cole, Intercultural Education in American Schools, Proposed 280
Objectives and Methods (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1943).
 Although there are differences between the terms, I will use the term interracial education.  Whereas 281
intercultural education referred to education aimed at improving relationships between religious, cultural, 
ethnic, and racial groups, interracial education referred more specifically to education focused on 
improving racial understanding.  Importantly, the pedagogical and ideological forces behind the both 
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 Martin D. Jenkins, “Editorial Comment: Education for Racial Understanding,” The Journal of Negro 282
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deliberate use of words and symbols, can be effective in modifying racial attitudes,” he 
pushed for a program of interracial education, which he understood as, “any organized 
and consciously designed program which has as its primary aim the improvement (i.e. 
changing in a favorable direction) of attitudes concerning subordinate racial groups in our 
society.”   A well designed interracial education program could be a particularly 283
effective tool in improving racial relations, and for Jenkins, “the most desirable programs 
are those which have as their goal the unqualified assimilation of Negroes into American 
life.”   The promise that interracial education could eventually undermine prejudice and 284
pave the way for full racial incorporation into American life meant that it had particular 
appeal to racial democrats.   
 The concept of interracial education extended beyond the formal primary and 
secondary classroom.  The JNE yearbook carried articles that examined existing 
programs and their potential for changing attitudes of adults, focusing especially on those 
in religious organizations,  interracial organization,  black organizations,  285 286 287
 Ibid., 267.283
 Ibid., emphasis added.284
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philanthropic foundations,  labor organizations,  the mass media,  and government 288 289 290
agencies.   While it was recognized that these efforts that targeted the racial attitudes of 291
adults were worthwhile, it was broadly understood that interracial education could be 
especially effective for children.  As Alaine Locke noted, “It is not too utopian, however, 
to assume that as we correct the deficiencies of the social education aspect of formal 
education there will remain much less to be done (and undone) by informal adult 
educative efforts.”    Racial democrats understood that public primary and secondary 292
school were critical sites if interracial education efforts were to succeed. 
 The JNE featured several articles that described the particulars of what an 
interracial education strategy would include.  Anthropologist Hortense Powdermaker 
offered specific advice for how to attack race prejudice in the classroom.  First and 
foremost in Powdermaker’s program (and central to most interracial education programs) 
was the “wide-spread popularization of the scientific facts of race and the anthropological 
concept that difference does not necessarily connote superiority.”   The elimination of 293
the idea of biological racial difference, particularly in terms of intelligence, was a central 
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part of the interracial education movement.   This meant exposing students to research 294
that demonstrated that there were no innate differences between races.  
 Apart from challenging the notion of inherent racial difference, interracial 
education advocates pushed for changes the curriculum to include discussion of the 
positive contributions of minorities.  In his 1944 JNE yearbook article, Roy Wilkins 
noted that the majority of textbooks either completely ignored the role of minorities or 
actively promoted ideas of white racial superiority.  Wilkins argued, “The textbook 
treatment of the Negro cries aloud for revision, and we will make little progress in 
education for racial understanding until the average boy and girl stops absorbing this 
poison from the first grade through high school.”   For Wilkins and others, this was 295
particularly problematic for black children, as the lack of exposure to “great men” of the 
ultimately meant, “they cannot function in a democracy without the self-respect which 
comes from a knowledge of the intrinsic worth of their own people.”   The calls for 296
changed textbooks or special attention to the contributions and achievements of 
 See Ina Corinne Brown, Race Relations in a Democracy, vol. 5, Bureau for Intercultural Education. 294
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minorities were also present in the manuals produced by the Intercultural Bureau for 
Intercultural Education.  This concern is indicative of the fact that interracial education 297
advocates were focused on both white prejudice and the psychological damage that such 
prejudice posed to black students.  298
  In her manual Probing Our Prejudice, published the same year as her article for 
the JNE yearbook, Powdermaker offered several other activities that could be useful in 
exposing the problems of prejudice, including assigning students to give a variety of 
reports focusing on race in other countries, the historical use of prejudice against 
religious and racial groups, the prejudice of the Nazi regime, all with the aim of 
“exploding the myth of racial superiority.”   Powdermaker and other interracial 299
education advocates called for the broad incorporation of social scientific research into 
school curricula and attention the achievements of minorities in the hopes that this would 
begin to break down the misguided and irrational idea of racial superiority.   300
 In addition to the factual focus, interracial education advocates sought to tap into 
emotional responses of students to break down racial stereotypes.  In the first manual 
published in the Intercultural Education Bureau’s Problems of Race and Culture in 
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American Education series, William Vickery and Stewart Cole advised that “teachers 
should plan experiences for their pupils which will affect their emotional reactions 
toward those of a different race.”   The authors suggested a variety of techniques that 301
might be useful in achieving the desired reactions, including hearing speakers of different 
races, exposing students to art and music of minority groups, and field trips to minority 
neighborhoods.   Such activities were premised on the hope that they would “enable 302
youngsters of the dominant group to identify themselves more humanely with their 
classmates.”   For the vast majority of interracial education advocates, this also 303
naturally meant a commitment to racial integration in the classroom, as direct exposure to 
students of different races was especially powerful in helping make emotional 
connections across race lines.  In fact, as historian Leah Gordon has noted, the rise in the 
focus on racial prejudice as problem correlated with the disappearance of critiques of 
integration from the pages of the JNE.  304
 Interracial educational advocates also advocated for the use of attitudinal tests to 
determine the existing prejudices of the students.  One of the most popular of these tests, 
known as the Social Distance Scale, asked students to self-report their willingness to 
interact with members of different races and cultures in a variety of different contexts 
 Vickery and Cole, Intercultural Education in American Schools, 81. Powdermaker made essentially this 301
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including friendship, the workplace, in the neighborhood, and marriage.   Powdermaker 305
claimed that this test could be useful in forcing students to confront their own prejudices 
and suggested that teachers host “truth parties” in the classroom where students would 
tell the class their prejudices and how they thought they had acquired them.   In a 306
reflection of the ultimate aims of this kind of interracial education, Vickery and Cole 
argued that these attitude tests were particularly useful tools in evaluating the success of a 
particular interracial program.  The authors suggested that the test should be administered 
both before and after students had been exposed to a particular interracial education 
program, arguing that movement towards less prejudiced responses indicated success.   307
For the vast majority of interracial education advocates, attitudinal shifts were the end 
goal.  
 Importantly, in conjunction with factual and emotional strategies, interracial 
education experts were vocal about the need to make use of “American values,” 
especially a commitment to equality of opportunity, to stress the inconsistency between 
racial prejudice and the “American Creed.”  Powdermaker noted “[t]he inconsistencies 308
between the prejudiced attitudes to Negroes and our values should be made very clear.”   309
She pushed for teachers to have students focus on the tension between the Bill of Rights, 
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the Declaration of Independence, and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment and the 
current treatment of minorities in the US.   Vickery and Cole stressed the need for “a 310
unit on the ideals of equal opportunity in education”  with particular attention to how 311
denial of equal opportunity “threatens American democracy by keeping part of the 
population ignorant, unequipped for work, and incapable of self-improvement.”   In Ina 312
Corinne Brown’s manual for the Bureau of Intercultural Education, Race Relations in a 
Democracy, Brown was careful to point out the pivotal place of education for economic, 
political and civic equality, arguing that “equality of educational opportunity underlies all 
the others.”  313
 Consistent with the racial democracy position, the interracial education advocates 
were careful to suggest that value of equality of educational opportunity was important 
because it helped ensure that academic merit or talent rather than race would would be 
the critical factor in social position.  Vickery and Cole suggested teaching students this as 
early as kindergarten, noting that teachers should stress “How everybody is rewarded 
according to his ability, talent, and good manners - no special favors accorded to the 
socially elite or to any particular racial, religious, nationality, or socio-economic 
group.”   Powdermaker echoed this sentiment, praising the ability of equality of 314
 Ibid.  See also Powdermaker and Storen, Probing Our Prejudices, 70.310
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opportunity to create a society in which “[a] man could get rich through his own ability 
and effort and rise from the class into which he had been born.”  315
Like the broader racial democracy position, the dominant version of interracial education 
articulated in the 1940s was consistent with idea of social and economic inequality as 
long as such inequality was based on a “neutral” category like academic talent rather than 
an arbitrary category like race, ethnicity or nationality. 
Economic Democracy and Interracial Education 
 The calls for interracial education programs did not exclusively come from racial 
democrats.  Several authors in the economic democracy camp attempted to articulate a 
version of interracial education in the pages of the JNE.  In his article in the 1944 
yearbook, J. Max Bond, an administrator at the Tuskegee Institute, argued for the 
importance of education for the elimination of racial misunderstanding.  However, Bond 
was careful to connect the existence of this racial misunderstanding to the economic 
forces of capitalism.  He suggested that the most promising form of interracial education 
could be found in the educational programs of labor movement.   Criticizing “our 316
highly individualized, competitive, capitalistic society,”  Bond asserted that the labor 317
movement’s promotion of education “center[ed] around job and wage discriminations, 
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 Bond, “Educational Programs”.316
 Ibid., 392.  In fact, Bond derisively defined this brand of ‘Americanism’ as “that paradoxical social 317
patter which includes at the same time, the Constitution and The Bill of Rights of the disfranchisement of 
the Negro, economic exploitation, and the consignment of lesser peoples to a place of degradation and 
shame.” 
!142
housing, health, collective bargaining, and more recently against race hate” offered the 
best example of interracial education that would most likely lead to concrete 
improvement in the lives of black workers.   John A. Davis echoed this view in his 318
examination of interracial education programs in organized labor which stressed “union 
and worker solidarity” as the most important aspect of any interracial education 
program.  319
 Finally, Caroline Ware, a history professor and former New Dealer, offered the 
clearest outline of what an interracial education program that originated from a 
commitment to economic democracy might look like.  Ware argued: 
In particular, students should realize how crucially their position is bound 
up with general economic conditions, and should recognize a special 
responsibility to be informed on economic matters, and a special stake in 
working for measures that involve economic expansion an full 
employment.  Moreover, since the mass labor unions offer the milieu in 
which the greatest amount of interracial contact and collaboration is taking 
place, and since Negro and white workers are building common 
institutions, common experiences, and a common society in meeting their 
common economic problems, special attention should be given to 
providing Negro students with an understanding of labor organization.  320
In addition to the focus on educating blacks on the importance of the economic forces 
that were responsible for their subordinate position, Ware also pushed for a corollary 
programs aimed at low-income whites stressing worker solidarity as well as programs 
 Ibid., 395. 318
 Davis, “Education Programs,” 342.319
 Caroline F. Ware, “The Role of the Schools in Education for Racial Understanding,” The Journal of 320
Negro Education 13, no. 3 (1944): 427.
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aimed at the wealthy informing them of “the extent to which their own lives are 
dependent upon what happens to others.”    321
 Crucially, for Ware, Bond, and Davis, education for racial understanding that 
stressed the economic foundations of racial oppression could be a useful tool in the 
broader political struggle.  These authors were careful to point out the need for interracial 
education to focus on the political and economic dimensions behind race prejudice and 
discrimination, a tendency largely missing from racial democracy framework.  This 
commitment reflects the difference in the broader political aims of the racial and 
economic democrats.  For the economic democrats, who were committed to the view that 
prejudice and discrimination were the result of the economic forces of capitalism, it was 
imperative that any educational program make this link clear.  Furthermore, for economic 
democrats the educational program was secondary to the economic programs like full 
employment.  Economic democrats generally viewed the educational approach as 
insufficient in the absence of success on these broader fronts.     322
 For the racial democrats, the fundamental problem facing blacks was not the 
capitalist economy, but an unfair exclusion from free competition within the marketplace.  
Therefore, the interracial education program pursued by racial democrats stressed 
teaching children that there was no difference in the intellectual capability of whites and 
blacks.  The hope was that this  would lead to the conclusion of the “irrationality” of 
 Ibid., 427-28.321
 For example, Caroline Ware was careful to frame her discussion of interracial education with the caveat, 322
“In considering the direct contributions of education to race relations, one should never lose sight of the 
fact that unemployment and economic frustration can tear down everything that has been built up”(Ibid., 
421).
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racial prejudice and its inconsistency with the American ideal of equality of opportunity.  
For racial democrats, education was perhaps the most central means of improving the 
situation of minorities, and interracial education in particular was portrayed as an 
essentially apolitical correcting of misinformation.  Charles Johnson drove this point 
home in the closing article of the JNE yearbook on education for racial education, 
claiming that “the problems to be dissolved are neither ethical nor political, but 
sociological and psychiatric.”   An educational program that broke down white 323
prejudice ultimately held the most promise for fair incorporation of minorities into what 
racial democrats interpreted was an otherwise inherently fair and democratic economic 
order.  324
Cultural Backwardness and Social Adjustment Through Education  325
 Although interracial education offered a solution to the racial democrats concern 
with the attitudinal prejudices, it did not represent the full extent of the educational 
program advocated by racial democrats.  While the irrationality of white prejudice was a 
substantial barrier to be overcome, racial democrats were also deeply concerned with 
 Charles S. Johnson, “The Next Decade in Race Relations,” The Journal of Negro Education 13, no. 3 323
(1944): 441.  Mary Ellen Goodman also praised the non-confrontational nature of interracial education 
(Goodman, “The Education of Children,” 44).
 Alice O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century 324
U.S. History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002: 97.
 Although the term “adjustment” was not widely used, it does reflect the common focus on the need to 325
change or adjust something about black students in order to facilitate their equitable incorporation into 
existing social and economic structures.  It also reflects the emerging field of “life adjustment education” 
that began to take off in the late 1940s (after the more radical social reconstructionist arguments had largely 
disappeared from the progressive education movement) that focused primarily on adjusting students to the 
world they would find upon exiting school (rather than prepare students to change the institutional 
structures, life adjustment sought to adjust the students to the institutional structure).
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cultural and skill differences between whites and blacks that they understood as at least 
partially responsible for white prejudice.   In fact, many racial democrats suggested that 326
the cultural backwardness and poor job skills that characterized the black population were 
capable of keeping blacks in an inferior position even in the absence of racial 
prejudice.   Like the problem of prejudice, racial democrats looked to the education 327
system to address these potential problems, advancing educational programs that focused 
on changing the cultural practices and skill level of blacks to help them adjust to the 
existing institutions and societal expectations.   
 As the idea of biological race difference became increasingly discredited within 
the social sciences, inquiries turned to questions of how best to account for the drastically 
different position of whites and blacks in society.  One of the points of entry into this 
question was to examine differences in familial structure and social behavior more 
broadly.  The differences that social scientists appeared to find regarding family structure 
and behavior was of particular interest to the racial democrats because of the political end 
goal of incorporation left little room for large differences that correlated with race.  
Furthermore, the majority of studies examining the ‘black family’ sought to explain why 
 As Alice O’Connor has argued, much of the writing in the racial democracy camp over the problems 326
facing blacks focused on two causes, white prejudice and black disorganization.  O’Connor notes that these 
two explanations existed in some degree of contradiction throughout much of the 1930’s, Myrdal’s notion 
of the “vicious circle” and “dual causation” essentially allowed both  explanations to fit comfortably 
alongside one another.  Rather than either  white racism or black disorganization as causes of black poverty, 
both caused poverty while also causing each other (O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge, 96).
 See Johnson, “The Present Status”; and Myrdal, An American Dilemma.  327
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they differed from whites, normalizing the ‘white family’ structure as ideal.   This led 328
many to call for the assimilation or acculturation of blacks into the supposed dominant 
family structures.  As Charles Johnson argued, the “manifestations of cultural 
backwardness, though correctable, are nevertheless strong barriers against acceptability 
in the common American society.”   Given the ultimate political aim of equitable 329
incorporation into the existing society, the ‘cultural backwardness’ of blacks represented 
a problem that needed to be overcome.   
 The JNE reflected this concern with the behavior of the black family as early as 
the 1930s.  E. Franklin Frazier, in a 1939 JNE piece entitled The Present Status of the 
Negro Family in the United States, sought to place the black family structure in historical 
context.  Frazier outlined the particular deviations that distinguished the black family,  
such as “loose sexual morals,” “widespread illegitimacy,” “maternal in organization,” 
ultimately producing children who were illiterate, had problems with impulse control and 
were prone to juvenile delinquency.   Frazier suggested that the origins of this family 330
organization could be traced back to the forced casualness of black relationships under 
slavery.  Frazier argued that the lack of strong family traditions coupled with the inferior 
social and economic position meant that most blacks never developed the family 
 Some authors (Myrdal in particular) acknowledge this and denied any connotation of superiority of one 328
form over the other, explained the move as simply recognizing the strategic value of getting black families 
to mirror the dominant social structures - although the highly moralistic tones in which these authors tended 
to discuss the differences of black families should give one pause before accepting the claim.
 Johnson, “The Next Decade,” 444.  Johnson’s concern here reflected his class position, as he noted the 329
particularly problematic position this posed for upper-class blacks, arguing, “no one is more intimately 
involved in the results than the culturally advanced Negroes who are all too readily classed with their 
backward brothers in the American race system”(Ibid.).
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structures of whites.  However, critically for Frazier, some black families, namely those 
that had their own land or had “assimilated the culture of whites,” had been able to 
develop a family structure that more closely approximated that of whites.   For Frazier:  331
In the competitive life of America, the success of the Negro in achieving a 
new and more intelligent adaptation to American civilization will depend 
upon his incorporation into the economic organization at large, upon his 
own cultural resources, and finally upon the extent to which he is able to 
incorporate in his own family traditions and heritage the patterns of 
behavior requisite for survival.  332
With the end goal of incorporation in mind, Frazier advocated for the elimination 
of racial barriers to economic success and cultural adjustment of the black family.   
 In the same year, anthropologist Allison Davis, similarly looked to what he 
took to be the problematic nature of the black family.   Noting the “American 333
Negro family, as sociologists have constantly pointed out, is relatively ineffective 
in training the Negro person to take on the normal sexual and familial behavior of 
American society,” Davis argued that this had substantial negative consequences 
for the “social adjustment” of blacks in United States.   Davis identified many of 334
the same disparities between black and white families as Frazier, noting black 
families were more likely to “have illegitimate children,” “desert their mates,” be 
characterized by parental abuse, eventually producing children that easily gave 
into impulse, were aggressive, truant, delinquent and “retarded in school 
 Ibid., 378, 380.331
 Ibid., 382.332
 See Chapter three of O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge, for a more in-depth discussion of the differences 333
between the academic commitments of Davis and Frazier.
 Davis “The Socialization of the American Negro,” 264-65.334
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achievement.”   Davis noted that although many might be tempted to point to a 335
biological source for the differences between family structure, there was a clear 
explanation for the presence of the disparity.  Davis argued that the main problem 
of systematic discrimination against blacks was that it confined blacks 
disproportionately to the lower class.  Davis wrote:  
the importance of the Negro-white positional system is great...It 
operates so as to fix upon the overwhelming majority of Negro 
families the social and economic traits and goals of lower-class 
people in America.  When the details of this process, and its effect 
upon the habit structures of the Negroes subjected to it are 
understood, the origin of the atypical behavior of relatively large 
numbers of Negro as compared to white adolescents becomes 
clear.  336
For Davis, it was not black culture that was aberrant, it was lower-class culture.  
Davis, citing Frazier among others, pointed to the “major differences of behavior 
within the Negro group, according to economic level” as evidence of class-based 
nature of the deviant behaviors.   Ultimately, the reason that black families 337
appeared to suffer from so many maladies was due to the fact that the caste 
system had driven blacks “into lower economic, occupational and educational 
levels, and thereby fixing upon them the social and educational traits of the lower 
class in America.”  338
 Ibid., 265.335
 Ibid., 268.336
 Ibid., 267.  Davis also used the difference of behavior by income level to attack the idea that the 337
observed behavioral differences could be ascribed to racial biology.
 Ibid., 271.338
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 The solution, according to Davis, was to raise more black families into the 
middle class.  Davis suggested that this would involve the gradual elimination of 
the racial “caste system,” but he focused more attention on the “remedial work 
with individuals, in which we direct them towards new class-goals and show them 
the techniques for reaching these goals.”   This was an ideal arena for education, 339
which would be tasked with making lower-class black students “understand that 
the social rewards of higher status are satisfying enough to justify hard work and 
renunciation on their part to change their behavior.”   Much like Frazier, a major 340
part of Davis’ ultimate proscription was changing the behavior of blacks to more 
closely mirror that of middle-class whites.   
 The idea that blacks should seek “assimilation” or “acculturation” into the 
dominant cultural patterns motivated a wide array of educational programs aimed 
at facilitating this transition.  Some these suggested programs focused on practical 
skills that were believed to be particular problem areas for blacks.   Maudelle 
Bousfield, the first black principal of a Chicago public school, pointed to the high 
rates of morbidity and mortality among black, and suggested that general health 
and hygiene should be a central focus of education for black students.  Bousfield 
pushed for educating on the need for proper “food, sleep, fresh air, personal 
hygiene; cleanliness of the home and toilets” in school, with the goal that students 
 Ibid., 274.  Alice O’Connor notes that the American Council of Education commissioned a series of 339
studies seeking to uncover the effect of racial caste on personality development in the 1930s, which ended 
up with similar conclusions and a similar suggestion of “rehabilitative social engineering, aimed at 
changing lower-class child rearing patterns” (O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge, 87).
 Davis, “The Socialization of the American Negro,” 274.340
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would “carry-over from the school to the home” these desirable habits.   341
Schools could be avenue through which black families began to learn best 
practices that could help reduce some of the disparities between blacks and 
whites. 
 Far more common than educational programs focused on changing 
practical habits were suggestions for educational programs that sought to adjust 
the psychological outlook and ‘personality’ of black students.  Many educators 
hoped to make black students more successful in life through developing certain 
‘personality’ traits that were believed to be characteristic of successful white and 
middle class students, and necessary for advancing socially and economically.  
For T. Arnold Hill, this meant education should seek to “develop initiative, 
aggressiveness, confidence” in order for black students to eventually match their 
white counterparts in the workplace.   Bousfield stressed that if the black 342
student was “ever to take his place as a responsible American citizen, he must 
learn to realize that thrift and frugality must be practiced in all things.”   343
 In 1944, Gunnar Myrdal, following in the footsteps of Frazier and Davis, 
pointed out that the “low standards of efficiency, reliability, ambition, and morals 
actually displayed by the average Negro” were in part due to the fact that racism 
 Bousfield, “Redirection of the Education,” 414.  For additional articles focusing on the deficient hygiene 341
habits of black families, see Frazier, “Problems and Needs,” and Banks, “Changing Attitudes”.
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and segregation had prevented blacks from adopting white cultural norms.    344
According to Myrdal, this had led blacks in the United States to develop a 
“distorted” culture characterized by several “forms of social pathology” and 
“unwholesomeness,” including unstable families, underemphasis on education, 
high crime rates and “personality difficulties.”   Myrdal devoted an entire 345
chapter the personality problems produced by, and characteristic of, black culture, 
including: a “tendency to be aggressive,”  generally likely to be “more indolent, 346
less punctual, less careful, and generally less efficient as a functioning member of 
society” compared to whites,  overly superstitious, a “love of the gaudy, the 347
bizarre, the ostentatious,”  “sexual looseness” and “weak family bonds,”  more 348 349
prone to criminal activity,  and generally “unfixed moral standards.”   Like 350 351
Davis, Myrdal is careful to point out that these characteristics were largely 
confined to the lower class, arguing that many of the the general disparities 
 Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 208.  Mydal’s work was heavily influenced by the work of Frazier, 344
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between whites and blacks could be traced to “the fact that the proportion of 
lower class Negroes is so much greater.”  352
 Like Davis and Frazier, Myrdal’s suggestion for dealing with the aberrant 
behavioral differences that caused the myriad “personality difficulties” was to 
change the culture.  Myrdal argued, “it is to the advantage of American Negroes 
as individuals and as a group to become assimilated into American culture, to 
acquire the traits held in esteem by the dominant white Americans.”   For 353
Myrdal, education was the way in which could be accomplished.  His strong 
advocacy of increasing the general educational level of blacks was based on his 
belief that “Education means an assimilation white American culture.”  354
Ultimately, Myrdal envisioned an education system that would reduce the cultural 
and personality differences between whites and blacks, by helping rid blacks of 
cultural differences that were partially responsible for keeping blacks politically 
and economically subordinate.  As Historian Alice O’Connor notes, this move 
essentially positioned “Negro” culture as a culture of poverty, only escapable 
through adopting white cultural norms.  355
 Myrdal’s report had a large impact in the pages of the JNE, receiving 
regular mention in a wide variety of articles long after it had been published, and 
 Ibid., 979.  Myrdal was careful to note that “Upper and middle class Negroes make a special effort to be 352
law-abiding just as they try to avoid most of the typical and stereotyped patterns of behavior associated 
with the Negro lower classes.”
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the problems of the “black personality” and cultural difference were a frequent 
topic of concern.  The academic turn to focus on the damaged ‘black personality’ 
was driven by many of the same forces that encouraged a focus on white 
prejudice, namely the growth in funding and increased prestige of social 
psychological approaches in the social sciences.   Several articles in the JNE in 356
1950s reflected the increasing concern with problematic “black personality” and 
attempted to offer specific educational solutions.  Walter Daniel, a professor of 
education at Howard, argued that “[e]ducation should develop a personality that 
can cope with the problems with which it is confronted and can advance social 
progress.”  He pushed for schools to develop “frustration-tolerance” in their black 
students.   Daniel suggested this would encourage “the delaying gratification” 357
and help build “restraint” and “will power” necessary for the success of black 
students.   Although Daniel acknowledged that “frustration-tolerance” would be 358
particularly helpful given the barriers that black students face, it also would 
address the problem of black “impulse control” identified by Myrdal, Frazier, and 
Davis. 
 Several authors emphasized on the importance of building the self-esteem 
of black students.  After conducting an series of experiment in which they 
attempted to show a preference for white skin among black and white children, 
 Leah N. Gordon, “The Question of Prejudice: Social Science, Education, and the Struggle to Define ‘the 356
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psychologists Kenneth and Mamie Clark suggested that their results pointed to, 
“the need for a definite mental hygiene and educational program that would 
relieve children of the tremendous burden of feelings of inadequacy and 
inferiority which seem to become integrated into the very stricture of personality 
as it develops.”   Regina Goff, an education specialist serving the Florida State 359
Department of Education, struck a similar chord as the Clarks, noting that the 
problems of black identity made it “apparent that the Negro child need an 
enriched program of training which places more emphasis on building of attitudes 
toward himself, attitudes of worth of self, respect for self, and confidence.”   360
Professor Lawrence Nicholson of Stowe Teachers College in St. Louis, expressed 
a similar concern in his article outlining the Urban League’s position on the need 
for “adjustment of Negro youth,” and stressed the importance of an educational 
program centered on “ministering to the psychological needs of Negro youth for 
higher level of aspiration.”   These suggestions were all driven by the belief that 361
the damaged “black personality” would limit the ability of black students 
assimilate white cultural norms that were necessary in order to achieve fair 
incorporation into the existing order.  The common solution offered by these JNE 
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articles was an educational intervention focused on changing lower class “black 
personality” and culture. 
Skills Adjustment 
 Concern with the skill level that black workers brought to the workplace garnered 
the attention of racial democrats from the start of the JNE’s existence.  The existence of a 
skill gap between white and black workers was particularly troubling to this group 
because it had the potential to relegate blacks to inferior economic positions even in the 
absence of discrimination on the part of the employer.  Therefore, any political project 
that sought to eliminate racial prejudice would also need to focus on ensuring that blacks 
were similarly situated when competing with whites.  Racial democrats turned to the 
education system as a means of eliminating important skill gaps between whites and 
blacks. 
 Several authors pointed to the skills differential as a particularly powerful 
explanation for the inferior economic and social position of blacks.  Some scholars 
argued that the poor preparation of blacks often meant that employers and professions 
that were open to hiring black workers were unable to given the lack of appropriately 
skilled black workers.   Furthermore, as T. Arnold Hill argued, a rational employer 362
would always select a more skilled employee over a less skilled one, which meant that 
even in a labor market devoid of racial discrimination, the skill differential between 
 Boykin, “The Vocational Education”; Smuts, “The Negro Community”. 362
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whites and blacks would mean widespread economic advantage for white workers.   363
Some authors, like F.D. Patterson, the director of the the philanthropic Phelps-Stokes 
fund defined racial income disparities entirely in terms of skill differential.  Patterson 
argued: 
In 1952 Negroes earned 52 percent as much in salaries and wages as 
whites.  Some 40 per cent of all Negro families had incomes of less than 
$2,000 whereas only 16.5 per cent of whites had incomes of less than 
$2,000; 10 percent of Negro families earned more than $5,000 a year as 
compared to 35 percent of white families. These discrepancies in earnings 
reflect the fact that one-half of the Negro male population is unskilled. 
Only one-sixth of the white population is so classified, yet the white group 
represents 90 percent of the total population. It is evident, therefore, that 
the Negro college must continue for a long time to come to hold the door 
of educational opportunity open to many Negro youth.   364
This formulation explicitly placed the responsibility racial disparity in wages and jobs 
squarely on the inferior skills that black workers brought to the marketplace.   The 
solution offered by Patterson and others to these racial disparities was to look to the 
education system to upgrade the skills of black workers. This represents a significant 
difference from the economic democrats position, which  pointed to the structure of the 
labor market, the lack of government commitment to full employment and the 
exploitation of labor as the key explanation for these racial disparities.  
 It was particularly important for racial democrats, who were committed to the 
idea of fair incorporation into the existing economic structure, that blacks bring the same 
skill level to the labor market in order to ensure fair competition between white and black 
 Hill, “Educating and Guiding.”  See also Johnson, “On the Need of Realism” and Daniel, “ The 363
Responsibility of Education”.
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workers.  Additionally, several authors suggested that the need for a focus on enhancing 
the skills of black workers was reinforced by the shifting demands of a labor market in 
the midst of a technological transformation.  Ernest Neal from the Tuskegee Institute, 
noted the particular importance of the changing economy for black workers.  He argued 
“in the future Negroes cannot look for security in agriculture nor the unskilled jobs in 
industry.  Mechanization of agriculture and industry is making cheap unskilled labor 
unessential in our economy.  This means that the traditional function of the Negro is 
gradually passing out of existence; and if he is to survive, he must survive as a 
competitor.”    365
 Racial democrats, firmly committed to the idea of the biological similarity of 
different racial groups, explained the skill difference between whites in blacks in part by 
pointing to an inequitable education system.  The racial democrats argued that equal 
educational opportunity was a requirement of democracy, would help with cultural 
assimilation of blacks, and would be an economic boon to the country.  Professor of 
education Leander Boykin argued that “[i]nequality of educational opportunity,” was 
“limiting Negro youth’s choice of jobs.”   For Walter Daniel, another professor of 366
education at Howard University, the clear solution for the skill differential between 
whites and blacks was “[i]ncreasing educational opportunities so that they will be equally 
advisable to all individuals in accordance with their needs, interests and abilities.”   For 367
 Neal, “Two Negro Problems,” 219.   See also Bousfield “Redirection of the Education”; Johnson, “On 365
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the racial democrats, the provision of equal educational opportunity was necessary to the 
fulfillment of the democratic ideal as it ensured economic reward and differentiation 
based on one’s abilities rather than race.     368
 The importance of a focus on equalizing educational opportunities was magnified 
by the belief that not only would blacks be disadvantaged in the marketplace by a skill 
differential, but this lack of skill would ultimately feed into and justify white prejudice.  
As several scholars had noted, the lack of income for many black families, in part driven 
by skill differences between the races, was associated with deviant family morals and 
culture that was a critical part of the ‘vicious circle.’   Many of the authors concerned 369
about the cultural backwardness of blacks supported skill upgrading as part of program 
that would eventually help blacks assimilate into more appropriate cultural norms. 
 Additionally, racial democrats noted that providing equitable education made 
economic sense, as the failure to educate capable black students and workers represented 
a significant waste of human resources.  In An American Dilemma, Myrdal argued that, 
“if the American economy and economic policy are not going to stagnate, Negroes are 
going to work in new occupations within the next generation.  What is needed is an 
education which makes the Negro child adaptable to an movable in the American culture 
 See Johnson, “The Negro and the Present Crisis” and Hughes, “What About Human Equality?”   As 368
Myrdal wrote in An American Dilemma, “The American nation will not have peace with its conscience 
until inequality is stamped out, and the principle of education is realized universally.” (Myrdal, An 
American Dilemma, 907).
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at large.”   Myrdal’s argument captures the central role that education would play in 370
addressing the skill differential between whites and blacks.  The solution proposed by 
racial democrats to the unfair competition between whites and blacks in the labor market 
was to use the education system to raise the skill level of black students in order that they 
might compete with with white students to meet the demands of the labor market.  The 
result of putting blacks on equal footing in competition for jobs would be the fulfillment 
of democratic ideals, the incorporation of blacks into middle and upper class culture, and 
an economic windfall for the nation.  Education could be used to adjust the individual to 
meet the demands of the existing economic and social structures. 
 The concern with the skill differential and the belief that equitable educational 
opportunity was a central to the goal of racial incorporation led racial democrats to 
articulate particular educational programs to address this problem.  The desire to prepare 
black students to compete on equal footing with their white counterparts led several racial 
democrats to seek to tie the education system closer to the demands of the labor market.  
For example, Boykin called for the development of a new curriculum and argued that 
“[t]he new curriculum should be aimed at preparation for life.  From this we must 
conclude that vocational education is implied.”   Vocational education was seen as a 371
particularly effective way of preparing individuals to enter the labor market.  
Significantly, racial democrats argued that any vocational education program must take 
into account the particular problems that facing blacks.  For Maudelle Bousfield, if “one 
 Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 906, emphasis in original.   See also Johnson, “Some Significant 370
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of the objectives of education is to prepare for efficient service in a chosen vocation, then 
the education of Negros must be directed towards vocations in which there seems to be 
reasonable hope of either immediate or remote employment.”   372
 While Bousfield stressed the importance that vocational education prepare blacks 
for the jobs that were actually open to them, Charles Johnson argued that schools needed 
to prepare students for the changing demands of the labor market given rapid 
technological change.  Johnson agued that these technological changes meant, “On the 
elementary level it seems essential, along with the simple tools of learning such as are 
provided in the familiar three “R’s,” that rigid discipline be instilled in the skillful 
coordination of the mind, hand, and eye.”   Johnson’s desire that black students learn 373
“highly developed and undifferentiated technical aptitude,” was driven by belief that such 
skills would be required in the changing market place as well as his conviction that the 
possession of such skill by black workers would outweigh racial prejudice.   Myrdal 374
pressed for a similar approach to educating black students, arguing “He needs to be able 
to read, write, and reckon, and to be lifted so high above illiteracy that he actually 
participates in modern American society.  Before all, he needs not to be specialized, but 
to be changeable, ‘educable.’”   These authors pushed a pedagogy that was particularly 375
responsive to the demands of the economy, focused on job preparation, and ultimately 
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was driven by the desire to put black students in a position to compete fairly with white 
students in the labor market.  
 The goal of preparing black students for the demands of the labor market 
represented a stance that sought to adjust individuals to the existing economic structure.  
For racial democrats, this educational focus offered significant promise of individual and 
group uplift.   This position, like those that sought to use education to adjust cultural 376
backwardness or damaged personality, was ultimately concerned with fair incorporation 
of blacks into existing social and economic institutions.   This was a clear point of 377
difference with the economic democrats, who advocated for a political and educational 
program focused primarily on challenging these structures which they identified as 
inherently problematic.  The adjustment education program of racial democrats were 
driven by the belief that skill and cultural difference was significantly responsible for the 
inferior position of blacks in the United States, and that any chance of incorporation for 
blacks would require adjustment on these fronts. 
Racial Democrats and Standardized Testing 
 The commitment racial incorporation that led racial democrats to advocate for the 
educational adjustment of black students to the demands of “white cultural norms” and 
the labor market also led many to support standardized tests as pedagogical tool.  Tests of 
 See Daniel, “The Responsibility of Education” and Nicholson, “The Urban League”.376
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addressing skill differential through education also argued for an educational focus on black cultural 
backwardness.
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intelligence and achievement were embraced by racial democrats as effective means of 
finding racial leaders and talent, and eventually as a means of evaluating and shaping 
elementary and secondary pedagogy.  While many progressive educators questioned the 
pedagogical value of the use of any sort of standardized test, racial democrats seized on 
racial disparities in standardized tests scores as an indication of an unfair and ineffective 
education system.  Given the racial democratic end goal of ensuring whites and blacks 
were fairly able to compete for resources, the ability to reduce racial gaps in test scores 
became an increasingly important means of evaluating the success of educational 
programs for racial democrats.     
 Early discussions of test scores in the JNE often centered on the value and 
interpretation of IQ tests, particularly in regards to their usefulness in sorting out the most 
intelligent students for special educational attention.  Although there was a common 
endorsement of the view that racial comparisons of IQ tests were problematic given that 
the differences were merely reflection of environmental factors or the chosen metrics of 
comparison, many authors argued that such tests could still be useful in guiding 
programmatic approaches to black education.  In a 1935 editorial entitled, “Investing in 
Negro Brains,” the JNE editorial staff praised the discovery of a girl in Chicago with an 
IQ of 200 as evidence that high intelligence was distributed across racial categories.  
While this fact was to be celebrated, the editors lamented the fact that there was not a 
closer connection between “very superior” intelligence and positions of black 
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leadership.   The editors of the JNE were concerned that the failure to identify these 378
“very superior” intellects and train them for positions of racial leadership, called into 
question “whether we are making the best use of our higher educational facilities on the 
one hand, and whether we are retarding the progress of the race and nation on the other, 
by expending our energy and machinery on raw material of only average quality when 
‘very superior’ quality is available.”   The concern about wasted intelligence and 379
incompetent black leadership drove the editors to argue, that “[t]here is no good reason 
why the graduating class of every high school in the country could not be canvassed this 
June, and the ‘very superior’ students unearthed.”   Charles Thompson and the rest of 380
the editorial staff argued that the implementation of such a national testing would allow 
for the discovery and targeting of community and educational resources to those students 
with ‘very superior’ intellects. 
 Daniel P. Clarke, a school psychologist for the New York State Training School 
for Boys, echoed this position in a 1941 JNE article.  Clarke asserted for the need for all 
schools to employ psychologists and “trained psychometrists” in order to discover, 
through testing, superior children that required special education.  Clarke agued that 
“Modern techniques of education, developed by psychologists, enable estimation (with 
 “Editorial Comment: Investing in Negro Brains,” The Journal of Negro Education 4, no. 2 (1935): 153–378
55.  The editors suggested that this situation represented a serious problem for blacks, arguing, “Whatever 
else may be at the root of the Negro’s troubles in this country, it is fairly obvious that one of his difficulties 
is in the fact that he has more than his necessary share of mental incompetence in high places”(Ibid., 154).
 Ibid., 154.  The editors argued that because intelligence was roughly equally distributed across racial 379
categories, that blacks had roughly an equal percentage of “very superior” individuals as whites - a figure 
he put at roughly 3% of the population.  The editors calculated there were approximately 50,000-75,000 
“very superior” black school children whose gift could be identified and “developed for the benefit of the 
race and nation” (Ibid.).
 Ibid., 155.380
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remarkable accuracy) of the potentialities for leadership possessed by the child of seven 
years; we can even get a fair notion of the pre-school child’s abilities and prognose his 
developmental limitations.”   Like Thompson, Clarke positioned the use of testing to 381
sort out the most intelligent children for special education as necessary for “our salvation 
as a race,”  noting it would be impossible to “attain racial sufficiency if we fail to 382
exploit fully our reserves of human resources.”   For Thompson and Clarke, the tests 383
emerging from the field of psychology had the potential to be an unbiased means of 
sorting out the most promising and deserving candidates for positions of black leadership.  
Once these tests determined which black students had “very superior” intellect, these 
authors suggested that they should receive substantial monetary support from the black 
community in their educational endeavors.  384
   While Thompson and Clarke were interested in the ability of a nationally 
standardized test to efficiently sort the deserving from the undeserving, others were more 
focused on the pedagogical potential of such tools.  Kenneth B. M. Crooks, a professor of 
biology at Hampton University, suggested in 1939 that while standardized tests could be 
 Daniel P. Clarke, “The Role of Psychology in Race Survival,” The Journal of Negro Education 10, no. 1 381
(1941): 51.
 Ibid.  For Clarke, a trained psychologist, this belief suggested that “the school psychologist is as 382
important to racial existence as are the school doctor and the school itself”(Ibid., 53).
 Ibid., 52.  Clarke was concerned that rather than focusing on the highly intelligent students, in most 383
schools “the dull child seems to get getting the lion’s share of attention” (Ibid.).
 This line of argument was not unique to black educators.  During the same era, James Bryant Conant, 384
President of Harvard, argued that as much as 50% of college students were unqualified, and argued 
forcefully for the use of the SAT scores to help place “others of more talent in their place” (As quoted in 
Nicholas Lemann, The Big Test: The Secret History of the American Meritocracy (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2000): 43).  Journalism professor Nicholas Lemann points out that Conant’s main goal (and the 
impetus behind his support for standardized entrance exams) was his desire to replace the hereditary elite 
with an elite determined by academic merit (Ibid., 42-52).
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useful in selecting the most fit, they also could be essential tools to “improve our 
educational processes in the grades and secondary schools.”   Crooks, argued that a 385
battery of studies had shown that certain standardized tests were valid indicators of 
mental achievement, and consistently revealed, “that our schools are now doing poor 
work in the fundamental tool subjects, reading, writing, and arithmetic.”    Accepting 386
the standardized tests as a legitimate tool of evaluation, Crooks claimed that standardized 
college “entrance tests will help the secondary schools by informing them how well their 
products have made the changes they were trying to bring about.  In other words, the 
curricula of the schools can be guided and the success of schools and teachers can be 
measured.”   Crooks argued that test scores could be used for evaluating the 387
performance of educational institutions in addition to sorting individual students.  For 
Crooks, the poor performance of black students on standardized tests suggested the need 
for changes to the public elementary and secondary education system.  
 Crooks articulated a vision of education as a process of perfecting the teaching 
methods and strategies to bring about desired changes in students, the success of which 
 Kenneth B. M. Crooks, “Is Negro Education Failing?,” The Journal of Negro Education 8, no. 1 (1939): 385
20.
 Ibid., 23.  Crooks noted that there was wide agreement that the public schools were not doing their job 386
when it came to black students.  Crooks wrote that “[m]ost colleges for Negroes acknowledge that 
something is wrong with our primary and secondary schools” and there was a common understanding that 
the achievement of “educational objectives and ideals .. in the education of Negroes is seriously to be 
doubted” (Ibid., 20).
 Ibid., 22-23. 387
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would be measured by standardized tests.   Crooks called for a centralized educational 388
body to agree on the common ends of education, and suggested that the rest of the 
educational process would “be a simple matter to develop means to these ends, and to 
devise tests to check the prospective pupils’ progress in these specific realities.”   389
Instead of traditional “subjective” teacher grade evaluations of students, Crooks argued 
for a “battery of comprehensive, objective tests administered at definite periods by 
examiners, not influenced by local personalities or prejudices, the pupils and the teachers 
would have some definite goals at which to aim.”   The tests would provide students 390
and teachers a clear metric of success or failure, and would drive the search for the most 
effective way of improving student scores on these tests.  The educational goal to be 
aimed for was rising test scores.  
 Although calls for widespread testing existed before the World War II, the passage 
of the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act and the nation’s first ever peacetime draft 
brought with it a massive expansion of the use of standardized tests as sorting 
mechanism.  Although there was no educational or intelligence standard for service in 
1940 when the Selective Service first began providing men for the armed forces, 
 This vision is essentially that expressed by the scientific efficiency progressives.  Crooks’ article has a 388
lengthy citation from Edward Thorndike, one of the founding academics that advocated for a scientific 
efficiency approach to education.  Crooks’ faith in the ability to measure intelligence was so great, he 
claimed, “We ought then to be able to measure our pupils’ mindpower as accurately as engineers measure 
machines in terms of horsepower” (Ibid., 24).
 Ibid., 22.389
 Ibid., 21.  It was clear that part of Crooks desire for implementing these tests was due to his 390
dissatisfaction with the performance of teachers.  Crooks noted teacher responsibility for poor student 
outcomes, claiming, “There is no doubt that teachers are doing their level best, but until teaching can be 
made more attractive by state or federal or philanthropic funds, there will be poor teachers for poor, low-
salaried jobs, and poor pupils will result” (Ibid., 25).
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technological advances in the “art of war” sparked concerns about the need for “men who 
had responsibly basic education and intelligence with requisite aptitude and skill.”   By 391
1941, driven by a concern that the large number of illiterate service members, the 
Selective Service established an educational requirement for induction.  Beginning on 
May 15th, 1941, selectees were required to “have the capacity of reading and writing the 
English language as commonly prescribed for fourth grade in grammar school.”   This 392
new standard was abandoned after a little over a year when it became clear that it was 
leading to large number of rejections and deferrals.  More than 143,000 men were 
rejected on educational grounds in the first four months of new standard.    After a few 393
tweaks, in mid-1943 the Selective Service’s standard of “acceptability was changed by 
both Army and Navy from literacy to intelligence and a new testing procedure based 
upon intelligence.”   Despite the fact that the shift to the intelligence test standard was 394
motivated by the belief that many of the men “rejected for military service on literacy 
grounds …. had sufficient native intelligence to satisfy military needs,” rejections for 
failure to meet the new minimum intelligence standard actually increased.   The extent 395
 Selective Service System, Special Monograph No. 10: Special Groups, vol. 1 (Washington: Government 391
Printing Office, 1953): 143.
 Ibid., 145.392
 Ibid.393
 Ibid., 147.  This was the first time that the armed forces had used an intelligence test as a means of 394
screening who would be accepted for service.  The Army General Classification Test and its progenitors 
had been administered after an individual had been inducted, and was used to largely to assign recruits to 
particular military jobs.
 Ibid., 151. See also, Martin D. Jenkins et al., “The Black and White of Rejections for Military Service: A 395
Study of Rejections of Selective Service Registrants, by Race, on Account of Educational and Mental 
Deficiencies” (Montgomery, Alabama: The American Teachers Association, August 1944); 4.
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of the problem was captured by the dire warnings of a 1944 Selective Service Report that 
claimed: 
Educational deficiency, or a failure to pass Army intelligence tests 
primarily because of educational deficiency, has deprived our armed 
forces of more physically fit men than have the operations of the enemy.  
Total American war casualties as of the last official announcement were 
201,454; total rejected for failure to pass Army intelligence tests primarily 
because of educational deficiency who have no other disqualifying defect 
have been about 240,000.  396
The rejection of hundreds of thousands of potential soldiers for failure to pass basic 
intelligence and aptitude tests called attention the failures of the education system, and it 
was clear that the level of educational deficiency exposed by the Army’s testing regime 
posed a risk to the Nation in times of peace as well as war.  397
 While the exclusion of hundreds of thousands of men on educational grounds was 
troubling nationally, it was particularly problematic for blacks.  Concern about the high 
level of educational and mental rejections led the American Teachers Association (ATA), 
a national professional organization of teachers of black students, to investigate the 
educational and racial implications of the Selective Service’s educational standard for 
induction.   The principle investigators were frequent JNE contributors Howard Hale 398
 As quoted in Selective Service Monograph, Special Monograph No. 10, 167.  This appears to be a 396
conservative estimate, as a report by the American Teachers Association concluded that roughly 341,200 
registrants had been excluded because of educational deficiency by September of 1943. ( Jenkins et al., 
“Black and White of Rejections,” 5).
 Selective Service Monograph, Special Monograph No. 10, 166.  The Report noted that “In peacetime, it 397
(educational deficiency) prevents the effective participation of large numbers of citizens at a productive 
level” (Ibid.).
 The mission of the ATA was “the achievement of the American goal of EQUALITY OF 398
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY for all children without respect to Economic Circumstance, Place of 
Residence, Sex, or RACE” (Jenkins et al., “The Black and White of Rejections,” iv).
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Long and Martin Jenkins and JNE editor Charles Thompson.   The resulting report, 399
“The Black and White of Rejections for Military Service: A Study of Rejections of 
Selective Service Registrants, by Race, on Account of Educational and Mental 
Deficiencies” found that educational deficiency was by far the single greatest reason for 
rejection of blacks for military service.   Under the fourth grade literacy standard, the 400
rejection rate for educational deficiency of blacks was almost eleven times that of 
whites.   Although the racial disparity was reduced with the implementation of the 401
intelligence test standard, the differences remained stark with blacks having an 
educational deficiency rejection rate six to seven times higher than that of whites and 
accounting for slightly over half of all such rejections.   402
 The huge disparities in rejections provided a powerful opening for racial 
democrats to criticize the disparate educational system as a major problem for the nation.  
The ATA report found that the high and racially disparate rejection rate posed dire 
problems to the nation, including a smaller and less efficient “reservoir of manpower for 
the armed forces,” an increased draft on well-educated population groups and “an 
increased burden being placed on those state and communities which have provided good 
 The other two principal investigators were high school principal Francis Gregory, and Jane E. 399
McCallister, a Professor of Education at Miner Teacher College.  The influence of the ATA report can 
clearly be seen in the Selective Service Monograph on Special Groups, which cites the report extensively 
and relies on much of its data.
 Jenkins et al., “The Black and White of Rejections,” 5.  Under the intelligence test standard, the ATA 400
report calculated that educational deficiency rejections accounted for 34.5% of all rejections of black 
selectees (almost three times as much as the second highest reason, mental disease).
 Ibid., 2.  In the first four months of the fourth grade literacy requirement, blacks accounted for 58% of 401
the total rejections for educational deficiency (83,480 of the 143,493 rejected for this reason). Selective 
Service Monograph, Special Monograph No. 10, 145.
 Jenkins et al., “The Black and White of Rejections,” 5-7.  This was a calculation based on total 402
rejections as of September 1, 1943. 
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schools.”   Through examining educational rejections on a state by state basis, the 403
report provided convincing evidence that the disparate rejection rates were due to 
environmental and institutional factors, as the rejection rates for southern whites was 
higher than the rejection rate of blacks in several Northern States.    Furthermore, the 404
authors found a significant relationship between per capita educational expenditures and 
rejections for low test intelligence, with those states spending less experiencing a much 
higher rejection rate.   The authors suggested that the fact that the per pupil expenditure 405
for black students was substantially lower than the white per pupil expenditure was a 
major explanatory factor in the performance on intelligence tests.  They ultimately 
 Jenkins et al., “The Black and White of Rejections,” 10.  The argument that high educational deficiency 403
rejection rates of blacks was unfair for whites was a common refrain.  The Selective Service Monograph on 
special groups pointed out that part of the justification for racial inclusion in the draft was “that if a Negro 
was not selected, accepted or inducted because of his race and a white registrant had to take his place, the 
discrimination was in relation to both men.  In such instance, the white registrant was required to serve 
ahead of the proper sequence for his liability” (Selective Service Monograph, Special Monograph No. 10, 
4).  This sentiment created strange-bedfellows, as civil rights groups were joined by southern 
segregationists in calling for greater black participation in the draft.  In a 1942 Senate Hearing, Mississippi 
Senator Theodore Bilbo urged the Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army General J.T. McNarney to lower 
the educational standard, arguing “In my state, with a population of one-half Negro and one-half whites … 
the system that you are using now has resulted in taking all the whites to meet the quota and leaving the 
great majority of Negroes at home, or they are sent back, because there is the literacy test … That is the 
result of the present system, and that was the reason I was anxious that you develop the reservoir of 
illiterate class”(Lowering the Draft Age to 18 Years: Hearing Before the Committee on Military Affairs, 
United States Senate, 77th Cong. 31-32 (1942) (testimony of General J.T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of 
Staff, United States Army).  The fact that progress in racial incorporation did not always proceed on noble 
grounds is further highlighted by the fact that several white draftees sued the federal government alleging 
discrimination when “[t]he disproportionately small number of Negroes appearing in the early calls issued 
throughout the System on requisitions from the War Department resulted in advancing white men so that 
they were inducted into the armed forces before their order numbers would ordinarily have been 
reached” (Selective Service Monograph, “Special Monograph No. 10,” 53).
 One example highlighted in the report was the fact that educational  rejection rates in Alabama for 404
whites was nearly four times that of the rejection rate of blacks in Illinois (8.5% for whites in AL and  2.5% 
for blacks in IL (Jenkins et al., “The Black and White of Rejections,” 5).
 Jenkins et al., “The Black and White of Rejections,” 32.  405
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concluded that responsibility for the racially disparate educational deficiency rejection 
rates could be found “in large measure at least, in the adequacy of the schools.”  406
 The broad surveys of intelligence conducted by the Selective Service System gave 
a portrait of an educational system in disarray, and placed hard numbers on the 
consequences of  educational failure.   Concern about the problems in education system 407
extended beyond the immediate wartime crisis, as studies of educational military 
rejections noted that “good schools do pay; and poor schools are a liability, no less in 
peace than in war.”   Indeed this line of argument about the danger of poor schools was 408
picked up by many black scholars in the JNE, who increasingly relied on disparities on 
intelligence or achievement test scores as evidence of failing schools.   For racial 409
democrats, who viewed equality of educational opportunity as essential for racial 
incorporation, the testing disparities were particularly problematic.  Using the data from 
the ATA report, George Redd, Professor and Head of the Education Department at Fisk 
 Ibid., 33.  The authors also looked at school attendance and school persistence in reaching this 406
conclusion.  This Selective Service reached a very similar conclusion regarding racial disparities in 
rejection, arguing “[s]ubstandard schools, equally poor physical facilities, teachers with inadequate 
preparation and a lower per capita expenditure of school funds …. were foremost among the factors 
creating this condition” (Selective Service Monograph, Special Monograph No. 10, 189).
 Herbert Aptheker referred the situation as a “the dream experiment” for educational and social 407
psychologists.(Herbert Aptheker, “Literacy, The Negro and World War II,” The Journal of Negro Education 
15, no. 4 (1946): 595).
 Jenkins et al., “The Black and White of Rejections,” 46.  See also page 10 where the ATA investigators 408
concluded that the most important implication of the high and disparate educational rejection rate was its 
long term indication of a “reduced social efficiency of large elements in the population and consequently of 
the Nation … [p]eople who are not sufficiently competent to participate in the war effort, are likewise 
unable to make their best contribution to a peacetime economy.”
 See Roy K. Davenport, “Implications of Military Selection and Classification in Relation to Universal 409
Military Training,” The Journal of Negro Education 15, no. 4 (1946): 585–94; Boykin, “The Vocational 
Education”; Redd, “The Educational and Cultural,”; Carroll L. Miller, “The Price of Educational 
Inequality,” ed. Eli Ginsberg and Douglas W. Bragg, The Journal of Negro Education 24, no. 2 (1955): 
129–30.
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University, argued that the educational disparities revealed by these tests were distressing 
because it indicated that the “Negro is placed …. at a disadvantage in competing with 
members of the white race for social and economic gains, when these are based on 
matching certain skills.”   Increasingly, poor performance on standardized intelligence 410
and achievement tests were used to indict the performance of schools.  For racial 
democrats, the problematic educational system revealed by low and disparate test scores 
fed racial inequality and represented a national threat to manpower. 
 By the 1950s, several groups took concrete steps to encourage the use of 
standardized tests as a means of identifying potential leaders as well as guiding 
educational goals and evaluating schools serving black students.   One such effort was 411
the Southern Project of the National Scholarship Service and Fund for Negro Students 
(NSSFNS).  Between 1953 and 1955,  the NSSFNS, a non-profit organization with 
substantial financial backing from the Ford Foundation and with technical support from 
the College Entrance Examination Board and the Educational Testing Service, pursued a 
“South-wide talent search.”  It sought to “uncover able, college qualified Negro high 
 Redd, “The Educational and Cultural,” 252.410
 It was clear that the widespread use of standardized aptitude and intelligence tests in during WWII 411
convinced many of their usefulness for peacetime education.  The Report President Truman’s Commission 
on Higher Education provides a useful example. The Report advocated for moving beyond traditional 
criterion for college entrance (like a high-school diploma)  and towards a reliance on “[g]eneral tests of 
intelligence and aptitude” that “can take adequate account of the wide disparities in high-school education 
even within individual States” in order to lead to a “wiser selection of students by the institutions” (The 
President’s Commission on Higher Education, “Higher Education for American Democracy: A Report” vol 
II: Equalizing and Expanding Individual Opportunity  (Washington, 1947):41).  For evidence of the 
desirability and feasibility of such a move, the Report noted that “[t]he program for accrediting the 
educational experience of men in the armed forces has abundantly demonstrated that objective tests of 
mastery of knowledge and skill are adequate measures of potential success in college” (Ibid., 42).
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school seniors and help them find and reach their college objectives.”   The Southern 412
Project sent workers into 45 of the largest southern cities visiting a total of 78 black high 
schools in search of talent.  After asking the principals and counsellors to identify the top 
10% of students, these students were given scholastic aptitude tests to determine the 
likelihood of success in college.   In total, the Southern Project tested 3,178 high school 413
students, of which 55% achieved the minimum score that the NSSFNS believed would 
indicate likelihood of college success.   Those students who met the NSSFNS’s 414
threshold received individualized advising on the how to apply for colleges and 
scholarships.  The Southern Project pointed to the acceptance of 523 students, and the 
receipt of over $215,000 in scholarships (including almost $48,000 from the NSSFNS 
itself) as evidence of the program’s success.  415
 In addition to helping certain black students enter college, the Southern Project's 
“[c]ollateral objectives were to experiment with the techniques and methods of talent 
searching.”   The director of the Southern Project was quick to emphasize the value of 416
the first widespread use of testing among black students as a means of talent searching. 
Noting that the Southern Project’s use of scholastic aptitude tests as a means of talent 
searching came at “a most opportune time, when discussions about similar programs on a 
 Richard Plaut, “Southern Project Report 1953-55” (New York: National Scholarship Service and Fund 412
for Negro Students, 1956): 1.
 The College Entrance Examination Board provided the NSSFNS with copies of the SAT at printing cost.413
 Plaut, “Southern Project Report,” 4.414
 Ibid.415
 Ibid., 1.416
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national scale are under way,” the Project’s final report argued that the “methods and 
techniques employed in the Project, probably the only one so far of its kind, can be useful 
in pointing the way for a national talent searching project.”    The timing was indeed 417
fortuitous, as approximately $40,000,000 in new corporate and foundation scholarships 
became available to students seeking higher education.   In a 1957 report entitled, 418
“Blueprint for Talent Searching, America’s Hidden Manpower,” Richard Plaut, the 
director of the Southern Project and the Executive Vice-Chairman of the NSSFNS, 
praised the talent searching function of these new scholarship funds and stressed the need 
for continued focus on minority students.   Arguing that “[t]rained human intelligence is 419
our most valuable resource” and that “[w]e are failing to discover and develop this most 
valuable resource,” Plaut pushed for significant financial and intellectual investment in 
discovering talent among blacks, which he argued promised the “highest yield for 
potential ability” given their disparate college attendance.   Plaut called for early and 420
extensive use of intelligence and achievement testing in order to identify promising 
 Ibid., 1-2.  The report also emphasized that it was the “first use of a scholastic aptitude test as a 417
screening device for a large, culturally and economically deprived group”(Ibid., 2).
 Richard Plaut, “Blueprint for Talent Searching: America’s Hidden Manpower” (New York: National 418
Scholarship Service and Fund for Negro Students, 1957): 3.  Much of this new money was reserved for 
those who demonstrated scholastic ability, which often meant performance on some sort of standardized 
test.  The largest scholarship organization to emerge from this time period is the National Merit 
Scholarships, which was founded in 1955, two years after the Southern Project.  Like the Southern Project, 
the National Merit Scholarship relied primarily on standardized test scores to identify potential scholarship 
recipients.
 This report, like the Southern Project, was funded by the Ford Foundation’s Fund for the Advancement 419
of Education.  Kenneth Clark was also a member of the board of directors of the National Scholarship 
Service and Fund for Negro Students.
 Plaut, “Blueprint for Talent Searching,” 6.420
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students, who could then be targeted for special attention and scholarships.   In an echo 421
of the earlier calls of Thompson and Clarke, Plaut pushed for the widespread adoption of 
testing as a means of efficiently sorting the manpower resources of the nation. 
 As the NSSFNS was extolling the virtues of testing as a means of identifying 
talent, other organizations sought to harness the pedagogical potential of standardized 
tests.  Most notably, the Phelps-Stokes Fund, a philanthropic non-profit organization with 
a longstanding commitment to improving education and race relations, in 1955 began a 
five year program called the Project of the Improvement of Instruction in Secondary 
Schools to address what they deemed the most immediate need of black students.   
Writing in the JNE, project director Aaron Brown noted that that justification for the 
assessment that this was the most pressing need was due to constant reports that black 
students consistently scored lower on standardized tests and were entering college 
unprepared.   The primary goal of the project was to “raise the level of academic 422
achievement of students in participating secondary schools to a point more in line with 
 Although Plaut noted that the lower scores of disadvantaged students were not particularly useful in 421
predicting college success, he still advocated for such tests as the best means of identifying talent, arguing, 
“We do know that tests of verbal and quantitative aptitude and school achievement are among the best 
predictors of scholastic attainment in high school and college.  For these reasons such tests are suggested 
for use in identifying talented pupils”(Ibid., 34). 
 Aaron Brown, “The Phelps-Stokes Fund and Its Projects,” The Journal of Negro Education 25, no. 4 422
(1956): 456–62.  The article cites an unnamed college professor who claimed “At our university a group of 
tests is given to the high school students and on practically any standard test 80% of the students is below 
the national norm” (Ibid., 456).  The article also cites the NSSFNS report on their Southern Project in 
which 50-60% of top black students were able to achieve minimum qualifying scores (for a prognosis of 
college success) on aptitude tests (Ibid., 457).
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national norms.”   Evidence of success would come in the form of elimination of racial 423
gaps in standardized test scores.    424
 The testing regime was one of the most prominent features of the Southern 
Project, with frequent JNE contributor Howard Hale Long signing on to design this 
aspect of the program   The NSSFNS focused on southern states and sought 425
cooperation from state superintendents of education and college presidents.  Throughout 
its five year history, the Southern Project had a broad reach, with participation from 
10,000 high school students, 500 high school teachers, 175 college and university 
teachers, and 50 administrators.   High schools and colleges agreed to a multi-year 426
program of intensive in-service training of teachers by college professors, with particular 
attention to improving instructional technique and “assisting the schools in developing 
sound evaluative techniques.”   Participating high schools were required to administer 427
four standardized exams each year to every entering freshman and graduating student.   428
This evaluation requirement was accompanied with encouraging extensive use of 
 Ibid., 457. 423
 In justifying the Project, Brown also pointed specifically to the racial gap on median achievement test 424
scores in elementary and secondary school students.  Of particular concern was the widening of the gap in 
the years after the fourth grade (Ibid., 456).
 See Brown, “The Phelps-Stokes Fund” and Aaron Brown, Ladders To Improvement: Report of a Project 425
for the Improvement of Instruction in Secondary Schools (New York, NY: The Phelps-Stokes Fund, 
1960).Long died shortly after, with much of the duties being taken over by Frank A. DeCosta, the Director 
of Student Teaching at Morgan State College, another contributor to the JNE.
 Brown, Ladders to Improvement, A-iii.  This represented sixteen public high schools and sixteen private 426
and public colleges as well as three resource universities.
 Brown, “The Phelps Stokes Fund,” 459.427
 Brown, Ladders to Improvement, These four tests were portions of the Iowa Tests of Educational 428
Development that focused on reading, social studies, natural science, and quantitative reasoning.(Ladders - 
Chapter III; Frank Decosta)
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“objective tests” by individual teachers as a means of evaluating pupil achievement and 
the effectiveness of teaching method.   For many teachers and students, this was their 429
first exposure to standardized tests.   In the final report on the Southern Project, director 430
Aaron Brown pointed to “[u]tilization of sound evaluation techniques and reliable 
instruments” as one of the greatest accomplishments, noting that “this area has been one 
of the most encouraging outcomes because the growth has been both rapid and 
substantial.”  431
 In evaluating the success of the Southern Project, the final report relied heavily on 
the effects of its programs on the standardized test scores of black students.  The report 
touted significantly higher scores by graduating students in 1959 at the end of the project 
when compared to the scores of those that had graduated in 1956.  By 1959, students who 
had participated in the program scored in higher in the national percentile than had 
students in 1956, meaning a reduction in the racial achievement gap.   Given that 432
“constant evaluation” was seen as key to improving educational instruction and 
outcomes, the project widely disseminated these scores, sending each participating 
schools reports of the performance scores of individual students, as well as their 
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comparative ranking among all schools in the project.   The final report used test scores 433
to identify underperforming schools and to suggest academic areas in need of 
improvement.   434
 By the 1950s the appeal of standardized tests to racial democrats was well in 
place.  Racial democrats were firmly committed to fair incorporation into existing 
economic and social structures, which they believed required equitable educational 
opportunity.  The goal was that merit, rather than race should ultimately determine one’s 
standing.  The overarching concern with establishing an equitable outcomes for those of 
equal merit meant that standardized testing fit quite well with the broader political 
program of racial democrats.  The “objective” metrics of comparison, like standardized 
intelligence or achievement tests, could help ensure that advancement in education and 
individual standing resulted from merit.  For racial democrats, the gaping racial 
disparities in test scores provided clear evidence of a lack of equitable educational 
opportunity.   The evidence of disparities contributed to calls for an “educational 435
reconstruction” that was “based on valid evidence successfully translated into 
practice.”   Racial democrats argued that standardized tests could be used not only to 436
determine the meritorious, but could also point the way towards better educational 
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practice.  As the tests became a way to judge the worth of the individual as well as the 
performance of schools and teachers, Crooks vision of a system in which “entrance tests 
… become tied up with the aims of education,” increasingly represented the racial 
democratic position.   Testing in education became a means by which the goal of fair 437
racial incorporation could be evaluated and eventually realized. 
 While the use of standardized tests in education was a natural fit with the racial 
democratic position, they were largely antithetical to the educational program of 
economic democrats.  Economic democrats had long been critics of standardized tests as 
a tool, arguing that they tended to foster excessive individualism and competitiveness.  
Calls for talent searching and discovery of “superior intellects” indicated that a 
significant part of the aim of education for racial democrats involved sorting students on 
the basis of intellectual capacity and preparation for future leadership.  As the final report 
on the Phelps-Stokes fund indicated, the tests were designed so that “desirably, the 
distribution of pupils’ achievement test scores should become more variable as pupils 
progress from grade to grade,” and “the function of the school is to develop individual 
potentialities, rather than group conformity.”   The role of tests, and by extension, the 438
role of the public school, was designed to find variation and reward the high scorers.  
This vision ran counter to the solidaristic approach envisioned by economic democrats, 
who tended to advocate for an educational program primarily focused on fostering 
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cooperation and class solidarity.   The extent of opposition to standardized tests among 439
economic democrats is evident in a 1938 JNE article by Philadelphia AFT Vice President 
Mary Foley Grossman.  Grossman argued forcefully against the use of standardized tests 
for sorting and evaluation, claiming “[t]he use of the I.Q. as an instrument of pressuring 
children into groups with limited and undesirable curricula is an abuse of their 
democratic privileges,” and noting that such tests tended to dangerously restrict the 
curriculum, which “suits the purpose of industry to mold belt-line minds in belt-line 
bodies.”   The introduction of standardized tests was largely incompatible with the 440
broader educational aims of Mary Foley Grossman and other economic democrats.   
Conclusion 
 The fundamental cleavage between economic democrats and racial democrats was 
over the whether improving the situation of blacks in the United States also required 
substantial changes to the economic landscape.  The differences on this central issue 
drove the development of educational perspectives and programs that were substantially 
different between the two groups.  Economic democrats viewed racial subordination in 
the United States as fundamentally resulting from exploitative economic arrangements.  
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This group viewed the primary task of education as educating students about these 
problematic social arrangements and providing tools and strategies, such as worker 
organization, to address these problems.  Importantly, because they viewed the problems 
facing blacks in the United States as fundamentally economic in nature, the economic 
democrats placed significantly less faith in the ability of education to address the poor 
condition of black citizens.  Instead, far more emphasis was placed on the importance of 
economic policies such as full employment, redistributive foundation, unionization, and 
democracy in the workplace as the primary means through which the problems facing 
black citizens.  Given the much more limited faith in power of education, unsurprising, 
the educational programs of the economic democrats were not nearly as substantial as 
that of the racial democrats.  However, the differences in the educational approaches of 
the two groups are clear from the strident critiques economic democrats like Oliver Cox 
levied at the educational politics and ideology of racial democrats. 
 The ultimate political goal of the racial democrats was fair incorporation into 
existing social end economic structures, and they viewed the education system as a 
particularly effective way of achieving this goal.  Significantly, racial democrats did not 
identify economic exploitation or the significant inequalities as the most problematic 
aspect the existing economy in the United States.  Instead, the racial democrats pointed to 
the fact that racial categories meant that opportunities for success in the existing 
economic landscape were distributed unfairly. It was this perspective that caused them to 
view education as a particularly potent vehicle to effectively ensure that opportunities 
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were based on merit, rather than racial categories.  This perspective also suggested a host 
of educational best practices, including interracial education to combat psychological 
prejudice, skills education to help black students effectively compete against white 
students in the labor market, and racial comparison of standardized test results to evaluate 
whether true equality of opportunity existed. 
 Fundamentally, the racial democratic perspective was not critical of significant 
economic inequality, rather it was critical of economic inequality that was ineffectively 
distributed.  This was quite close to the ideological perspective of the social efficiency 
progressives, and not surprisingly, the educational proposals of the two groups have 
substantial overlap.  Similarly, the critique of the economic order that served as the 
foundation for the economic democrats placed them in ideological alignment with the 
social reconstructionist wing of the progressive education movement.  Although the 
educational program of economic democrats was not nearly as extensive as that of the 
social reconstructionists, both groups advocated for a pedagogy that focused on broad 
social problems as well as providing students tools to help address these problems.   
 The economic democracy perspective was in many ways the dominant (but not 
exclusive) perspective in the pages of the JNE throughout the 1930s and into the early 
1940s. By the mid-1940s, this had begun to change, as the racial democracy framework 
came to increasing monopolize the discussion of black politics and education.  Chapter 4 
turns to examination of the political developments that drastically limited the ability of 
the economic democrats and social reconstructionists to advocate for a politics and 
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educational perspective that centered on a critique of the existing economic order.  As 
these voices were marginalized throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the ideas and policies of 
the racial democrats and social efficiency progressives increasingly dominated the 
educational landscape. 
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Chapter Four  
Communism, Courts, and Context: Political Developments in the 1940s and 1950s 
and the Death of the Educational Left 
 Scholars seeking to understand political developments in the second half of the 
twentieth century have often overlooked the significance of the 1940s and 1950s.  
Occasionally referred to as an “Age of Consensus,” the time period between the end of 
World War II and the 1960s has been described as affluent, homogenous, bland, and 
conformist.  However, as historian Thomas Sugrue has noted, a more apt description of 
this time period is one of intense conflict between groups with very different political 
visions.  The common interpretation of these years as an “Age of Consensus” flows from 
the fact that one side - a resurgent business community that joined with anti-communist 
liberals from both political parties - was the overwhelming victor in the conflict between 
visions. The lopsided victory of one coalition over the other masks the fierce battles of 
the time period, which Sugrue ultimately describes as “an era of brutality, of attempts to 
silence dissent.”  441
 The silencing of dissent in during the 1940s and 1950s had significant effects on 
the ideas and coalitions during this time period, particularly on the left.  The changing 
international and domestic political context of this era greatly weakened the ability of 
individuals on the left to  effectively advance policies and arguments that were openly 
critical of existing economic arrangements and made organizing coalitions around such 
an agenda nearly impossible.  Thus, the 1940s-1950s represent not only a time period of 
 Thomas J. Sugrue, “Reassessing the History of Postwar America,” Prospects 20 (October 1995): 505.441
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fierce contestation but also one of limitation of alternatives.  While scholars such as 
Daniel T. Rodgers and Daniel Stedman Jones have pointed to the 1970s as a critical 
moment for the emergence of a neoliberalism that would come to dominate the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century, the story is incomplete without understanding 
the ideological contraction of the left that occurred in years following World War II.   442
The 1940s and 1950s did much to set the ideological stage for the later neoliberal turn in 
American politics, as a resurgent form of business friendly liberalism moved to curtail 
challenges from the left, destroying coalitions and individuals on the way.  
 Critically, this curtailment of the left had important consequences for education.  
As the American left was hobbled by a changing international context, a resurgent 
business community, shifting court doctrines, and outright repression - the postwar 
environment greatly advantaged educational coalitions and ideas that could accommodate 
the changing political landscape.  This political context greatly advantaged racial 
democrats and scientific efficiency progressives, who were able to articulate a policy 
agenda for education that was largely divorced from radical critiques of American 
political and economic structures.  In the 1940s and 1950s, the dominant education 
coalition on the left switched from those that pursued fundamental social transformation 
to those that pushed for incorporation into existing structures as the primary goal of 
education. This chapter takes aim at outlining the political context and developments of 
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(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge, Mass.; 
London: Belknap Press, 2012).
!186
the 1940s and 1950s that greatly limited the left, and the consequences of this change for 
the ideological visions and coalitions of education. 
The Changing International Context 
 One of the most significant developments ultimately shaping the ideological and 
coalitional landscape was the rapidly shifting international context of the 1940s and 
1950s. 
Events including the rise of Nazism, the entrance of the United States into World War II, 
and the onset of the Cold War provided a peculiar mix of opportunity and peril for the 
individuals and policies of the American left. The exigencies of the international situation 
during this era open up avenues for effective pressure on certain fronts, such as the 
attainment of civil rights, even as it all but shut the door on radical economic critiques.  
Ultimately, international events greatly privileged a programatic approach from the left 
centered on making existing institutional arrangements more fair, rather than wholesale 
transformation of the economic order. 
International Relations before World War II  
 The dramatic break with the ideological tenor of the 1930s and early 1940s 
highlights the developments of the immediate postwar decades.  During this earlier time 
period, the ideological center of gravity for left politics was organized around critiques of 
the exploitative nature of the American economic order.  Among black political circles, a 
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group of young black intellectuals including Ralph Bunche, Abram Harris, Richard 
Wright, and E. Franklin Frazier advocated for a reorientation of black political activity 
along class lines and away from the racialist thinking of the NAACP and NUL.  
Conferences like the Second Amenia conference in 1933 and the 1935 “The Position of 
the Negro in Our National Economic Crisis”  conference at Howard University that led to 
the formation of the National Negro Congress (NNC), sought to give organizational 
strength to a political program focused on uniting black and white laborers in the hopes 
of taking on the economic exploitation that flowed from the capitalist economic order. 
Indeed, in the late 1930s, the NNC had broad appeal and was frequently at the center of 
debates and black political activism.   The American Student Union and the League of 443
American Writers were also formed in 1935, and had members from a similarly broad 
mix of leftist perspectives, including a substantial communists contingent.  These 444
organizations and others formed a broad coalition of Popular Front organizations that 
rallied around shared goals of economic justice, unionization and class solidarity, anti-
racism, and anti-fascism.    445
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 One of the first international events that began to expose cracks in the left was the 
1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that established an official policy of nonaggression 
between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.  This agreement was a sharp change from 
the previous communist stance of open hostility and active resistance of fascism.  The 
pact put the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) in the position of shifting stances from one 
of cooperation with a broad coalition, including the Roosevelt administration, in resisting 
the spread of fascism to advocating for isolation almost overnight.  Doxey Wilkerson, a 
member of the Communist Party and a frequent contributor to The Journal of Negro 
Education (JNE), was emblematic of this switch.   In a 1941 article, Wilkerson urged 
against involvement in a conflict of “rival imperialisms” and argued that “the government 
of this newer America has placed our nation ‘beside’ Britain, again to prosecute an 
imperialist war under the guise of a great ‘moral’ crusade.”    446
 This new position was roundly criticized by many within the Popular Front. This 
resulted in substantial fracturing among organizations and individuals of the left.  Ralph 
Bunche, who had tolerated the significant involvement of communists in the National 
Negro Congress, was particularly critical.  In a 1940 JNE article, Bunche criticized the 
new position of the communists as “sophistry of the cheapest variety,” noting that the 
Party had urged support of the fight against fascism in Spain less than a year prior, “but 
then came the Communist shift from the Popular Front line, the Soviet-Nazi pact, and 
 Doxey A. Wilkerson, “Russia’s Proposed New World Order of Socialism,” The Journal of Negro 446
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now Russia and the Communists are on the other side.”   Bunche suggested that this 447
rapid switch was a clear indication of the CPUSA’s true commitments, arguing “the 
Negro interest for the Communists is tied to uncertain and constantly shifting foreign 
policy of the Soviet Union.”   This moment was also pivotal for labor leader and 448
president of the NNC A. Phillip Randolph, who halted his pragmatic cooperation with the 
Communist Party after the 1939 Pact.  In fact, both Bunche and Randolph ceased their 
relationship with the NNC in 1940 after it followed the communist line and switched 
from strong support of Roosevelt and antifascism to a noninterventionist.   This 449
complete break with CPUSA was significant given that the Communist Party had been 
the been one of the earliest organizations to support racial equality and one of its most 
dedicated proponents.      450
 The Soviet-Nazi Pact was not the only international event that had contributed to 
the fracturing of the left in the late 1930s.  Other prominent intellectuals on the left 
became increasingly critical of the Soviet Union in the wake of the Great Purge, a 
widespread program of political repression and elimination of political opposition from 
1936 through 1938.  Despite earlier work that had largely lauded the Soviet Union, leftist 
scholars including Social Frontier contributors George Counts, John Dewey, William H. 
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Kilpatrick and Sidney Hooks became openly critical of the Soviet Union after the purges.  
Indeed, Dewey and Hook formed the Committee for Cultural Freedom in 1939, which 
committed itself to fighting the “totalitarianism” of Soviet Russia in addition to that of 
Germany and Italy.    After hearing about the Soviet-Nazi pact, George Counts, whose 451
relationship with the CPUSA had already soured due to the purges, joined an anti-
communist faction of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT).  With the support of 
Dewey, Counts was elected president of the AFT in 1939, and steadily limited the 
influence of communists within the union, including Doxey Wilkerson and Mary 
Grossman.  The AFT was not alone in seeking to counteract the influence of 452
communists in the wake of the 1939 pact.  A number of liberal groups and other unions 
passed so called “Communazi” resolutions aimed at excluding supporters of 
“totalitarianism,” either from the right or the left, from membership.   The fact that 453
communists were the dominant organized group in the Popular Front meant that this 
backlash left it weakened, and several groups, including the American Student Union and 
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League of American Writers, disbanded in the early 1940s.   The renunciation of 454
communism and the effort to sever communists from participation in the Popular Front in 
the late 1930s represented a significant fracturing of the left, and it was largely 
precipitated by international events. 
 The CPUSA was forced to change its position once again after Germany invaded 
Soviet territory in June of 1941.  The party abandoned its isolationist stance and pushed 
for engagement in the conflict.  In a 1942 article appearing in the JNE just months after 
he had strenuously objected to joining what he called an imperialist war, Doxey 
Wilkerson urged full cooperation in the war effort, citing the necessity to “crush the 
fascist aggressors with their state-sponsored ideologies of race hate and persecution.”   455
For many, the whiplash engendered by this second about-face on the issue of 
international politics further called into question the priorities of the CPUSA.  Beyond 
issues of consistency, the fact that party members called for the subordination of protests, 
or in some cases “no-strike pledges,” in order to prevent obstructing the war effort led 
many to conclude that the communists ultimately were loyal only to Moscow.  Like the 
Party’s earlier switch, the interventionist stance led to significant loss of membership, 
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including some prominent members such as Richard Wright and his wife, who objected 
to the Party's new pro-War advocacy.  456
 Despite the further loss of members, the communists’ re-embrace of the Roosevelt 
administration’s foreign policy did moderate the most vigorous efforts at policing the left, 
particularly after the United States officially joined the War in late 1941.  The fact that 
Soviet Russia and the United States were now allies in the fight against the Axis powers 
lessened the pressure to purge communists from organizations on the left, and reopened a 
space for Popular Front activity.  Robert Korstadt and Nelson Lichtenstein have shown 
how the entrance of the United States in WWII created the space for the communists and 
their allies in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) to make substantial gains in 
unionization and labor power in unlikely places, with particularly strong gains for black 
workers.   Michael Kazin captures the the unique potential, and temporality, of this 457
opening, noting, “as long as the war continued, a communist could be both a sinner 
patriot and a follower of Stalin, without tripping over the contradiction.”  458
United States’ Entrance into World War II 
 Individuals and groups looking to press a progressive agenda, particularly those 
concerned with improving the condition of black citizens, viewed the movement of the 
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United States away from its isolationist stance during 1941 with cautious optimism.   As 
historian Guion Johnson noted in her 1941 article for the JNE, “the ultimate gains from 
war have in the long run usually outweighed the initial losses” for racial minorities 
throughout American history.   Johnson argued that wars had historically meant “a 459
relaxation in the ordinary controls … and the minority may actually achieve a few long-
time goals,” as international crisis facilitated “rapid shifts in ideologies.”    More 460
specifically to the situation in 1941, Johnson noted that the United States’s engagement in 
WWII had the potential to be an economic boon for black workers as the productive 
demands of war would greatly increase the need for workers.   461
  Beyond the economic advances promised by increased government expenditure in 
the war industries, the particular nature of the WWII conflict provided particularly 
powerful openings for advancing black political demands.  As the United States entered 
WWII in the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, black 
intellectuals and political organizations increasingly pointed out the hypocrisy of the 
United States fighting for democratic ideals abroad while supporting the continued 
subjugation of black citizens.  In a 1942 commencement address, Charles Thompson, the 
editor of the JNE, drove this point home, noting that the “paradoxical situation of out 
country at home to save the world for democracy, denying a substantial part of its 
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population at home a full share of democracy for which it was fighting abroad.”   Lewis 462
K. McMillan, professor of history at Wilberforce University, accused the United States of 
“shedding ‘crocodile tears’ for the oppressed people of the earth” given the treatment of 
blacks domestically.   The fact that the United States frequently framed engagement in 463
the war as protecting and advancing the cause of democracy provided a particularly 
powerful ideological weapon for those critical of its domestic treatment of black citizens. 
 The specific racial ideology of the enemy provided an additional opening to those 
pushing for racial reforms in the United States.   The Nazi use of Herrenvolk ideology, 
which translated as master folk or race, underlined the racial hygiene and eugenic policies 
of the Nazis including restrictive marriage and sexual relations policies, compulsory 
sterilization of non-Aryans, and ultimately mass murder of Jews and other groups 
considered inferior.  Herrenvolk ideology also provided the justification excluding non-
Aryans from the full benefits of citizenship.  This proved an uncomfortable fact in the 
United States given the early connection between the American eugenics movement and 
Nazi Germany and the existence of similarly racially restrictive laws in the Jim Crow 
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south.   Pointing out similarities between Nazi and American racial ideology, 464
philanthropist Anson Phelps Stokes argued, “we all condemn the Herrenvolk idea as both 
unscientific and unChristian, but in the final analysis the ‘white supremacy’ doctrine held 
by large groups of people in the South, and some in the North, is closely akin to it in 
theory.”   Martin Jenkins, a professor of education at Howard University, claimed that 465
“the present war, based as it is in part at least, on differing racial ideologies, has made 
race a paramount issue throughout the world.”   This fact meant the the war provided 466
an opportunity to attack “white supremacy” on the home front, as Stokes argued: 
the war, by raising the Herrenvolk issue in the case of Germany, has driven 
home to us in the United States that we are subject to attack on the 
grounds of inconsistency and insincerity if we… make any requirements 
for voting or office-holding that do not treat white men and colored men 
exactly on the same objective basis.  467
As in the case of arguments pointing out the hypocrisy of fighting for democracy abroad 
while denying it citizens domestically, the embrace of racial supremacy by the Nazis 
provided an opening to attack racial supremacy ideology and practice in the United 
States. 
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 The charges of hypocrisy and inconsistency on the issue of race carried particular 
significance given the broad geographical scope of World War II.  The United States was 
allied with many nations that were not predominantly white.  Several articles pointed out 
that the racial practices of the the Untied States were a substantial weakness in the War 
effort, particularly in the Asian and African theaters.  Charles Thompson claimed:  
the maintenance of our traditional pattern of race relations in the 
prosecution of this war is giving aid and comfort the enemy by furnishing 
them with evidence to convince the darker people of Asia that America 
cannot be trusted when she says that she is fighting to preserve 
democracy.  468
Similarly, Martin Jenkins pointed out that American “treatment of its darker racial groups 
is a source of embarrassment to the nation,” and that the “counter-propaganda of the Axis 
nations has not failed to make good use of this weak position of our country to the 
detriment of our total war effort.”   The racial practices of the United States also 469
strained relations with allied nations with large or predominantly non-white 
populations.   The hypocrisies represented more than a moral failing on the domestic 470
front, they had the potential to damage the efforts of the United States internationally.   
 The attention progressives brought to the subject of inconsistency and hypocrisy 
was more than a simple venting of spleen.  Intellectuals recognized the unique 
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opportunity that these contradictions provided to extract political concessions.  As 
Charles Johnson, the editor of the National Urban League’s journal Opportunity, noted in 
a 1941 article about the international political context, “the temper of the times has made 
possible formal reassertions of the full citizenship rights of the Negro minority.”   A 471
variety of black political organizations such as the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters 
and other black labor organizations, the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, the National Urban League, and the National Negro Congress, took 
advantage of the particular openings provided by the international context.  These groups 
successfully secured long held policy goals in early 1940s, including a nondiscriminatory 
clause in the Selective Service Act, greater opportunities for advancement of black 
military officers, greater representation in skilled trades and trade unions.   Perhaps the 472
most significant achievement was the creation of the Fair Employment Practices 
Committee (FEPC) in 1941.  The threat of massive protest action spearheaded by A. 
Phillip Randolph’s Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters led to the creation of the FEPC 
via executive order, the first executive order directly concerning African Americans since 
the Emancipation Proclamation.   In securing these victories, black political 473
organizations pursued a strategy of “forcing from reluctant majority extensions of social, 
economic, and political gains during wartime, when bargaining power is highest,” 
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ensuring that “full capital is made of defections in the American way of life.”   The 474
international context proved effective helping to advance the domestic agenda of these 
groups, as they pushed for a “Double Victory” at home and abroad.  The success of this 
strategy led Anson Stokes to remark, “the progress of the Negro in the United States 
during the war years has been of epoch-making significance.”  475
Postwar International Context and Civil Rights 
 The Second World War provided particular openings for advancing priorities of 
the left and had temporarily papered over the divisions in the left that had begun to show 
between 1939 and 1941.  When the war ended in 1945, the international scene was 
quickly reconfigured and dramatically changed the prospects of the American left.  The 
rising conflict with the Soviet Union allowed black political organizations to continue to 
make arguments emphasizing that improving the treatment of racial minorities and 
increasing the protection of civil rights made strategic sense in a globalized conflict 
involving millions of non-white individuals.  These arguments were particularly effective 
and did lead to meaningful progress on this front.  Progress was coupled with a 
significant limiting of the scope of issues that the left was able to effectively press during 
this time period.  Advancements in civil rights occurred simultaneously with the 
widespread purging of the left from left-leaning organizations as the Popular Front 
collapsed.  Individuals on the left were suppressed of by various levels of government, 
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leading to the abandonment of anti-imperialism and economic transformation as central 
tenets of a left politics. 
 As the United States entered into a new struggle for the hearts and minds of 
countries that were predominantly not white, the treatment of the non-white citizens 
within the United States became particularly important to the nation’s international 
agenda.  This new reality was quickly grasped by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who 
in a 1946 letter to the FEPC, wrote:  
the existence of discrimination against minority groups in this country has 
an adverse effect upon our relations with other countries.   We are 
reminded over and over by some foreign newspapers and spokesmen, that 
our treatment of various minorities leaves much to be desired….We will 
have better international relations when these reasons for suspicion and 
resentment have been removed.    476
This international reality was part of the impetus for President Truman’s decision to 
establish the President’s Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR) in 1946 to investigate the 
status of civil rights.  The PCCR’s 1947 report, To Secure These Rights: The Report of the 
President’s Committee on Civil Rights, pointed repeatedly to the international rationale 
for taking action to improve the protection of civil rights for racial minorities.  The PCCR 
argued that “our civil rights record has growing international implications,” and noted 
that “throughout the Pacific, Latin America, Africa, the Near, Middle, and Far East, the 
treatment which our Negroes receive is taken as a reflection of our attitudes toward all 
dark-skinned peoples.”  Beyond the desire to portray a good portrait to the international 477
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community, the fact that Soviet Union was publicly committed to racial equality and 
frequently publicized the United States’s domestic racial trouble provided another 
important international incentive for action to protect minority rights.  The PCCR argued 
that “[t]hose with competing philosophies have stressed -- and are shamelessly distorting 
-- our shortcomings” in civil rights, and had “tried to create hostility toward us among 
specific nations, races, and religious groups” and “tried to prove our democracy an empty 
fraud, and our nation a consistent oppressor of underprivileged people.”   The PCCR 478
report noted that this strategy had succeeded in some circumstances, and suggested acting 
on protecting civil rights in order to deprive the Soviet Union of this weapon. 
 This opening for advancing civil rights protections was quickly seized by many 
on the left who adapted the arguments they had made during World War II to reflect the 
new international situation.  Black political organizations and political leaders were quick 
to adapt claims that domestic racism and racial inequality undermined American moral 
authority and international interests.  The NAACP began connecting the fight against 
communism with the fight against racial subordination almost immediately, with 
prominent members including Roy Wilkins making this case in Crisis.   In 1947, the 479
NAACP took the dramatic step of submitting a petition to the recently created United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights asking for redress for violation of human rights 
by the United States government.  The petition, entitled An Appeal to the World: A 
Statement on the Denial of Human Rights to Minorities in the Case of Citizens of Negro 
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Descent in the United States of America and an Appeal to the United Nations for Redress, 
was submitted to the U.N. by W.E.B. Du Bois, who also authored the petition’s 
introduction.   In the petition, Du Bois outlined the instances of violations of human 480
rights and the basic tenets of democracy faced by blacks in the U.S.  Du Bois 
continuously pointed to the economic foundation of racial subordination and accused the 
United States federal government of “continuously cast[ing] its influence with imperial 
aggression,” arguing that “[i]t has become through private investment part of the 
imperialistic bloc which is controlling the colonies of the world.”   Du Bois continued 481
his radical critique, noting “It is not Russia that threatens United States so much as 
Mississippi; not Stalin and Molotov but Bilbo and Rankin.”    482
 The petition was particularly embarrassing to the United States, and Eleanor 
Roosevelt in particular, who served as both a delegate to the United Nations and as a 
board member of the NAACP.  Roosevelt and the rest of the United States delegation 
refused to bring up the petition; however, the Soviet Union gladly proposed that the 
charges be investigated.  Despite the Truman administration’s refusal to address the 
petition, it enjoyed significant domestic support as Du Bois had secured the endorsement 
of a number of professional organizations and religious groups in addition to leftist 
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support.   Despite international support and domestic support within the U.S., the U.N. 483
general assembly ultimately rejected the proposal to investigate, and no further action 
was taken on the petition.   The submission of An Appeal to the World was the zenith of 484
the NAACP’s radicalism on the international stage, and the last time the organization was 
formally anti-imperialist.  
 The NAACP and mainstream black political leaders adapted Du Bois’s radical 
argument to reflect a closer alignment with the formal international interests of the United 
States as the contours of the Cold War changed.  The transition of China to communism 
in 1949 and the subsequent Korean War shifted the focus of the Cold War to Asia in the 
early 1950s.  In a 1951 JNE article sociologist St. Clair Drake noted that in Asia, the 
“Communist movement attempts to define the situation as one in which ‘white imperialist 
powers’ are decimating ‘oppressed Colored peoples.’”   St. Clair Drake argued that the 485
communists pursued a strategy of “publicizing its own repudiation of racism and all 
theories of biological determinism,” while it simultaneously “exposes, attacks, and 
ridicules any evidences of racism among the ‘free nations.’”   Several articles in the 486
JNE exposed the effectiveness of this strategy, pointing out that the treatment of racial 
minorities was one of the most encountered questions by Americans traveling abroad, 
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even in allied countries.    Psychologist Howard Hale Long argued that the treatment of 487
blacks meant that the “USSR has several advantages over the West in its approach to the 
Asians,” most notably the fact that “she had decisively abolished race prejudice and 
ostensibly at least accepted the Asians on equality.”   While both St. Clair Drake and 488
Long maintained that the claims emanating from the Soviet Union were sensationalized 
and overstated, they did both suggest that the United States should combat this 
international problem through expanding civil rights protections for minorities 
domestically.   Recent court decisions and the newfound willingness of federal Justice 
Department officials to point to international relations in civil rights cases led both of 
these authors to point to the federal judiciary and the civil rights strategy of the NAACP 
as potentially holding the most promise for advancing black interests.  489
 Organization around the opening provided by the international context proved 
effective in advancing some long-held goals of black political organizations.  In 1948, 
President Truman began to press for the protection of civil rights for racial minorities.  In 
a special message to Congress, Truman advocated for legislative action to strengthen civil 
rights protections in order to “strengthen our democracy and improve the welfare of our 
people.”  Arguing that all deserved “equal protection under the law,” Truman asked 
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Congress to send him legislation that included a Civil Rights Division in the Department 
of Justice, federal protection against lynching, protection of the right to vote, and 
prohibition of discrimination in employment and transportation.  Truman was clearly 
motivated substantially by the international context, and ended his Congressional appeal 
by noting, “If we wish to inspire the peoples of the world whose freedom is in jeopardy, 
if we wish to restore hope to those who have already lost their civil liberties, if we wish 
to fulfill the promise that is ours, we must correct the remaining imperfections in our 
practice of democracy.”   Congress largely ignored his message, but Truman did take 490
action to achieve some of the recommendations of the President’s Committee On Civil 
Rights.  On July 26th, 1948, President Truman issued Executive Orders 9980 and 9981, 
which ordered the desegregation of the federal workforce and the armed services.   491
Truman’s actions were just one example of how international context provided substantial 
impetus for action on civil rights domestically.   Indeed, scholars like Mary Dudziak 492
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and Gerald Horne have argued that progress in desegregation throughout the late 1940s 
and 1950s was to a substantial degree a Cold War imperative.  493
 Although the nascent Cold War provided opportunities to press for certain policy 
goals of the left, most notably in the protection of civil rights, it quickly proved to be a 
substantially limiting force for the left more broadly.  The election of 1948 was a critical 
moment in curbing the influence of the left, particularly in black politics.  Henry Wallace, 
the former Vice President and Secretary of Commerce who Truman had fired largely over 
strong disagreement in the direction of foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union, 
mounted a challenge to Truman from the left, running as the Progressive Party’s 
candidate.  Wallace’s platform warned that the “American way of life is in danger,” and 
that “the root cause of the crisis is Big Business control of our economy and 
government.”   The platform coupled domestic policies of  “full equality for the Negro 494
people” and strong anti-discrimination legislation, a publicly planned economy and 
public ownership of critical industries and housing, a strengthening of labor unions, a 
guaranteed living wage, full employment with an international agenda committed to 
disarmament and peaceful relations with the Soviet Union.   Wallace and the 495
Progressive Party had the potential to broadly appeal to black voters, indeed, a 1947 poll 
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of the NAACP national office found that roughly 70 percent of NAACP staffers intended 
to support Wallace over Truman in the 1948 election.    496
The NAACP and Post-War International Relations 
 The support of Wallace vexed Walter White, then President of the NAACP.  
White, who was of the opinion that the most effective means of advocating for the 
organization was through lobbying those in the inner circle of power, was concerned with 
maintaining his relationship and access within the Truman administration.   White had 497
long been suspicious of, and in some instances outright hostile towards, the left, and was 
a staunch supporter of Truman in the 1948 election.  White used the platform of NAACP 
president to actively campaign both for Truman and against Wallace across the nation, 
and he also warned prominent Wallace supporters in the NAACP, including Du Bois, 
against advocating for Wallace.    498
 The 1948 campaign proved to be a moment where important divisions 
crystallized.  Through strong support of President Truman and the Democratic Party, 
Walter White tied the NAACP tightly to anti-communism, abandoned earlier anti-
imperial foreign policy advocacy, and began severing ties with the black left.  Truman 
ultimately garnered two thirds of the black vote, which in the close election provided him 
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his margin of victory in several states.   The effect of the election on black politics was 499
significant.  Truman’s campaign was premised on both modest racial reforms and a 
staunch anti-communism internationally and domestically.  Both during the campaign 
and after Truman’s victory, White moved the NAACP decisively to the right in order to 
maintain its relationship with the Truman administration.  One of the costs of maintaining 
this access was the repudiation of the organization’s earlier anti-imperial stance embodied 
in the An Appeal to the World petition.  Despite the denouncement of the “imperial 
aggression” of the United States throughout the world in the 1947 petition, by 1948 
White had led the NAACP to an open embrace of the United States’s efforts to halt the 
spread of global communism.    500
 The extent to which the NAACP had moved on the issue of foreign policy was 
evident in 1951 in the organization’s response to a petition submitted to the United 
Nations by the Civil Rights Congress (CRC).  The CRC, founded in 1946 as a merger of 
the NNC and two other Popular Front groups, submitted a petition to the UN General 
Assembly accusing the United States of the newly defined international crime of 
genocide.   The petition, entitled We Charge Genocide: The Historic Petition to the 
United Nations for Relief from a Crime of the United States Government Against the 
Negro People, claimed that “the oppressed Negro citizens of the United States … suffer 
from genocide as the result of the consistent, conscious, unified policies of every branch 
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of government.”   The petition argued that the experience of blacks in the United States 501
was at its heart tied to the structure of economic relations in the nation.  Claiming that 
“the object of this genocide … is the perpetuation of economic and political power by the 
few through the destruction of political protest by the many,” the petition concluded that  
“the foundation of the genocide of which we complain is economic.”   The petition also 502
asserted that  the foreign policy of the United States was motivated by the same economic 
forces, stating “[j]ellied gasoline in Korea and the lyncher’s faggot at home are connected 
… The tie binding both is economic profit and political control.”   The incendiary 503
charges were roundly condemned by United States government officials, who quickly 
mobilized prominent black leaders to denounce the petition.   
 The State Department reached out to Walter White and asked him to publicly 
repudiate the petition. Although the criticisms of the United States were more extreme 
than in An Appeal to the World, and the criticism of capitalism much more explicit in the 
CRC’s petition, the two petitions had much in common.  Much of the data and specific 
events that the CRC petition had used in We Charge Genocide had been taken directly 
from An Appeal to the World.  This proved to be an uncomfortable reality when Walter 
White attempted to initially discredit the CRC’s petition through challenging the facts it 
presented, a position he backed off of only after Roy Wilkins pointed out that “many of 
the citations in that book are from the records and other publications of the NAACP.  
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How can we ‘blast’ a book that uses our records as source material?”   White ultimately 504
instead released a statement at the behest of the State Department charging that the 
petition failed to take into account the “phenomenal gains” in civil rights and reducing 
bigotry that characterized the United States in the most recent decade and accused the 
CRC of using black “grievances as a pawn in the world struggle for political 
domination.”  505
 White recognized the value of his statement to the State Department, given that 
the “experience and prestige” of the NAACP meant that his statement regarding the 
treatment of blacks in the United States would be “accepted as truth by the non-
communist people of the world.”   White followed his official statement with a column 506
for the Saturday Literary Review entitled “Time for a Progress Report,” in which he 
pointed to fifteen specific areas that constituted a “solid body of achievement” in 
bettering the lives of racial minorities throughout the 1940s.  507
 White was not alone in denouncing the CRC petition, as the federal government 
had moved to incorporate several black leaders into its international relations apparatus.  
Indeed, the incorporation of some of these individuals may have contributed to their 
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shifting positions on foreign policy, or at least modified their willingness to be as openly 
critical.  This appears to be particularly true for Ralph Bunche, whose strident critiques of 
the foreign policy of the United States and the NAACP subsided significantly around the 
same time he was hired by the Office of Strategic Services.  508
 The increasingly prominent roles occupied by black individuals such as Edith 
Sampson as an alternate delegate to the U.N. assembly, Ralph Bunche as an analyst and 
U.N. diplomat, and Edward Dudley as the ambassador to Liberia, as well as the more 
temporary advisory roles given to Charles Johnson and R.P Weaver, provided the United 
States government with high-profile surrogates to combat criticisms of its racial record.   509
The State Department reached out to Bunche, as well as Phelps-Stokes Fund director 
Channing Tobias, to help push back against the charges in the petition.   Edith Sampson 510
was asked to tour Scandinavian countries to limit any damage from the petition, during 
which she echoed White’s rosy portrayal of the state of race relations in the United States.  
Sampson claimed that concerns about Jim Crow were overblown, that blacks did not face 
any barriers to voting, and that the black people she knew drove Cadillacs and lived in 
$100,000 houses.   The well-organized effort to combat the claims of the CRC petition, 511
many of which were substantially similar to those the NAACP had made just a few years 
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earlier, indicates the extent to which the NAACP and other prominent black intellectuals 
had shifted their views to align with Cold War anti-communism in international affairs. 
 The embrace of the anti-communism and an interventionist foreign policy by the 
NAACP was accompanied by a silencing of those voices of dissent within the 
organization.  Perhaps the most notable instance of this silencing was W.E.B. Du Bois’s 
unceremonious dismissal from the organization in 1948.  Du Bois vehemently disagreed 
with the increasingly close relationship between the NAACP and the Truman 
administration, and the muting of criticism of Truman’s interventionism that this 
relationship required.  This disagreement over the NAACP's position on foreign policy 
appears to have been decisive in his expulsion from the organization in 1948.   The 512
NAACP became increasingly openly critical of other prominent black leftists, including 
Paul Robeson and William Patterson, the president of the CRC.  Du Bois, Robeson, and 
Patterson had all been critical of the NAACP’s embrace of Truman in the 1948 election, 
and all three were signatories to the We Charge Genocide petition.     513
 Despite disagreements, there was some attempt by Patterson to cooperate on 
common political goals with the NAACP.  Patterson had reached out to White in 1949 in 
an attempt to work together on the UN petition, but White refused and criticized the 
communist nature of the CRC.    The open refusal to associate with blacks on the left 514
was part of a broader effort to separate the NAACP from the Popular Front.  At the 
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annual meeting of the NAACP in 1950, members passed a resolution authorizing the 
national organization to take “necessary steps to eradicate Communist infiltration,” 
including suspension or expulsion of any local branch that came under communist 
influence.  This official stance formalized what had been an unofficial policy since 515
1946 organized by Walter White, Roy Wilkins, Thurgood Marshall and others to combat 
the influence of communists within the organization.  516
 The distancing of the NAACP and others from those on the left made them 
particularly vulnerable to the repressive action increasingly employed by the United 
States government.  Paul Robeson had his passport revoked due to his criticism of the 
United States’s foreign policy abroad.   After submitting the We Charge Genocide 517
petition, Patterson was charged with contempt of Congress and had his passport 
confiscated.   In 1951, the 82-year-old Du Bois was charged with being “an agent of 518
foreign principle” for his foreign policy positions and work with the Peace Information 
Center.  Although all charges were eventually dismissed, Manning Marable notes that the 
NAACP was particularly “conspicuous in it cowardice” in its refusal to offer any legal or 
public support of the former prominent member.   Despite the dismissal of all charges, 519
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the indictment did accomplish some of the objectives of the Truman administration, as 
thousands of libraries removed copies of Du Bois’s work and he was increasingly 
marginalized from organizations that wished to maintain mainstream appeal.  Others on 
the left were not so lucky, and many faced massive material consequences when they 
were convicted of subversive activities because of their foreign policy views.   520
Although it is certainly true that the NAACP was in part a victim of Cold War anti-
communist hysteria, the more conservative politics of those at the top of the organization 
meant that this hysteria also served as a useful tool to shape the politics of the 
organization towards the more conservative politics of those at the top.    521
 By severing ties with the left, the NAACP and other mainstream organizations 
eliminated those members who had been most committed to economic justice through 
structural transformation.  Indeed, this position had become increasingly untenable in 
organizations strongly committed to anti-communism, as any criticism of the economic 
organization of the US economy immediately cast suspicion on the loyalty of those 
making the argument.  The strident anti-communism of the United States led to the 
downfall of the inclusion of strong economic and social equality guarantees as part of the 
U.N. Charter on Human Rights, largely over concern from the United States that they 
were a Soviet trojan horse.  The NAACP and other mainstream black political 
organizations that prioritized combating Jim Crow largely abandoned these economic 
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commitments in an attempt to maintain legitimacy.   By 1948, it was clear that the brief 522
opening provided by World War II to be both a communist and a patriot had closed.  The 
ouster of Du Bois, the purging of communists from the organization, the abandonment of 
anti-imperialism and strong demands for economic justice was the price the NAACP 
willingly paid for the promised support of modest civil rights advancements from Cold 
War liberals.  
 As black political organizations were increasingly channeled into a civil rights 
framework, commitments to organizing a coalition of interracial working-class people in 
order to facilitate broad economic structural transformation to achieve economic justice 
receded into the background.  The new imperative of the international context 
substantially benefitted those individuals and organizations who had long been skeptical 
of the wisdom of closely associating black political demands with the left.  Arguments 
calling for fair racial incorporation into the existing institutional order were better able to 
accommodate the changing international context, as their highest priorities could be 
achieved within the existing institutional and economic landscape.  Those pushing for 
economic reorganization were marginalized, as calls for significant changes to the 
economic system were increasingly deemed un-American. 
The Domestic Constraints of the Second Red Scare 
 Just as the shifting international context shaped the strategic decisions of 
organizations and individuals on the left, the brutally repressive domestic suppression of 
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the left facilitated by this shifting context had extensive repercussions for postwar 
politics.  As the influence of the rehabilitated business community and Congressional 
conservatives waxed in the postwar era, anti-communism served as a particularly 
effective tool in attacking political opponents on the left. Stoked by a political coalition 
that found communist witch hunts politically useful, political organizations were 
increasingly pressured to prove their patriotism through severing all association with 
anyone deemed too far Left or face Congressional investigation.  During the era of the 
Second Red Scare, unions and other organizations on the political left paid the price 
demanded of them in order to maintain access to mainstream political discourse/
politicians, and purged hundreds of thousands of individuals from membership rolls.  
Beyond weakening and destroying organizations, the attack on the left during the Second 
Red Scare had dramatic consequences for the individuals, who experienced immense 
pressure to renounce old positions, abandon social networks and friendships, or else 
suffer marginalization, substantial fines, or jail time.   The anti-communism that shaped 
much of the domestic politics in the Post-War era proved devastating for the 
organizations, individuals, and ideas of the left. 
The Rise of Anti-Communism 
 Nine days after he outlined the new interventionist foreign policy approach of the 
Truman Doctrine, President Truman indicated that the conflict with communism would 
have a domestic component.  On March 21st, 1947, the President signed Executive Order 
9835 requiring a loyalty investigation of every individual entering the employment of any 
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department or agency of the executive branch.  The order also authorized the 
investigation of any current employee and set up a Loyalty Review Board with the power 
to fire anyone deemed not loyal.  The order outlined disqualifying offenses for which 
employees could be fired, including “membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic 
association with” any organization “designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, 
fascist, communist, or subversive.”   Although the executive order technically applied 523
to individuals across the political spectrum, the primary concern was with those on the 
left.  
  The testimony of FBI director J. Edward Hoover before the the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC) on March 26th, 1947 underlined the fact that 
the primary targets would be those on the political left.  Hoover’s testimony focused 
almost exclusively on domestic communism as one of the most serious threats facing the 
nation, warning the committee that “[l]iterally hundreds of groups and organizations have 
either been infiltrated or organized primarily to accomplish the purposes of promoting the 
interests of the Soviet Union.”   The FBI director proposed a number of tests that would 524
indicate the subversiveness of an organization, including whether an organization 
criticized American and British foreign policy, whether an organization was endorsed by 
a communist-controlled labor union, and whether an organization denounced “monopoly-
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capitalism.”   Hoover identified the school system, labor unions, radio, and the motion 525
pictures industry as areas of special concern, where communists had already made 
progress towards infiltration.  The director also clarified unequivocally that communists 
did not have a right to Government employment.  526
 The focus on communist infiltration drew particular interest from Congressional 
conservatives.  Republicans gained control of both the House and Senate after a dominant 
performance in the 1946 elections, and quickly exercised the investigative powers gained 
through control of Congressional committees.   Congressman Richard Nixon (R-CA) 527
was present at the HUAC hearing, and expressed particular concern about communist 
infiltration and reiterated the pressing need “to expose them, to drive them out of labor 
unions, out of other institutions.”   During Hoover’s testimony, Republican 528
Congressman Karl Mundt of South Dakota, who would become one of Senator Joseph 
McCarthy’s (R-WI) staunchest allies, argued that it was “liberal and progressive” forces 
that had the responsibility to be the most vigilant and outspoken, noting that “it is 
necessary for them to take vigorous and active steps to expose and defeat the activities of 
communists, and not simply to damn communism with faint praise, as some have done in 
the past.”   Hoover’s description of domestic communists as a “fifth column”  529 530
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committed to “the destruction of free enterprise” provided a powerful line for 
conservatives against those that failed to condemn the party and sympathizers in the most 
strident terms.   The committee, and its focus on the threat of domestic subversion, 531
would become well known to the public by the end of 1947 as it launched an 
investigation of communist infiltration in the movie industry.  532
  A broad range of conservative groups, including the American Legion, the 
Daughters of the American Revolution, the National Association of Manufacturers, and 
the Chamber of Commerce found red-baiting to be a powerful means of silencing critics 
and advancing their own political agendas.   Calling into question an individual’s 533
loyalty became a particularly potent political weapon, especially as criteria that could 
lead to termination of employment and the number of groups considered subversive 
expanded in 1951 and 1953.   The loyalty investigations soon spread to the state level, 534
and by the early 1950s over thirty states had their own policies that called for loss of 
employment for membership in subversive organizations, over twenty required public 
servants to sign loyalty oaths, and thirteen had created their own version of HUAC.   As 535
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the hysteria increased, accusations of disloyalty became a devastatingly effective means 
of combating individuals, ideas, or policies that might be considered remotely critical of 
capitalism or American foreign policy. 
The Political and Policy Effects of the Second Red Scare 
   In her account of the loyalty investigations, historian Landon Storrs demonstrates 
the considerable consequences for civil servants targeted for investigation.  To be accused 
of subversive activity often meant one was subjected to years of repeated loyalty 
investigations, imposing a staggering economic and psychological price on the accused.  
Storrs shows how the prevalence of loyalty investigations and their cynical use by 
conservatives and business interests, forced prominent left-leaning civil servants to 
distance themselves from strong critiques of economic inequality and capitalism or face 
unemployment.  These loyalty investigations had a significant impact on the direction of 
post-War social policy, as important individuals were forced to abandon left policies.  
Policies such as national health insurance, anti-militarism, strong consumer protections, a 
comprehensive social welfare system, public control of power, and public housing were 
marginalized as these individuals moved towards more the political center and business 
friendly positions in an attempt to shore up their anti-subversive credentials.   The 536
effects of loyalty investigations in non-government organizations mirrored the effects of 
loyalty investigations in the civil service, as friendships, networks and coalitions frayed 
and disappeared under the immense pressure.  The loyalty investigations, and their 
 Storrs, The Second Red Scare, 205-258.536
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remarkably effective use by opponents of New Deal-style social and economic programs, 
contributed significantly to the defeat of more democratic policy alternatives and helped 
forge a Post-War consensus that was substantially more conservative.  537
 The attempt to roll back the social policies of the New Deal, and to prevent 
passage of similar legislation, motivated a campaign by corporate leaders and pro-
business groups to attempt “to shape a national consensus that was conducive to 
unfettered corporate expansion and economic growth.”   Historian Wendy Wall’s work 538
follows the invention of the phrase “The American Way,” and the associated politics that 
came to be a particularly powerful force in the 1940s and 1950s.  This ideology frowned 
on labor militancy and class conflict as un-American, idolized individual liberty and 
tolerance, and positioned high productivity and mass consumption as central to the 
preservation of democracy and the economy.   Importantly, while this emerging 539
ideology was in part an attempt to head off New Deal type social welfare programs, the 
high value it placed on tolerance and consensus did provide an opening for minority 
groups to seek incorporation into existing structures.   In fact, as Wall notes, by the 1950s 
race and “intergroup relations [had] become a good ‘cause’ for conservatives to be liberal 
about.  It [was] not basically threatening to their own economic agenda.”  However, the 540
opening provided was limited, as this ideology could easily be appropriated for purposes 
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like legal and political equality of black individual, while forcefully shutting the door on 
other claims - most importantly, demands for economic equality or economic 
transformation.  541
 The Second Red Scare facilitated the rise of this new pro-growth and pro-business 
political coalition.  The loyalty investigations of prominent left-leaning policymakers in 
the federal civil service pushed individuals to abandon previous advocacy of expansive 
government in economic planning and redistribution.  Under the threat of loyalty 
investigation, important individuals like Leon Keyserling, the head of the Council of 
Economic Advisors (CEA) under President Truman, began to advocate for focusing on 
growth and increasing production rather than redistribution in the early 1950s.  This new 
“guns and butter” strategy positioned economic growth, in large part through increased 
military spending to combat communism, rather than redistribution of wealth as the top 
economic priority of Cold War liberals.  As Keyerseling and his wife were investigated, 
he adopted increasingly pro-business rhetoric and policy proposals, at least in part to fend 
off charges that he was insufficiently loyal.   The Keyerselings were certainly not the 542
only individuals that felt this pressure.  Historian Landon Storrs has argued that the Right 
frequently used accusation of disloyalty to “block policy initiatives that impinged on 
business prerogatives at home and abroad.”   543
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The Left and Political Suppression 
 As J. Edgar Hoover and Richard Nixon’s public comments on communist 
influence and infiltration on unions foreshadowed, the Second Red Scare had particularly 
powerful effects on the membership and programmatic agenda of Unions in the post-War 
era.   The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 significantly undermined the power 544
of the labor movement in the United States.  The legislation contained several provisions 
that made it much more difficult for labor unions to maintain and expand membership.  
The limitation on the right to strike, limitations on the use of the boycott, and a provision 
allowing states to ban “closed shops” all substantially weakened the political position of 
labor in the Post-War era.   Passed as the anti-communist hysteria was reaching a fever 545
pitch the legislation contained a provision, Section 9(h), that required all trade union 
officials to sign affidavits proclaiming that they were neither members nor supporters of 
the Communist Party.    The industrial unions of the CIO were by far the largest 546
organizations that had continued to maintain the rough outlines of Popular Front-style 
cooperation with communists.  The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act and the reemergence 
of HUAC the same year made this cooperation increasingly untenable. In 1948, the 
President of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (UE) was arrested after he 
refused to cooperate with HUAC in an investigation of another Popular Front 
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organization.  The UE, and ten other union affiliates of the CIO representing roughly one 
million members were expelled from the CIO between 1949 and 1950 over their refusal 
to sign the anti-communist affidavits required by the Taft-Hartley Act.   The Resolution 547
on Expulsion of the UE stated emphatically “[t]here is no place in the CIO for any 
organization whose leaders … would betray the American workers into totalitarian 
bondage.”  548
 This massive purging of left-oriented unions and members had serious 
consequences for the political agenda of the labor movement.  The active removal and 
exclusion of communists and other leftists from the labor movement limited the 
connection unions had to other core leftist-movement of the Post-World War II years.  
The CIO members that were also members of the Communist Party were often the most 
committed and effective organizers when it came to combating racial prejudice and racial 
exclusion.  The elimination of communists and other leftists from the mainstream labor 
movement resulted in a substantial decline in the priority that the AFL-CIO put on 
fighting racial segregation.   The retreat on race issues was just one example of the 549
programmatic consequences of severing ties with the left.  As labor historian Nelson 
Lichtenstein has noted, prior to their exclusion, communist union members had often 
provided the “organic leadership” for many left-oriented movements the era, including 
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opposition to Cold War, defense of civil liberties, and early feminism.   The mass 550
removal of the communist members or sympathizers from the political mainstream 
significantly limited the influence and connection the labor movement would have in the 
dominant left politics that would emerge in the coming decades.   Additionally, the 551
Second Red Scare and the broad purges foreclosed the possibility of a clear independence 
from the Democratic Party and ultimately served to bind the leadership of the labor 
movement tightly to the Democratic Party leadership.   552
 Beyond restricting the broad political vision and connection with other left 
movements, the elimination of the radical left from the labor movement and the 
increasingly defensive posture forced by unfriendly legislation and resurgent business 
influence led to consequential changes in the political demands of unions.  The passage of 
the Taft-Hartley Act forced labor leaders to shift focus from advocating for universal 
government social welfare programs to a stance that prioritized collective bargaining.   
This was largely a reaction to an unfavorable political climate in which union leaders 
made the strategic decision to prioritize the maintenance of member loyalty and the 
protection of existing unions over active expansion and organization of new members.  
Political Scientist Marie Gottschalk argues that the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act and 
the political context of the postwar era created an alliance of labor and employers around 
job-based health and pension benefits that limited labor’s active advocacy for universal 
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benefit programs.   The purging of the left flank of the labor movement was important 553
to this reprioritization, as this was precisely the part of the labor movement that was most 
likely to organize around broad social issues like universal social welfare programs.   554
Ultimately, the fracturing of Popular Front-style cooperation between labor unions and 
the radical left forced by a changing political context resulted in a labor movement with a 
narrowed focus on collective bargaining, fewer connections with the other left 
movements, and a close embrace of the Democratic Party.  In a sharp reversal of the 
trends of the previous decades, the percent of the workforce belonging to union began its 
lengthy decline in 1953.  555
 The broad targeting of organizations based on political association had 
devastating, and in some cases, fatal consequences for many organizations on the left that 
were unwilling or unable to effectively distance themselves from past or present 
association with now questionable political views.  Groups such as the Emergency Civil 
Liberties Committee, which had been formed by civil rights activists unhappy with the 
unwillingness of the ACLU to defend accused communists, and the National Lawyers 
Guild who actively opposed anti-communist repression, were actively targeted and 
marginalized for combating McCarthyism.   By the late 1950s, a number of groups 556
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advocating for interracial working-class organization and anti-imperialism, including the 
American Labor Party, the Council on African Affairs, the National Negro Labor Council, 
and the Civil Rights Congress, had disbanded due in large part due to suppression by the 
federal government.  In addition to infiltration, surveillance, and harassment, many left-
leaning groups (including all those listed above) were added to the Attorney General’s list 
of subversive organizations by 1953.  The act of adding an organization to this list was 
essentially a death blow, as individuals seeking employment with the federal government 
were required to sign a statement certifying that they had no past or present connection 
with any of the listed organizations.    557
 The disappearance of these organizations represented a substantial loss to the 
ideas and coalitions of the left.  Without the intellectual and financial resources, 
organizing around the political agenda like that advocated by the Popular Front became 
infinitely more difficult.  Furthermore, as historian Ellen Schrecker has argued,  
McCarthyism’s main impact may well have been in what did no happen 
rather than in what did—the social reforms that were never adopted, the 
diplomatic initiatives that were not pursued, the workers who were not 
organized into unions, the books that were not written, and the movies that 
were not filmed.  558
There is no way to account for the personal relationships, political allegiances, and new 
organizations and coalitions that might have emerged in the absence of the widespread 
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suppression of the political left.  The repression of the left had an impact not only in the 
coalitions and policies that disappeared from the political arena, but also in the absence of 
organizational capacity to resist and push back against an increasingly conservative 
national political agenda. 
 As the responses of the CIO and the NAACP indicate, government officials were 
far from the only actors responsible for repression of the political left during the Second 
Red Scare.  Many groups that had tolerated or welcomed the participation of Communist 
Party members in the early 1940s began targeting and purging these individuals by the 
end of the decade.  The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) ousted communists and 
sympathizers and actively supported federal suppression efforts.   The American Bar 559
Association (ABA) passed resolutions against permitting communists from practicing 
law and actively cooperated with federal officials to investigate members and begin 
disbarment proceedings against those deemed subversive.  In some cases, simply 
representing individuals in anti-communist proceedings was enough to subject lawyers to 
a barrage of negative consequences, including loss of income, clients and potential 
disbarment.    560
 As employers increasingly adopted the same tactics as organizations like the ABA 
and ACLU, communists and fellow travelers faced widespread firing and diminished 
economic prospects across the labor market.  The film and entertainment industry had 
been the subject of high profile loyalty and subversive investigation by HUAC, and 
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workers throughout the industry faced a career-ending blacklist, in some cases simply for 
supporting procedural rights for accused subversives.  Professional organizations like the 
Screen Actors Guild, headed by Ronald Reagan, actively participated in the purging of 
communists and required members to sign loyalty oaths.   U.S. Steel, General Electric, 561
and a number of other employers publicly announced that any employee that exercised 
their Fifth Amendment Right against self-incrimination while under investigation would 
be dismissed.   The anti-communist fervor spread to academia as left-wing professors 562
found their employment on increasingly unstable ground.  When Congressional 
investigators turned their attention to communism in Higher Education in 1953, the 
Association of American Universities, whose members consisted of the presidents of 
thirty-seven of the country’s most prominent universities, released a statement warning 
professors that “invocation of the Fifth Amendment places upon a professor a heavy 
burden of proof of his fitness to hold a teaching position and lays upon his university an 
obligation to reexamine his qualifications for membership in its society.”   Charles 563
Johnson, now the President of Fisk University and a still frequent JNE contributor, 
dismissed two faculty members for taking the Fifth Amendment when called before 
HUAC, despite widespread support for the two professors on campus.   The American 564
Association of University Professors (AAUP) the main organization committed to 
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defending academic freedom in higher education, largely stayed on the sidelines during 
the height of the Second Red Scare and did nothing to combat the academic firings that 
cost hundreds of professors their livelihoods.  565
 The changing domestic political context of the decade and half after World War II 
dramatically circumscribed the terrain on which the left could operate in the United 
States.  Cold War liberals, like President Truman, questioned the loyalty of those on the 
left, especially when they expressed opposition to his foreign policy.  The loyalty 
investigation machinery built by President Truman provided a convenient tool for 
renascent business groups and conservative politicians committed to rolling back many of 
the New Deal programs and to prevent the passage of similar generous social welfare 
programs, as they cast individuals on the political left as a threat to national security, 
particularly if they were critical of the economic system.  Groups and individuals on the 
left were affected, as many scrambled to reverse previous political positions, abandon 
long standing relationships, and move decidedly towards the political center in a time 
where being too far to the left carried the possibility of ending one’s career.  Although 
this shifting Post-War domestic political context was devastating for those on the left that 
centered their politics on a critique of economic inequality and exploitation under the 
existing economic system, it was substantially more friendly to a politics that could 
articulate grievances in a manner that did not implicate capitalism.  This provided a 
decisive advantage to those on the left that were primarily concerned with fair 
incorporation of racial minorities into the existing system. 
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The Changing Court Doctrines 
 At the moment that the Cold War context was rapidly shrinking the political space 
for left political organizations and individuals, changing federal court doctrines in the 
1950s provided an advantage to those groups and individuals advancing a political 
agenda that centered on fair incorporation and equal opportunity.  While throughout the 
1930s and early 1940s the Supreme Court had appeared open to a conception of civil 
rights that provided strong protection for the rights of workers and labor, by the late 
1940s this moment had largely passed.  Shifting court doctrines had important 
consequences for the types of legal arguments advanced by groups seeking redress - 
particularly for those targeting Jim Crow. By the early 1950s, as the Cold War context 
made cases emphasizing the rights of black laborers unappealing, the NAACP shifted its 
focus to attacking the non-economic consequences of Jim Crow segregation.  The 
increasing openness of the Supreme Court to ruling segregation violated the 14 
Fourteenth Amendment reinforced for many the wisdom of pursuing a political and legal 
agenda centered on demonstrating the negative psychological effects of segregation and 
discrimination.  Although this approach proved quite successful in eliminating formal 
barriers to black participation in existing institutions, it was particularly ill equipped to 
address the deteriorating economic situation facing black Americans. 
Labor and the Federal Courts 
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 The passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935 is viewed by 
some scholars as perhaps the most radical piece of legislation of the twentieth century.   566
Passed amidst turmoil of the Great Depression and after a massive wave of strikes, and 
the rise of the CIO, the NLRA formalized a number of workers rights.  The NLRA 
included sections clarifying the right of workers to organize, the right of workers to 
choose their own representatives, promotion of collective bargaining between employees 
and employers.  The Act also created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to 
oversee labor organization and prevent unfair labor practices.  Senator Robert Wagner (D 
- NY), the author of the NLRA, argued that the legislation was necessary to promote 
industrial democracy, a democratic workplace in which employees had meaningful 
participation in the deciding the conditions under which they worked. Wagner asserted 
that NLRA was essential legislation, as “democracy cannot work unless it is honored in 
the factory as well as the polling booth; men cannot be truly free in body and in spirit 
unless their freedom extends into the places where they earn their daily bread.”   This 567
articulation of democracy is squarely in line with the economic democracy ideology.  The 
NLRA’s promotion of industrial democracy, strong unions, and redistribution of power 
from corporate leaders to workers had potentially radical implications.   However, the 568
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extent of the NLRA’s radicalism would be worked out in federal courts in the late 1930s 
and 1940s, a process which ultimately resulted in curtailing the revolutionary potential of 
NLRA. 
 The passage of the NLRA provoked an immediate and sustained effort by 
Republicans and business leaders to undermine the Act’s provisions.  Unhappy with the 
twin threat of loss of managerial prerogative and growing labor militarism, the business 
community attempted to undermine the NLRA through refusing to follow the newly 
established rules and devoting resources to illegal antiunion campaigns.   The 569
intransigence from the business community ultimately resulted in the federal court 
system having a decisive role in determining the boundaries of legitimate labor activity.   
 Some initial Supreme Court decisions gave the labor movement hope that the 
Court would take an expansive interpretation of protections the NLRA granted to 
workers.  In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Court handed down several decisions 
favorable to labor, including the protection of the right of unionists to speak in public, 
protection for union advertisements, and protection of the right of unions to picket.   570
The Supreme Court also protected the NLRB’s independence, insulating its proceedings 
from judicial interference and stalling tactics from employers.  These early decisions 
significantly undermined what had been some of the most common and effective means 
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of employer attacks on unions.   However, these early victories were interspersed 571
among other Court decisions that narrowed the rights of unions and workers, including 
decisions that allowed employers to hire permanent replacement workers, outlawed of sit-
down strikes, and required employees suing for wrongful termination to mitigate 
damages while waiting for a ruling.  By the 1940s, the Court was increasingly handing 
down decisions that “progressively chipped away at labor’s rights under the Wagner 
Act.”    572
 This trend accelerated after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, and in the 
1950s, the Supreme Court substantially weakened the protest rights of labor. As the 
Supreme Court limited, or failed to protect, the most effective union protest tactics, the 
labor movement was put squarely on the defensive.   After reaching 35% of the 573
workforce in 1953, union membership began a long and steady nationwide decline.  As 574
organizing new workplaces and members became more difficult, the labor movement’s 
activity and political agenda narrowed significantly. The Supreme Court’s decisions 
discouraged unions from challenging economic exploitation and social injustice broadly, 
and instead “encouraged responsible unions to accept the social order as a given and to 
seek to defend and better the lot of their members only within its ground rules.”   575
 Klare, “Judicial Deradicalization,” 318.571
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Shifting Court doctrine, much like the purging of labor’s left flank, channeled union 
activity towards bargaining over the wages and conditions of existing members rather 
than expanding membership and broad challenges to existing economic structures.  576
 The decisions of the Supreme Court had a hand in foreclosing the radical potential 
of the NLRA.  During the 1940s and 1950s, the possibility of an expansive interpretation 
of the NLRA and the rights of workers dimmed, as the Court ultimately “embraced those 
aims most consistent with the assumptions of liberal capitalism and foreclosed those 
potential paths of development most threatening to the established order.”   The 577
Supreme Court’s labor decisions shifted the NLRA’s focus away from redistribution, 
equal power, and industrial democracy, centering the NLRA instead on the goals of 
industrial peace, collective bargaining as a means of heading off labor militarism, and a 
much more limited redistribution of power in the workplace.    As the Court narrowed 578
the protections of the NLRA and limited the boundaries of legitimate labor activity, it 
shifted power in industrial relations back towards the employer, decisively undermining 
the industrial democratic potential (and intent) of the NLRA.   
The NAACP Legal Strategy at the Supreme Court 
 Much like the labor rights cases, Supreme Court decisions in the 1940s and 1950s 
helped shift the political center of gravity for groups seeking legal redress for issues 
relating to civil rights and racial inequality.  This time period was one in which the legal 
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understanding of civil rights was in flux.  Despite contestation and debate in the early 
1940s, a variety of factors, including the Supreme Court’s less sympathetic stance 
towards labor rights, federal institutions more open to combating racial discrimination, 
the class commitments of the NAACP, and the rising Second Red Scare all contributed to 
an eventual postwar settlement on a conception of civil rights centered on seeking redress 
from the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause for the intangible and 
psychological and harms psychological harms imposed on black Americans by Jim Crow.  
This settlement, most famously evident in the 1954 Brown v Board decision, greatly 
strengthened the political hand of racial democrats who pressed for equal opportunity for 
success in the existing institutional landscape. 
 As Risa Goluboff has shown, this outcome was certainly not inevitable.  
Throughout the early 1940s, the Civil Rights Section (CRS) of the Justice Department 
pursued a number of cases that focused first and foremost on the material consequences 
of exploitation and discrimination for black laborers.  In fact, “the attempts of black 
workers to build on the labor and economic rights of the New Deal represented the most 
politically promising civil rights issues of the 1940s.”   The CRS successfully pursued a 579
number of cases on behalf of black workers, particularly agricultural workers in the 
southern sharecropping economy, on the grounds that the certain work arrangements had 
violated their Thirteenth Amendment right against involuntary servitude and peonage.  
Pursuing relief for the economic claims of black workers allowed the CRS to navigate the 
 Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 579
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thorny racial politics of the Democratic Party, since these cases were palatable to 
Democratic administrations because they did not directly challenge segregation.   580
Furthermore, as Goluboff has argued, relief for the economic consequences of racial 
discrimination was actually the highest order grievance for most blacks fighting against 
racial discrimination.   The legal resource and precedents offered by these labor cases 581
suggested a particularly auspicious avenue for pursuing a conception of civil rights that 
included labor freedom and economic rights in addition to racial equality.  582
 For a brief moment during World War II, the NAACP experimented with a legal 
strategy that privileged the economic concerns of black workers, most notably in a 
number of cases seeking salary equalization for black teachers teaching in segregated 
schools.   These cases did not attack the segregated nature of workplaces, but rather 583
sought to improve the material conditions of black workers within segregated 
workplaces.  However, the NAACP had never viewed the work-related problems as 
constituting the primary harm of Jim Crow.  The leaders of the organization had always 
been much more willing to frame the problem of Jim Crow as one in which whites 
singled out blacks for discriminatory treatment in access to government, hotels, 
restaurants, theaters, and other social and cultural institutions because this was how they 
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were most affected in their personal lives.  The view emanating from the elites at the 584
helm of the NAACP was a class-inflected one, as most blacks tended to express more 
concern about - and were more affected by - the material consequences of Jim Crow.   585
This core commitment by the leaders of the NAACP, coupled with a postwar 
international and domestic context that was less friendly to both the labor related cases 
and the individuals advocating for a focus on the economic consequences of Jim Crow, 
meant that the NAACP was quick to drop its brief flirtation with a labor-centric notion of 
civil rights in the 1940s.   By 1950, the organization had firmly committed to the goal 586
of overturning Plessy v. Ferguson and eliminating segregation as its top priority - 
regardless of the consequences for black workers in segregated workplaces. 
 Significantly, the NAACP’s decision to focus on attacking segregation on 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds was in part due to federal courts increasing receptivity to 
these arguments.  In a 1939 article discussing recent Court cases regarding segregation in 
education including the 1938 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada decision which 
effectively desegregated the University of Missouri Law School, professor of sociology 
Henry McGuinn noted that, “an indirect effect on the Court’s decision was to strengthen 
the determination of the N.A.A.C.P. to fight segregated educational opportunities.”   587
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McGuinn argued that the Court’s increasing openness to Fourteenth Amendment 
arguments against segregation “constitutes another reason why those who oppose the 
inequality and inferiority which Jim Crow schools impose upon Negroes should rally to 
oppose the spread of separate schools into the North and to wipe them out elsewhere.”   588
The strategy used in the Gaines case challenging segregation in higher education on 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds spurred a number of similar challenges in other states.   
 The increasing success of this legal argument reinforced the belief among many 
civil rights activists that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection argument was the 
best means of challenging racial subordination.  In a 1947 JNE article, George Johnson, 
the dean of Howard University’s Law School, and law student Jane Lewis argued that the 
Supreme Court had never decisively settled the question of whether segregation of public 
education institutions was constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Stating, “in 
the opinion of the writers of this article, the United States Supreme Court has never 
squarely held that a state ‘separate school’ law per se discharges a state’s obligation under 
the Fourteenth Amendment,” the authors urged continued pursuit of this line of argument 
and expressed hope that several cases then working their way through the courts might 
find segregation unconstitutional on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.   In a 1951 JNE 589
editorial, Charles Thompson, taking stock of mounting court victories, pointed out that 
the successful “cases adjudicated thus far have been based upon the ‘equal protection 
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clause’ of the Fourteenth Amendment.”   Thompson argued the result of NAACP’s legal 590
strategy had meant that “the Court has whittled down Plessy v. Ferguson,” and he urged 
civil rights organizations to continue to “take full advantage of this opportunity.”   The 591
growing willingness of the courts to accept these arguments had a feedback effect on the 
NAACP and others seeking to combat racial subordination.  These groups increasingly 
rallied behind challenging segregation on Fourteenth Amendment grounds and moved 
away from labor related cases that had relied primarily on the Thirteenth Amendment. 
 The class-inflected nature of the NAACP legal strategy was increasingly apparent 
in the cases and the arguments made by NAACP lawyers.  The economic position of 
individuals influenced the very cases that the NAACP chose to pursue, as the decisions of 
the organization and the lawyers themselves were constrained by the need to appeal to the 
wealthy and middle class blacks and liberal whites that funded their efforts.  As NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund lawyer Leroy Clark noted: 
[t]here are two ‘clients’ the civil rights lawyer must satisfy: (1) the 
immediate litigants (usually black), and (2) those liberals (usually white) 
who make financial contributions. An apt criticism of the traditional civil 
rights lawyer is that too often the litigation undertaken was modulated by 
that which was ‘salable’ to the paying clientele who, in the radical view, 
had interests threatened by true social change. Attorneys may not make 
conscious decisions to refuse specific litigation because it is too 
"controversial" and hard to translate to the public, but no organization 
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dependent on a large number of contributors can ignore the fact that the 
“appeal" of the program affects fund-raising.   592
The fact that the organization was run by black elites, and depended on middle-class and 
wealthy individuals for funding meant that many of the cases pursued by the NAACP 
were at “the confluence of the personal, professional, class, and racial interests” of well-
off blacks.   Cases focusing on graduate and professional education, transportation, 593
voting, and the ability to purchase houses were particularly important to black elites.   594
By the late 1940s, the NAACP and its lawyers in the Legal Defense Fund lined up 
squarely behind a legal strategy committed to the fair incorporation of blacks into the 
existing institutional landscape and class structure.  
 The NAACP’s campaign against racially restrictive housing covenants is an 
excellent example of the class-inflected nature of the organization’s legal strategy.  Many 
cities throughout the United States allowed for racially restrictive housing covenants, 
which were private agreements between white property owners not to sell or lease their 
property to racial minorities.  Ending the practice of these racially restrictive covenants 
was one of the top priorities of the NAACP legal team in the 1940s, in no small part 
because it was a practice that was particularly insulting to black elites who had the desire 
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and resources to move out of racially segregated ghettoes.  Thurgood Marshall headed the 
team of the NAACP lawyers that successfully challenged the state enforcement of racial 
covenants in the 1948 case Shelley v. Kraemer.  Marshall and the NAACP had relied 
heavily on the research of prominent black social scientists, most notably that of future 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Robert Weaver, sociologists Charles 
Johnson and E. Franklin Frazier, and psychologist Herman Long.  Relying on the work of 
these social scientists in their petition to the Supreme Court, the NAACP lawyers argued 
that the segregation of blacks into certain neighborhoods resulted in high-level crime, 
juvenile delinquency, dependency, psychological and personality damage, mental 
disorders, and social pathology among black individuals and families.   Furthermore, 595
these social scientists argued that the damages to black individuals and poor conditions of 
the neighborhoods and housing to which blacks were relegated ultimately supported the 
racial prejudice of whites.    596
 As political scientist Preston Smith has shown, the NAACP’s victory in the courts 
was followed immediately by attempts of black elites to manage the transition of blacks 
into new neighborhoods through occupancy standards.  These new occupancy standards, 
supported by the American Council of Race Relations and Robert Weaver, were race-
neutral rules and regulations attached to property that limited the ways in which the 
property could be used, and were designed to limit the integration of nicer neighborhoods 
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to those that had the economic resources and behavioral habits of the existing neighbors.  
The turn to occupancy standards was an attempt by black elites to ensure that only the 
right class of blacks were allowed into certain neighborhoods, and were an attempt to 
find a market-friendly tool to eliminate racial segregation in the housing market while 
maintaining the stark class segregation of neighborhoods.  There was certainly criticism 
of the NAACP from blacks who realized that the attack on racially restrictive covenants 
would mostly benefit the wealthy. The turn to occupancy standards after the victory in the 
Court was roundly criticized as an attempt to restrict access to housing for poor blacks.   597
Ultimately, the NAACP’s legal strategy and victory in the Kraemer case 
disproportionately reflected the class interests of wealthy and middle class blacks. 
 The 1948 Shelley v. Kraemer case also marked the first time that the federal 
government intervened as an outside party on behalf of the civil rights groups seeking 
redress for Fourteenth Amendment violation due to racial discrimination.   The 598
increasing willingness of the federal government to intercede on behalf of racial 
minorities before the Court was in no small part due to negative consequences that 
continued racial discrimination had on the image of the United States abroad.  The 
amicus brief filed by the Office of the Solicitor General argued that government 
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants was a “source of serious embarrassment to 
agencies of the Federal Government,” and hindered “the conduct of foreign affairs.”   599
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The brief included a statement from the Secretary of State warning that instances of racial 
discrimination were widely publicized internationally, and cautioning that “we find it 
next to impossible to formulate a satisfactory answer to out critics in other countries” and 
that “the existence of discrimination against minority groups in the United States is a 
handicap in our relations with other countries.”   As previously discussed, the 600
international context provided an opening for the pursuit of a civil rights agenda that 
privileged incorporation of racial minorities into the existing institutional landscape.  By 
the late 1940s, advocates for racial democracy had found powerful institutional support in 
the NAACP, the Federal Government, and the Supreme Court. 
Brown v. Board 
 Perhaps the most important indication of this new settlement in the legal arena 
was the Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown v. Board decision.   Education provided the 
NAACP a particularly opportune area to pursue its top priority of overturning the Plessy 
v. Ferguson (1896) precedent.  In 1952, Thurgood Marshall outlined the plan of attack at 
a conference at Howard University hosted by Charles Thompson, editor of the JNE.  At 
the conference, which took place as Brown v. Board was working it way through the 
courts, Marshall made clear that the main thrust of the NAACP’s argument would rely on 
an emerging social science literature that focused on the immaterial consequences of 
segregation in primary and secondary schools.  Instead of focusing on tangible 
differences between black and white schools, such as physical facilities, number of 
 Ibid., 20.600
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teachers, or amount of funding, the NAACP’s legal strategy would focus on the evidence 
that segregation caused “insecurity, self-hate” and “adverse effect[s] on personality 
development” in black students.   As historian Leah Gordon has shown, the postwar era 601
was a particularly opportune time for this change in legal strategy.   Generous federal and 
foundation funding for studies examining the psychological effects of prejudice and 
segregation had facilitated a decisive shift in the ideological tenor of the social sciences, 
and led to a proliferation of studies that identified prejudice and attitudes, rather than 
labor exploitation and class struggle, as the source of racial oppression.   It was these 602
studies that would form the heart of the NAACP’s argument in Brown v. Board. 
  The focus on the psychological harm of segregation was distinct from the strategy 
that the NAACP had pursued in previous cases involving higher education and 
professional schools.  The NAACP had experienced some success in cases pursuing 
integration in institutions of higher education through arguing that the separate 
opportunities provided to white and black students were unequal, most notably in the 
Sweatt v. Painter (1950) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents (1950) cases.  
However, as Marshall pointed out at the conference, it would be much more difficult to 
win on this argument in primary and secondary education cases, as many states had made 
an effort (often in response to, or in an attempt to head off, adverse court decisions) to 
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equalize the tangible aspects of black and white schools.   This fact made the turn to the 603
immaterial psychological harm that was the focus of many social scientists particularly 
attractive to the NAACP lawyers, as it provided them a new avenue of arguing that 
separate schools did  not (and in fact, could not) provide equal educational opportunities. 
 The turn to a focus on the psychological effects of segregation was evident in the 
oral arguments and briefs submitted by the NAACP in the Brown case.  The NAACP 
lawyers submitted an extensive appendix with their briefs, entitled “The Effects of 
Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science Statement.”  This 
statement, which was represented as “a consensus of social scientists” and a “summary of 
the best available scientific evidence relative to the effects of racial segregation” was 
drafted and signed by a number of prominent social scientists, including psychologists 
Kenneth and Mamie Clark, anthropologist Allison Davis, and sociologist Ira Reid.   The 604
statement emphasized that segregation had the potential to “damage the personality of all 
children”  which could lead to myriad negative consequences including “anti-social and 605
delinquent behavior,” a “defeatist attitude,”  and “feelings of inferiority and and doubts 606
about personal worth.”   The focus on the immaterial and psychological harm of 607
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segregation featured heavily in Marshall's oral arguments before the Supreme Court as 
well.  Marshall's argument before the justices relied heavily on the claim that segregation 
in education damaged the personality of children, and thus denied them equal status in 
schooling.  Marshall stated that “Negro children have road blocks put up in their mind as 
a result of this segregation” and this “stamps [them] with a badge of inferiority.”   608
Marshall also drew the justices attention to the testimony of Kenneth Clark, who had 
examined Leah Carter and found evidence of psychological injury, and warned of the 
potential for permanent injury to the mind if students were forced to stay in segregated 
schools.   609
 The argument that segregation caused psychological damage to students was 
persuasive, and was cited by the justices in their unanimous decision overturning the 
separate but equal doctrine.  Much as Marshall had predicted at the 1952 Howard 
University conference outlining the NAACP's legal strategy, the justices emphasized that 
efforts to equalize black and white schools “with respect to buildings, curricula, 
qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other ‘tangible’ factors,” meant their decision 
could not be based “on merely a comparison of these tangible factors.”   Instead, the 610
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decision focused on the immaterial harm of segregation on children, arguing, “[t]o 
separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race 
generates a feeling of inferiority … that may affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely to ever be undone.”   In justifying their decision, the Justices cited Kenneth 611
Clark, E. Franklin Frazier, and Gunnar Myrdal among others, arguing that new evidence 
emanating from social scientists had decisively shown that segregation caused 
psychological damage to children; “Whatever may have been the extent of psychological 
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern 
authority.”  612
 The Brown decision represented the victory of the NAACP legal vision that 
focused on the non-material consequences of segregation.  The decision also marked 
doctrinal shift in the courts that established that government-backed segregation was 
unconstitutional, even in absence of material inequality.   Law professor Lani Guinier 613
has noted that through the Brown decision the Supreme Court converted the problems 
facing blacks “into a problem of individual psychological dysfunction” and as merely “an 
aberration in individuals who disregard relevant information, rely on stereotypes and act 
thoughtlessly.”   This left little room for legal recourse for the widespread material 614
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consequences that Jim Crow had imposed on blacks.  This was a significant change from 
earlier conceptions of civil rights that focused on economic and labor rights.   
 The Brown decision galvanized support behind the continued push for a civil 
rights platform centered on overcoming the specific harms identified by the Court in its 
decision, the psychological injury imposed by segregation.  In a 1955 JNE article, 
Thurgood Marshall and Robert Carter, two of the NAACP lawyers who had argued the 
Brown case before the Supreme Court, urged for the continuation of their program, 
arguing, “it is important the strongest pressures against the continuation of segregation, 
North or South, be continually and constantly manifested… as much as anything else, 
this is the key to the elimination of discrimination in the United States.”   The Brown 615
decision, and the many court victories before it, refocused the political agendas of a 
number of groups and individuals combating racial subordination.  The National Council 
of Negro Women, a council comprised of over two dozen groups founded by New Dealer 
and Works Progress Administration administrator Mary McLeod Bethune, announced 
their new focus, saying “[f]ollowing the Supreme Court decision of May 17, 1954, the 
Board of Directors of the National Council of Negro Women decided that the program 
emphasis for the organization should embrace a program to further the implementation of 
the decision.”   The decision to shift focus was quickly followed by an invitation to 616
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Kenneth Clark to give the keynote speech at a national conference and the decision to 
found a new Interracial Conference to promote interracial understanding.    617
 The Court victories of the NAACP lawyers received extensive and 
overwhelmingly positive coverage in the JNE in the late 1940s and 1950.  The articles 
appearing in the JNE increasingly embraced the racial democracy framework and the 
identification of psychological harm as the paramount harm of racial segregation.  This 
development is particularly significant given the fierce debates between the racial and 
economic democrats in the 1930s and early 1940s.  Indeed, many in the economic 
democracy camp had made the point that attacking prejudice or segregation without also 
attacking the exploitative economic system - which they viewed as the source of 
prejudice - amounted to attacking the symptoms while leaving the cause intact.  By the 
mid-1950s this argument essentially disappeared from the pages of the JNE, as the Court 
decision in Brown (and others) reaffirmed the pursuit of desegregation and anti-prejudice 
as the paramount goal of black politics.  The political agenda shifted accordingly, as 
programs focused on interracial contact and education to combat prejudice and 
discrimination and improve race relations began to dominate the political landscape. 
 The post-Brown legal consensus that enshrined psychological damage as the 
primary consequence of segregation left little room for legal recourse for the material 
consequences - including poor pay, lack of jobs, and lack of job stability - that were often 
at the forefront of black complaints about the harms of Jim Crow.   The consolidation of 618
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this legal and political consensus came at a particularly perilous economic time for black 
workers.  The 1930s and early 1940s had been a time of significant improvement in the 
economic situation of black workers.  There was a four-fold increase in the number of 
blacks employed by the federal government between 1933 and 1946, and black union 
membership exploded from 150,000 in 1935 to 1.25 million by the end of World War 
II.   Although their situation remained decidedly worse than their white counterparts, 619
black workers continued to make economic gains and considerably reduced the black-
white income gap in the immediate post-War years.    620
 By the early 1950s, the economic prospects of black workers (and many white 
workers as well) changed considerably.  The fatal blow to the industrial democratic 
potential of the NLRA dealt by the federal courts and Taft-Hartley legislation greatly 
weakened the position of workers and the labor movement, leaving them unable to 
effectively combat the destabilization of millions of jobs as companies turned to 
automation and moved jobs to open shop states.  As the labor movement was forced into 
an increasingly defensive position in response to Court decisions and hostile legislation, 
the percentage of the workforce that belonged to unions began to decline by 1953.   At 621
roughly the same time, the economic fortunes for black workers began to shift, and the 
gap between the wages of black workers and white workers actually increased from 1952 
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through the end of the decade.   Indeed, although the late 1940s and the 1950s are often 622
regarded as a time of prosperity and affluence, this characterization misses the uneven 
distribution of the economic gain.  By the end of 1950s, over 22% of the population, and 
55% of the black population, was living in poverty.   As the courts facilitated the 623
disappearance of previous commitments to job guarantees, redistribution of power in the 
workplace, and strong economic rights from the political and legal landscape, these 
commitments were replaced by the pursuit of a legal and policy agenda centered on 
attacking discrimination and prejudice.  This new agenda offered considerably fewer 
avenues for effective redress of immense economic problems facing black workers. 
The Suppression of Individuals and Ideas of the Educational Left 
 The brutal domestic repression of the left was perhaps the most significant factor 
in limiting the potential for an alternative vision of education.  As individuals on the left 
who had promoted a vision of education grounded in a critique of unfair economic 
arrangement  were increasingly targeted by Congressional investigations and 
organizations from across the political spectrum in the 1940s, the space for this 
alternative vision collapsed.  The recovering economy and the strained relationship 
between the United States and the Soviet Union before, during, and immediately after 
World War II provided a favorable political environment for opponents to undermine the 
influence of the left through challenging their loyalty.  This was by far the most effective 
 Marable, Race, Reform, and Rebellion, 51-52.622
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way that social reconstructionism was attacked, and the severe and ever-present 
suggestion of political subversion faced by the most prominent members of the 
movement were critical to the movement’s eventual demise.  Conservative organizations 
like the NAM, the American Legion and the Daughters of the American Revolution 
accused individuals like John Dewey, Harold Rugg, William Kilpatrick and George 
Counts of holding subversive political ideas.  These accusation frequently caught the 
attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the House Committee on Un-
American Activities, (HUAC), and official loyalty investigations were opened on several 
of the most important social reconstructionists.  The open ended investigations 
represented a serious threat to the careers and influence of these individuals, and were a 
particularly useful method for undermining the broader movement.  A focus on a few of 
the most prominent social reconstructionists subjected to these tactics illuminates the 
devastating destructiveness of questioning the loyalty of political opponents in the era of 
the Second Red Scare.   
Red Baiting the Educational Left: John Dewey 
 John Dewey, the most prominent of the social reconstructionists, was an inviting 
target.  The FBI had a file on Dewey that dated back to 1930, apparently prompted by 
Dewey’s association with the People’s Lobby, a watchdog organization that advocated 
good government and public disclosure.  Despite turning up nothing in their initial 
search, the FBI kept Dewey’s file on hand, and reopened a much more serious 
investigation in 1943.  This time, the investigation was prompted by the FBI office in 
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New York, who noted his membership in twenty-one potentially subversive 
organizations.  The aim of the investigation was to conclude whether Dewey should be 
officially classified officially as a “sympathizer,” under the Custodial Detention Index, a 
program used to identify potential subversive that might need to be incarcerated in case 
of war.  Dewey was cleared once again; however; his file remained open and was moved 
to the “Subversive Control” section of the FBI.    624
 Although never officially charged, Dewey was frequently the subject of attacks by 
conservative groups.  Allen Zoll, perhaps the most infamous of the education red baiters 
and the founder of the National Council for American Education (NCAE), whose sole 
purpose was to root out progressive ideas and educators from the public school system, 
took aim at Dewey directly in the late 1940s in one of his more popular pamphlets 
entitled “Progressive Education Increases Delinquency.”  Noting that, “the purpose of 
education as conceived by John Dewey, George Counts, and their like,” amounted to little 
more than a denial of “the necessity of every factor necessary for our survival as a free 
people” had “robbed growing youth of the ability to think independently,” and 
“blights...the moral standards by which alone a people may maintain a secure, free, 
coherent society.”   Dewey was also specifically targeted by the American Legion, 625
which published “Your Child is Their Target” in the American Legion Magazine which 
accused Dewey and other progressive educators (the article also mentions George 
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Counts, William Kilpatrick, and Harold Rugg) as a group of “pinkos, commies, 
collectivists, and Marxists” that controlled public schools in the hopes of converting 
children into Communists.   Even Dewey’s death did not slow the criticisms or the 626
investigations.  In 1957, five years after Dewey’s death, J. Edgar Hoover, the director of 627
the FBI, requested, “Let me have a summary on John Dewey, the educator who furthered 
the idea of progressive education.”  628
Red Baiting the Educational Left: Harold Rugg 
 The investigations and accusations of subversive sympathies made Dewey more 
cautious in his writing and activities,  however, the effects of these investigations on 629
Dewey paled in comparison to some of his colleagues.  The consequences of red baiting 
attacks on Harold Rugg are much more apparent.  As educational historian Stephen 
Foster has noted, “[v]irtually every organization associated with the red scare participated 
in reflexive assaults on textbooks.”   Rugg’s social studies textbook series was subject 630
to particularly heated criticism, with business groups playing a  particularly influential 
role in movement to ban Rugg’s textbooks.  Perhaps no group was as influential in 
 Ibid., 76-77.626
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targeting Rugg’s work as the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM).  In 1941 the 
NAM commissioned Ralph Robey to prepare a comprehensive list of textbooks with 
extracted quotations in an attempt to “[d]etermine the attitude or point of view presented 
by the respective authors with respect to the private enterprise system or the traditional 
governmental system of the United States.”   The report evaluated several of Rugg’s 631
textbook, and included excerpts that focused on Russia, unemployment, increasing 
inequality, and economic planning.   Although the report remained officially neutral, the 632
quotations were chosen in such a way to give the impression that Rugg’s textbook were 
well outside the mainstream, and hostile to free enterprise.  The reaction to report was 
swift, with immediate calls for the banning of all of Rugg’s textbooks.   Other business 633
groups soon piled on, with the publisher of Forbes Magazine stating he would personally 
“insist that this anti-American educator’s text books be cast out,” and the American 
Association of Advertisers joining the effort by asking all of its local affiliates to pressure 
school boards to no longer buy Rugg’s textbooks.    634
 The accusations of subversiveness had an immediate and drastic effect on the use 
of Rugg’s textbook in public schools across the country.  The state of Georgia suspended 
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all the use of all of Rugg’s textbooks in 1940 after a police officer affiliated with the 
Governor’s home defense corps claimed he had found “communistic doctrines” in Rugg’s 
books.   In a remarkable case in the central Pennsylvania town of Sunburry, all of 635
Rugg’s textbooks mysteriously disappeared from the junior high school after the School 
Board refused demands from the local chapter of the American Legion that they be 
removed.  The books were the only items missing from an apparent break-in over the 
Christmas break.  The case went unsolved, perhaps because the police chief called to 
investigate the case was also the commander of the local council of the American 
Legion.   In a 1941 editorial, The Milwaukee Sentinel approvingly quoted the Robey 636
report and called for a ban, and provided a clear articulation of the reasoning behind 
much of the attempts to ban of Rugg’s textbook.  After noting that “public school children 
are being ‘softened’ towards Soviet Russia by radical teachers and textbooks,” the 
editorial issued a condemnation of the teaching of any sort of social vision that 
challenged the status quo, stating “[o]nly one doctrine should be taught APPROVINGLY 
in our schools--that is, AMERICANISM.  All other systems but constitutional, free 
democracy should be condemned unsparingly.”  637
 “Intellectual ‘Hot Potato’ Stirs Row,” The Miami Daily News, September 19, 1940.  In the charged 635
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 Activity on the local level soon eventually culminated in attention from HUAC, 
which held hearings in 1948 to consider a recommendation to officially ban all textbooks 
written by Rugg and two other progressive educators.   Although the committee 638
declined to ban Rugg’s books, the accusation of subversiveness was enough to effectively 
eliminate the textbook from public schools.  Over the course of the attacks on the 
textbook’s content, circulation of Rugg’s textbook declined from 289,000 in 1938, to 
21,000 in 1944, to essentially zero by the 1950s.  After Rugg’s publisher discontinued 
production his social studies series under pressure from outside groups, many schools 
replaced it with series by Paul Hanna.  Hanna had self-consciously crafted his series to 
avoid serious engagement with the social and political issues of the day, and actively 
attempted to limit the control that social studies teachers had over the parameters of the 
curricula.  The result was a dispassionate series that proved uncontroversial and popular 
with schools throughout the 1940s and 1950s. The decline of Rugg’s textbook, and the 
style of those that replaced it, was another damaging blow to the reputation and influence 
of the social reconstructionists.  639
 The attack on his textbook was just one of the was one avenues used to undermine 
Rugg and his educational positions in this era.  Rugg was also investigated as a potential 
subversive individual by the FBI.  Rugg’s FBI file did not begin until 1942, and was 
apparently created in reaction to the accusations of conservative groups that his textbooks 
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contained material designed to indoctrinate students with subversive beliefs.  Tellingly, 
most of the material in the initial file was reprints of articles by conservative critics, 
including articles from the NAM and the a business executive associated with the 
American Legion.  No action was taken, but the Bureau retained a file on Rugg.  Another 
investigation was started in 1951 in reaction to visit by Rugg to Ohio State University at 
the invitation of graduate students in the Education school.  The invitation triggered an 
immediate outcry from community groups, and opposition from the board of trustees, the 
American Legion, and the Governor of Ohio.   Although Rugg did give a speech at the 640
University, the backlash caught the attention of the state level Ohio Un-American 
Activities Committee and the FBI, which began investigating Rugg under a Security 
Matter - C (Communist) classification.   The 1951 investigation again found little basis 641
for these attacks and there was apparently no mention or objection to the contents of his 
1951 speech at Ohio State University; however the file was filled with attacks on Rugg’s 
writings from the 1930s and 1940s.   These were largely local editorials and pamphlets 642
from conservative groups, including some from the DAR and the American Legion.  The 
1951 event began a period of sporadic investigation into Rugg’s subversiveness that 
would last until his death in 1960.   Of particular concern to the FBI during this period 643
 Alan F. Schoedel, “OSU Speaker Controversy Still Hot Issue After 5 Months,” Toldeo Blade, December 640
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was his vocal criticism of loyalty investigation in education, and his defense of fired 
teachers, a practice that Rugg had engaged in since his affiliation with The Social 
Frontier.   Despite never having been officially charged, and frequently being found 644
harmless by several investigations, Rugg faced was deemed a potential risk and faced 
continuous investigation by the FBI for nearly twenty years. 
Red Baiting the Educational Left: Mary Foley Grossman 
 The investigations proved particularly devastating for personal and professional 
careers of many of the educators that had been strong advocates for a pedagogy centered 
in investigating the inequalities of the existing social and economic landscape.  In the late 
1930s Mary Foley Grossman, the Philadelphia teacher and union leader, had been a 
respected voice in the education and labor community.  Grossman had testified before 
Congress in 1937 as an educational expert, urging Congress to increase federal aid to 
public education.   In 1938, as president of nearly 4,000 organized teachers in 645
Pennsylvania, she led the successful effort to affiliate with the AFT, giving the AFT its 
first presence in the state.   Grossman was a prominent voice warning against the 646
dangers of reducing academic curriculum to “the 3 R’s,” encouraging greater education 
 See Harold Rugg, “This Has Happened Before,” Frontiers of Democracy 7, no. 58 (January 15, 1941): 644
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for workers so they could articulate against employers, and a strong proponent of teachers 
unions and greater federal aid to public education.  647
 By 1939 Grossman had already drawn the attention of HUAC, due to both her 
membership in the American League for Peace and Democracy and for her outspoken 
opposition to attempts to weaken or overturn the Wagner Act.   Grossman’s influence 648
was greatly limited by 1941 in the wake of accusations from Counts’ “right wing” 
coalition (see below) that she held subversive political beliefs resulted in her being 
pushed out of her leadership position in the national AFT and the revocation of the 
charter of her local union.  Although these accusations did not immediately threaten her 
teaching job, when HUAC turned attention to subversive influences in public education, 
Grossman was eventually suspended from her teaching position and interrogated by the 
committee.  In her 1954 testimony, the accusations that Counts’ coalition had used in the 
1940 AFT campaign, as well as the suspension of the Philadelphia local’s charter were 
central to the committee’s case against Grossman.  Grossman invoked her Fifth 
Amendment right against self incrimination as the committee asked her whether she had 
ever been a communist or hosted communist meetings in her home, and questioned her 
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about the political loyalties of her fellow union members.   The accusations and 649
investigation of Grossman effectively destroyed any influence that she may have had 
over education policy. The elimination of Grossman’s voice from the national scene 
meant the loss of a prominent voice advocating for a pedagogy devoted to tackling social 
injustice. 
Red Baiting the Educational Left: Doxey Wilkerson 
 Doxey Wilkerson, a fellow AFT leader ousted in the 1940 elections, suffered a 
similar fate as Mary Foley Grossman.  Like Grossman, Wilkerson had been a prominent 
national voice on education. After gaining his masters degree from the University of 
Kansas, Wilkerson began his career as a professor of education at Virginia State 
University, moving to Howard University in 1935.  As his prominence grew with his 
frequent contributions to the JNE throughout the 1930s, in 1937, President Franklin’s 
newly appointed Advisory Committee on Education reached out to Wilkerson and hired 
him as a researcher.  Between 1937 and 1939, the Committee commissioned Wilkerson 
for several studies outlining information on federal aid to vocational education, the role 
of federal, state, and local governments in education, and the particular educational 
challenges of black students.  In 1939, the Advisory Committee combined Wilkerson’ s 
reports into one volume, Special Problems of Negro Education, and printed and 
distributed copies through the Government Printing Office.   As a result of his work, 650
 Communist Activities in Philadelphia, 3994-3997.  Incidentally, the house where Mary Foley Grossman 649
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Wilkerson was asked to serve on the National Advisory Committee of the Works Progress 
Administration education program, and was eventually hired as an educational specialist 
for the Office of Price Administration (OPA) in 1942 and 1943.   
 Wilkerson’s national profile as an educational expert was also boosted by his 
service as a vice president for international affairs of the AFT from 1937-1940, and as a 
representative of the American Teacher’ Association, a black teachers association with 
over 4,000 members.   By the late 1930s and early 1940s, Wilkerson was one of the 651
most prominent national black educational figures. Wilkerson publicly advocated for a 
greater federal role in primary and secondary education, encouraged teachers to expose 
students to the social injustices of the existing economy, and was firmly committed to the 
principles of economic democracy.  
 Wilkerson’s actions and writings quickly drew the attention of the FBI, 
conservative Congressmen, and liberals uncomfortable with his more radical stances.  In 
the late 1930s, as he made multiple appearances as an expert witness on education before 
the Senate Committee on Labor and Education, Wilkerson’s name appeared in a HUAC 
investigation of “Un-American Propaganda Activities” because of his connection with the 
 Subversive Influence in the Educational Process: Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee to 651
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International Labor Defense, a suspected communist front group.   Wilkerson was 652
ousted from his position at the AFT along with Mary Foley Grossman, by George Counts’ 
right wing coalition.  Following the very public ouster 1940 of Wilkerson and Grossman 
from AFT after George Counts’ right wing coalition questioned the loyalties of Wilkerson 
and his fellow national officers (see below), the FBI opened an investigation into 
Wilkerson.  By 1942, the Bureau had concluded that Wilkerson was a communist and 
issued a report recommending that he no longer be employed by the Federal Government 
despite the fact that at the time there was no official prohibition on communists serving 
as federal employees.  Although Wilkerson was not immediately terminated, he 
ultimately resigned his position a year after the FBI report, at which point he publicly 
announced his membership in the Communist Party.      653
 Despite no longer being employed by the federal government, Wilkerson 
continued to draw the attention of Congressional investigations.  Wilkerson’s name 
showed up frequently in Congressional reports of suspected subversive organizations, 
including the American League for Peace and Democracy, the Washington Committee for 
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Democratic Action, and the Council on African Affairs.   Importantly, after Wilkerson 654
announced that he was a communist, his case became a rallying cry for those looking to 
rid the federal government of communists.  In his 1947 testimony before HUAC, J. Edgar 
Hoover mentioned Doxey Wilkerson’s case, and the failure of the OPA to terminate his 
employment despite an FBI report warning of his communist affiliation, as a cautionary 
tale.   Hoover’s testimony resonated with Senator Joseph McCarthy, who began using 655
Wilkerson’ case as an example throughout the country of the important work done by the 
FBI and HUAC.  656
 After 1943, any past association with Wilkerson had the potential to call an 
individual’s political loyalty into question.  In his 1950 Senate confirmation hearings to 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge William Henry Hastie was questioned about the 
years in which he and Wilkerson were both on the faculty of Howard University and were 
both members of the National Negro Congress.   After President Eisenhower nominated 657
former Howard faculty member George Johnson to be a member of the Commission on 
Civil Rights, Johnson faced similar questions in his Senate confirmation hearing about 
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how well he knew, and how close he worked with, Doxey Wilkerson.   Upon being 658
nominated to be a federal circuit court judge in 1962, Thurgood Marshall was questioned 
over whether he knew or had a relationship with Wilkerson, and if there was any 
connection between Wilkerson and the NAACP.  Despite the fact that Marshall testified 
that he did not know Wilkerson, the first fifty-four pages of the HUAC file on on 
Wilkerson were read into the records of the Confirmation Hearing.   Wilkerson also 659
came up when President Johnson’s requested an FBI background check on Abe Fortas for 
his potential appointment to the Supreme Court in 1964.  Fortas’ file includes the fact that 
both Fortas and Wilkerson were members of the Washington Committee for Democratic 
Action in the early 1940s, and cautioned that Fortas may have once attended a meeting 
led by Wilkerson.   660
 In March of 1953, Wilkerson was subpoenaed to appear before a Senate 
committee investigating subversive influence in the educational process.  Wilkerson 
invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as he was asked about his 
involvement with the Communist Party during his time working for the OPA and WPA 
and as a faculty member at Howard University.   However, before invoking his Fifth 661
Amendment privilege, Wilkerson delivered a statement to Senator McCarthy outlining 
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his educational approach and excoriating the committee and its investigation for the 
damaging effect it had on education in the country.  The remarkable statement, worth 
quoting at length, began: 
I want to make it clear at the outset that I have nothing but contempt for 
the efforts of this subcommittee to subvert academic freedom in the 
schools and colleges of our country.  I will not cooperate with this 
subcommittee’s aim to reduce the people of our Nation to the intellectual 
status of robots whose ideas on social and political questions are dictated 
by certain congressional committees.  My whole career as a student and 
teacher has been one of trying to understand and interpret the history, 
problems, and development of our society; and I have ever been ready to 
proclaim what my studies revealed.  This I will continue to do.  For more 
than 2 decades I have encouraged thousands of young people in my 
classes to dig in deeply, to seek answers the basic questions of our time, 
and follow with courage the convictions they reach.  This, likewise, I will 
continue to do.  662
After reaffirming his commitment to a pedagogy centered on investigation of social 
problems, 
Wilkerson asked a number of rhetorical questions to highlight what he viewed as the 
political motivations of the committee.  Wilkerson suggested that the subpoena was 
motivated by his opposition to “the drive to war and fascism which this subcommittee 
seeks to abet,” his history of “investigating and exposing the abominable school 
conditions to which Negro children are subjected in much of the country,” his public 
advocacy for “the Socialist reorganization of our society.”   Finally, Wilkerson hinted 663
that the motivation for his appearance was due to fact that “this subcommittee believes 
that, by running me through its inquisitorial mill, it will thereby help intimidate other 
 Ibid., 638.662
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Negro leaders, other educators, other students into silence.”   Despite the fact that the 664
committee learned little from Wilkerson’s March testimony, he was called before a 
different Senate subcommittee investigating communist infiltration of Army civilian 
workers six months later, where he again invoked his Fifth Amendment rights.  665
 Wilkerson eventually renounced his membership in the Communist Party in 1957, 
and was hired as a professor of education at Bishop College, a black college in Marshall, 
Texas.  After a few quiet years at Bishop, Wilkerson participated in student-led protests 
and demonstrations against segregation in Marshall in 1960.  Before long, Wilkerson’s 
identity and past association were reported by the press and widely publicized by those 
critical of the demonstrations.  Facing intense pressure from the press and donors, the 
college president requested that Wilkerson resign, and when Wilkerson refused, he was 
fired.  Much like his earlier activities, the events at Marshall were recorded and 
publicized by a Congressional subcommittee investigating subversive individuals.   666
Over a period of twenty years, Wilkerson’s political beliefs had cost him his his semi-
regular column in the JNE, his leadership position in the AFT, and his ability to work as a 
public employee.  Additionally, Wilkerson became a threat to the personal and 
professional lives of friends, allies, and organizations that he had interacted with.  
Wilkerson’s former prominence and influence, along with his educational ideas, had been 
effectively eliminated from the nation’s educational scene. 
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Red Baiting the Educational Left: George S. Counts 
 Perhaps the clearest indication of the devastating effect that the changed political 
context had on the prospects for a vision of education grounded in a critique of unfair 
economic and social arrangements can be seen in changing views of George Counts.  
Counts faced questions over his loyalty almost immediately in the wake of the first 
publication of The Social Frontier.  The journal dedicated an entire issue to the covering 
the attacks on Counts and other educators from noted newspaper magnate and red baiter 
William Hearst.   The apparent initial popularity of the social reconstructionist 667
movement prompted heated attacks on Counts.  For example, a call by National 
Education Association (NEA) for higher taxation on the wealthy and the proclamation 
emanating from the 1934 National Convention of School Superintendents that, 
“educational workers of America must band themselves together now in a powerful union 
to create tens of thousands of citizens groups to study critical economic and social 
problems,” prompted prominent anti-New Deal educator William Wirt to charge Counts 
with attempting to create an “ultra-radical sentiment among our people, which will force 
the country over the precipice and into the abyss of Communism.”   Counts was also 668
subject to continuous attacks from the conservative groups that seemingly specialized in 
 See Volume 1, Number of The Social Frontier from February 1935 for full issue dedicated to attacks on 667
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this form of character assassination, the American Legion, the NCAE, the DAR and the 
American Council of Churches.  669
 As these accusations put Counts on the defensive, they also drew the attention of 
the FBI and HUAC. The FBI opened its investigation into Counts in 1942, largely due to 
his affiliation with various suspected front organizations.   Although the initial 670
investigation found that Counts expressed “pro-Russian sympathy,” it concluded that he 
was likely not a communist.   Counts continued to face accusations despite his 671
increasingly vocal opposition to the Soviet Russia and vigorous efforts to eliminate 
communist influence from several organizations he was involved with by 1940.  Much 
like Ralph Bunche (and others), the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact appears to have greatly 
upset Counts, and drove him to reconsider his previously sympathetic view of Soviet 
Russia.  By 1939, Counts had publicly denounced Stalin and soon turned his attention 
towards driving communists out of Popular Front organizations.  Perhaps most 
significantly, he led a coalition in 1940 to challenge the leadership of the national 
American Federation of Teachers (AFT), which he charged with being too close to the 
Communist Party.   
 The leadership Counts sought to oust included Doxy Wilkerson, a professor of 
education at Howard University, and Mary Foley Grossman, a middle-school teacher and 
 For example, see “Anti-Red Speaker Hit as Pro-Red,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, March 13, 1952.669
 In an illustration of how wide this label was, the list of suspected front groups that led to Counts being 670
targeted included the American Civil Liberties Union, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 
and tellingly, the People’s Committee Against Hearst. Nelson & Singleton, “Government Surveillance,” 
18-22.
 Ibid., 18.671
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union leader from Philadelphia.  Both Grossman’s and Wilkerson’s view of the purpose 
of education was in line with the social reconstructionist ideals of what Counts had 
advocated in the early 1930s.  Both had outlined their views in the JNE, where Wilkerson 
also had a recurring column.   Although Wilkerson's and Grossman’s educational 672
philosophy was closely aligned with Counts’, after 1939, Counts was no longer willing to 
collaborate with individuals he considered too close to the Communist Party.  He led a 
coalition seeking to oust Wilkerson and Grossman, arguing that keeping the existing 
leadership in charge would do irreparable harm to the AFT. Counts and his allies, 
successfully defeated the existing leadership in the 1940 A.F.T. election and Counts took 
over as President of the organization in 1941.  673
 One year after the election, Counts and the other newly elected officers moved to 
revoke the charters of three of the largest and most active local unions on the grounds that 
they were dominated by communists.  Counts and the new executive council publicly 
introduced the charges against locals 5 and 537 of New York City (one represented 
elementary and secondary teachers, the other represented college teachers) as well as 
local 192 of Philadelphia in a lengthy and detailed document entitled The Executive 
Council’s Proposal to Save the AFT.  Evidence against these locals included the fact that 
 See Mary Foley Grossman, “Redefining the Relationship of the Federal Government to the Education of 672
Racial and Other Minority Groups,” The Journal of Negro Education 7, no. 3 (1938): 450–53; D. A. 
Wilkerson, “The Vocational Education and Guidance of Negroes,” The Journal of Negro Education 7, no. 1 
(1938): 104–8; D. A. Wilkerson, “The Vocational Education and Guidance of Negroes: A Measure of the 
Economic Value of Vocational Education,” The Journal of Negro Education 8, no. 1 (1939): 118–20.
 Federal Aid for Education: Hearings Before the Committee on Education and Labor, United States 673
Senate, 79th Cong. 782-784 (1945)(statement of Selma M. Borchart,, Vice President, American Federation 
of Teachers).
!271
the union publication had been insufficiently critical of the “Stalin-Hitler pact”, and had 
reported on the activities of pro-communist organizations such as the National Negro 
Congress and the American League for Peace and Democracy.  Mary Foley Grossman, 
who was the president of the Philadelphia local, was one of the few individuals named in 
the report.  She was singled out for particularly harsh treatment in the document because 
of her continued opposition to the newly elected national officers.   This would prove 674
quite damaging for Grossman when she was called before HUAC in the 1950s.  The 
successful effort to revoke the charters of these locals, which by Counts’ own admission 
were some of the most active, is a clear indication that by the early 1940s the changing 
international context was already creating damaging fissures among left oriented 
educators.   675
 In 1944 Counts led a similar effort to rid the American Labor Party (ALP), an 
organization he had founded a decade earlier, of communist influence.  In 1944, Counts, 
who was then chairman of the ALP and its roughly 400,000 voters, was challenged by 
Sidney Hillman, the president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers.  Counts ran a 
campaign in which he accused Hillman making common cause with communists.  During 
the campaign, he warned that if he lost, he and his supporters would “not remain in the 
 Subversive Influence in the Educational Process: Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the 674
Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, United States Senate, 82nd Cong. 305-322 (1952) (Exhibit No. 18, The Executive Council’s 
Proposal to Save the AFT).
 Investigation of Communist Activities in Philadelphia Area-Part 4: Hearing Before the Committee on 675
Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 83rd Cong. 3994-3997 (1954) (testimony of Mary Foley 
Grossman).
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party and serve as a front for Communists.”   After Hillman’s coalition won an 676
overwhelming victory, Counts and his allies left the party he had founded, and vowed to 
form a splinter group without communists, and declared the “death of the A.L.P.”   677
Counts’ efforts and public accusations would provide significant fodder for red-baiting 
Congressmen in the near future. 
 For Counts, active participation in anti-communist efforts was not enough to clear 
his name from suspicion of being a subversive person.  Counts continued to be a person 
of interest to Congressional committees investigating the influence of subversive 
individuals in public employment and private organization.  Counts’ name appeared in a 
number of reports throughout the 1940s because of his past association with now suspect 
organizations including the National Committee for Defense of Political Prisoners, the 
Union for Democratic Action, the National Committee for Student Congress Against War, 
the American Student Union, and the Consumers Union.   Counts’ name and his book 678
Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order? were repeatedly invoked in Congressional 
testimony by conservatives as a means of combatting federal funding for public education 
and of smearing political opponents.  For example,  opponents of the Public School 
Assistance Act of 1949 pointed to the subversive nature of Dare the Schools build a New 
 “Rightists Bolt N.Y. Labor Party, Charge Browder Now Has Control of A.L.P.,” Chicago Tribune, 676
March 30, 1944.  See also, “Hillman Elected Party Chairman,” The Milwaukee Journal, April 9, 1944.
 Ibid.677
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Social Order? and Counts’ advocacy for greater federal funding of education as a means 
of attacking the increased federal funding and involvement in public elementary and 
secondary schools.    679
 The situation for Counts became more serious in 1951 when a former European 
communist claimed Counts was a hidden “member at large” of the Communist Party.   680
Another investigation was launched as a result of this information, it again failed to 
conclude that Counts’ was a communist.  However, this most recent accusation appeared 
to put Count on the radar of the HUAC.  Although the Committee apparently found no 
new evidence, it still issued 19 citations against Counts for communist leanings in early 
1952.   Given that Counts was not employed in the Federal government, these citations 681
would not lead to his loss of employment, but it represented a serious threat to his 
reputation, and potentially to any individual or organizations with which he interacted.   
 Counts took the latest charges quite seriously as evidenced by his drastic response 
to the actions of the HUAC.  Shortly after the citations were issued, Counts gave 
speeches in March of 1952 at two universities in Pennsylvania where he renounced 
communism and, more significantly, much of his social reconstructionist positions.  Both 
 Public School Assistance Act of 1949: Hearings Before a Special Subcommittee of the Committee on 679
Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 81st Cong. 575 (1949) (testimony of Amos A. Fries, Major 
General, United States Army, Retired, Vice President and Director of the Friends of the Public Schools of 
America, and Editor of the Bulletin, Friends of the Public Schools).  See also pg. 834 (testimony of Rosa 
M. Farber), and pg. 894 (Address by Aaron M. Sargent, Counsel for Committee, Sons of the American 
Revolution). 
 As quoted in Nelson & Singleton, “Government Surveillance,”; 20. Importantly, Storrs notes that the 680
informants used by the FBI and HUAC at this time were notoriously unreliable, a fact of which both these 
organizations were well aware.
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speeches were apparently devoted to criticisms of the Soviet Union and communism,  682
indicated by the title of his second speech, “The Soviet System of Thought Control.”   683
In a moment that offered a stark contrast to his earlier writing, Counts excoriated the 
Soviets for encouraging their populace to pursue the “the vision of an ideal society some 
place just around corner.”  Counts also used the speeches to outline a new social vision.  684
He claimed that America’s best course was to seek, “military strength first of all.”   The 685
role for teachers was quite limited, but he did urge educators to teach students about 
Russia in order to bolster their self-defense against the dangerous Soviet ideology.  If 
there was any doubt that Counts still subscribed to his earlier writings, he eliminated it in 
the question and answer section of one of his Pennsylvania speeches.  Asked specifically 
about his position outlined in Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order that teachers 
ought to lead the nation towards a collectivist social transformation, Counts replied, “I 
once believed that, but I don’t anymore.”  686
 Counts’ recantation did little to satiate his critics, who still frequently protested 
his speeches and questioned his political loyalties.  Counts continued to move farther 
away from his previous positions, eventually claiming in 1954 that “a Communist has no 
 See “Accused Educator Blasts Reds, Refutes Charges,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, March 14, 1952; see 682
also Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, "Anti-Red Speaker Hit as Pro-Red."
 “Squabble over Accused Red’s Appearance Grows Hot,” The Pittsburg Press, March 13, 1952.683
 As quoted in, Guy Wright, “Once Pro-Russian but Not Now, Speaker at Pitt and Tech Claims,” The 684
Pittsburg Press, March 14, 1952.
 Ibid.685
 Ibid.686
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right to teach in the schools of a free society.”   Although this movement away from 687
social reconstructionism did not quiet his critics, it did strain the relationships he had with 
former progressive educators.  Harold Rugg and Counts’ had an apparent falling out over 
Counts’ subdued reaction to the dismissal on loyalty grounds of twenty-one teachers from 
Brooklyn College.  According to his widow, Rugg resented Counts for fanning the flames 
of red-baiting, and their relationship never fully recovered.    688
 This type of damage to personal relationships was a common occurrence during 
this era, as investigations of individuals resulted in the broader destruction of networks 
and coalitions on the left.    Beyond the hundreds of teachers that lost their positions 689
due to political their political beliefs, the suffocating atmosphere of the Second Red Scare 
greatly limited what could taught in the classroom.  Subjects that were central aspects of 
a left vision of education such as trade unionism and capitalism became essentially off 
limits.   The active suppression of the individuals and ideas of the political left 690
dramatically shifted the center of gravity in terms of national educational vision. 
Conclusion 
 Perhaps the height of the repression of economic democracy and social 
reconstructionist visions of education, a HUAC investigation into subversive activity in 
 As quoted in “Claim Reds Make Poor Instructors,” The Schenectady Gazette, June 2, 1954.  See also 687
Jerry Cahill, “No Room for Commie Teacher, Says Educator,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, November 6, 1954.  
Counts joined his fellow contributor to The Social Frontier Sidney Hook in taking the position that 
communists should not be allowed to be employed as teachers.
 Nelson & Singleton, “Government Surveillance,” 19.688
 Storrs, The Second Red Scare, 181.689
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education, coincided with the Supreme Court’s momentous decision in the Brown case.  
These developments resulted in a political environment that proved to be particularly 
amenable to the educational vision and particular pedagogical approaches advocated by 
racial democrats and social efficiency progressives.  As the Red Scare eliminated the 
influence of economic democrats and social reconstructionists and the Courts 
demonstrated increasing responsiveness to arguments relying on the non-material 
inequities of segregation, the stage was set for the consolidation of a liberal 
incorporationist educational vision centered on providing equal opportunity for success 
within the existing economic system.  The growth of educational movements advocating 
for intercultural education, life adjustment education, and greater use of testing in the 
1950s was clear indication that mainstream education ideas had shifted firmly away from 
the vision of the economic democrats and social reconstructionists. 
 The Brown decision gave substantial support to an intercultural education 
movement that framed racial subordination as primarily a problem psychology and 
attitudes.  As detailed in Chapter 3, the basis for the intercultural education movement 
was the belief that racial tensions and prejudice stemmed primarily from fundamental 
misunderstandings between, and misconceptions about, different races, in part due to the 
lack of direct interaction of individuals of differing races.  These prejudices resulted in 
the lack of equal opportunities for success for individuals of different races.  Advocates of 
intercultural education had long pushed for integration and greater interaction between 
students of a different races as a means of combatting racial prejudice, along with a 
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curricular emphasis on the fundamental similarities of different races, particularly in 
terms of intellectual ability.   The arguments of the NAACP, and much of the basis for 691
the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, were fundamentally similar to those of 
intercultural education advocates, relying heavily on the idea that segregation caused 
feelings of inferiority in black students and contributed to the prejudice of white children.  
Both the intercultural education movement, and the Brown decision downplayed the idea 
of an economic dimension to racial prejudice or subordination, instead framing the issue 
as primarily a non-material, attitudinal one.   The ultimate goal was to break down 692
racial misunderstandings to encourage racial harmony, and to ensure that opportunity was 
not distributed on the basis of an arbitrary category like race, but instead tied closer to a 
meaningful category such intellectual merit. 
 The destruction of the personal lives and coalitions on the left also had an effect 
on education policy.  As it became increasingly difficult to openly advocate for a vision 
of education centered on challenging exploitative economic arrangements and the social 
injustice, a vision of education centered on fairly and effectively adjusting individuals to 
succeed in the existing institutional landscape.  As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, racial 
democrats and scientific efficiency progressives had long advocated for a form of 
adjustment education for students that emphasized improving the skills, culture and 
 Hortense Powdermaker and Helen F. Storen, Probing Our Prejudces: A Unit for High School Students, 691
Problems of Race and Culture in American Education, 2 (New York: Harper, 1944).
 See  Jeanne L. Noble, “Future Educational Emphasis: Psychological or Sociological,” The Journal of 692
Negro Education 25, no. 4 (1956): 402–9;  Eugene L. Hartley, “Psychological Investigations and the 
Modification of Racial Attitudes,” The Journal of Negro Education 13, no. 3 (1944): 287–94; Layle Lane, 
“Report of the Committee on Cultural Minorities of the American Federation of Teachers,” The Journal of 
Negro Education 14, no. 1 (1945): 109–12; “Second National Conference on Intergroup Relations,” The 
Journal of Negro Education 18, no. 2 (1949): 186–91.
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behaviors that students brought to the labor market.  Racial democrats argued that 
adjustment education would prepare black students to compete on equal footing with 
their white counterparts, ultimately leading to a economic distribution based on merit 
rather than race.  Similarly, adjustment education offered hope to the poor as well, as it 
could provided the skills needed to earn a living in a changing labor market.   
Importantly, this educational vision garnered the support of many conservatives who saw 
the benefit of having the education system carry the burden of workforce training.   693
With their voices  marginalized, educators on the left were unable to effectively combat a 
vision of education that sought to adjust the student to existing structures, rather than 
challenge them. 
 Finally, the changing political context of the 1940s and 1950s proved to be a boon 
for advocates of standardized testing in education.  The use of intelligence and aptitude 
tests by the military during World War II convince many of their potential usefulness for 
the education system.   Scientific efficiency progressives had long pushed for the use of 694
intelligence testing, achievement tests, and student tracking as the best means of 
developing teaching methods and of aiding in assigning students to jobs that were most 
appropriate for their skill set.  This was essentially identical to the position of  racial 
democrats, who were proponents of testing as a means of identifying future race leaders 
and of identifying effective (and ineffective) educational methods and teaching.  In the 
 United States. Office of Education. Division of Secondary Education, “Life Adjustment Education for 693
Every Youth” (Washington, D.C.: Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, 1948).
 United States.  President’s Commission on Higher Education, “Higher Education for Democracy: A 694
Report” (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print Off., 1947): 41-42.
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aftermath of the Brown decision ending segregation in public education, racial democrats 
were increasingly committed to testing as comparing the educational opportunities 
between black and white students through comparing scores on achievement tests.   The 695
use of standardized testing in education had been vigorously opposed by many on the 
educational left, who believed that these tests promoted excessive individualism, 
competitiveness, a narrowing of the curriculum and routinization that were antithetical to 
their educational vision.   As the changing political context weakened the strength of 696
these critiques, and the ability of individuals to make them, testing advocates faced less 
opposition. 
 The consequences of the changing political context of the 1940s and 1950s for 
educational ideology were profound.  Shifting Supreme Court doctrines, the rising 
Second Red Scare, and the increasingly hostile international engagements with the Soviet 
Union all drastically reduced the political space for a vision of education that was critical 
of the existing economic landscape.  As developments in the 1940s and 1950s 
marginalized those promoting economic democracy and social reconstruction, the 
educational vision of racial democrats and scientific efficiency progressive increasingly 
began to define the purpose and methods of education.  This new order was committed to 
 Daniel P. Clarke, “The Role of Psychology in Race Survival,” The Journal of Negro Education 10, no. 1 695
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as southern educational officials turned to tests like the National Teacher’s Examination as a race-neutral 
way of firing thousands of black teachers as schools consolidated in the wake of the Court rulings.  Scott 
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ensuring equality of educational opportunity as a means of ensuring fair and effective 
incorporation into the existing market economy.  As education was increasingly 
positioned as social policy that could effectively combat racism, racial inequality, poverty 
and effectively prepare individuals for the demands of the workforce, it became 
increasingly attractive to policymakers looking for a means of addressing these social ills.  
The stage was set for the consolidation of the liberal incorporationist educational order. 
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Chapter Five 
The Victory of Liberal Incorporationism: The Great Society and the Origin of   
Punitive Education Policies 
 By the 1960s, the changing political context of the 1940s and 1950s helped 
cement a liberal incorporationist understanding of the purpose of education firmly in the 
minds of the education community.   The contestation and changes in the dominant 
understandings of the purpose of education were mirrored by a number of similar 
developments in other policy areas, most notably broad economic and unemployment 
policy.  Significantly, by the mid-1940s, policymakers within the Democratic Party began 
to abandon the New Deal commitment to full employment, economic redistribution 
through progressive taxation, and public job guarantees. 
 The timing of the ideological victory by the liberal incorporationists would prove 
auspicious as these policymakers increasingly looked for new policy avenues to address 
the problems of unemployment, poverty, and racial inequality that could fit with a new 
preference for economic stimulation through tax cuts.  The liberal incorporationist 
understanding positioned education policy as an effective means of addressing all three of 
these pressing social issues without committing the Democratic Party to the massive 
federal expenditures of a New Deal-type policy agenda.  As the Democratic Party turned 
its attention to education policy, it relied heavily on the liberal incorporationist ideology 
and methods in crafting the programatic structure of the nascent federal education state. 
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 This chapter traces how the ideological developments and the dominant position 
of a liberal incorporationist understanding of education were institutionalized into the 
federal education state by Democrats in the 1960s.  The chapter begins with a brief 
overview of current scholarship on the development of federal education policy.  It then 
analyzes the demise of the commitment to full employment and public jobs within the 
Democratic Party, and the rise of commercial Keynesian and human capital approaches to 
economic growth within the Democratic Party.  The chapter next outlines the ideological 
understanding of poverty that provided the basis for the War on Poverty and positioned 
education as a particularly effective policy area to address both poverty and racial 
inequality.  The liberal incorporationist understanding of the purpose of education was 
able to easily accommodate itself to new ideological explanations of social problems - 
such as human capital theory and culture of poverty theory - in large part because these 
new theories also refocused attention and explanations of economic status on the 
individual rather than the broader economic forces or labor market structures.   
 With the passage of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), 
these ideological perspectives helped institutionalize the liberal incorporationist order in 
federal education policy.  As a result, the ideological foundation and programmatic 
structure of the federal education state that emerged with the passage of the ESEA was 
one that incorporated an understanding of public education’s purpose as correcting 
individual deficiencies in order to improve economic outcomes and reduce racial 
disparities.  This understanding resulted in the early adoption of punitive policies in 
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federal education policy with immediate substantial consequences for black educational 
workers, and continues to provide the basis for much of the punitive policies of the 
modern education state. 
Current Interpretations 
 Much of the recent literature on the elementary and secondary public education 
system attempts to grapple with the apparent shift towards education focused on using 
standardized test scores as an evaluative tool with which to hold schools, teachers, and 
students accountable, increasingly though punitive means.  Reforms to the 1965 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in the 1980s expanded its reach to all 
children in Title I schools, not just the disadvantaged.  Reforms of the 1990s and early 
2000s brought new regulations that required states to drastically increase compliance and 
sanction activities if they wished to continue receiving federal aid.  The most recent 
reauthorization of the ESEA, the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, requires that every 
state come up with its own system of standards and system of measuring achievement of 
these standards.  As a means of holding schools accountable, the law requires that schools 
that fail to meet benchmarks of achievement be subject to punitive sanctions.  A 
bipartisan coalition of federal policymakers has increasingly turned towards punitive 
measures, ranging from forced firing of staff to reconstitution as privately run charter 
schools, to hold schools accountable for their perceived performance failures. 
 Several researchers have commented on the inequitable distribution of negative 
effects of such practices such as a narrowed curriculum, harsh academic and behavioral 
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punishment for students, increased segregation, and the limited focus on the test scores of 
a small population of “borderline” students.   Others have praised the punitive 697
accountability approach, claiming it is the best approach for ensuring excellence and 
equality in a troubled public schooling sector.    While disagreement exists on the 698
appropriateness of a turn towards sanctions, there appears to be little disagreement that 
this represents a significant departure from past practices.  The current understanding of 
the rise of punitive accountability education policies asserts an origin in the 1980s.  
Several scholars have pointed to the ESEA as the pinnacle of the Great Society’s attempt 
to attack inequality and poverty, with initial success rolled back by conservative 
mobilization around the school choice and standards movement, and a renewed focus on 
 See Enora R. Brown, “The Quiet Disaster of No Child Left Behind,” in Schooling and the Politics of 697
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education see  Patrick McGuinn, “The Federal Role in Educational Equity: The Two Narrative School 
Reform and the Debate over Accountability,” in Education, Justice, and Democracy, ed. Danielle Allen and 
Rob Reich (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 221–42.
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‘excellence’ rather than ‘equity’ in education.   Although identifying powerful truths 699
about the current trends in education policy, much of this literature fails to account for the 
extent to which the current regime of punitive sanctions is consistent with the vision of 
many liberal supporters of the original ESEA.  Situating the ESEA in broader debates 
about unemployment and poverty clarifies that as liberals achieved a victory in 
institutionalizing a federal role in education, they did so on largely on liberal 
incorporationist ideological terms. 
 The ideological commitments that the coalition of liberals relied on to justify the 
expansion of federal authority in the realm of education ultimately contributed to a 
deeply problematic interpretation of the purpose and problems of public education.  The 
ESEA institutionalized a federal role in education and laid the foundation for the rise of 
punitive policies and the obsession with test scores and achievement gaps by positioning 
education as poverty and unemployment policy.  Despite the long-standing educational 
findings of limited ability of schools or teachers to affect test scores, and a surge in recent 
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scholarship that has questioned the connection between education and pay and 
employment, this dynamic continues to dominate federal education policy.  700
 The origins of these current trends trace back to the educational politics and 
policies of the 1960s.  Although liberal incorporationists succeeded in institutionalizing a 
federal role in elementary and secondary education policy during the Great Society, they 
did so on terms that quickly led to punitive policies of sanctions and test-based 
accountability.  By the 1960s, Democrats had adopted a more limited economic 
philosophy that precluded direct government programs aimed at job creation or income 
supplements.  This shift reinterpreted the problems of unemployment and poverty as of 
individual deficiencies rather than of broader problems with the market economy.  With 
this development, education became the main policy by which Great Society liberals 
would try to attack unemployment and poverty.  The entrance of the federal government 
into the elementary and secondary education policy realm was premised on this shift in 
the economic policies of liberals.   
 The particular economic turn that justified federal investment in education was 
crucial in shaping the policies that emerged.  The emphasis on reporting and evaluation 
and the concern about holding schools accountable for results was driven by the belief 
that equitable distribution of education and achievement would go a substantial way 
towards eliminating unemployment and poverty.  The federal education state was 
 For some of the most striking critiques of the relationship between education, skills, and employment, 700
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engineered on a fundamentally liberal incorporationist foundation that assumed education 
could solve the problem of poverty and unemployment through increasing the 
achievement scores of individuals and closing the achievement gap between targeted 
populations.  Federal investment in education was coupled with an emphasis on reporting 
and evaluation and the concern about holding schools accountable for results.   
The Problem of Unemployment: From Full Employment to ESEA 
 The year 1965 saw not only the passage of the (ESEA) but also the 
implementation of the first tax cuts as a form of Keynesian economic management policy.  
Although the significance of the connection between these two policies may not be 
immediately apparent, a brief account of the changing federal employment policy 
illuminates the importance of the connection.  The implementation of the 1965 tax cut 
represented the consolidation of a form of commercial Keynesianism that cast 
unemployment as a problem primarily of individual deficiencies in skills and education.  
The victory of this brand of Keynesianism had important consequences not only for 
employment policy, but helps explains the newfound interest at the federal level in a 
sweeping education bill.  An account of the rise of commercial Keynesianism and the 
interpretation of unemployment that accompanied it is crucial in understanding the 
federal turn toward education, the populations targeted, the types of programs pursued, 
and the results expected from the ESEA. 
 The staggering events of the Great Depression opened the door to a 
reconsideration of the strict balanced budget approach to economic management that 
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presidents of both political parties had largely pursued. The closing of nearly 40% of the 
nation’s banks as well as the unemployment of  one out of every four workers ushered in 
fevered period of legislative activity, including the expansion of social insurance with the 
Social Security Act  and a host of programs aimed at the problem of unemployment.  701
However, this increased activity did not initially represent a commitment by President 
Franklin Roosevelt to use government spending as a means of economic recovery.  
Rather, he remained committed to a balanced budget and viewed the increased 
expenditures as temporarily necessary to ease the worst effects of the Depression for the 
unemployed and vulnerable.   However the return of economic recession at the end of 702
1937 ultimately convinced Roosevelt to pursue spending as a tool of stabilization.  The 
1938 announcement of a plan to expand expenditures by $7 billion represented a decisive 
step towards the use of fiscal policy as a means of economic recovery.  703
  The turn toward this type of economic management found an intellectual basis in 
John Maynard Keynes’s 1936 book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money.  Keynes provided guidelines for how aggressive fiscal policy could help prevent 
economic recessions that radically differed from the conventional belief that general 
 These programs included the Public Works Administration, the Federal Emergency Relief Act, the Farm 701
Security Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Civil Works Administration, the Works 
Progress Administration, and the National Youth Administration. 
 Gary Mucciaroni, The Political Failure of Employment Policy, 1945-1982 (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of 702
Pittsburgh Prress, 1990): 21.  Mucciaroni notes that in the early part of his second term, with decreasing 
unemployment rates President Roosevelt immediately took steps aimed at balancing the budget.  See also, 
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wage reduction was the best means of combatting economic depressions.   Within 704
Keynes’s broad commitment to the maintenance of a market economy, his theory “offered 
policy formulations which differed significantly in their ideological, political, and 
economic potentials.”   These varied policy recommendations, ranging from the 705
maintenance of low interest rates through central control to the more progressive option 
of active use of government spending to augment private investment, meant that the 
Keynesian label was potentially attractive to a broad swath of the ideological spectrum. 
 The Keynesian policies initially pursued by the federal government in the wake of 
the recession of 1937 and 1938 stemmed from a progressive brand of Keynesianism 
know as “secular stagnation.”  According to the stagnationists, the slowing of population 
growth and technological innovation coupled with the end of territorial expansion meant 
that the United States had reached a stage of economic maturity in which stagnation was 
a natural condition of a capitalist economy.  The appropriate response to this fundamental 
disability of the market economy was continued government investment to regenerate 
growth.    On the policy side this meant large programs of social spending and public 706
works funded by highly redistributive taxation that would decrease unemployment and 
inject money into the economy when required.   This was the course advocated by the 707
 Collins, The Business Response, 6-7.704
 Ibid., 10.705
 Mucciaroni, The Political Failure, 22-26.706
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leading stagnationist, Harvard economist Alvin Hansen, one of many stagnationists who 
served in an advisory capacity to the Roosevelt administration in the 1940s.   Hansen 708
was an advisor on the National Resources Planning Board, a site of institutional strength 
for the stagnationists, and helped craft the administration’s 1944 endorsement of an 
economic bill of rights, including the right to work.   The introduction of the Full 709
Employment Bill of 1945 by liberal Senator James Murray (D-MT) was the high point of 
stagnationist influence over economic and employment policy.   
 The Full Employment Bill of 1945 was based on the assumption that private 
business would be unable to fulfill the required investment to stimulate full employment, 
thus necessitating federal expenditure to bridge the gap.  The bill sought to create a 
permanent role for the federal government in regulating the economy, committing the 
government to expenditures necessary to secure the right to work for all Americans 
seeking employment.  Importantly, the bill was based on the belief that unemployment 
largely represented a fundamental weakness in the market economy rather than in 
unemployed individuals.  The attempt to build powerful planning agencies capable of 
injecting large sums into the economy was seen as the most appropriate means of 
ensuring that these individuals were not unfairly unemployed by forces beyond their 
control.   
 Weir notes that by 1940, many of Hansen’s students served in important positions in the executive 708
branch, a result of the active recruitment by those in the administration that favored increased spending as 
well as the specifically orientation towards policy by Hansen and his students (Weir, Politics and Jobs, 41).
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 Despite passing by an overwhelming margin in the Senate, the Full Employment 
Bill of 1945 was ultimately defeated in Congress by a coalition of business groups, 
southern Democrats, and Republicans.  Margaret Weir notes that the southern politicians 
were afraid that the Full Employment Bill would mean an increase in federal oversight 
over local farm labor and wage rates and ultimately threaten the racial caste system that 
depended on the economic subordination of black Americans.  The one-party nature of 
southern politics meant southern Congressmen occupied disproportionately powerful 
positions, particularly within the powerful committees of each chamber. 
 Congressman Carter Manasco (D-AL), the chair of the House Expenditures 
Committee that handled the Full Employment Bill in the House of Representatives, was 
pivotal in the bill’s defeat.   Additionally, after passage in the Senate, various business 710
groups led by the Chamber of Commerce mobilized opposition to the bill by charging it 
as a form of socialism that threatened free enterprise and “the American way of life.”   711
Business opposition was also grounded in a broader strategy to curb organized labor’s 
political power.   This opposition resulted in the abandonment of the Senate bill, and the 712
passage of the alternative Employment Act of 1946.  Written by conservative Mississippi 
Democrat Will Whittington, the new act abandoned the idea of employment as a 
government guaranteed right as well as a centralized planning agency committed to 
federal spending a means of achieving full employment.  In place of the national planning 
 Weir, Politics and Jobs, 48-49.710
 Mucciaroni, The Political Failure, 24.  See also Weir, 49711
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agency the bill established the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), which would prove 
to be an important avenue for the advancement of a more conservative, business-friendly 
version of Keynesianism in the executive branch.  Criticized by Alvin Hansen as little 
more than “window dressing,” the 1946 Employment Act was endorsed by the Chamber 
of Commerce and passed by an overwhelming margin in the House and was unanimously 
approved in the Senate.  713
 The defeat of the Full Employment Bill marked a turning point in the battle over 
employment policy and over the direction of which style of Keynesian economic 
management policies would be pursued.  Robert Collins argues that facing the broad 
acceptance and influence of Keynesianism among economists in wake of World War II 
provision of “striking evidence of the effectiveness of government expenditure on a huge 
scale,” many in the business community sought to work within the new consensus to 
promote more business-friendly Keynesian policies.   The defeat of the Full 714
Employment Bill marked a fortuitous moment for this move, as a rising number of 
economists began to question the tenets of secular stagnationists in the wake of strong 
demand for goods and labor in the postwar years.   
 Abandoning its previous attachment to a strictly balanced budget approach, the 
business community coalesced around a particular version of Keynesianism that offered a 
strikingly different interpretation of unemployment and policy prescriptions than the 
secular stagnationists.  Rejecting the view that unemployment represented a fundamental 
 Collins, The Business Response, 108.713
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weakness of the market economy, the advocates of commercial Keynesianism instead 
argued that, “the demand for labor periodically fluctuates, being sometimes excessive and 
inflationary and at other times deficient.”   Explaining changes in economic growth and 715
joblessness as the result of economic fluctuations, commercial Keynesians argued that the 
fiscal role of government should be limited to temporarily moderating these business 
fluctuations.   Commercial Keynesians advocated tax cuts and automatic stabilizers rather 
than direct spending as the policy mechanisms of choice for dealing with these economic 
fluctuations.  Although nominally committed to pursuing high levels of employment, this 
goal competed with concerns about inflation and the desire to restrain the growth of the 
federal budget.    716
 With the abandonment of the notion of the market economy as fundamentally 
flawed, many Keynesians turned towards explanations for unemployment that focused on 
the individual.  Although normal business fluctuations would lead to some 
unemployment, it would not affect all workers equally.   Commercial Keynesians argued 
that those affected would largely be the most marginal workers, those with little skill or 
ability to adapt to the changing demands of the labor market, a view largely borrowed 
from the increasingly popular human capital theory. Human capital theory, which posits 
that resources such as education, specific skills or personality traits possessed by the 
individual determine the worth of labor that an individual brings to the marketplace, 
 Mucciaroni, The Political Failure, 26.715
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quickly gained acceptance across the political spectrum as an explanation for why 
individuals were poor or jobless.   Human capital theory offered an interpretation of 717
wage earning not as the result of work performed, or as the result of political struggle 
between labor and management, or of structural conditions imposed by the broader 
economic system, but rather as a result of the yield on investment in an individual’s 
human capital.   As economist Gary Becker argued, “because observed earnings are 718
gross of the return on human capital, some persons earn more than others simply because 
they invest more of themselves.”    719
 As human capital theory gained credibility with policymakers, the solution to 
unemployment and poverty was increasingly phrased in how best to increase the human 
capital of certain individuals rather than the direct provision of jobs or income 
supplements.   The growing critiques of the stagnationists and the rehabilitated image 720
of business in the postwar years provided an opening for the emergence of a version of 
 Although the theory of human capital had been around for centuries, political scientist Jennifer Breen 717
notes that it was not was not understood as resources within the individual worker until the late 1930s, and 
this view did not gain widespread political popularity until the 1960s.  And while human capital theory 
quickly gained broad popularity, the majority of scholars responsible for crafting and popularizing the 
theory were conservative academics.  Scholars like Theodore Schultz, Jacob Mincer, Gary Becker, and 
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“Chicago” school of economics (Jennifer Stepp Breen, “Capitalizing Labor:  What Work Is Worth and 
Why, from the New Deal to the New Economy” (Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania, 2011), http://
search.proquest.com/docview/888151857/abstract/E3F9793C82654833PQ/1).
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Keynesianism that envisioned a drastically limited role for federal government that was 
much more appealing to the business community.   
 The victory of the commercial Keynesian viewpoint was evident by 1964 in both 
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s State of the Union Address announcing the War on 
Poverty as well as his Economic Report to Congress, which was delivered along with the 
annual report of the CEA.  Arguing that, “a lack of jobs and money is not the cause of 
poverty, but the symptom,”  Johnson noted that “far too long, our economy has labored 721
under the handicap of a Federal income tax rates born of war and inflation,”  and 722
identified the “release of $11 billion of tax reduction into the private spending stream to 
create new jobs,” as the most immediate solution to the problem of unemployment.   723
The CEA praised the Johnson tax bill in its annual report to Congress, echoing the call for 
“a large reduction in corporate taxes, a cutback of risk-inhibiting top bracket individual 
tax rates, and a further broadening of the investment credit” as these would “insure the 
increase in demand necessary to provide markets for our growing productive potential” 
and “encourage investment.”   But the CEA report, in a move that would be repeated by 724
 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union” (Online by Gerhard 721
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, January 8, 1964), http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26787.
 Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1964).722
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solution to the economic downturn of 1962, but Congressional concern about the effect of tax cuts on the 
budget deficit stymied passage until President Johnson proposed a similar tax cut with smaller budgetary 
requests (Weir, Politics and Jobs, 59-60).
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President Johnson and other Great Society liberals, coupled the emphasis on tax cuts with 
policies aimed at easing what it knew would be the increased job insecurity for millions 
of Americans by advocating increased focus on vocational education and unemployment 
insurance.  The report also stated: “In our concern with the problems of today’s 
unemployed, it should not be forgotten that a strengthened system of basic education will 
be the best guarantee against significant problems of displacement and dislocation in 
tomorrow’s full-employment economy.”   These policies were based on the assumption 725
that jobs were available for all who were qualified, turning the focus squarely on the 
deficiencies of the individual.   
 The adoption of the commercial Keynesian management policy and the broad 
acceptance of human capital theory brought education into the spotlight as a crucial piece 
of the policy solution to the problem of unemployment.  This shift was evident in 1963 
hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower, which heard 
seven days of testimony relating on the importance of education as an important part of 
the Manpower needs of the nation.  Francis Keppel, the Commissioner of Education, 
described unemployment as in part a problem of “the fit between the educational 
arrangements in the United States and the nature of the labor market ... the gears are not 
joining successfully.”   He argued that, “Manpower development is education.  726
 Ibid., 111.725
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Education is manpower development ... the only way we can develop our manpower 
resources fully and effectively is to develop our whole educational system.”   This 727
sentiment was echoed repeatedly throughout the days of testimony, perhaps most 
forcefully by Dr. Grant Venn, a representative from the American Council on Education.  
Claiming that an individual’s “job is more than ever a function of his education,” Dr. 
Venn argued for a renewed focus on the relationship between the labor market and 
education since “without a job a man is lost and without educational preparation few jobs 
are available.”   This testimony helped shape the 1963 Manpower Development and 728
Training Act, which was premised on the belief “that an individual is unemployed 
because he lacks a marketable skill.”    729
  In 1964 attention shifted more directly to education and the appropriate role for 
the federal government.  President Johnson pledged to “put education at the head of our 
work agenda,” and soon followed through by submitting the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA) to Congress in 1965.   In his statement accompanying the bill, 730
Johnson stated; 
 The purpose of this legislation is to meet a national problem.  This 
national problem is reflected in draft rejection rates because of basic 
educational deficiencies.  It is evidenced by the employment and 
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manpower retraining problems aggravated by the fact that there are over 8 
million adults who have completed less than 5 years of school.  It is seen 
in the 20-percent unemployment rate of our 18- to 24-year-olds ... The 
solution to these problems lies in the ability of our local elementary and 
secondary school systems to provide full opportunity for a high quality 
program of instruction in the basic educational skills because of the strong 
correlation between educational underachievement and poverty.  731
President Johnson’s reasoning reflected that of the CEA, which had argued that, “the 
chief reason for low rates of pay is low productivity, which in turn can reflect lack of 
education or training, physical and mental disability, or poor motivation.”   The CEA 732
had also suggested a renewed focus on primary and secondary education by noting, “ if 
children of poor families can be given skills and motivation, they will not become poor 
adults.”    The increased federal interest in education by Great Society liberals was 733
driven by the reinterpretation of unemployment and underemployment as a problem of 
individual deficiencies in human capital rather than as an indication of a fundamental 
weakness of the market economy. 
 Understanding that the interest in federal investment in education was premised 
on a more limited vision of federal regulation of the economy is critical for 
comprehending why federal education policies took the form they did.  In fact, it is much 
less likely that the federal government would have been able to establish any authority in 
this realm had the stagnationist version of Keynesianism been guiding public policy.  As 
 Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, “Report on Elementary and Secondary Education Act 731
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Harvey Kantor and Robert Lowe have noted, during the New Deal “education typically 
was not a conscious tool of federal policy and was of secondary importance compared to 
other federal measures to revive the economy and alleviate immediate economic 
sufferings,” and those educational measures that were present were geared toward 
directly providing work for the unemployed, such as school construction.   By the time 734
that Johnson proposed the ESEA, the economic shift repositioned education as an 
alternative to the more direct government intervention pursued during the New Deal Era.  
Although there was still a significant contingent of executive branch employees calling 
for public job creation as the solution to unemployment, particularly within the 
Department of Labor, the turn by Kennedy and Johnson towards tax cuts and human 
capital investment through education signified that the vision of the commercial 
Keynesians were the guiding doctrine of Great Society.    735
Education and the War on Poverty 
 As the Kennedy administration began to solidify a commercial Keynesian 
economic policy, it also turned its focus to poverty, an issue that was receiving increasing 
attention in the popular press.  In part driven by a concern about having a policy program 
for those that would not benefit directly from the proposed tax cuts, President Kennedy 
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 See Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: America’s Enduring Confrontation with Poverty: Fully 735
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asked Walter Heller, the chairman of the CEA, to investigate what could be done about 
the problem of poverty.   The programmatic approach that would develop was 736
dominated by cultural understandings of poverty, which reinforced the notion from 
human capital theory that the proper focus of policy attention was addressing deficiencies 
within the individual.  Much like the unemployment policy emerging from the era, the 
War on Poverty placed a renewed focus on education as essential to solving the problem 
of poverty. 
 Although the federal government had not focused on the issue of poverty prior to 
President Kennedy’s directive to Walter Heller, it did have an institutional source that 
provided an intellectual understanding of poverty, as well as strategies to address it.  In 
1961, Attorney General Robert Kennedy announced the formation of the President’s 
Commission on Juvenile Delinquency (PCJD).  Created by executive order, this cabinet-
level body was composed of the secretaries of the Labor and Health, Education, and 
Welfare departments, and chaired by the Attorney General.  Charged with investigating 
and tackling the then salient problem of juvenile delinquency, the PCJD reached out to 
academics early on for guidance on what kind of programs might best address the issue.  
Chicago sociologist Lloyd Ohlin was a major influence on the committee’s interpretation 
 Weir, Politics and Jobs, 68; Muciarroni, The Political Failure, 53.736
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of juvenile delinquency and the programs it proposed, signing on as the committee’s chief 
research consultant and personally advising the Attorney General.  737
Ohlin and fellow sociologist Richard Cloward had argued in their book, Delinquency and 
Opportunity, that delinquency was primarily the result of a deviant subculture that arose 
among the lower class frustrated over their inability to realize their aspiration because of 
blocked opportunities.   This “opportunity theory” was fundamentally a cultural 738
explanation of delinquency, and the notion of differential access to opportunity gained 
widespread traction as the explanation for delinquent behavior by the early 1960s.    739
 Cloward and Ohlin’s book did not offer specific policy suggestions, however the 
clear implication was that expansion of opportunities for would “close the gap between 
aspiration and achievement,” and thus attack the aberrant culture at its source.   The 740
authors did suggest that the local community would be the most effective level at which 
to address the differential opportunity structures.  Cloward and Ohlin also singled out 
access to education as an important source of, and solution to, the origins of delinquent 
cultures.  According to Cloward and Ohlin, the lower-classes placed a lesser value on 
education because they had fewer educational opportunities than their better off peers.   741
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This fact was damaging, as “the lower-class boy who fails to secure an education is likely 
to discover that he has little chance of improving his circumstances,” at which point 
“discontent may be generated, leading in turn to aberrant behavior.”   The clear 742
implication was that a concerted focus on increasing the educational opportunities of the 
lower-class could attack the problem of deviant subcultures at the source.  The close 
association of Ohlin with the PCJD, the limited scholarly literature, and the active 
movement of members of the PCJD into other executive departments resulted in the 
‘opportunity theory,’ and the important position it ascribed to education, guiding the 
policy approach of the broader War on Poverty.    743
 Despite the fact that Cloward and Ohlin claimed their theory applied to the 
society within which individuals existed, it meshed well with other culture of poverty 
explanations which tended to take the focus off of the broader economic structures and 
concentrate the focus on the individual.  Culture of poverty theories claimed deviant 
cultures among some groups had resulted in warped values and family structures leading 
to widespread poverty and other social problems within these groups.  Children raised in 
these deviant households were mostly doomed to perpetuate the failings of the culture, 
resulting in the passage of poverty from one generation to the next.  The 1965 report by 
Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan entitled, The Negro Family: The 
Case for National Action, best exemplifies the modified version of the culture of poverty 
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theory that ultimately held sway with policymakers. Moynihan argued that the source of 
poverty among blacks was a vicious cycle in which “[l]ow education levels in turn 
produce low income levels, which deprive children of many opportunities, and so the 
cycle repeats itself.”  Like most other culture of poverty theorists, Moynihan argued 744
that addressing poverty meant breaking this cycle, and argued that the lack of education 
was a critical component of the cycle. 
 This understanding of the relationship between education and the economic 
success of the individual is completely consistent with that of human capital theory, 
which was frequently formulated as “the belief that a good education would lead to 
individual financial success, higher personal status, and the benefits of a flourishing 
economy.”  With human capital theory and the culture of poverty theory both pushing 745
similar interpretations of poverty, policymakers increasingly turned towards “youth, who 
human capital theorists argued were in the best position to reap the rewards of greater 
investment in themselves ….in the hopes that doing so would break the ‘cycle of 
poverty.’”   President Johnson clearly drew on this understanding of education in 746
justifying the need for a federal role in education targeted at the disadvantaged.  His 
message accompanying the delivery of the ESEA to Congress indicated, “with education, 
instead of being condemned to poverty and idleness, young Americans can learn the skills 
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to find a job and provide for a family.”    Johnson also mentioned the “cost in other 747
terms” of failing to invest in education, noting “we spend $1,800 a year to keep a 
delinquent youth in a detention home - $2,500 for a family on relief - $3,500 a year for a 
criminal in a State prison.”   Senator Robert Kennedy agreed on the need for an early 748
educational focus in breaking the cycle of poverty, noting, “by the time you start to focus 
the attention on them at the age of 12, they are already lost to society.”  749
 The CEA enthusiastically supported education as a poverty program, in part 
because it was a substantially cheaper approach that was compatible with its primary 
policy proposal of tax cuts,  but it also fit well with its broader political goals.  In a 750
particularly revealing statement of the degree to which education had come to replace 
more direct programs aimed at the poor, the 1964 CEA report asserted that “tax reduction 
is the first requisite in 1964 of a concerted attack on poverty,” and praised the focus on 
education as an attack on the root cause of poverty:  
 Conquest of poverty is well within our power.  About $11 billion a year 
would  bring poor families up to the $3,000 income level we have taken to 
be the minimum for a decent life.  The majority of the Nation could 
simply tax themselves enough to provide the necessary income 
supplements to their less fortunate citizens.  The burden ... would certainly 
not be intolerable.  But this ‘solution’ would leave untouched most of the 
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roots of poverty.  Americans want to earn the American standard of living 
by their own efforts and contributions ... We can surely afford greater 
generosity in relief of distress.  But the major thrust of our campaign must 
be against causes rather than symptoms.  751
The use of the cultural understanding of poverty served as powerful weapon for the CEA.  
This understanding positioned the individual as the proper policy focus, and further 
allowed the CEA to claim that policies of direct redistribution and job creation advocated 
by the Labor Department would not only degrade recipient, but would likely only 
perpetuate the poverty problem.  In its place, the CEA advocated attacking the “roots” of 
the problem through educational investment aimed at breaking the intergenerational cycle 
poverty. 
 The theoretical understanding of poverty that drove the programmatic approach of 
the War on Poverty echoed the ideological understanding of unemployment as a problem 
of individual failing put forth by the commercial Keynesians.  Furthermore, like the 
unemployment dilemma, Great Society liberals looked toward education as the best 
curative policy measure.  Even as these understandings diverted attention from more 
redistributionary policies, they did create a powerful argument for a federal presence in 
public elementary and secondary education policy.  The successful passage of ESEA after 
years of failed attempts to pass general aid legislation represented a significant 
achievement for the Johnson administration.  Although liberals had succeeded in their 
long-sought goal of institutionalizing a federal role in education, the shift in  economic 
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policy that paved the way for their success would significantly shape the policies that 
would emerge.   
Early Federal Policy Development: The Origins of Punitive Accountability Policies 
 The consensus that education was the most effective means of addressing the 
issue of unemployment and poverty created a powerful coalition in Congress to push for 
compensatory education.  In an important shift, rather than the general aid bills that had 
been proposed and defeated since the late 1800s, this bill would focus on the 
disadvantaged.  This focus was driven by the understanding that emerged from the 
unemployment and poverty debates.  In his 1964 Economic Report to Congress, President 
Johnson outlined education as his first priority in the War on Poverty.  Arguing that 
education was key to earning power through the acquisition of marketable skills, he 
implored Congress to “upgrade the education of the children of the poor, so that they 
need not follow their parents in poverty.”   This view was echoed in the Department of 752
Labor after the 1963 Manpower hearings, as assistant Labor Secretary Stanley Ruttenberg 
noted:  
 It became increasingly evident that it was not the skilled workers, the 
family men  with long-time work experience, who were left behind ... it 
was already evident  that we were working with the wrong woodpile ... It 
was the disadvantaged who  filled the ranks of the unemployed -- those 
who were discriminated against or  were never equipped in the first 
place to function successfully in the free labor  market.  The problem 
was the bottom of the labor barrel, not the top.  753
 Ibid., 15-16.752
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The interpretation of poverty and unemployment as largely attributable to individual 
deficiencies in skill or culture drove the compensatory approach of ESEA, in which funds 
were targeted towards the disadvantaged poor.   
 The centerpiece of the compensatory strategy was Title I, which accounted for 
between 75 to 85 percent of total ESEA funding.   Title I was a categorical grant that 754
provided schools funding based on the concentration of low-income families, defined as 
families earning less than $2,000 annually.  This design ensured that although Title I 
funds would be targeted towards the poor, funding would also be widely distributed with 
over 94 percent of school districts ultimately receiving Title I money.    The formula 755
grant enabled substantial discretion for local educational agencies to pursue a variety of 
approaches aimed at increasing the educational opportunity of the disadvantaged.  The 
school, with the help of federal funding, would help ensure that no individual was 
arbitrarily relegated to economic squalor due to discrimination, cultural deprivation or 
technological displacement.   
 In addition to inspiring hope, the understanding of education as the central 
mechanism for overcoming poverty and unemployment also drove many Great Society 
liberals to criticize schools and teachers as responsible for these problems in the first 
place, and demand accountability for any federal funds distributed by the ESEA.  No 
member of Congress represented this tendency more than New York Senator Robert 
 Wayne J. Urban and Jennings L. Wagoner Jr, American Education: A History, 4 edition (New York, NY: 754
Routledge, 2008): 373.
 McGuinn, No Child Left Behind, 31.755
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Kennedy.    Reflecting the concerns of many of his constituents, particularly his minority 
constituents,  Senator Kennedy repeatedly expressed his belief that the schools and 756
teachers themselves bore a substantial portion of the blame for the state of education for 
the poor.   In questioning Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel, Senator Kennedy 757
charged, “would you agree ... that from your experience of studying the school systems 
around the United States, that the school system itself has created an educationally 
deprived system?”   After Commissioner Keppel agreed, Kennedy questioned the 758
wisdom of giving these schools more money, saying, “if you are placing or putting 
money into a school system which itself creates this problem or helps to create it ... are 
we not just in fact wasting the money of the Federal Government and of the taxpayer?”    759
Kennedy was concerned not that education could not help the disadvantaged, but that 
absent a mechanism of accountability schools would continue to contribute to the 
 For example, see Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited, Inc., Youth in the Ghetto: A Study of the 756
Consequences of Powerlessness and a Blueprint for Change (New York: Orans Press, Inc., 1964).
 Indeed, Kennedy argued that, “If you are going to judge [the school system] on whether the children are 757
keeping up with their reading, reading ability, whether they are dropouts, whether they are involved in 
juvenile delinquency, all of these matters in these various communities at the present time, including my 
own city of New York, you would have to say that the school system is flunking” (Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, Eighty-
Ninth Congress, First Session, on S. 370, a Bill to Strengthen and Improve Educational Quality and 
Educational Opportunities in the Nation’s Elementary and Secondary Schools (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1965): 2729-30).
 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United 758
States Senate, Eighty-Ninth Congress, First Session, on S. 370, a Bill to Strengthen and Improve 
Educational Quality and Educational Opportunities in the Nation’s Elementary and Secondary Schools 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1965): 511 (Testimony of Francis Keppel, 
Commissioner of Education). 
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“economic educational deprivation of the child,” a concern shared by Commissioner 
Keppel.  760
 Senator Kennedy argued that funds distributed by Title I of ESEA should be 
accompanied by “some standardized test that could be given in these areas where the 
money has been invested to determine whether, in fact, the child is making the kind of 
progress that we hope.”   Kennedy had made clear to Commission Keppel and Wilbur 761
Cohen, the Assistant Secretary of Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(DHEW), that his support for ESEA was dependent upon modifications to the bill that 
“hold educators responsive to their constituencies and to make educational achievement 
the touchstone of success in judging ESEA.”    Telling Keppel, “Look, I want to change 762
this bill because it doesn’t have any way of measuring those damned educators like you, 
Frank,” Kennedy’s refusal to support the legislation absent an evaluation amendment 
came close to derailing the legislation.    763
 Keppel agreed with Kennedy on the need for some sort of evaluation provision.  
He helped draft an amendment that required any local educational authority wishing to 
 Ibid., 511.  Later on in the hearings, noting poor reading ability test scores, dropout numbers, and 760
juvenile delinquency Kennedy argued that, “the school system must have something to do with it, and if the 
program they have had in effect over the period of the last decade has produced such poor results and 
destroyed the lives of these children, then I think that whoever is responsible for that should be held 
responsible”(Ibid., 3086, emphasis added).
 Ibid., 512.  See also pages 1298, 2663, 2727, 2875, and 3085.761
 Samuel Halperin, “ESEA: Five Years Later” (Congressional Record, U.S., Congress, House September 762
9, 1970).
 Hugh Davis Graham, The Uncertain Triumph: Federal Education Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson 763
Years (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1984): 78-79.  See also,Milbrey Wallin 
Mclaughlin, Evaluation and Reform: The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Title 1. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballanger, 1974): 3.
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receive federal grant to prove, “[t]hat effective procedures, including provision for 
appropriate objective measurements of educational achievement, will be adopted for 
evaluating at least annually the effectiveness of the programs in meeting the special 
educational needs of educationally deprived children,” as well as make these results 
public.   Realizing that this type of evaluation provision would likely provoke strong 764
backlash from conservatives and professional education organizations such as the 
American Federation of Teachers, Commissioner Keppel asked Samuel Halperin, the 
Director of the Office of Legislation of the United States Office of Education (USOE), to 
quietly insert the new provision into the bill.  According to Halperin, he did this by giving 
the new evaluation provision to Representative John Brademas while not divulging what 
it was and therefore allowing him believe that it did not substantively change the bill and 
therefore did not require a House debate or vote.  The tactic worked, and the evaluation 
requirement attracted no attention and received no substantive debate.   765
 In the Senate hearing, Senator Kennedy made sure to emphasize to Commissioner 
Keppel that he expected the USOE to follow through on holding schools accountable.   766
The commissioner assured Kennedy that the evaluation amendment, and the requirement 
 Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, “Report on Elementary and Secondary Education,” 40.  764
See also, Samuel Halperin, “ESEA Ten Years Later,” Educational Researcher 4, no. 8 (1975): 8, and 
McLaughlin, Evaluation and Reform. 
 McLaughlin, Evaluation and Reform, 23.  Although there was little debate about the evaluation 765
provisions at the time of passage, it did provoke backlash after passage from some groups.
 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United 766
States Senate, Eighty-Ninth Congress, First Session, on S. 370, a Bill to Strengthen and Improve 
Educational Quality and Educational Opportunities in the Nation’s Elementary and Secondary Schools 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1965): 511 (Testimony of Francis Keppel, 
Commissioner of Education).
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that the results be shared and disseminated, would mean that “we can really depend on 
the competitive instinct, the competition of American school systems,” to assure 
accountability for raising educational achievement.  If this did not work, Keppel argued, 
“I think we have some instruments here frankly to needle a lot of the schools.”   767
Secretary Anthony Celebrezze of the DHEW told Kennedy that local educational 
agencies would have to submit plans that complied with the evaluation provisions, “or 
they get no funds.”  768
 Although Kennedy was primarily responsible for the inclusion of the evaluation 
provision and the raised achievement test score standard of success in the ESEA, his view 
was shared by several of his fellow liberal Senators and several important members of the 
executive branch who would be responsible for implementing the bill.  Senator Wayne 
Morse (D-OR), the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Education, repeatedly endorsed of 
Kennedy’s line of questioning.    Both Secretary Celebrezze and his assistant Wilbur 769
Cohen supported the strong evaluation requirements, as did Celebrezze’s replacement, 
John Gardner.  Secretary Gardner also created the position of assistant secretary of 
program evaluation filled by William Gorham, who became a powerful advocate for 
evaluation based on achievement scores within the DHEW.   There was also pressure 770
from groups outside of government who were critical of the schools and teachers, most 
 Ibid., 901.767
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notably prominent African American social psychologist Kenneth Clark.  Clark argued 
that any reform needed to address the fact that the low expectation of schools and 
teachers for “culturally deprived” students contributed to their poor performance.   771
These voices represented a powerful coalition of liberal voices that were confident that 
schools could help address the problem of joblessness and poverty, but only if schools 
were held accountable for the achievement scores of their students.   The result of the 
active maneuvering of this likeminded group was evaluation and reporting requirements 
that were unprecedented for a piece of social legislation. 
 Without the secretive strategy of adding evaluation requirements, it is unlikely 
that the ESEA would have included such a provision.  Professional education groups 
were broadly against evaluations of the type mentioned in the Kennedy amendment.  
Organizations such as the National Education Association argued that such requirements 
would undermine the professionalism of teachers by reducing teacher autonomy, lead to 
destructive comparisons among teachers, schools, and school districts, and narrow the 
 See Kenneth Bancroft Clark, Dark Ghetto; Dilemmas of Social Power (New York: Harper & Row, 771
1965).  See also David K. Cohen and Susan L. Moffitt, The Ordeal of Equality: Did Federal Regulation Fix 
the Schools? (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009): 71; and Harvey Kantor, “Education, 
Social Reform, and the State: ESEA and Federal Education Policy in the 1960s,” American Journal of 
Education 100, no. 1 (November 1991): 66.  For another example of a voice outside of government that 
agreed with Kennedy’s analysis, see the testimony of Lindley J. Stiles, Dean of the University of 
Wisconsin’s School of Education before the Senate Subcomittee on Education (Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, Eighty-
Ninth Congress, First Session, on S. 370, a Bill to Strengthen and Improve Educational Quality and 
Educational Opportunities in the Nation’s Elementary and Secondary Schools (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1965): 3076-3091 (Statement of Lindley J. Stiles, Dean, School of 
Education, University of Wisconsin)). In his statement, the Dean Stiles presciently called for a “program of 
evaluation ... designed to measure the increments of educational gain achieved by individual pupils, school 
systems, and States that have support under Title I,” and argued “Federal assistance without educational 
accountability ... is sheer educational and fiscal irresponsibility”(Ibid., 3090-91).
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focus of education to only tested subjects.   These concerns meant that “educators were 772
in almost complete agreement that standardized tests were insensitive and inappropriate 
measures of the effectiveness of a Title I program.”   Republicans, some southern 773
Democrats, and religious organizations were also suspicious of the type of evaluation 
proposed by Kennedy, as the use of such standardized measures could eventually lead to 
national standards and curriculums, ultimately threatening local autonomy.   774
Furthermore, the educational research community was largely in agreement that changes 
in education strategies had little affect on academic achievement, prompting some 
members of the American Educational Research Association to ask that the association 
officially go on record as opposed to the Kennedy evaluation requirement of Title I at 
their 1966 annual meeting.   Had the amendment received open debate when it was 775
included in the ESEA, it is probable that these groups would have prevented its inclusion 
in the final bill. 
 See National Education Association, “National Education Assessment: Pro and Con” (Washington, D.C.: 772
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 After passage, mandated evaluations of the ESEA and compensatory education 
began to shift the focus of the legislation towards the goal of increasing achievement 
scores of disadvantaged students on standardized tests.  The 1966 Equality of Educational 
Opportunity Survey (EEOS), popularly know as the Coleman Report after its lead author, 
cast doubt on whether compensatory funding could raise the achievement of poor and 
minority students.  Commissioned as part of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the EEOS 
reported “it appears that differences between schools account for only a small fraction of 
the differences in pupil achievement.”   The conclusion that inequalities in school 776
resources, variations in curriculums, and teacher experience had little effect on student 
achievement scores measured by standardized tests sent shockwaves through the 
educational community.  The report’s finding that 80 percent of variation in student 
achievement occurred within schools rather than between them appeared to directly rebut 
the intellectual foundation of compensatory funding: the belief that greater funding would 
result in greater achievement.   The negative findings of the Coleman Report were soon 777
confirmed by a study conducted by E.J Mosbaek of the General Electric Company, 
commissioned by the DHEW.  Known as the G.E. Tempo report, it was authorized by the 
Kennedy Amendments, and drew its data from the of achievement test evaluations 
 James S. Coleman et al., Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 776
Printing Office, 1966): 22.
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mandated by the same amendments.   The G.E. Tempo report looked at the effect on 778
standardized test scores of Title I funds on five school districts, finding that scores 
increased in one district, remained the same in three districts, and decreased in the final 
district despite the increased funding.   The high profile reports shocked Congressional 779
liberals, and quickly put them on the defensive. 
 These findings should not have been surprising given that such negative and null 
findings had long been the norm in education research.  However, the liberal 
incorporationist faith that education was the key to solving important social problems and 
the belief that greater funding was central to raising educational achievement meant that 
much of this earlier evidence was ignored.  Congressional Democrats and others 
interpreted this new evidence of the failure of compensatory education programs to raise 
achievement as an indication of failing institutions, rather than the result of a flawed 
educational (and broader social welfare) strategy.   The negative reports that followed the 
passage of ESEA therefore had the effect of enshrining the raising of standardized test 
scores and the closing of achievement gaps as the primary purpose of the ESEA, and the 
standard by which it would be judged.    
 This development was not a forgone conclusion, as Title I had never specified that 
improvement on standardized tests of achievement was the legislation’s objective.  
Indeed, this topic had been intentionally avoided because of the likely backlash such an 
 Cohen and Moffitt, The Ordeal of Equality, 252 n13.778
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objective would have provoked.  Furthermore, as Milbrey McLaughlin notes, there were 
many other metrics by which Title I could have been judged.  Researchers easily “could 
have looked at the efficiency of the delivery of Title I services, or examined the effects of 
Title I on the redistribution of educational services between socioeconomic groups,” and 
in fact, “such study designs [were] more typical of evaluations conducted in other areas 
of DHEW.”   Congressional liberals did not raise any of these issues.  Instead, they 780
largely adopted the view that improvement in achievement test scores and the narrowing 
achievement gap should be the standard of success for Title I. 
 As several reports focused on the limited effect of compensatory education on 
achievement scores, others focused on where the ESEA funds were actually being spent.  
A particularly influential report sponsored by the NAACP’s Legal Defense and Education 
Fund and the Washington Research Project, questioned whether Title I funds were being 
used for their intended purposes.  The 1969 report, entitled Title I of ESEA: Is It Helping 
Poor Children?, argued that although “the central purpose of Title I is to raise academic 
achievement ... Title I in some school systems is not being used at all, or only in a limited 
way, for academic programs for the special educational needs of children from poor and 
minority communities.”  The report noted several instances in which Title I funds were 781
being used for programs that had existed before ESEA, not targeted specifically at the 
 McLaughlin, Evaluation and Reform, 36.  For example, at the time health programs were largely 780
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disadvantaged, or diverted into programs that were not specifically education related.  
Claiming that many states were treating Title I funds as if it were general aid rather than 
compensatory, the authors urged Congress, the Department of Justice and the USOE to 
crack down on schools systems that had misused funds.  Their suggestions included the 
“immediate action” of demanding “restitution of misused funds” against local education 
authorities not in compliance, a Congressional oversight hearing, additional staff 
members within the USOE devoted to enforcing that States and local authorities were in 
compliance as well as additional audits and evaluation of Title I programs.   The report 782
positively cited the recent action taken by the USOE against the state of Mississippi.  In 
response to several complaints, the USOE conducted a review in the summer of 1969 of 
the State’s administration of Title I funds and found that it had violated several federal 
policies.  Then Commissioner of Education James Allen ordered that no Title I projects 
be approved in Mississippi for 1970 until remedial action had been taken, and froze Title 
I expenditures for several broad areas such as construction, supplies and equipment, and 
custodial services.   The report endorsed a more muscular federal enforcement of ESEA 783
provisions, and sanctions for those who violated them, as the best means of “fulfilling a 
long-needed promise to our Nation’s poor children.”  784
 The reports finding limited effects on achievement of compensatory funding and 
misspent funds resulted in quick Congressional action.  Through the 1969 amendments to 
 Ibid., iii-iv.  782
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the ESEA, Congress increased the focus on standardized tests and sought to strengthen 
and encourage the USOE to sanction states and localities that did not comply with Title I 
provisions.  Despite testimony by academics and policy specialists expressing concern 
over the extent to which the ESEA had come to be judged by standardized tests,  785
Congress passed amendments that provided funding for states and the USOE to help 
localities develop and implement these tests,  required local educational agencies to set 786
objectives and report annually on their progress,  and extended the “objective 787
measurement of education achievement” requirements to sections of the bill targeting 
handicapped children  and districts receiving additional funds for the having the highest 788
concentration of disadvantaged students.   By 1974, Congress moved decisively to 789
orient the ESEA around improving academic performance, requiring DHEW to “develop 
and publish standards for evaluation of program effectiveness,” including “goals and 
 For example, in a letter to Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), Walter McCann of the Center for Law and 785
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specific objectives in qualitative and quantitative terms,” and required annual reports on 
the “effectiveness” of compensatory programs.   790
 Along with increasing the focus on objective educational achievement measures 
originally desired by Senator Kennedy, the 1969 amendments also encouraged more 
aggressive oversight, including sanctions on noncompliant states, by the USOE.  Citing 
the NAACP Legal Defense Education Fund Report, the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare expressed its “deep concern about the necessity for stronger enforcement 
of Title I requirements by both Federal and State agencies in monitoring the legitimate 
and effective use of Title I funds by local educational agencies.”   Praising the action 791
the USOE had taken in the case of Mississippi, the committee pushed for “vigorous 
action” and increased prioritization and staff devoted to compliance, and a greater focus 
on auditing and state program reviews within the USOE.   The USOE appeared to get 792
the message from Congress when the next year the Commissioner of Education sent out 
letters to states indicating violations from the previous three years, and expected to 
request a total repayment as high as $30 million from the nearly thirty states that were not 
in compliance.    By 1977, the total amount of repayment of Title I funds sought by the 793
 Halperin, “ESEA Ten Years Later,” 8.790
 Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, “Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 791
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USOE had reached $240 million.   Although much of the compliance action had been 794
geared towards misspent funds, the 1974 ESEA extension required that the USOE report 
on plans for “implementing corrective action” for those programs that had not met their 
specific qualitative or quantitative effectiveness objectives.   As Samuel Halperin, the 795
former Director of the Office of Legislation of the USOE who helped slip the Kennedy 
Amendments into the original ESEA, pointed out, this clearly oriented the federal 
education state around “ensur[ing] that public funds result in gains in learning, 
particularly in reading and mathematics.”  796
 The quick alignment of the ESEA around the goal of increasing achievement as 
measured in part by standardized test scores, and the emerging strategy of sanctions as a 
means of insuring progress towards this goal, was the result of understanding education 
as an unemployment and poverty program.  The reason that Senator Kennedy, 
Commissioner Keppel and others liberals supported the extensive evaluation 
requirements and the standardized test score standard was due to a belief that education 
could eliminate these problems if educational opportunity was equalized.  Moreover, as 
this belief triggered widespread liberal support for investment in education, it also 
triggered suspicions of the role the existing educational structures had played in 
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perpetuating disadvantage and demands for accountability. As Senator Kennedy noted in 
the Senate ESEA hearings: 
 Most of us, 95 percent of us, are doing well, but there are 5, 8, or 10 percent of 
our young people who, through no fault of their own, are never going to be able to 
live decent lives... I just do not believe that we can meet our responsibilities here 
as Members of Congress or others, or as American citizens, and let that kind of 
situation exist.  I think it is the fault of the school system that has been permitted 
to exist as long as it has.  797
The disappointing results of the initial reports on the effectiveness of ESEA programs at 
raising the test scores of low-income children did not result in a questioning of the 
appropriateness of test scores as measure of success or a reexamination of the ability of 
compensatory education to raise achievement scores.  Instead, the early results 
strengthened the use of achievement scores as a yardstick, increased evaluation of ESEA 
programs, and the led to increased enforcement of stricter sanctions on states who failed 
to deliver.  
Liberal Incorporationism and Displacement 
 The institutionalization of the liberal incorporationist vision of education that 
stressed the ability of education to solve social problems such as unemployment, poverty 
and racial inequality in lieu of broader political economic change set education policy in 
the United States on a punitive path.  Importantly, the victory of this educational ideology 
also had considerable, and often overlooked, consequences for the material circumstances 
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of black educators employed in southern states.  The passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
and the ESEA in 1965 greatly increased the pace of desegregation in southern schools.  
As southern states began to transition away from a dual school system, thousands of 
schools throughout the south were shuttered as students and staff of previously 
segregated schools were consolidated under one roof.   
 The desegregation and consolidation of public schools had dramatic consequences 
for black public school teachers and principals.  Recalcitrant southern school districts 
used the massive reorganization that consolidation required as an opportunity to 
intimidate, demote, and eliminate thousands of black public school employees.  This 
phenomena, commonly known as “displacement,” involved numerous tactics and became 
widespread as the federal government increased efforts to hold states accountable for 
failing to desegregate.  As a researcher for the Race Relations Information Center 
(RRIC), a non-profit organization funded by the Ford Foundation, noted, “[t]he irony of 
displacement is that it has followed compliance with federal laws designed to end 
discrimination …[i]n state after state, black educators’ positions, pay and prestige have 
diminished with each newly desegregated school.”   Significantly, mainstream black 798
political organizations such as the NAACP were caught flat-footed and failed to respond 
until several years into the process.  These groups had largely ignored warnings from a 
economic democrats such as Oliver Cox and Bayard Rustin about the likelihood of, and 
need to combat, black teacher displacement, in part because they saw it as a distraction 
 Robert W. Hooker, “Displacement of Black Teachers in the Eleven Southern States.” (Nashville, 798
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and potential problem for their primary goal of ending segregation in public schooling.  
Although these groups certainly did not support the displacement of black teachers, their 
response to the displacement crisis reveals both the political commitments and 
ideological blindspots of the liberal incorporationists when it came the material 
conditions of black workers. 
The Methods of Displacement 
 Early displacement efforts centered on weakening teacher tenure protections, 
firing teachers who challenged segregation, and implementing discriminatory teacher 
examinations. Within eighteen months of the 1954 Brown decision, seven southern states 
made efforts to change tenure laws to make it easier to fire public school teachers.  North 
Carolina took the strongest step and terminated all teacher contracts, and required that all 
future contracts be limited to one-year terms.   The roll-back of tenure protection was 799
coupled with efforts to eliminate black teachers who supported desegregation efforts.  In 
1955, the Georgia Board of Education adopted a resolution that permanently revoked the 
teaching license of any individual who supported desegregation or held membership in 
any “subversive group,” such as the NAACP, that advocated for desegregation.  Fears 
over whether the resolution would withstand judicial scrutiny led to its replacement with 
a loyalty oath that required teachers to “support, uphold, and defend” the state 
 Michael Fultz, “The Displacement of Black Educators Post-Brown: An Overview and Analysis,” 799
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constitution, a constitution that required segregation.   This loyalty oath requirement 800
became common practice in many southern and border states. 
 The Brown decision also intensified a trend in southern states of relying on the 
National Teacher Examination (NTE) as a means of controlling teacher pay, certification, 
and retention.  Developed in the late 1930s by Ben Wood of the Educational Testing 
Service, the NTE was a standardized test for public school teachers designed to provide 
school superintendents “objective measures” to help eliminate ineffective teachers and 
establish a “meritocracy in teaching.”   The dramatic teacher shortages during World 801
War II meant that there was limited demand for a test that would reduce the number of 
certified teachers with one prominent exception, southern and border states.  As the 
NAACP legal campaign demanding equal salaries for black teachers was increasingly 
successful in federal courts in the late 1930s and early 1940s, southern political and 
educational leaders looked for new means of holding down pay for black teachers.  The 
legal victories of the NAACP created an opening for Wood to pitch the NTE to a new 
market, and he embarked on a tour of several southern states to advocate for use of the 
NTE.  Wood suggested that the NTE could be used to constrain the effects of the equal 
pay movement by providing school districts  with a tool to base salary on test scores 
rather than experience.  When pressed on the likely racial breakdown of test scores, Wood 
 Ibid., 16-17.800
 Scott Baker, “Testing Equality: The National Teacher Examination and the NAACP’s Legal Campaign 801
to Equalize Teachers’ Salaries in the South, 1936-63,” History of Education Quarterly 35, no. 1 (1995): 53.  
Importantly, Ben Wood was a student of  prominent educational psychologist Edward Thorndike.
!325
assured southern school leaders that in all previous administrations of the test, the 
average scores for black teachers significantly lower than those of whites.    802
 Several southern school districts adopted the NTE as a means of maintaining 
disparities in teacher pay in the 1940s.  The courts consistently allowed this new way of 
determining salary, in large part by accepting the argument that the NTE was an objective 
means of determining merit.   The popularity of the NTE grew exponentially after the 803
Brown decision, with use of the test growing by 65 percent between 1955 and 1956.  By 
1960, the NTE had been adopted by every large southern city, and by five state education 
departments in southern and border states.  The test was used both to maintain salary 
disparity and increasingly to fire and demote black teachers in newly desegregated school 
systems.   The effectiveness of these strategies of displacing black teachers is reflected 804
in the fact that by the 1963-4 school year, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, North Carolina and South Carolina still had entirely segregated teaching 
staffs, despite the fact that every state except Mississippi had begun the process of 
desegregating school children.    805
The Federal Role in Displacement 
 Passage of the ESEA provided the federal government a powerful new tool in its 
efforts to enforce desegregation of students and teaching staffs.  Ironically, the new tools 
 Ibid., 55.802
 Ibid.,  58.803
 Ibid., 64.804
 Fultz, “The Displacement of Black Educators,” 20.805
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provided by the ESEA and the 1964 Civil Rights Act - both traditionally thought of 
liberal triumphs- ultimately helped facilitate teacher displacement, particularly in the 
southern states.  Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination in 
programs that received federal financial assistance and authorized the termination of 
funds to any recipient of federal funds that violated this law.  During Congressional 
debate, Title VI receive little debate and virtually no public attention, in large part 
because it was expected to have minimal effect.  This was particularly true for the issue 
of desegregation, where the average school district received only $4,000 in federal 
funding, an amount that could be absorbed relatively easily by school districts.   The 806
passage of the ESEA, and $1 billion in new federal funding for public education 
substantially altered the status quo and gave the federal government significant financial 
leverage over recalcitrant school districts.  Commissioner Keppel recognized this new 
possibility, noting in a memo to Secretary Celebrezze that the ESEA, “makes possible a 
new approach in handling civil rights problems in education,” where “Title VI can 
become less a negative threat and more of a condition necessary to progress in the 
future.”  807
 By the mid-1960s, the problem of black teacher displacement in the south became 
increasingly clear.  In a July 2, 1965 speech before the NEA convention in New York 
City, President Johnson noted that “you and I are both concerned about the problem of 
 Gary Orfield, The Reconstruction of Southern Education: The Schools and the 1964 Civil Rights Act 806
(New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1969): 36-40.
 As quoted in Orfield, The Reconstruction of Southern Education, 94.  See also, Jeffrey, Education for 807
Children of the Poor, 107-111.
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dismissal of Negro teachers as we move forward … with the desegregation of the schools 
of America.”  He told the crowd that he had instructed Commissioner Keppel “to pay 
very special attention, in reviewing the desegregation plans, to guard against any pattern 
of teacher dismissal based on race or national origin.” However, Johnson acknowledged 
that there was likely to be continued displacement, and noted that he had ordered federal 
officials to provide funds under the Manpower Development and Training Act for 
retraining displaced teachers for new employment.    808
 After Johnson’s speech, the NEA, with funding from federal government followed 
up with an investigation into the problem of teacher displacement in the south.  The result 
was the 1965 Report of Task Force Survey of Teacher Displacement in Seventeen States, 
which highlighted the importance of the issue of displacement.  Based on hundreds of 
interviews with teachers and administrators during the first few weeks of the 1965 school 
year, the report found increased displacement activity in the wake of desegregation.   The 
report described renewed efforts to limit teacher tenure, firing for any involvement in 
civil rights activity, revocation of teacher licenses for black teachers at segregated schools 
closed,  increased use of teacher quality measures as means of displacement,  and 809 810
widespread loss of status and pay for black teachers in the states examined.   For those 811
 Lydon B. Johnson, “Remarks in New York City Before the Convention of the National Education 808
Association,” Public Papers of the President of the United States. July 2nd, 1965.
 National Education Association of the United States and National Commission on Professional Rights 809
and Responsibilities, Report of Task Force Survey of Teacher Displacement in Seventeen States, December 
1965 (Washington, 1966): 18.
 Ibid., 26.810
 Ibid., 27-30.811
!328
black teachers who kept their jobs, the report noted that “the threat of job loss is so great 
in many places that fear permeates the teaching force,” and this fear was used “to 
intimidate Negro teachers and to inhibit their personal and professional activities.”   812
This overwhelming fear made it difficult for the NEA to gather information on the full 
extent of displacement, as teachers refused to speak to investigators both because many 
hoped to be hired at some point in the future and over fear of further blacklisting in their 
communities.   Despite the fact that the NEA acknowledged that they could only 813
capture a small fraction of the extent of displacement, the report found 668 cases in of 
displacement in 1965 alone.    814
 Following the report and the interest of President Johnson, Commissioner Keppel 
did in fact change policy in the Office of Education to include race-based teacher firing as 
a violation of federal desegregation guidelines, punishable by loss of ESEA funds.   815
However, the efforts to increase enforcement of desegregation in southern and border 
states resulted in new strategies of resistance that affected black teachers particularly 
harshly.  As these states began the process of integrating teaching staffs, black teachers 
faced widespread displacement, including firing through non-renewal of contract, 
transfer, and widespread demotion.  In many instances, the most experienced teachers 
were targeted first, as their higher salaries made them targets for dismissal or 
 Ibid., 40.812
 Ibid., 25.813
 Ibid., 42.814
 Orfield,The Reconstruction of Southern Education, 107.815
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demotion.   Many districts reassigned black teachers to subject areas for which they 816
were uncertified, and then subsequently dismissed them for “incompetence” or “lack of 
preparation in assigned field.”   Districts also began to drastically limit the number of 817
new black teachers hired, and the percentage of black teachers in employed public 
schools decreased throughout the south.  818
 The NTE played an increasingly important role in teacher displacement as schools 
were consolidated.  Reports by the NEA and RRIC found that the NTE was used to as a 
discriminatory screen in determining who received teaching certification, as well as a 
means to dismiss, demote, and reduce the pay of black public school employees across 
the south.   The popularity of the NTE soared in the mid-1960s as Texas, South 819
Carolina, and North Carolina made it statewide requirement for all teachers.  The racially 
motivated aspect of this turn towards teacher testing was clear.  An administrator in the 
Georgia State Department of Education justified this new focus on teacher quality and the 
dismissal of large number of black educators, arguing, “We were lax about the quality of 
black teachers before desegregation … Now we are paying the price and having to clean 
 Boyd Bosma, Planning for and Implementing Effective School Desegregation: The Role of Teacher 816
Associations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Education, Office of Educational Research and 
Improvement, National Institute of Education, 1980): 6.  In fact, Bosma, notes that in some states black 
teachers had higher average salaries because of greater experience and qualification than their white 
counterparts.  This meant that “consolidations and closings of former black schools offered unique 
opportunities to dismiss the higher paid black teachers as white administrators sought to economize and to 
appease their white constituents”(Ibid., 6).
 Report of NEA Task Force III, “School Desegregation: Louisiana and Mississippi.” (Washington, D.C.: 817
National Education Association, November 12, 1970): 20-21.  See also, Hooker, “Displacement of Black 
Teachers,” 6.
 Hooker, “Displacement of Black Teachers,” 6-7.818
 See Report of NEA Task Force III, “School Desegregation”; Hooker, “Displacement of Black Teachers.”819
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house, which is why more blacks have been fired in the last 12 months.”   In some 820
cases, black educators were fired for failing to meet minimum NTE test scores, 
minimums that were set after they had taken the exams.   White teachers did not face 821
the same scrutiny and school districts in Louisiana and Florida abandoned the NTE when 
too many whites scored poorly on the test.  822
 Ironically, the massive influx of federal funds for compensatory education 
provided southern school districts with a particularly effective means of displacing black 
teachers.  A 1970 NEA report on school desegregation found that “Title I offers a unique 
opportunity for districts to get teachers off the regular payroll and back into the system 
under a federal subsidy and without normal continuing employment rights.”   Several 823
states shifted black teachers to newly created Title I teaching positions, technically 
“lateral transfers” that were widely understood to be less prestigious, and more 
precarious, positions.   A 1970 RRIC report found examples in Tennessee where black 824
teachers were demoted from classroom teaching positions and placed in Title I positions.  
In Arkansas, the report found evidence that school districts only assigned black teachers 
to Title I positions.  Importantly, these Title I positions did not come with the limited 
protections and job security afforded to non-Title I teachers. 
 As quoted in Hooker, “Displacement of Black Teachers,” 14. 820
 Report of NEA Task Force III, “School Desegregation,” 37.821
 Hooker, “Displacement of Black Teachers,” 13; Report of NEA Task Force III, “School Desegregation,” 822
8.  
 Report of NEA Task Force III, “School Desegregation,” 37.823
 Hooker, “Displacement of Black Teachers,” 35.824
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 The broad shifting of black teachers into Title I positions was particularly 
problematic in the context of increased enforcement efforts of desegregation plans by the 
Office of Education.  School systems began to reclassify general teaching positions under 
new federally supported categories as a means of dismissing black teachers in large 
numbers.  After shifting black educators to these newly categorized positions, school 
districts that faced termination of ESEA funds for failing to comply with desegregation 
guidelines simply fired black teachers in the positions supported by these funds, and 
blamed the federal government.   Reports from the NEA and RRIC found that this 825
strategy was a widespread and particularly effective tool of mass displacement.  826
Limitations of the Great Society’s Hidden Labor Policy 
 The black educational displacement of the 1960s and 1970s, and the fact that it 
was in part facilitated by federal sanctioning efforts associated with the ESEA, 
complicates scholarly accounts that portray public-sector expansion Great Society era as 
boon for black employment.  Most notably, Michael B. Katz, Mark J. Stern, and Jamie J. 
Fader have argued that the large increase in public expenditure in the 1960s and early 
1970s resulted in the creation of a substantial number of public-sector jobs, which were 
disproportionately filled by black Americans. In fact, these authors argue that government 
 James E. Haney, “The Effects of the Brown Decision on Black Educators,” The Journal of Negro 825
Education 47, no. 1 (1978): 93.
 See Report of NEA Task Force III, “School Desegregation” and Hooker, “Displacement of Black 826
Teachers.”
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expenditures that resulted in the reduction of racial inequality through public employment 
represented the “hidden labor market policy” of the Great Society and War on Poverty.    827
 The massive displacement of black teachers and principals in southern schools 
suggests that this was not true across public-service sectors, particularly when considered 
regionally.  Analysis of census data on teacher employment from the eleven former 
confederate states demonstrates the limits public education expansion for black 
employment during the Great Society.  Although as Graph 1 demonstrates, it true that  
Graph 1: Number of Black Teachers in Southern States 
Data compiled by author from census information (see footnote 830). 
 Michael B. Katz, Mark J. Stern, and Jamie J. Fader, “The New African American Inequality,” The 827
Journal of American History 92, no. 1 (2005): 87-88.
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employment of black teachers steadily increased from 1920 through 1970 in these states, 
when black teacher employment numbers are put in context with white teacher 
employment, a different picture emerges.  
 Graph 2 indicates that although the 1950s and 1960s was an era of massive 
growth in the education sector, the vast majority of these jobs in the south went to white 
teachers.  In the decade between 1960 and 1970 alone, there were approximately 361,000 
new jobs created, 85% of which went to white teachers.   Critically, this represents a 828
significant shift from earlier years, where blacks had been expanding their foothold in the  
Graph 2: Number of Teachers by Race in Southern States 
Data compiled by author from census information (see footnote 830). 
 For comparison, this is roughly half the percentage  of the decade between 1940 and 1950, when 35% of 828
new jobs went to black teachers.
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public education sector.  Indeed, between 1920 and 1950, blacks had gained a 
disproportionate number of new education jobs, and had grown to over 30% of the total 
teaching workforce.  As Graph 3 indicates, by 1970, this number had shrunk back to 
23%.  The trends in educational employment in the former confederacy provide evidence 
of the devastating effects of displacement in the educational workforce. 
Graph 3. Percent of Black Teachers of Total Teacher Workforce 
Data compiled by author from census information (see footnote 830). 
 Despite large increases to the overall teaching force, the raw number of black 
teachers actually decreased in Alabama and South Carolina between 1970 and 1975, and 
the ratio of black to white teachers continued to decline in Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, 
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North Carolina, and Virginia.   The increasing marginalization of blacks in the 829
educational sector hit black women particularly hard, as the job of public school teacher 
was one of the few professional occupations open to black women.  Indeed, public school 
teachers represented a substantial majority of black women in professional and semi-
professional positions in many of these states throughout the time period examined.  This 
suggests that this time period that Katz, Stern, and Fader point to as a significant 
advancement of black public employment actually represented a reversal of fortune for 
black employees in the public education sector in the south.  This reversal occurred 
despite, and in part, ironically, because of a massive increase in federal education funding 
and the sanctions that came with it.  830
 The limited data available provides a glimpse of the staggering consequences of 
these efforts for black educators. Using data from the HEW’s Office of Civil Rights, the 
NEA’s Samuel Ethridge estimated that by the 1970-1971 school year, 31,584 black 
 Samuel Ethridge, “Impact of the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education Decision on Black Educators,” 829
The Negro Educational Review 30, no. 4 (1979): 230.  It is important to again note that this is not a full 
reflection of the extent of displacement.  Not only do these numbers not capture demotion and salary 
reductions, but they also only reflect displacement in the southern states.  Ethridge noted the most flagrant 
perpetrators of displacement were the schools systems of Boston and  New York City, numbers that are not 
fully reflected in the statistics above. (224) 
 Graphs based on author calculations from Fourteenth Census of the U.S., 1920, Vol. 4, Occupations 830
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1923), Table 1; Fifteenth Census of the U.S., 1930, 
Population Vol. 4, Occupations by State (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943); Table 11; 
Sixteenth Census of the U.S., 1940, Population, Vol. 3 The Labor Force (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1943), Table 13 in Parts 2 - 5; Report of the Seventeenth Decennial Census of the United 
States, Census Population: 1950, Volume II, Characteristics of the Population (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1952): Table 77 in Parts 2-50; The Eighteenth Decennial Census of the United 
States, Census of Population: 1960, Volume I, Characteristics of the Population (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1963), Table 122 in Parts 2-52; 1970 Census of Population, Volume 1, 
Characteristics of the Population (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), Table 171 in 
Parts 2-52.
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teaching positions had been lost since the Brown decision.   Ethridge estimated that for 831
the 1970-1971 school year alone, this level of displacement represented a loss of over 
$240 million in salary to black educators.  The ongoing nature problem was made clear 
when Etheridge calculated that the number of displaced black teachers had increased to 
39,386 by the 1972-1973 school year.   832
  The displacement numbers were not only high for black teachers.  Black 
principals suffered as well.  Ethridge reported that 2,235 black principals had been 
displaced by 1972.   The extent of this displacement is captured by another 1972 report 833
that found that in the thirteen southern and border states, 90% of black high school 
principals had lost their jobs, and the percentage was even higher for elementary 
principals.   In his RRIC report, Robert Hooker noted that between 1967 and 1970, the 834
number of black principals decreased from 620 to less than 170 in North Carolina, from 
250 to less than 50 in Alabama, and that Mississippi lost more than 250 black 
principals.   835
 Ethridge, “Impact of the 1954 Brown,” 223.  The vast majority of these positions would have been lost 831
as desegregation enforcement activity increased.  Ethridge reached this displacement number by calculating 
the number of black teaching positions that would have been available had the schools remained 
segregated.
 Ibid., 224.  Ethridge notes that during the two years, black student enrollment compared in the seventeen 832
southern states increased by two percent compared to whites, while the ratio of black to white teachers 
decreased by two percent.  
 Ibid.833
 Linda C. Tillman, “(Un)Intended Consequences? The Impact of the Brown v. Board of Education 834
Decision on the Employment Status of Black Educators,” Education and Urban Society 36, no. 3 (May 1, 
2004): 293.
 Hooker, “Displacement of Black Teachers,” 4.835
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 Like earlier reports, these numbers are likely gross underestimates of the true 
extent of displacement.  The numbers represent only job losses, ignoring the thousands of 
teachers and principals who faced demotions and salary reductions.  Furthermore, the 
effects of displacement extended beyond monetary consequences, as thousands of black 
educators lost homes, and were forced to leave friends, family members, and 
communities in search of employment in different school districts.  836
Ideological Blindspots 
 The widespread displacement of black teachers in the south highlights the 
consequences of the victory of a liberal incorporationist vision of education that was 
largely divorced from the political economic concerns of black workers.  This vision 
privileged the incorporation of blacks into existing social and economic structures and the 
elimination of racial disparity through equality of educational opportunity.  In the 1950s 
and 1960s, this ideology situated the pursuit of desegregation in public school as a top-
order grievance, and relegated other concerns, like the material consequences to black 
teachers, to the back burner.  Indeed, black political intellectuals committed to economic 
democracy had long warned of the danger of pursuing a politics that focused so 
prominently on desegregation.  Oliver Cox argued the right of black teachers to earn a 
living deserved as a high a priority as desegregation, noting “[t]he right to employment in 
tax-supported institutions of learning is equally as important as the right to a non-
discriminatory form of education.”   Many were aware that desegregation might harm 837
 Bosma, Planning for and Implementing, 6.836
 Oliver C. Cox, “Vested Interests Involved in the Integration of Schools for Negroes,” The Journal of 837
Negro Education 20, no. 1 (1951): 113.
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black teachers, as Herman Long warned presciently, “The great advance in school 
desegregation under the impetus of Federal sanctions may well result in what we feared 
when desegregation began; namely, the use of the Negro teacher as a pawn, as the 
dispensable element with which gains in desegregation can be bought.”   838
 The strong chorus of racial democrats, who argued both that displacement was 
unlikely to happen and that if it did, it was a price that black teachers should be willing to 
pay, drowned out the voices warning of the dangers of displacement.  Charles Johnson, 
the president of Fisk University, proclaimed, “[i]t does not appear that there will be any 
serious displacement of Negro teachers,”  a sentiment echoed by the NAACP’s Roy 839
Wilkins, who argued “[t]here is little logical prospect that Negro teachers will lose their 
employment.”   Others positioned the job losses as necessary sacrifices.  Education 840
professor Willard Gandy argued that black teachers should accept their new 
unemployment because “[t]hey are Negroes first, and teachers second.”   Oliver Cox 841
noted that the argument urging blacks to accept job losses was common.  Cox pointed to 
a particularly stark example of this tendency in the editorial page of a black newspaper, 
which had remarked, “Is it too great a sacrifice to pay for integration and a beginning 
toward real democratic living? We cannot have our cake and eat it too.”  842
 Herman Long, “Second National NEA - PR&R Conference on Civil and Human Rights in 838
Education” (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, May 1965), 13.
 Charles S. Johnson, “Some Significant Social and Educational Implications of the U. S. Supreme 839
Court’s Decision,” The Journal of Negro Education 23, no. 3 (1954): 367.
 Roy Wilkins, “The Role of the NAACP,” Social Problems 2, no. 4 (April 1955): 201.840
 Willard E. Gandy, “Implications of Integration for the Southern Teacher,” The Journal of Negro 841
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 Ultimately, the views of the NAACP, Charles Johnson, and Roy Wilkins, and 
other liberal incorporationists, which focused on eliminating racial disparity through 
equality of educational opportunity, drove public policy.  The main policy program of this 
coalition focused on desegregation of public schools and increased funding to ensure 
equality of educational opportunity to raise the marketable skills of the disadvantaged as 
the most effective way of raising individuals out of poverty and reducing racial disparity.  
Importantly, as the case of teacher displacement demonstrates, this political program had 
significant ideological blindspots.  Although the rate of displacement began to decline 
from after 1972 and 1973, the process had already exacted staggering material costs from 
black educators in the south.  One of the unintended consequences of pursuing a narrow 
educational program focused on increasing educational skills and desegregation of the 
student body was the loss of thousands of black jobs in the public education sector. 
Conclusion 
 The shift in the economic policy agenda of the Democratic Party coupled with the 
dominance of the liberal incorporationist understanding of education economic that paved 
the way for enactment of the first major federal involvement in public elementary and 
secondary education policy also set the federal education state down a path of punitive 
policies aimed at increasing standardized test scores.  The design of the ESEA reflected 
the commercial Keynesian interpretation of the problem of poverty and joblessness, 
which meshed well with the prominent academic diagnoses of these problems as 
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fundamentally the result of individual failings of culture or human capital.  The liberal 
incorporationist understandings of the purpose and possibilities of education that 
dominated the educational landscape helped position education policy as the ideal policy 
realm to attack these problems.  Furthermore, the liberal incorporationist understanding 
of education was fundamentally compatible with the political commitments of human 
capital and culture of poverty theories, and offered policymakers a way of attempting to 
address unemployment, poverty, and racial inequality without pursuing interventionist 
and redistributive economic policies. 
 The resulting federal education program aimed at the disadvantaged was a way to 
implement a poverty and unemployment program without tackling these issues more 
directly, and more expensively, through direct job creation or redistribution.  As the faith 
in the education solution provided tremendous political capital in getting an education bill 
through Congress, it also led policymakers to demand an unprecedented level of 
evaluation and insist that standardized achievement scores be the metric by which 
teachers, schools, and educational programs ultimately be judged.  Failing to raise scores 
became grounds for punitive sanctions, as schools and teachers became the front line of 
the nation’s unemployment and poverty program.  Furthermore, as education was 
positioned as a potential panacea, the interests teachers and the public schools were 
increasingly pitted against the students, parents, and communities they served.  Attacks 
on teacher tenure and demands for greater accountability destabilized the teaching 
profession in the name of providing better educational outcomes.  The widespread 
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displacement of black teachers in the south in the wake of desegregation and 
consolidation was an early indication of the ideological commitments and political 
blindspots of the new educational order. 
 Most current accounts of punitive accountability policies suggest that they 
emerged largely in response to the excesses and failed promises of the federal education 
state and the Great Society more broadly.   Present explanations describe the 1965 ESEA 
as the high point of the Great Society attack on poverty and inequality that was later 
reined in by conservatives committed to an agenda of expanded use of standardized tests, 
school choice, and a renewed focus on excellence over equity.   This narrative 843
overlooks the extent to which accountability, evaluation and sanctions were first 
supported and institutionalized in the ESEA by liberal lawmakers.  Placing the passage of 
the 1965 ESEA within the larger debates about unemployment and poverty, and the long 
ideological history of national debates about the purpose of education, clarifies that as 
liberals successfully institutionalized a federal role in public education, they also 
institutionalized a liberal incorporationist educational vision that quickly led to 
increasingly punitive policies. 
 The dominance of the liberal incorporationist ideology in education has led to a 
fixation on the best way to hold schools, teachers and students accountable for 
standardized test scores and achievement gaps.   This orientation show little sign of 
changing despite extensive evidence of the inability of schools or teachers to change test 
 See Apple, Educating the Right Way; Debray, Politics, Ideology, & Education; Fabricant and Fine, 843
Charter Schools; Henig, “Education Policy from 1980”; Manna, School’s In; McGuinn, No Child Left 
Behind; Rhodes, An Education in Politics; and Saltman, The Failure of Corporate School Reform.
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scores, and recent research that has called into question the assumed connection between 
education, wages and employment.   As long as federal education policy is premised on 844
the understanding of education as a poverty and employment program, the immense 
expectations and responsibility placed on the primary and secondary public education 
system of the United States will continue to push federal policy in a punitive direction.  
Chapter six briefly covers developments in federal education policy from the 1970s to the 
present, demonstrating the continued influence of liberal incorporationist ideology, and 
the pernicious effects for students, teachers, and communities.   
 See Jeffrey, Education for Children of the Poor; Lafer, The Job Training Charade; McLaughlin, 844
Evaluation and Reform; Wolff, Does Education Really Help? 
!343
Chapter Six 
 Conclusion: Liberal Incorporationism and the Modern Punitive Education State  
[E]ducation is no longer just a pathway to opportunity and success, it's a prerequisite for 
success. 
[D]espite resources that are unmatched anywhere in the world, we've let our grades slip, 
our schools crumble, our teacher quality fall short, and other nations outpace us…year 
after year, a stubborn gap persists between how well white students are doing compared 
to their African American and Latino classmates.  The relative decline of American 
education is untenable for our economy, it's unsustainable for our democracy, it's 
unacceptable for our children, and we can't afford to let it continue…It is time to expect 
more from our students. It's time to start rewarding good teachers, stop making excuses 
for bad ones. It's time to demand results from government at every level. It's time to 
prepare every child, everywhere in America, to outcompete any worker, anywhere in the 
world.  
       -Barack Obama, March 10, 2009.  845
 The quote from President Obama that opens this chapter indicates the current 
consensus on the state of public primary and secondary education.  According to this 
consensus, public schools are facing a crisis of poor achievement, low standards, and bad 
teachers.  These problems of the public education system are pointed to as the root cause 
of poor economic outcomes for individuals in a changing labor market and as the 
foundation of racial inequality.   The educational vision President Obama’s articulated in 
the above quote - one that positioned the primary function of education as equitably 
providing individuals with skills needed to compete in global marketplace - is a 
 Barack Obama: "Remarks to the United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce", March 10, 2009. 845
Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85836.  Significantly, in this speech President Obama outlined a very 
early version of what would become his Race to the Top Initiative.
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thoroughly liberal incorporationist one.  This liberal incorporationist understanding of 
education, while justifying greater federal investment in the education system, has also 
led to increasingly punitive policies targeted at students, teachers, and public schools.     
 A full comprehension of the modern educational landscape requires an 
understanding of the foundations of the liberal incorporationist order.  Recent federal 
reform efforts such as No Child Left Behind (NCLB), Race to the Top (RTT), and the 
Every Child Succeeds Act (ESSA) rely on an ideological understanding of education’s 
purpose that emerged from fierce debates of the 1930s through 1950s, and rely on policy 
mechanisms fundamentally similar to those first established by the ESEA in 1965. This 
concluding chapter traces the continuity of recent punitive reform effort with the 
ideological and institutional order established in the 1960s.  Although the liberal 
incorporationist order remains the dominant driver of federal education policy and 
discourse, the increasingly devastating consequences of recent educational reforms for 
teachers, students, and communities has engendered a growing resistance to this 
educational order. 
Origins of the Liberal Incorporationist Order 
 The dominance of liberal incorporationist ideology at the time of constructing the 
federal education state can be traced to the settlement of fierce ideological battles in the 
decades preceding the passage of the ESEA.  Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the 
progressive education movement was riven by a debate over whether schools and 
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teachers should lead the efforts to fundamentally change an unfair social and economic 
order, or whether the education system should attempt to fit students into the existing 
social order.  As the social efficiency progressive vision proved better able to 
accommodate the changing political context of the 1940s, its vision of the purpose of 
education came to dominate the progressive education reform landscape.  This vision 
articulated an incorporationist function for education and promoted a particular set of 
policies, including extensive use of testing, educational tracking, and routinization of 
teaching methods.  846
 A similar divide characterized black political organizations and thought 
throughout the same era, as one coalition argued that advancing the concerns of black 
Americans required fundamental changes to the economic order, and another argued that 
justice could be achieved through fair racial incorporation into the existing economic and 
social structures.  The educational vision of the racial democrats was much more 
amenable to the international and domestic developments of the 1940s and 1950s.  The 
Cold War, shifting Supreme Court doctrines, and brutal political repression of the 
economic democrats during the Second Red Scare all helped position the racial 
democratic vision as the most influential articulation of black political interests by the 
1960s.  Much like the social efficiency progressive vision, the racial democratic 
educational vision was centered primarily on the incorporation of students into the 
existing economic and social order, with the central difference that racial democrats 
 Table 1 in the Appendix provides an overview of the educational and political programs and 846
perspectives of the ideologies just mentioned.
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demanded that this incorporation not be unfairly structured on the basis of race.  The 
ideological concerns of the racial democrats also drove their preferred educational 
policies, including equal educational opportunities for black and white students, 
intercultural education to combat racial prejudice and strong accountability policies to 
ensure equal opportunity across racial lines.  
 The two perspectives that proved best suited for the changing political context had 
substantial ideological commonalities.  Both the racial democrats and the social 
efficiency progressives viewed the function of schools as preparing students for 
successful integration into the labor market.  The two ideological perspectives placed 
great faith in the ability of efficient and fair educational organization to significantly 
improve human welfare and social goods.  Both  also warned of the long term 
consequences and significant human suffering that could result from a poorly organized 
educational system.  These commonalities in broader education vision meant that there 
was also significant overlap in the programmatic approach of the two groups.  Both 
supported the implementation of standardized testing, curriculum more tied to the skills 
demanded by the labor market, and increased accountability for schools and teachers.  
 At first blush, the commonalities between the social efficiency progressives and 
racial democrats are quite surprising.   One of the core beliefs of the social efficiency 
progressives was in the heritability of intelligence and fundamentally different levels of 
intelligence between racial categories.  This vision justified very different educational 
experiences and opportunities for white and black students in the social efficiency vision, 
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which sought to align educational opportunities on the basis of intelligence.  However, 
the Nazi embrace of the idea of genetic racial superiority and eugenics led many 
progressives in the U.S to turn away from theories of genetic racial difference.  Many in 
the educational arena continued to point to the value of the intelligence testing as an 
educational tool, but after WWII, few continued to claim that there were racial 
differences in intelligence levels. 
 Importantly, racial democrats had few qualms with the differentiation sought by 
social efficiency progressives, as long as the differentiation was not based on race.  Many 
racial democrats openly embraced differentiation on the basis of factors such as 
intelligence or merit as both wise and, more importantly, fair.  By the end of WWII, the 
broader acceptance of the fundamental similarity of the distribution of intelligence levels 
between blacks and whites meant that the differentiation of educational opportunities on 
the basis of intelligence or merit did not necessarily imply the creation of racial disparity.  
Both the racial democrats and the social efficiency progressives embraced the usefulness 
of markers such as merit, talent, and intelligence in distributing opportunity and power.  
Shorn of racial overtones, psychologist Henry Goddard’s ideal of “Aristocracy in 
Democracy” is fundamentally similar to Phelps-Stokes fund director F.D. Patterson’s call 
to transform college admissions to ensure that “[t]he aristocracy of such institutions must 
be an aristocracy … of talent.”   As these two perspectives increasingly dominated the 847
 Henry Herbert Goddard, Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence, Fifth Printing (Princeton, NJ: 847
Princeton University Press, 1922); 99.  See also  F. D. Patterson, “Colleges for Negro Youth and the 
Future,” The Journal of Negro Education 27, no. 2 (1958): 114.
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educational landscape, both positioned merit, talent, and intelligence as legitimate means 
of differentiation in the education system, and in social destiny more broadly. 
 Perhaps most significantly, neither of these groups pressed for substantial changes 
to the existing economic order.  Whereas the transformation of the fundamentally unfair 
and undemocratic economic order was central to vision of economic democrats and social 
reconstructionists, the social efficiency progressives and racial democrats sought 
relatively minor adjustments.  The social efficiency progressives wanted schools to 
prepare students for success in the existing institutional landscape.  Racial democrats also 
wanted schools to prepare students for success within the existing social order, but 
wanted to make sure that this preparation was the same across racial lines.  The 
compatibility of both positions with the capitalist organization of the economy proved 
greatly advantageous as the radicalism of the New Deal years gave way to the more 
conservative Post-WWII era.   
 The changing political context of the 1940s and 1950s also led the Democratic 
Party to look to different economic management techniques than the ones relied on by the 
New Deal coalition.  By the mid-1940s, the consensus within the Democratic coalition 
around high levels of taxation, centralized economic planning, and extensive public job 
creation had begun to crack.  Policymakers within the party increasingly turned to 
commercial Keynesian approaches to dealing with economic issues, such as tax cuts to 
stimulate growth and job training to help workers adjust to labor market demands.  The 
turn to commercial Keynesian approaches shifted the focus of policymakers from broader 
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structural forces to the individual.   Persistent economic problems such as poverty and 
unemployment were increasingly explained by pointing to  deficiencies within 
individuals that prevented their success in the existing labor market.  The turn to the 
individualized explanation for economic inequality and disparities also positioned 
education as a particularly effective and relatively inexpensive means of addressing these 
concerns. By the 1960s, as the Democratic Party turned away from the most expansive 
and redistributive policies of the New Deal, it increasingly positioned education as a 
means of addressing myriad social problems such as poverty, unemployment, and racial 
disparity. 
 Greater investment in education, particularly on the terms advocated by social 
efficiency progressives and racial democrats, was also increasingly attractive to the 
business community.  
A 1966 report by the Chamber of Commerce entitled “The Disadvantaged Poor: 
Education and Employment,” reflected this new consensus and declared the importance 
of education for the efficient incorporation of poor and minority students into the nation’s 
economy.  The report stated that “[e]ducation is necessary to prepare the minority poor to 
take advantage of the opportunities a fair and efficient free economy presents.”   848
Adopting the language of racial democrats, the report stated that “systemic exclusion of 
any ethnic group from full participation is not only morally and politically wrong, but 
 The Task Force on Economic Growth and Opportunity, “The Disadvantaged Poor: Education and 848
Employment” (Washington, D.C.: Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1966): 26.
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economically wasteful as well.”    The report contained several policy proposals as 849
well, including greater federal investment in education, more vocational education 
opportunities, and an extensive use of testing both to measure the effectiveness of schools 
and to match students to future vocations.   The report argued that society, and the 850
business community in particular, would see broad benefits from greater investment in, 
and appropriate reforms to, the education system.  851
 By the end of the 1960s, a powerful coalition backed the liberal incorporationist 
education order.  Faith in the ability of education to meaningfully address the persistent 
issue of poverty, unemployment and racial disparity had united a coalition of 
policymakers to pass the  first major federal intervention in primary and secondary 
education policy.  The programmatic approach chosen by federal policymakers was 
liberal in its attempt to ensure that all students, regardless of race or economic status, 
were given equal opportunity to reach their potential.  The approach was also explicitly 
incorporationist in that justification for targeting aid to poor students was done in the 
attempt to give all students an equal chance for success within the existing economic 
 Ibid., 12.  The adoption of this language may be due in part to the fact that Kenneth B. Clark served on 849
the Chamber’s task force that produced the report.
 Ibid., 50-61.  In calling for greater testing, the report noted that “American education has been subject to 850
few tests of its efficiency….there is little information to measure the quality of the public school ‘output’ - 
the student.”  The report advocated for the development of “tests that measure a graduate’s employability,” 
and “pupil preparedness for entry into employment”(Ibid., 60-61). 
 It is useful to note the compatibly of the liberal incorporationist educational vision and the conservative 851
economic theory of human capital.  The conservative embrace of human capital theory increasingly put 
racial democrats and conservative economics on the same side, with both positioning racial discrimination 
as an irrational, economically wasteful, and ultimately harmful for business.  Human capital theory also 
fundamentally agreed with the position that the role of education was to prepare individuals for future 
success in the labor market, a position that was central to both social efficiency progressives and racial 
democrats.
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order.  Within the Democratic Party, positioning education as one of the most effective 
solutions to poverty, unemployment, and racial disparities largely replaced more directly 
economically redistributive policies - such as public job guarantees and a progressive 
taxation system.   
 These ideological commitments were reflected in the design of the educational 
policies of the ESEA.  The vast majority of ESEA funds were distributed through Title I, 
which targeted aid on the basis of the number of low-income students each district 
served.  The design of the program ensured that although nearly every district in the 
country would see some federal money, those districts serving the poorest populations 
would receive the greatest amount of funding.  Given the close association between race 
and income, this also meant a sizable portion of federal dollars went to schools serving 
minority students.  By providing a more equitable base of funding, policymakers hoped 
to provide more educational resources that would place poor children - and black students 
- on equitable footing with their wealthy peers when they graduated high school.  This 
faith in the ability of education to address the causes of poverty, racial disparity and 
unemployment also meant that policymakers included means of holding schools 
accountable in the ESEA.  The ESEA included language that encouraged the evaluation 
of program effectiveness through changes in standardized test scores and authorized the 
withholding of funds from states and districts that failed to use funds appropriately.  The 
decision to structure the ESEA in this way was driven by particular ideological beliefs 
about the relationship between education policy and  broader social and economic 
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problems.  The liberal incorporationist educational ideology positioned education as a 
particularly effective social policy arena for addressing problems within the existing 
economic order. 
Developments within the Liberal Incorporationist Order: 1965-2000  
 The substantial federal investment in education premised on the faith that 
education could solve problems such as racial disparity, poverty, and unemployment 
spurred the development of increasingly punitive reforms as education failed to solve 
these problems.   The persistent racial disparities in the education and society more 
broadly were frequently blamed on failures of the education system and prompted calls 
for greater accountability.  These calls often took the form of demands for more objective 
evaluation of school performance, such as through standardized tests, and reforms aimed 
at eliminating racial disparities on these measures.  In his 1967 testimony before the 
Commission on Tests, Kenneth Clark, the prominent psychologist reiterated his continued 
disappointment with the public education system accountability, arguing:  
If I were doing any studies now … concerned with getting the American 
people to understand the enormity of the injustice inherent in differential 
educational quality of out biracial school systems, I would search for the 
most rigorous, objective, standardized test that was relevant to the 
question of educational achievement, and I would administer it to all of 
the children in public schools.  [Then] I would present … the stark 
differential results and say to the American people: ‘This is what you are 
doing by way of damming up human potential and human resources … 
You can either continue this and know … that you are spawning hundreds 
of thousands of human casualties, or you can make the necessary changes 
in the educational system to narrow this gap, and hopefully obviate it.  852
 As quoted in Winton H. Manning, “The Measurement of Intellectual Capacity and Performance,” The 852
Journal of Negro Education 37, no. 3 (Summer 1968): 261.
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Clark’s argument positioned standardized tests as the most accurate indicator of both 
educational success and racial injustice in the public education system.  Racial 
achievement gaps in standardized tests, and the belief that continues to motivate calls for 
education reform to this day  
 Clark’s call for increased testing and measurement of educational effectiveness 
was echoed by Democrats at the federal level who were anxious for evidence that 
increased federal expenditure was improving educational outcomes.   Democrats had 
argued that the ESEA would help improve the quality of education for low-income 
students, ultimately helping to address problems of persistent poverty. After several 
reports in the late 1960s found that increased federal spending had resulted in few 
positive gains on test scores, Congressional Democrats began to demand more 
accountability for the federal funds.    John F. Jennings, a long-time Democratic staffer on 
the House Subcommittee on Education, has stated that by the 1970s, “success came to be 
measured by achievement.  Democrats who in 1964-65 had looked to Title I as a poverty 
program had to try to find achievement data with which to defend it.  We were forced into 
wanting data.”   Throughout the 1970s, federal Democrats supported a number of 853
amendments to the ESEA that increased the state reporting requirements and sanctioning 
power of federal education officials.  These changes were made in an attempt to ensure 
that federal money was being well spent on measures that would improve outcomes, 
which were increasingly measured through standardized test scores.   
 As quoted in David K. Cohen and Susan L. Moffitt, The Ordeal of Equality: Did Federal Regulation Fix 853
the Schools? (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009): 73.
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 Although some Republicans had supported the ESEA, many in the party remained 
opposed to the idea of a federal role in education policy throughout the 1970s and the 
early 1980s.  Reflecting this position, President Reagan attempted to abolish the recently 
created Department of Education multiple times early in his first term.  President 
Reagan’s opposition to federal involvement in education early in his term represented a 
potential challenge to the development of a punitive federal education state.  However, the 
President and the broader Republican Party dramatically shifted course with the publication 
in 1983 of A Nation At Risk.   This federal report made national headlines by suggesting 854
that the poor state of education in the United States represented a serious economic and 
national security risk in an increasingly globalized world.  This report mobilized the 
educational, civil rights, and business communities to press for more federal funding and 
guidance in education and eliminated much of the opposition to a federal role in education 
from elites within the Republican Party.  
 Republican politicians increasingly adopted liberal incorporationist language 
when talking about the purpose of education, particularly in its relationship to the labor 
market.  Republicans began to push for education reform as a means of ensuring students 
were gaining the skills demanded by a globalized marketplace.  Shortly after the 
publication of A Nation at Risk, President Reagan reiterated its warning of a dangerously 
ineffective public education system, noting that “[b]etween 1963 and 1980, Scholastic 
 See Elizabeth H. Debray, Politics, Ideology, & Education: Federal Policy During the Clinton and Bush 854
Administrations (New York: Teachers College Press, 2006); Diane Ravitch, Reign of Error: The Hoax of 
the Privatization Movement and the Danger to America’s Public Schools (New York: Knopf, 2013); 
Michael Fabricant and Michelle Fine, Charter Schools and the Corporate Makeover of Public Education: 
What’s at Stake? (New York: Teachers College Press, 2012).
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Aptitude Test scores were in a virtually unbroken decline. Too many of our States 
demanded too little of their students, imposing lax graduation requirements. And 
compared to students in other industrialized nations, many of ours performed badly.”   855
Reagan called on states to hold schools accountable, and urged states to partner with 
businesses to pursue needed reform. Spurred by A Nation at Risk and the appeals of the 
Reagan administration, states across the country raised education standards.  In addition 
to updating teacher quality standards, states took steps to increase requirements for grade 
promotion, high schools graduation, and college entrance and exit.   The new embrace 856
of the federal role by the Republican Party also opened new avenues for the Party to craft 
conservative educational appeals  - such as vouchers - to unlikely constituents, 
particularly racial minorities and the poor. 
 With its growing embrace of a federal role in education, the Republican Party began 
to make inroads with voters concerned about education by the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
The Democratic Party recognized the need to adjust their stance as Republican efforts 
gained traction with voters, including racial minorities and urban families, constituencies 
that had traditionally voted for the Democratic Party.  By the 1990s, Democrats at the 
national level were increasingly willing to adopt the Republican Party tactic of publicly 
criticizing failing public schools, and began to call for greater accountability and higher 
 Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at a White House Ceremony Marking the Beginning of the National 855
Partnerships in Education Program ," October 13, 1983. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The 
American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40626.
 Ronald Reagan: "Remarks to the National Governors' Association-Department of Education Conference 856
in Columbia, Missouri ," March 26, 1987. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American 
Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=34025.
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standards.  Passed under a Democratic Congress and President, the 1994 Improving 
America’s Schools Act (IASA), a reauthorization of the ESEA, called for state to 
implement more stringent accountability measures to improve student outcomes and 
provided funding for charter schools.  As a means of stimulating competition and 
innovation in the public education sector, funding for charter schools was increased in 
1998 with the passage of the Charter School Expansion Act.  The IASA and the Charter 
School Expansion Act passed with substantial support from both parties.  
  By the end of the 1990s, both political parties agreed that the public education 
system was failing.  Importantly, this bipartisan convergence in rhetoric and policy was 
firmly within the liberal incorporationist order, and the criticism stemmed from a 
fundamentally liberal incorporationist understanding of the purpose of education.  Both 
parties argued that public schools were failing to provide equitable opportunities to 
minority students and were failing to provide individuals with the skills needed to 
succeed in an increasingly globalized economy.  Both parties pointed to racial test score 
gaps and international test comparisons to justify policies aimed at holding schools and 
teachers accountable for educational outcomes.  By the end of the 1990s, the bipartisan 
consensus that schools had failed in their central function of the equitable provision of 
skills needed for success in the labor market began to justify an increasingly punitive 
array of educational policies. 
Current Educational Landscape: 2000-Today 
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 The consequences of the origins of and developments in the federal education 
policy victories can be seen in the modern education policy landscape and the rhetoric 
surrounding the education system.  The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act passed under 
President George W. Bush, and the Race to the Top Initiative (RTT) and Every Student 
Succeeds Act (ESSA) under President Obama have solidified the liberal incorporationist 
ideology that has driven federal education policy since the passage of the ESEA.  These 
post-2000 federal education policies have made the receipt of federal funds contingent on 
the implementation of statewide standards, frequent student evaluation, and harsh 
turnaround methods for schools failing to meet standards. The NCLB Act, RTT, and 
ESSA have all positioned standardized achievement tests scores as the method of choice 
for evaluating the success of students, teachers, and schools.  A brief examination of the 
structure and policies of recent reform efforts reveals the  the ideological continuity of 
recent reforms with the liberal incorporationist vision that provided the foundation for the 
1965 ESEA.   
NCLB, ESSA, and RTT 
 Passed with widespread bipartisan support in 2001 as a reauthorization of the 
ESEA, the NCLB Act represented a dramatic expansion of federal influence in education 
policy.  The act required states to develop subject area standards to determine what 
students should learn throughout their elementary and secondary school years, with the 
goal that every student would reach a minimum level of proficiency as determined by 
these new standards.  In order to hold schools accountable, the new law also required that 
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states test every student in grades three through eight, and once more in high school to 
ensure that every student reached the standards set by the state.  The law also required 
that schools keep track of the scores of “sub-group” populations, most notably racial 
minorities, in order to insure the elimination of test score achievement gaps. Critically, 
the new federal law required states to intervene in schools who's students failed to meet 
proficiency standards (determined by standardized test scores) and implement 
“turnaround” strategies.  These turnaround strategies included many punitive measures, 
including forcing schools to pay for private tutors for students out of already strained 
budgets, mass firing of teachers, or closing the school completely.  The ultimate goal that 
the NCLB set for states was that 100% of students would be meet proficiency levels by 
2014. 
 Although the NCLB Act faced widespread criticism, the measure that replaced it - 
the 2015 ESSA - maintains much of the NCLB Act’s programmatic structure and clearly 
shares the same ideological understanding of the purpose of education and the perceived 
shortcomings of public schools.  Like the NCLB, the ESSA requires states to test all 
children in grades three through eight and once in high school and continues the practice 
of requiring separate sub-group testing records.  Unlike the NCLB, the ESSA allows 
states to determine their own accountability goals (doing away with the 100% proficiency 
goal).  However, it does require that states submit their accountability plans to the 
Department of Education for approval and also requires that test scores be given greater 
weight than more subjective measures.  Finally, the ESSA retains punitive turnaround 
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requirements for schools failing to meet the standards set by the state.  The law requires 
that states implement turnaround strategies for any schools with a graduation rate lower 
than 67%, with persistent disparities in subgroup test scores, or at the bottom 5% of state 
assessment scores.  The states have more leeway in determining which strategy to pursue, 
however, many of the strategies recommended by the ESSA are similar those of the 
NCLB and are quite punitive, including mass firings, conversion to charter school, and 
state takeover.  857
 Although the RTT Initiative differs from NCLB and ESSA in structure and origin, 
there are many similarities in the policies and overall vision of reform it promotes.  At the 
request of the Obama administration, the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
set aside $4.35 billion for the creation of the RTT fund.  The Obama administration 
committed to use these funds to motivate states to create  “the conditions for education 
innovation and reform…including making substantial gains in student achievement, 
closing achievement gaps, improving high school graduation rates, and ensuring student 
preparation for success in college and careers.”  The RTT funds were distributed 858
through a total of three rounds of grants, with states submitting applications for 
funding.   Grant winners were determined on basis of a points system, with states 859
 Gregory Korte, “The Every Student Succeeds Act vs. No Child Left Behind: What’s Changed?,” USA 857
Today, December 11, 2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/12/10/every-student-
succeeds-act-vs-no-child-left-behind-whats-changed/77088780/; Daarel Burnette II, “States, Districts to 
Call Shots on Turnarounds Under ESSA,” Education Week, January 5, 2016, http://www.edweek.org/ew/
articles/2016/01/06/states-districts-to-call-shots-on-turnarounds.html.
 U.S. Department of Education, “Race to the Top Executive Summary,” November 2009: 2.858
 Since the ARRA funds were exhausted in the first two rounds of grants, the Obama administration 859
requested and received additional funding from Congress for a third round of grants. 
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getting points for adopting rigorous standards, eliminating barriers to the expansion of 
charter schools, implementing extensive new teacher evaluation plans, and turnaround 
plans for the poor performing schools, promotion and emphasis on STEM (Science, 
Technology, Engineering, and Math) education, and expanding the use of data systems.  
Facing dire financial straits in the wake of the 2008 recession, many states 
enthusiastically passed reforms in an attempt to be competitive for RTT funds.  In the 
three rounds of RTT grants funding, forty-five states and the District of Columbia 
submitted applications, and eighteen states and the District of Columbia eventually 
received funding.  Ultimately, RTT proved to be a dramatically effective means of 
inducing states to enact substantial changes in education policy, regardless of whether 
these states ultimately received RTT funds.  860
 These latest federal efforts reflect the liberal incorporationist faith and 
understanding of the purpose of education.  Expansive and punitive reforms are pursued 
based on the belief that public schools are failing children and are the root cause of a 
number of social ills such as unemployment and racial disparities.  These federal policies 
are responsible for the development of a number of policy reforms at the local level with 
particularly pernicious consequences for teachers, students, and communities. 
Teacher Evaluation 
 The reliance on standardized test scores as a metic of evaluation has opened up 
new lines of attacks on public school teachers.  Nearly a century after John Franklin 
 William G. Howell, “Results of President Obama’s Race to the Top: Win or Lose, States Enacted 860
Education Reforms,” Education Next, Fall 2015, http://educationnext.org/results-president-obama-race-to-
the-top-reform/.
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Bobbitt praised the the usefulness of standards and frequent testing in the identification of 
good and bad teachers (and suggested tying teacher pay, promotion, and retention to the 
test scores of their pupils), policymakers have again turned to tying teacher evaluation to 
student test scores.  A coalition of  large-city school superintendents, including Michelle 
Rhee in Washington D.C. and Joel Klein in New York City, and national non-profit 
organizations, such as the Gates Foundation, argued that persistent low student test scores 
were a reflection of poor teaching.  Arguing that teachers needed to be held accountable 
and could no longer be allowed to rely on the poverty of students as an excuse for poor 
performance, this coalition pressed for greater teacher evaluation on the basis of 
standardized test scores and greater administrative freedom to fire teachers whose 
students scored poorly.   This demand for greater administrative authority to fire 861
teachers with low performance scores is often framed as a necessary reform to ensure 
quality education in schools serving high numbers of poor and racial minority students.   862
The Obama administration was responsive to these arguments and made the receipt of 
Race to the Top funds and NCLB waivers contingent upon the implementation of teacher 
evaluation systems that included evaluation on the basis of improvement in student 
 Valerie Strauss, “Everything You Need to Know about Common Core — Ravitch,” Washington Post, 861
January 18, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2014/01/18/everything-you-
need-to-know-about-common-core-ravitch/; see also, Bloomberg Businessweek, “Bill Gates’ Latest 
Mission: Fixing America’s Schools,” Msnbc.com, July 17, 2010, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/38282806/ns/
business-us_business/t/bill-gates-latest-mission-fixing-americas-schools/.
 Bloomberg Businessweek, “Bill Gates’ Latest Mission”;  San Diego Union-Tribune, “The Reformer,” 862
The San Diego Union-Tribune, March 24, 2013, http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2013/mar/24/
tp-the-reformer/; also http://www.nj.com/njvoices/index.ssf/2010/12/ask_michelle_rhee_there_is_no.html; 
New Jersey Star-Ledger, “Michelle Rhee: ‘I Don’t Think There Is a Need for Tenure,’” NJ.com, December 
19, 2010, http://www.nj.com/njvoices/index.ssf/2010/12/ask_michelle_rhee_there_is_no.html.
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standardized test scores.   This organized support has led to the rapid expansion of this 863
type of teacher evaluation, with the number of states requiring student standardized test 
scores be a part of teacher evaluation growing from fifteen in 2009, to forty-three in 
2015.  864
Educational Tracking 
 Although educational tracking of the type envisioned by the social efficiency 
progressives, where students would be grouped by ability and placed in entirely separate 
educational tracks aimed at preparing them for their future professions, is not a major 
aspect of the educational landscape today, the elementary and secondary schools do still 
use forms of tracking.   The placing of students in different classes on the basis of 865
ability or prior performance continues to be a widespread practice.  At the elementary 
 Alyson Klein, “Will Teacher Evaluations Through Test Scores Outlast Obama?,” Education Week - 863
Politics K-12, November 4, 2015, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2015/11/
will_teacher_evaluations_throu.html?cmp=SOC-SHR-FB.
 Not only has the number of states employing student achievement test scores in teacher evaluation 864
increased, but their weight of importance in teacher evaluation has increased as well.  The number of states 
where these test scores are the biggest factor in teacher evaluation increased from 4 in 2009 to 17 by 2015, 
and the number of states including student test scores in teacher tenure decisions went from 0 in 2009, to 23 
just six years later (Kathryn M. Doherty and Sandi Jacobs, “State of States 2015: Evaluating Teaching, 
Leading and Learning” (Washington, D.C.: National Council on Teacher Quality, November 2015), http://
www.nctq.org/dmsView/StateofStates2015).  However, there is evidence of a recent pushback at the state 
level to this approach, as both Hawaii and Oklahoma passed legislation dropping the use of student growth 
on standardized tests for teacher evaluations in May of 2016. (See Max Dible, “Standardized Testing to No 
Longer Require Teacher Assessment,” Hawaii Tribune-Herald, May 19, 2016, http://hawaiitribune-
herald.com/news/local-news/standardized-testing-no-longer-require-teacher-assessment; and “Lawmakers 
Pass Teacher Evaluation Changes,” Bartlesville Examiner Enterprise, May 12, 2016, http://examiner-
enterprise.com/news/local-news/lawmakers-pass-teacher-evaluation-changes).
 The more extreme version of tracking, where the entire educational program of students differed on the 865
basis of intelligence test scores or perceptions of ability was a widely popular in the mid-twentieth century, 
when a majority of high schools used some form of this tracking. (Maureen T. Hallinan, “The Detracking 
Movement: Why Children Are Still Grouped by Ability,” Education Next 4, no. 4 (Fall 2004), http://
educationnext.org/the-detracking-movement/.)  This form of wholesale college and vocational tracking died 
out in the 1970s. (Tom Loveless, “The Resurgence of Ability Grouping and Persistence of Tracking,” The 
Brookings Institution, March 18, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/03/18-tracking-
ability-grouping-loveless).
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level, although students of differing ability are housed in the same classroom, they are 
frequently grouped with children of similar ability (known as ability grouping) with each 
group receiving instruction on the basis of the group’s perceived ability.   Tracking today 
is predominantly used in high school and is determined on a subject by subject basis, with 
students assigned to different classrooms based on past performance.   Although getting 866
a firm grasp of the extent of tracking in schools is difficult given the lack of longitudinal 
national survey data, recent comprehensive surveys of teachers indicates that between 
70-90% of elementary classrooms use ability grouping, and 65-85% of high school 
students experience tracked classrooms.  867
Education Research 
 Recent federal reforms have also ushered in a decisive shift in the definition of 
educational research and what types of research schools and educators are allowed to rely 
on in guiding pedagogy.  NCLB included provisions that made receipt of federal funds 
for turnaround schools contingent on schools and districts using these funds to develop 
educational programs based on the best available evidence of effectiveness, or 
“scientifically based research.”  Much like the social efficiency progressives’ importation 
 The growth in AP (Advanced Placement) classes is indicative of the continued influence of tracking in 866
high school. In many subjects, there are three groupings (basic, regular, and advanced) for core subjects, 
such as Math and English. The three group division is the same recommendation that many of the social 
efficiency progressives made in the 1920s and 1930s.
  See Vivian Yee, “Grouping Students by Ability Regains Favor With Educators,” The New York Times, 867
June 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/education/grouping-students-by-ability-regains-favor-
with-educators.html;  Marc Tucker, “Student Tracking vs. Academic Pathways: Different...or the Same?,” 
Education Week - Top Performers, accessed March 27, 2016, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/
top_performers/2015/10/tracking_vs_pathways _differentor_the_same.html?cmp=SOC-SHR-FB; Jay 
Mathews, “My Bluebird Group Is Back despite Scholarly Qualms,” Washington Post, March 17, 2013, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/class-struggle/post/ability-grouping-is-back-despite-scholarly-
qualms/2013/03/17/5dc15a1c-8df8-11e2-9f54-f3fdd70acad2_blog.html; Loveless, “The Resurgence of 
Ability,” 2013; Hallinan, “The Detracking Movement.”
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of the scientific methods of industrial organization to the schools, the term and definition 
of “scientifically based research” originates in the medical field and is seen as a way of 
rationalizing and improving a disorganized education system.  The importance of this 
requirement is reflected by the fact that the term “scientifically based research” appears 
over 100 times in the NCLB Act.   The act also outlined what constituted “scientifically 868
based research,” ultimately settling on an extremely narrow definition that limits research 
to “testing hypotheses and using experimental and quasi-experimental designs only, and 
preferring random assignment.”  This narrow definition of what counts as research is 869
particularly consequential as it provides support for educational research that frames 
success in education through testing whether educational methods have effects that can 
be detected through easily quantifiable and replicable observations.  Standardized tests 
scores provide ideal observations, and the desire for the “certainty” of scientifically based 
research reinforces the proliferation of testing in education.  Furthermore, as education 
professor Suzanne Wright has pointed out, the definition adopted by the NCLB inevitably 
“leads one to the conclusion that forms of research that do not conform to SBR 
[scientifically based research] are invalid.”   The 2015 ESSA similarly emphasizes the 870
value of scientifically based research and continues to point to experimental studies as the 
 Much like the social efficiency progressives’ importation of the scientific methods of industrial 868
organization to the schools, the term and definition of “scientifically based research” originates in the 
medical field and is seen as a way of rationalizing and improving a disorganized education system.
 Margaret Eisenhart and Lisa Towne, “Contestation and Change in National Policy on ‘Scientifically 869
Based’ Education Research,” Educational Researcher 32, no. 7 (October 2003): 34.
  Suzanne Franco, “Time to Reconsider the Scientifically Based Research Requirement,” Nonpartisan 870
Education Review, 2007, http://nonpartisaneducation.org/Review/Essays/v3n6.htm.
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gold standard in education research.   Defining the boundaries of education research in 871
terms that support limited conceptions of educational success reinforces the liberal 
incorporationist order by delegitimizing research that might challenge its ideological 
foundations and preventing schools from implementing an alternative policy approach. 
Common Core 
 Aspects of social efficiency ideology are also present in the justifications used for 
the recent push to implement the so-called “Common Core State Standards” nationwide.   
The original standards were first developed in 2009, with considerable support from the 
testing industry, which dominated the working groups that wrote the standards, and the 
Gates Foundation, which poured roughly $230 million into efforts to get states to adopt 
the standards.   The Obama administration also got on board, requiring states competing 872
for the $4 billion in Race to the Top funds to adopt rigorous “standards that build toward 
college and career readiness,” and that were “supported by evidence.”   The Common 873
Core website describes the standards as “[r]esearch and evidenced based,” “[a]ligned 
 Sarah D. Sparks, “What Role Will Research Play in ESSA?,” Education Week, December 4, 2015, http://871
blogs.edweek.org/edweek/inside-school-research/2015/12/essa_waves_at_tiered_evidence.html?
cmp=SOC-SHR-FB.
 Lyndsey Layton, “How Bill Gates Pulled Off the Swift Common Core Revolution,” Washington Post, 872
June 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/gates-foundation/; see also Strauss, 
“Everything You Need to Know.”  The original working groups that constructed the basic skeleton of the 
standards consisted of twenty-four individuals, of which, none identified as practicing teachers.  This initial 
round was dominated by individuals with connections to the testing industry, as was the second round of 
101 individuals who fleshed out the standards, of which only five were current classroom teachers (Diane 
Ravitch, “Who Wrote the Common Core Standards? Here Is a List,” Diane Ravitch’s Blog, April 23, 2014, 
https://dianeravitch.net/2014/04/23/who-wrote-the-common-core-standards-here-is-a-list/; Mercedes 
Schneider, “Those 24 Common Core 2009 Work Group Members,” deutsch29 - Mercedes Schneider’ 
EduBlog, March 31, 2015, https://deutsch29.wordpress.com/2014/04/23/those-24-common-core-2009-
work-group-members/).
  U.S. Department of Education, “Race to the Top Executive Summary,” November 2009; 8.  The 873
application process for Race to the Top funds is expensive and complex, and The Gates Foundation has 
provided several states with financial and logistical help in putting together their applications, most of 
which have included the adoption of the Common Core Standards. (Layton, “How Bill Gates Pulled Off.”)
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with college and career expectations,” and designed to prepare all students for “success in 
college, career, and life in our global economy and society.”   The website notes that the 874
standards would impact teachers by providing them “with consistent goals and 
benchmarks to ensure students are progressing on a path towards success in college, 
career, and life.”   Remarkably, by 2011, 45 states and the District of Columbia had 875
adopted the Common Core State Standards.   
 The development and implementation of these standards followed a top-down 
approach with little initial input from the public or teachers.  These new “evidenced-
based” standards, the evaluation of teachers on basis of student test scores aligned with 
these standards, and the design of standards that reflect the needs of the labor market or 
“global economy,” clearly echo the scientific management techniques of the social 
efficiency progressives.  The Common Core standards movement also employs racial 
democracy ideology, as advocates have framed it as a way to ensure racial equity.    876
Reform advocates like Bill Gates have argued that ensuring that all schools were holding 
students to the same high standards, and punishing those schools and teachers that failed 
to improve student scores, would not only improve education - but would help combat 
poverty and racial disparity.  As Gates remarked in a speech before the National Urban 
League, “let's end the myth that we have to solve poverty before we improve education. I 
 “Read the Standards | Common Core State Standards Initiative,” Common Core State Standards 874
Initiative, 2016, http://www.corestandards.org/read-the-standards/.
 “Frequently Asked Questions | Common Core State Standards Initiative,” Common Core State 875
Standards Initiative, 2016, http://www.corestandards.org/about-the-standards/frequently-asked-questions/.
 Strauss, “Everything You Need to Know.”876
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say it's more the other way around: Improving education is the best way to solve 
poverty.”  877
School Choice and School Closings 
 Recent federal education policy efforts have been at the forefront of the twin 
developments of rapid expansion of charter schools and closing of traditional public 
schools.  The NCLB specially named transfer to charter school as one of the school-
choice options that must be given to children in low-performing schools.  The promotion 
of charter schools as a turnaround strategy continued under RTT, which made elimination 
of state barriers to charter school expansion a significant factor in determining which 
states won grants.   Since the start of RTT, fifteen states have lifted caps on charter 878
school growth and one state enacted its first charter law.  The rapid growth of charter 
schools shows little sign of slowing down.  In September of 2015, the U.S. Department of 
Education announced that it would give $157 million to expand charter schools 
nationally, and the passage of the ESSA in December of 2015 channeled even more 
federal funds to charter expansion.  879
Russell Contreras, “Bill Gates: Poverty Not Excuse for No Education,” MPR News, July 28, 2011, http://877
www.mprnews.org/story/2011/07/28/bill-gates-poverty-race.
 Secretary of Education Arne Duncan warned, “States that do not have public charter laws or put 878
artificial caps on the growth of charter schools will jeopardize their applications under the Race to the Top 
Fund.” (“States Open to Charters Start Fast in ‘Race to the Top,’” U.S. Department of Education, June 8, 
2009, http://www2.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2009/06/06082009a.html.)
 Lyndsey Layton, “Charter Love: Feds Give $157 Million to Expand Charter Schools,” Washington Post, 879
September 28, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/charter-love-feds-give-157-million-
to-expand-charter-schools/2015/09/28/006ad118-6613-11e5-8325-a42b5a459b1e_story.html; Carol 
Hornsby Haynes, “Follow the Money: Race to the Top and ESSA,” Education News, January 11, 2016, 
http://www.educationviews.org/follow-money-race-top-essa/.
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 As charter schools expand, the requirements that states intervene in poor 
performing schools has pushed a number of states and local school districts to pursue a 
strategy of mass school closure.  Spurred by these federal requirements, cities such as 
Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, and Columbus have aggressively closed low-performing 
schools as a central aspect of their reform agendas.  The closure of traditional public 
schools often goes hand-in-hand with the expansion of charter schools.  In a recent 
twelve city study, the Pew Charitable Trust found that more than 40% of closed school 
buildings were ultimately reopened as charter schools.  The shift towards charters is 880
also evident in enrollment numbers. In Chicago, between 2005 and 2013 enrollment in 
traditional public schools fell by 14% while charter school enrollment grew by 219% 
over the same period.  881
 The move towards widespread school closure and rapid expansion of charter 
schools is particularly problematic given growing evidence of the pernicious effects of 
these reform strategies.  Studies have consistently shown that expansion of charter 
schools comes with a significant risk of increasing segregation by race, ethnicity, and 
income.  The expansion of charter schools is also associated with increased segregation 
for special education and language minority students.   The reform strategy of school 882
closure and charter expansion has also been tied to diminished teacher effectiveness and 
 Emily Dowdall and Susan Warner, “Shuttered Public Schools: The Struggle to Bring Old Buildings to 880
New Life” (The Pew Charitable Trust, February 11, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/
2013/02/11/philadelphia_school_closings_report.pdf?la=en.
 Journey for Justice Alliance, “Death By a Thousand Cuts: Racism, School Closures, and Public School 881
Sabotage” (Journey for Justice Alliance, May 2014): 3.
 Iris C. Rotberg, “Charter Schools and the Risk of Increased Segregation,” Phi Delta Kappan 95, no. 5 882
(February 1, 2014): 26–31.
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working conditions, increased student conflict, and a weakening of community 
connection to local schools.   Additionally, the expansion of charter schools has 883
provided the opportunity for the private sector to reap massive profits even as hundreds 
of traditional schools are closed down in part due to lack of funds.   Finally, there is 884
little evidence that charters schools offer better student outcomes, even on the 
standardized testing metrics preferred by reform advocates.  885
 Beyond school closings and charter expansion, mounting evidence suggests that 
the broader federal reform agenda has had similarly negative consequences for schools 
across the country.   In addition to the consequences mentioned above, researchers have 
found that these reforms have narrowed the curriculum,  increased the practice of 886
expelling poor performing students to boost test score averages,  caused teachers to 887
 Journey for Justice Alliance, “Death By a Thousand Cuts.”883
 Kristin Rawls, “Who Is Profiting From Charters? The Big Bucks Behind Charter School Secrecy, 884
Financial Scandal and Corruption,” AlterNet, January 21, 2015, http://www.alternet.org/election-2014/who-
profiting-charters-big-bucks-behind-charter-school-secrecy-financial-scandal-and.
 Rotberg, “Charter Schools,” 26-31.885
 David Berliner, “Rational Responses to High Stakes Testing: the case of Curriculum Narrowing and the 886
Harm that Follows,” Cambridge Journal of Education 41, no. 3 (October 2011): 287-302; Margaret S. 
Crocco, “The Narrowing of Curriculum and Pedagogy in the Age of Accountability Urban Educators Speak 
Out,” Urban Education 42, no. 6 (November 2007): 512-535; Audrey L. Amrein and David C. Berliner, 
“An Analysis of Some Unintended and Negative Consequences of High-Stakes Testing,” report from 
Education Policy Studies Laboratory, (Tempe: Arizona State University, 2002); George Madaus and 
Michael Russell, “Paradoxes of High-Stakes Testing,” The Journal of Education 190, no. 1/2 (2010/2011): 
21-30; Smith, Mary Lee et al., Political Spectacle and the Fate of American Schools (New York: 
RoutledgeFalmer, 2004); Linda Darling-Hammond, “Race, Inequality and Educational Accountability: The 
Irony of ‘No Child Left Behind,’” Race Ethnicity and Education 10, no. 3 (September 2007): 245-260.
 Julian Vasquez Helig and Linda Darling-Hammond, “Accountability Texas-Style: The Progress and 887
Learning of Urban Minority Students in a High-Stakes Testing Context,” Educational Evaluation and 
Policy Analysis 30, no. 2 (June 2008): 75-110; Amrein and Berliner, “An Analysis of Unintended and 
Negative Consequences,” 2002; Jennifer Booher-Jennings, “Below the bubble: "Educational triage" and the 
Texas Accountability System,” American Educational Research Journal 42, no. 2 (June 2005): 231-268.
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focus on small set of students most likely to raise test scores,  increased dropout 888
rates,  decreased teacher satisfaction and increased teacher turnover.   Unsurprisingly, 889 890
these negative consequences are felt disproportionately by poor, minority, and urban 
communities.  891
 Despite growing evidence of the negative consequences, the bipartisan punitive 
education reform agenda has proceeded full speed ahead at the federal level.  The 
continued popularity of these reforms among federal policymakers can be explained by 
dominance of the liberal incorporationist ideology.  Both parties continue to articulate an 
educational vision that couples calls for equal educational opportunity regardless of racial 
identity with an understanding that central purpose of education is providing individuals 
with the skills needed to successfully compete in the existing labor market.  Republicans 
and Democrats continue to agree that primary and secondary education is key to solving 
 Booher-Jennings, “Below the bubble,” 2005; Linda M. McNeil, Contradictions of School Reform: 888
Educational Costs of Standardized Teaching, (New York: Routledge, 2000); George F. Madaus et al., “The 
Influence of Testing on Teaching Math and Science in Grades 4-12, report from Center for the Study of 
Testing, Evaluation, and Educational Policy (Chestnut Hill, MA: Boston College, 1992); Amrein and 
Berliner, “An Analysis of Unintended and Negative Consequences,” 2002.
 Gary Orfield and Johanna Wald, “Testing, Testing,” The Nation 270, no. 22 (June 5, 2000): 38-40; Linda 889
M. McNeil, “Faking Equity: High-Stakes Testing and the Education of Latino Youth,” Leaving Children 
Behind: How “Texas-style” Accountability Fails Latino Youth, ed. Angela Valenzuela (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2005) 57-112; Madaus and Russell, “Paradoxes of High-Stakes Testing,” 
2010/2011; Helig and Darling-Hammond, “Accountability Texas-Style,” 2008; Darling-Hammond, “Race, 
Inequality and Educational Accountability,” 2007; Smith et al., Political Spectacle, 2004.
 William A. Mehrens, “Consequences of Assessment: What is the Evidence?” Education Policy Analysis 890
Archives 6, no. 13 (July 1998): 1-30; Kennon M. Sheldon and Bruce J. Biddle, “Standards, Accountability, 
and School Reform: Perils and Pitfalls,” Teachers College Record 100, no. 1 (1998): 164-180; Dana 
Goldstein, The Teacher Wars: A History of America’s Most Embattled Profession (New York: Doubleday, 
2014); Crocco, “The Narrowing of Curriculum and Pedagogy,” 2007; Gerson, “The Neoliberal Agenda,” 
2012.
 Wayne Au, Unequal By Design: High-Stakes Testing and the Standardization of Inequality, (New York: 891
Routledge, 2009); Kenneth J. Saltman, Capitalizing on Disaster: Taking and Breaking Public Schools 
(Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007); Darling-Hammond, “Race, Inequality and Educational 
Accountability,” 2007; Smith et al., Political Spectacle, 2004; McNeil, Contradictions of School Reform, 
2005.
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the persistent problems of poverty, unemployment, and racial disparity.  This faith in 
education justifies the increasingly punitive reforms targeted at the public schools when 
these problems persist.  The expansion of high-stakes testing, destabilization of the 
teaching force, and increasing privatization and charterization of public schools represent 
the latest destructive extension of the institutional and ideological commitments of the 
liberal incorporationist order in education.  The federal government continues to rely on 
the essentially same institutional mechanism to induce change as it has since the 1960s, 
the threat of withholding compensatory funds from states failing to demonstrate objective 
gains in student achievement.  The common ideological foundations explain why so 
many of the reforms of the current era look similar - in some cases nearly identical - to 
those proposed over 50 years ago.  The continued support of this reform agenda despite 
mounting evidence of negative consequences for vulnerable populations demonstrates the 
thoroughly entrenched nature of the liberal incorporationist order.  
Moving Forward 
 Despite the dominance of the liberal incorporationist educational vision and the 
punitive reform effort it justifies, there is growing evidence of increasingly organized 
efforts to push back against the punitive education policies that have flourished under this 
hegemonic educational ideology.  Although the ideas of the social reconstructionists and 
economic democrats were marginalized by the 1960s, the vision put forth by these 
coalitions never completely disappeared from the national discussion.  Coalitions pushing 
against the liberal incorporationist education order and the punitive policies it has 
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supported have increasingly mobilized these ideas in the past decade.  The most 
prominent organized opposition to the bipartisan liberal incorporationist order has come 
from a number of progressive teacher’s unions situated in large cities that have born the 
brunt of the negative consequences of punitive educational reforms.  Frustrated with the 
traditional approach of supporting the Democratic Party as the “lesser of two evils” only 
to see enthusiastic Democratic support for punitive reforms, progressive groups such as 
the Caucus of Rank and File Educators (CORE) in Chicago, the Progressive Educators 
for Action Caucus (PEAC) in Los Angeles, and Educators for a Democratic Union (EDU) 
in San Francisco, have successfully pushed their unions toward a more combative 
approach to the liberal incorporationist order.  892
 Karen Lewis, the president of the Chicago teacher’s union (CTU) since 2010, is 
perhaps the most visible national leader of teacher led efforts to combat the bipartisan 
punitive reform consensus.  In her 2010 election acceptance speech, Lewis announced, 
“Today marks the beginning of the end of scapegoating educators for all the social ills 
that our children, families and schools struggle against every day.”   Lewis outlined an 893
  See: Ron Whitemore, “Social Justice Slate Sweeps to Victory in the Chicago Teachers Union,” The 892
Philadelphia Public School Notebook, June 14, 2010, http://thenotebook.org/articles/2010/06/14/social-
justice-slate-sweeps-to-victory-in-the-chicago-teachers-union;  Samantha Winslow, “L.A. Teachers Run on 
a Bigger Vision,” Labor Notes, June 10, 2014, http://labornotes.org/2014/01/la-teachers-run-bigger-vision; 
Samantha Winslow, “Activist Coalition Wins Control of L.A. Teachers Union,” March 25, 2014, http://
inthesetimes.com/working/entry/16474/activist_coalition_wins_control_of_l.a._teachers_union; Cynthia 
Ladsen and Tom Edminster, “San Francisco Teachers Elect Reformers to Lead Union,” Labor Notes, June 
10, 2015, http://www.labornotes.org/2015/06/san-francisco-teachers-elect-reformers-lead-union.  On the 
larger strategy of social justice unionism, which captures much of the programmatic and strategic approach 
of the more activist unions, see Lois Weiner, The Future of Our Schools: Teachers Unions and Social 
Justice (Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books, 2012).
 Karen Lewis, “Karen Lewis, CTU President-Elect Acceptance Speech,” CORE: The Caucus of Rank 893
and File Educators, June 12, 2010, http://www.coreteachers.org/karen-lewis-ctu-president-elect-acceptance-
speech-2/.
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educational vision that placed the CTU in clear opposition to the liberal incorporationist 
ideology, and harkened back to the ideas of the economic democrats and social 
reconstructionists.  Lewis called for greater teacher autonomy,  substantial reduction in 894
the use of testing,  and a renewed teacher activism outside the classroom.   In a 895 896
reflection of the new activist stance, Lewis led the CTU on a strike in 2012 and won 
substantial concessions from Mayor Rahm Emmanuel’s initial proposed contract.  
Notably, the CTU halted the implementation of merit pay, limited the use of student 
standardized test scores in teacher evaluations, stopped the city’s plan to increase class 
sizes, and won a pay raise.  897
 In language sounding distinctly similar to the social reconstructionist of the 
1930s, Lewis and CTU have expanded their political agenda and the proposed role for 
teachers as agents of political change.  In 2015, Lewis gave a speech drawing attention to 
the limited and politically problematic nature of the liberal incorporationist educational 
vision, arguing that, “[t]hey want ‘Stepford Teachers’ and ‘Children of the Corn’—kids 
who are compliant and will not challenge authority or the system on eradicating 
 Lewis pushed for greater teacher autonomy at the expense of business influence, noting that “inside the 894
classroom, the only people who can improve our schools are professional educators.   Corporate heads and 
politicians do not have a clue about teaching and learning.” (Ibid.)
 Lewis argued that the standardized test, which were costing the district roughly $60 million a year, did 895
little more than label “students, families and educators failures” and measure the district’s “slow death by 
starvation.” (Ibid.)
 Ibid.896
  Micah Uetricht, Strike for America: Chicago Teachers Against Austerity (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2014).897
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inequality, poverty, and injustice.”   In the same speech, Lewis announced her 898
endorsement of a number of progressive challengers to Democratic City Council 
members, including a number of teachers from the ranks of the CTU.  The CTU 
emphasized its commitment to expand the involvement of teachers in bringing about 
social change through the 2015 release of “A Just Chicago: Fighting for the City Our 
Students Deserve,” a report detailing an expansive political agenda.  In addition to calling 
for greater and more equitable funding of schools, the CTU pointed to the need to take on 
broader economic issues and called for expansive reforms including “increas[ing] the 
numbers of affordable and homeless housing units built across the city”  and 899
“guarantee[d] jobs that pay  living wage and provide heath insurance for families of 
Chicago’s students.”   The report channels the analytical outlook of both the economic 900
democrats and social reconstructionists by framing the existing economic and social 
order as fundamentally unfair and positioning teachers as powerful agents in bringing 
about a just future.  901
 Karen Lewis, “Karen Lewis Speech to City Club Today,” Chicago Teachers Union Net, February 2, 898
2015, http://www.ctunet.com/blog/karen-lewis-speech-to-city-club-today.  In the same speech Lewis argued 
forcefully that attacking teacher through accountability discourse distracts from those that truly needed to 
be held accountable.  Lewis asked, “who holds the venture capitalist accountable?  Who has been held 
responsible for the foreclosure crisis that saw the greatest reduction of wealth among the middle class in 
our nation’s history? Who has been held accountable for the rampant pension thefts?  For the destruction of 
American jobs?”
 Chicago Teachers Union Research Department, “A Just Chicago: Fighting for the City Our Students 899
Deserve” (Chicago Teacher’s Union, February 2015): 22.
 Ibid., 13.  Significantly, the CTU report positioned their proposals as a corrective to “current CPS 900
policies of closing schools, attacking teachers, and giving more tests,” arguing that instead of this approach, 
“students need policies that acknowledge the existence of and work to eradicate poverty and 
segregation.”(13)
 In one of its most damning passages, the report critiqued the economic by noting that “[i]nequitable 901
justice policies, healthcare, housing, education, and job availability is the expected outcome of a system 
designed to maintain two distinct Chicagos: one for those with access to income …. and one for those left 
to navigate whatever is left over” (Ibid., 29).
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 Within the past few years, the efforts of activist teachers unions to combat 
punitive education reform has been accompanied by a number of community groups, that 
have become increasingly critical of the liberal incorporationist education order.  Groups 
such as Parents United for Public Education in Philadelphia have organized to push back 
against the privatization, rapid characterization, and widespread school closings that have 
served as the backbone of the school reform efforts in Philadelphia for the last 15 years.  
Helen Gym, a co-founder of Parents United for Public Education who had criticized the 
reform approach as a “brand of disaster capitalism,” won a seat on the Philadelphia City 
Council in 2015, largely on a platform of halting punitive education reforms.    902
 In an effort to resist the national reform, Journey for Justice (J4J), an alliance of 
36 community based organizations from 21 different cities, released a report entitled 
“Death by Thousand Cuts: Racism, School Closures, and Public School Sabotage.”  This 
report explicitly criticized President Obama, Secretary Duncan, Bill Gates, Michelle 
Rhee and others of promoting educational reforms that attempted to “driv[e] a wedge 
between low-income communities of color and the teachers that serve their schools,” 
reducing schools to “fungible businesses,”  and ultimately perpetuating a social order in 903
which “wealth, ideology, and political opportunism have been allowed to triumph over 
the interests and well-being of our communities.”   This coalescing of groups and 904
  Helen Gym, “Commentary: You’re Not Speaking to Me, Mr. Knudsen,” The Philadelphia Public 902
School Notebook, April 24, 2012, http://thenotebook.org/articles/2012/04/24/commentary-you-re-not-
speaking-to-me-mr-knudsen.
 Journey for Justice Alliance, “Death By a Thousand Cuts: Racism, School Closures, and Public School 903
Sabotage” (Journey for Justice Alliance, May 2014): 18.
 Ibid., 27.904
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unions from cities throughout the country underscores the degree to which the dominance 
of the liberal incorporationist ideology at the federal level has produced problems for 
schools across the nation. 
 Teacher and community resistance to the liberal incorporationist understanding of 
education and the punitive reforms it supports is a promising development.  However, 
these developments have yet to meaningfully shift federal education policy from the 
liberal incorporationist ideology that motivated the first significant federal intervention in 
primary and secondary education policy back in 1965.  At the national level, both 
political parties continue to broadly articulate a liberal incorporationist understanding of 
the function of public education, as evidenced by overwhelmingly bipartisan support of 
the ESSA in 2015.   In his remarks at the bill signing, President Obama noted the 905
fundamental ideological continuity of the new bill with earlier federal efforts, stating, 
“The goals of No Child Left Behind, the predecessor of this law, were the right one: High 
Standards.  Accountability.  Closing the achievement gap.”   Invoking the spirit of 906
President Johnson, Obama proclaimed, “With this bill, we reaffirm that fundamental 
American ideal that every child, regardless of race, income, background, the zip code 
where they live, deserves the chance to make out of their lives what they will.”   907
 The final bill passed the House by a vote of 359-64 in the House, and 85-12 in the Senate.  In both 905
chambers, Democrats supported the bill unanimously.
 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at Every Student Succeeds Act Signing Ceremony,” 906
Whitehouse.gov, December 10, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/10/remarks-
president-every-student-succeeds-act-signing-ceremony.  President Obama went on to frame the ESSA as 
carrying on the spirit that animated the original ESEA, noting “this bill upholds the core value that 
animated the original Elementary and Secondary Education Act signed by President Lyndon Johnson -- the 
value that says education, the key to economic opportunity, is a civil right.”
 Ibid., emphasis added.907
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Obama’s remarks indicate the continued hegemony of the liberal incorporationist 
understanding of education’s purpose, limited to providing students with the tools to 
compete equally in the labor market.  
 Moving forward, a more just education system requires a fundamental 
reconceptualization of the purpose of education, and of the role of the federal 
government.   Education must be understood as something valuable beyond its ability to 
provide marketable skills for students.  Problems that are at their core issues of broader 
economic structure, such as unemployment, poverty, and racial disparity can no longer be 
laid at the doorstep of education.  Efforts to address the problems that have been blamed 
on education require expansive federal efforts to shift fundamentally unfair economic 
arrangements that are the real causes of unemployment, poverty, and racial disparity.  
Absent these fundamental shifts in ideology and political commitment, the cycle of 
blaming schools leading to ever more punitive reform measures will no doubt continue to 
dominate the education landscape in the United States. 
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Appendix I. 
Table 1: Political and Educational Program of Four Ideologies  
(Points in red represent the educational program of Liberal Incorporationism) 
Problem with 
US Democracy
Broad Political 
Program
Purpose of 
Education
Pedagogical 
Program
Economic 
Democracy
• Capitalist 
Economy 
• Economic 
inequality 
• Working class 
unorganized and 
exploited  
• Egalitarian 
Redistribution 
• Income Guarantee 
• Worker solidarity 
and unionization
• Expose students to 
community 
problems, and 
ways to help deal 
with them 
• Foster solidarity 
• Schools not central 
to solving 
fundamental 
problems 
• Education for 
workplace 
solidarity 
• community based 
education 
• integrated 
• citizenship 
focused 
• not particularly 
clear
Racial 
Democracy
• Racial exclusion 
from full 
citizenship rights 
• Lack of equality 
of opportunity  
• Arbitrary social 
destiny chances 
on basis of race 
• Racial 
incorporation to 
existing order 
• Equality of 
Opportunity 
• Civil Rights
• Provide equal 
footing for labor 
market competition 
• Sort on the basis of 
talent, intelligence, 
or merit 
• Foster interracial 
understanding 
• Incorporation of 
blacks into existing 
social structures
• Integration to 
address 
psychological 
harm 
• Intercultural/
Interracial 
education 
• Emphasis on 
ensuring equality 
of test results, 
facilities, and 
teacher quality 
between racial 
groups 
Scientific 
Efficiency 
Progressives
• Inefficiently 
organized 
• Individuals in 
positions they are 
either under- or 
over-qualified for
• Reform political 
institutions based 
on the most recent 
scientific 
techniques 
• Those with power 
should be the most 
intelligent 
• Efficient 
incorporation into 
existing order 
• Preparation of 
students to meet the 
needs of labor 
market  
• Sort students to 
employment most 
suitable base on 
inherited 
intelligence 
• Standardization 
of teaching 
methods 
• Tracking 
• Intelligence tests 
• Achievement tests 
• Standards set 
outside schools 
• Preparation for 
success with 
existing order
Social Re- 
constructionist
• Capitalist 
Economy 
• Exploitative 
economic 
arrangements 
• Teacher led 
reconstruction of 
social and 
economic order 
• Transition away 
from Capitalism
• School as the 
vanguard of social 
change/lead the 
way to societal 
reconstruction 
• Inculcate proper 
character needed 
for new order
• Community 
based and 
experimental 
• Anti-competitive 
• Communal rather 
than 
individualistic 
focus 
• Unique to 
teacher, 
community, and 
students
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